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At a time when there are critical debates about the role of Public Service television in the UK, this 
thesis will provide a timely, original and innovative new approach to the study of Current Affairs 
broadcasting. The research will critically examine the BBC Current Affairs broadcasting strand most 
closely associated with, even emblematic of public service broadcast ‘values’, Panorama (1953 – 
current). Panorama is of particular significance inasmuch as it is the established Current Affairs 
television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current Affairs 
broadcasts are measured: Panorama is perhaps the key signifier of serious journalism on television. 
Furthermore, the BBC’s public service remit is figuratively and discursively displayed by the 
Panorama ‘brand’. The BBC in general, and Panorama in particular, are framed by ideas of 
impartiality and balance, this research examines what these terms mean, and how are they manifest in 
the television journalism discourse and landscape. Alongside its position as a ‘flagship’ brand, an 
additional rationale for selecting Panorama as the sample lies in the fact that research into 
contemporary representations in high modality forms has largely been limited to analysis of News 
texts. Concomitantly, there is a paucity of research data regarding the ‘extended’ text that is Current 
Affairs broadcasting. This thesis addresses this ‘lack’. 
 
Analysis in Media Studies, Cultural Studies and Journalism have so far paid little attention to the 
techniques and methods appropriated and imported from other modes of representation. In this 
instance, attention will be paid to the representational modalities of drama – character, archetype, 
casting, narrative, non-diegetic score – to assess the extent to which these elements are evident (even 
central) in Current Affairs broadcasting, and to assess the role these modalities play in the discursive 
formation of Current Affairs in general and Panorama in particular.  
 
Employing a multi-modal approach, the thesis incorporates an extensive content analysis in order to 
chart patterns and regularities within a large sample of Panorama broadcasts pertaining to the Iraq 
War/Gulf War. The research assumes a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to investigate the ideas 
evoked both linguistically and visually throughout ten Panorama broadcasts. Taking a qualitative 
approach, the thesis develops specific analytical and discursive frames of analysis that systematically 
examine the recurring themes and scrutinises their discursive strategies and functions in the 
construction of meaning and ideology. The dominant thematic and discursive findings suggest that the 
Panorama broadcasts of 2002–2004 pertaining to Iraq all, to some extent, employ a combination of 
televisual, journalistic and dramatic characteristics that construct a vision and version of Western 
Power that has at its core, benign and benevolent intent(ions). What this thesis outlines as the 
‘doctrine of benign intervention’. 
 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that Current Affairs in general, and Panorama in particular, must 
either shift away from the overly and overtly dramatic and instead [re]turn to an approach that 
[re]locates issues and events in their wider social, historical, ideological and geo-political context. Or 
alternatively, if, as contemporary trends suggest, the latest iteration of television Current Affairs 
journalism increasingly does focus on the personal, utilising dramatic frames in order to tell stories, 
and if Panorama continues to remain within the genre, the form, and utilising the practices and 
discourses of journalism, with all its contemporary attendance to ‘the personal’ and ‘the dramatic’, 
then it will need to cast its net wider. In order to provide the necessary wider contextual detail, the 
Current Affairs journalistic form will need to feature a much wider and greater plurality of voices. 
Anything less means that, through its internalised and established practices, Panorama will continue 
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A note on terms and style. In the following research, when referring to the ‘genre’ of Current 
Affairs Broadcasting, I have chosen to define it using upper case lettering. This decision is 
based on the need for both stylistic consistency and generic precision. There are also a 
number of officially designated acronyms employed. These are alphabetically listed below: 
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation 
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis 
DA – Discourse Analysis 
PNAC – Project for the New American Century 
PSB – Public Service Broadcasting 
WPM – War Programming Model 
 
When using particular Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis terms, I have used 
the upper case to designate the terms as important analytical terms. Additionally, I have used 










The ten Panorama broadcasts referred to and analysed in this research have been shortened. 
These are listed chronologically using the following acronyms 
Pre-conflict Phase: 
P:SAWFH – Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History 
P:TCAS – Panorama: The Case Against Saddam 
P:TCAW – Panorama: The Case Against War 
P:CSW – Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
Conflict Phase: 
P:BW – Panorama: Blair’s War 
P:TRTB – Panorama: The Race to Baghdad 
P:TBFB – Panorama: The Battle for Basra 
Post-conflict Phase: 
P:TPOV – Panorama: The Price of Victory 
P:SOTR – Panorama: Saddam on the Run 

























































This thesis was first born many (too many) years ago, but emerged, took shape, was honed 
and was, in some ways, a reaction to (and against) what I perceived to be the inadequacies of 
firstly News and then in time, Current Affairs coverage of the (then impending) war 
in/against Iraq. Incredulous at the coverage, one sought refuge among other like-minded 
campaigners and activists, which culminated, for some, in the march against the war on 
February 15th, 2003 in London. I attended this demonstration and was, at the same time, 
engaged in research on a very different doctoral thesis in the Department of Theatre Studies 
at Lancaster University. The above is mentioned precisely because both events, attendance at 
the march and the early doctoral research, have contextual importance. The early research 
work was undertaken, albeit in a different context, and the remnants of the (unfinished) 
previous thesis remain here, not least, its focus on characterisation, diegetic and non-diegetic 
music, and the dramatic as the principle means through which ‘stories’ are communicated to 
an audience. It is this, the drama, the narratives, the characterisation, the deployment of 
dramatic archetypes where this research hopes to contribute to media and journalism 
scholarship regarding journalistic broadcasting in general, Current Affairs journalism in 
particular, and Panorama more explicitly. The research seeks to develop an innovative and 
original way of critically interrogating and assessing the extent to which the British flagship 
public service broadcast journalism strand Panorama, provides a developed and fully 
rounded picture of the world; ‘our’ place and role within it, and the extent to which 
Panorama functions (and offers) a critically reflective analysis of the urgent global issues of 
the day. Is Panorama, as befits its obligations, and as is often claimed, an interrogator, an 
effective communicator of salient and vital geo-political issues of the day, is it an effective 
check and balance on power? 
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While (if) still operating within the public service remit that is its obligation, is it the 
case that Panorama’s coverage of conflict, specifically in Iraq, is able to posit the notion that, 
‘Western intervention’ is, if not always welcome, then at least benign. To clarify, that the 
‘intervention’ is benign in intent, if not always in operation and practice. One can of course 
partially understand this belief, this framework, or at least a degree of journalistic trepidation 
and safety regarding the intent of political elites. After all, one (a journalist) would have to be 
in possession of incontrovertible evidence in order to publicly level the accusation of malign 
intent. Intent is, in all likelihood, rather more difficult to demonstrably sustain and prove. 
This of course is not a piece of historical research, nevertheless, while understanding the 
reticence of the Panorama journalists, it is not too onerous a task, nor is it too difficult with 
merely a cursory glance at historical precedents, to at least posit the notion that ‘Western 
intervention’ is not always benign. In fact, said cursory glance at historical record would 
indeed soon uncover a range of instances whereby ‘our’ intervention is anything but benign. 
Intent may be one thing, but the cumulative weight of ‘our’, sometimes bloody, history is 
quite another. However, Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq conflict, while offering some 
semblance of critical scrutiny, continuously seemed to assume that Western ‘intervention’ is, 
in intent, even if not in actuality, benign and motivated by high-minded principle(s). In the 
face of sometimes compelling alternative evidence, what can account for such assumptions, 
such oversight? It is not the intention here to rush head-long into something I myself cannot 
demonstrably prove, but what follows is a systemic critical and critical discourse analysis into 
10 of the Panorama broadcasts pertaining to the Iraq war of 2003. The analysis is undertaken 
in order to map out the frameworks, narratives, the discourses that underpin and that might 
orient audience understanding of urgent globally and locally resonant geo-political issues. 
What are the organisational, televisual, journalistic, ideological, and political practises and 
discourses that are embedded, how do they enable stories to be told, and, to what end? 
12 
 
Other than the key works Public Issue Television: World in Action 1963-1998 by 
Corner, Goddard and Richardson (2007), Patricia Holland’s The Angry Buzz: This Week and 
Current Affairs Television (2006) and Rob Stones Why Current Affairs Needs Social Theory 
(2015) research into contemporary representations in high modality forms has largely been 
limited to analysis of News texts. Concomitantly, there is a paucity of research data regarding 
the ‘extended’ text, sometimes referred to as ‘long-form’ journalism, that is Current Affairs 
broadcasting. Panorama is selected because it was, and remains, the flagship Current Affairs 
television broadcast. In many ways Panorama developed, and continues to develop, the very 
form of television Current Affairs. Beginning in 1953, as Richard Lindley discusses, 
Panorama effectively  
…invented television journalism in Britain … it was Panorama that first found 
effective ways of reporting and presenting what was happening in the world to a mass 
television audience. Panorama that first made television journalism important. 
Similar programmes – This Week, and World in Action – followed, thrived and died. 
Panorama survived, a potent symbol of public service broadcasting. (Lindley 2002: 
ix) 
 
Panorama is of particular significance inasmuch as it is the established Current Affairs 
television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current 
Affairs broadcasts are measured in the UK: Panorama is perhaps the key signifier of serious 
journalism on British television. Further, it is representative of the BBC’s output with regards 
serious journalistic discourse. This thesis will argue that the BBC’s public service remit is 
figuratively and discursively displayed by the Panorama ‘brand’. This study will offer an in-
depth analysis of Panorama as the exemplar of the BBC’s serious journalistic output, and as 
the exemplar of the form of Current Affairs broadcasting. Academic studies have so far paid 
little attention to the techniques and methods appropriated and imported from other modes of 
representation. In this instance, attention will be paid to the representational modalities of 
drama, and, importantly drawing on the historical structuralist canon of Propp, and the later 
Television Studies academics, the notion of the archetype as principle characterisational and 
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storytelling trope. Drama and the archetype are chosen principally because tropes such as 
character, casting, narrative and non-diegetic score are, perhaps despite expectations, 
frequently present within both News and in particular Current Affairs texts, therefore the 
ways in which such representational devices work is ripe for analysis. Secondly, dramatic 
forms of representation tend to interpellate (Althusser 1972) using emotive and emotional 
register, such as normally found in fiction(al) forms. This thesis will attempt to assess the 
extent to which these tropes are evident in Current Affairs broadcasting, and to assess the role 
these modalities play in the discursive formation of Current Affairs in general and Panorama 
in particular. The research will also attempt to discuss the extent to which such televisual and 
journalistic discourses effectively ‘frame’ news events and potentially subsequently shape our 
understanding of said events. 
Summary of Chapters 
The opening chapter, Chapter 1 functions as a ‘Contextual Chapter’ and concentrates 
on the importance of both the BBC, as preeminent and most established publicly funded, 
public service oriented broadcaster in the world; and Panorama which being the longest-
running Current Affairs journalism broadcasts in the world, is similarly preeminent. Both the 
BBC and Panorama are ‘flagships’ or standard bearers, they therefore establish journalistic 
and discursive parameters that others’ follow, in both a journalistic and televisual sense. 
Therefore, Panorama deserves critical scrutiny, and such scrutiny needs to be located in the 
context of it being a vital plank of Current Affairs broadcast journalism within a specific PSB 
context. This context is vital because the BBC and Panorama, at least in part, derive their 
value from being seen, with ‘due impartiality’, to provide the public with vital information 
regarding important, global and geo-political events. In other words, Panorama does not 
emerge from nowhere, it does not exist in a vacuum, but is instead inextricably located within 
this context, and, to some extent draws its legitimacy from its PSB oriented journalistic focus. 
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Current Affairs broadcasting is itself a peculiarly British construction, it exists (in this form at 
least) in no other country in the world and is situated as a separate area of documentary 
production, but one more beholden, and bearing resemblance to, traditional News 
broadcasting. It is this generic slippage between documentary reportage and news, these 
contextual features that remains both interesting and problematic in the broad overview and 
approach of this research.  
Chapter 2 functions as a traditional review of the literature. That is to say, the overall 
focus of this chapter is to assess and chart the overall scholarly academic literature relating to 
the fundamental research questions this thesis concerns itself with. The aim: to locate this 
research within this wider academic critical landscape, a landscape that has as its focus, 
similar themes, concerns and issues. Given the overall lack of critical academic work on 
Current Affairs broadcasting, this thesis first draws attention to this ‘oversight’ then, through 
careful and critical development, addresses this apparent ‘lack’ and begins to map out 
potential critical, discursive and journalistic possibilities. In order to assess and to map out 
the territory and concerns of this thesis, it is necessary to thread a line through the various 
complimentary concerns that characterise academic scholarship on News; television (the 
specificities of the form); Current Affairs (what it is); journalism (as a distinct discourse, and 
its over-reliance on sourcing via ‘Primary Definers’) (Hall 1978, 1980); ‘infotainment’, the 
public sphere (and its relation to Public Service Broadcasting (PSB)); the ‘War on Terror’ 
and what David Altheide and Jennifer Grimes refer to as ‘The War Programming Model’ 
(2005).   
My own major additional contributions are to address the lack of critical academic 
scholarship pertaining to the longer-form of Television Journalism (Current Affairs); to 
address the lack of critical academic scholarship that focuses on the flagship ‘brand’ 
Panorama; at a time when journalism in the Public Service broadcast tradition is facing 
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increasing scrutiny, it is vital that academic scholarship develops and makes the case that the 
(potential) values of PSB are recognised, improved upon and secured; and methodological, 
that a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis and the use of televisual and dramatic 
frames, techniques and tropes has an effect on both the form and the content. The use of 
drama, and the consistent deployment of universally recognised archetypes as a means of 
story-telling potentially orients understanding in quite distinct and narrow ways.  
It will be argued that in order to convincingly inform the audience and ‘tell the 
story(s)’ of Iraq, the Current Affairs broadcast journalism found in BBC Panorama make 
such extensive and specific use of dramatic forms, that the story of Iraq is refracted and 
narrated through recognisable archetypal and stereotypical characters as a series of narratives 
that renders the news ‘event(s)’ as emotionally resonant story-lines that demonise officially 
designated enemies, while simultaneously humanising ‘our’ central protagonists. All of the 
above form a critical frame through which this research develops its own theoretical approach 
and analytical model. 
The focus of Chapter 3 is both theoretical and methodological. Drawing on 
established qualitative textual methods (Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis; The War 
Programming Model; the focus on the dramatic aspects of broadcast Current Affairs) this 
chapter sets out the analytical, theoretical and methodological frames that provide a new 
systemic form for the analysis of Television Current Affairs broadcasting as it is currently 
instituted on British public service broadcast channels. This chapter will also develop and 
outline specific key terms, namely: ‘Primary Definers’; hegemony; and archetypes, as they 
relate to my research. This chapter also outlines and discusses the ways in which my 
particular research, the frames and discursive terms were operationalised. While the 
analytical and discursive focus remains specifically trained on the BBC (and Panorama in 
particular), and conflict coverage, the developed methodology and methodological frames 
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will provide an original analytical approach capable of being applied across a range of Public 
Service-oriented Current Affairs broadcasts (not merely Panorama), and, importantly, across 
a range of subject matters (not merely Conflict programming). 
The following three chapters are the analytical chapters. Beginning with Chapter 4, 
using the methodology identified and honed in the methodology and theoretical framework 
chapter, locating the broadcasts in the context of the BBC as the emblematic and 
paradigmatic example of PSB and the changes brought about by ‘Birtism’; relating to the 
specificities of Television (its visuality, its need and demand for ‘infotainment’) and of 
journalism more broadly (its discourse, its reliance on specific operational and sourcing 
practises) the research seeks to analyse the selected Panorama broadcasts within the above 
context(s). Additionally, the ‘War Programming Model’ (WPM) of Altheide and Grimes 
(2005) provides a specific analytical, discursive and temporal frame – pre-conflict; conflict; 
post-conflict – into which each broadcast can be located and critically interrogated. However, 
whereas the WPM of Altheide and Grimes concentrates its focus on News, this research pays 
close attention to the more developed long form or ‘extended reportage’ (Corner 1996) 
journalism of Current Affairs Broadcasting.  
Chapter 4 focuses on four of the Panorama episodes broadcast prior to the ‘outbreak’ 
of the conflict in Iraq (Gulf War II), in Altheide and Grimes terminology, the ‘pre-conflict 
phase’ (2005) to assess the extent to which the WPM is applicable, and where it is not. 
Further, and in addition to the WPM, this research assesses and critically interrogates the use 
of the dramatic televisual codes and conventions that Panorama employs in order to tell the 
story(s). 
Chapter 5, following the discursive and temporal logic, analyses a further three 
episodes broadcast as the conflict was underway (the conflict phase). The tone of the 
coverage shifts in these broadcasts. In place of any wider, contextual and geo-political 
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analysis or critique, the focus moves on to concentrating on ‘getting the job done’ rather than 
critically interrogating precisely what the ‘job’ is, and the rights and wrongs of it in the first 
instance. The dramatic focus in these episodes is certainly obvious and the focus shifts to 
moments of ‘action’, much of it told through the ‘soldiers eyes’, it is their conflict, and we are 
asked to bear witness to it through the dramatic signifiers of action and the representational 
storytelling strategies of character(isation) (typically reliant on the figure(s) of the 
archetype(s)). Additionally, and as outlined by the WPM, some of the action is substantiated 
and ‘explained’ by the use of ‘expert’ commentators. The ‘expertise frame’ provided by the 
(usually military) commentators and, through repetition and familiarity, the archetypal 
characterisation role they play is also significant in the context of this research.   
Chapter 6 analyses a final three episodes broadcast once the conflict had ‘officially’ 
ceased – the ‘post-conflict phase’. The discursive and journalistic focus or angle in these final 
three episodes is demonstrably marked by a tendency to tie up loose ends. We return to many 
of the key sources, the ‘Primary Definers’ we first encountered in the pre-conflict phase of 
Chapter 4. As befits their (still established) status as key sources of information, and as 
proposed by the WPM, the(se) sources are asked to reflect on what went wrong, and to 
(pro)pose possible solutions for future engagements and conflicts. At no point is the self-
critical focus turned on the television journalism practices of Panorama itself. There is a 
decisive discursive and journalistic shift in favour of denouement. There are certainly a 
number of dramatic signifiers and frames employed in order to tell us the story of post-
conflict Iraq, and a sense of the media caravan beginning to pack up and move on (to the next 
conflict) having, as my development of the WPM implies, learned nothing (or very little). 
Finally, the research concludes by drawing together the key findings of the thesis, 
making the case that the methodology developed over the course of the research can help us 
understand both the issues and problems faced by television broadcast Current Affairs strands 
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(particularly Panorama) and proposing possible alternative approaches to both its 
construction and its (likely) reception.  
This thesis will provide an original and innovative new approach to the study of 
Current Affairs broadcasting. The thesis proposes that: relying on (and emphatically 
endorsing) standardised forms of journalistic sourcing, employing similarly standardised 
television aesthetics, using both journalistic sources and television tropes, when combined 
together as the principle means of dramatic story-telling, Panorama in particular, and 
consequently, Current Affairs television more generally, reproduces a discourse largely 
incapable of critiquing or countering western hegemony. Taking the above into account, the 
research will ask questions as to how ‘we’ might analyse, think about, talk about, and even 
produce, Public Service Current Affairs broadcasting more generally, in the (changing) 






The BBC, Panorama and the genre of Current Affairs 
 
This, the opening chapter outlines and seeks to provide context for the research as a whole. 
The overview is principally necessary in order to locate this research and the Panorama 
sample in the context of British Public Service Broacasting (PSB), what it is, what it means 
and why the BBC remains perhaps the most important ‘practitioner’ and signifier of public 
service journalism. The research will outline a theoretical and critical model of analysis in 
order to provide a new model of understanding the ways in which Current Affairs 
broadcasting might be said to discursively and ideologically serve the needs and demands of 
pro-Western, neoliberal elites. Given this fact, it is important that the opening chapter 
provides a rigorous contextual frame that locates and positions the actual sample contained in 
the research. Said sample is drawn from a very specific and, in some ways unique producer of 
‘journalistic content’. As such, the industrial, national, social-economic and journalistic 
site(s) of its production and distribution, its continuing relevance, its ability to disseminate 
widely and with legitimacy, needs to be adequately outlined and contextualised in sufficient 
detail. Additionally, it is hoped that the theoretical and analytical model that is developed will 
be applicable across a range of Current Affairs broadcast strands, particularly those produced 
and broadcast on channels with a PSB remit, and not merely Panorama. Moreover, although 
the issues identified are perhaps most pronounced when dealing with war and conflict 
‘events’, it is proposed that the creation of the theoretical and analytical model will provide a 
useful framework that is applicable when scrutinising news events and issues beyond war and 
conflict.  
1.1 The Historical Emergence of the BBC 
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Historically, the BBC was first established by six different wireless radio manufacturers – 
Marconi; Radio Communication Company; Metropolitan-Vickers (MetroVick); General 
Electric; Western Electric; and British Thomson-Houston (BTH). Under the supervision of, 
and granted licence to broadcast by, The General Post Office (GPO), the BBC was in some 
ways, established on the basis of supervening social necessity. In short, a supervening social 
necessity is essentially a break or fracture, something beyond or outside the confines of the 
industry, some wider social factor(s) that creates a ‘necessity’ for technological developments 
to be oriented in particular directions. Something, or usually several related things, must be 
present in the wider social sphere in order for the technology to go from the prototype stage 
to the invention and diffusion stages. With regards the establishment of the BBC, the key 
supervening social necessities were the First World War and its aftermath. Prior to, then 
during the First World War (WWI) specific technological and infrastructural developments 
and advancements in radio wireless technology aided the war effort. At the conclusion of 
WW1 there was less need for products developed in war time, thus producing an abundance 
of spare capacity, an over-supply of technological equipment produced by the electronics 
industry with no apparent obvious use to which they could be put or adapted. Additionally, 
other social factors and developments were the emergence of a working and middle class 
(now with parliamentary representation in the form of The Labour Party) producing an 
aspirant class with a concomitant rise of and increased demand for (home) entertainment. 
Thus, mass broadcasting, mainly for entertainment purposes, was established and rolled out, 
slowly of course, but rolled out all the same. This of course suits the nascent ‘electronics 
industry’ perfectly. It allows an entry into a market, or perhaps more accurately, the creation 
of a market where none previously existed. The invention phase of broadcasting is 
synchronous with the supervening social necessities. It is the spare capacity of the electronics 
industry that drives the innovation, researchers and inventors working in the electronics 
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sector (then, industry) trying to develop commercially viable and attractive technologies. 
Historically, and merely as a means of providing a (slightly) more up to date example, much 
the same can be said of the mass marketing of, for instance, the video cassette recorder 
(VCR). Contemporarily, we might see this mirrored by the invention phase for new digital 
technology and convergence processes. What I mean by this is: as opposed to the industry 
responding to consumer demand, inventions are consistently and continuously developed by 
the industry, firstly for use within the field for which they are originally deployed (a micro-
economic sphere or context) and then marketed for a mass consumer audience in order that 
the products that can generate income (a macro-economic sphere or context). Added to this, 
the emergence and now dominance of advertising, in which desire for new products is 
constantly manufactured, and prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, the 
emergence and reliance on ‘easy credit’, the proliferation of what has been dubbed a 
‘consumer culture’ are now well-established parts of everyday lived experiences in Western 
socio-cultural and economic life.  
 At this point, it should be added that the above points are elucidated merely as a 
means of providing some context regarding the supervening social necessities that some 
analyses of the BBC might overlook. Although only brief and in-exhaustive here, such details 
remain important in this instance, as they provide some important contextual detail outlining 
that the BBC was partly compromised from the outset. It was caught between the competing 
demands of manufacturers, the needs of a previously non-existent but then emerging 
audience and all bound-up with notions of the public value or use of journalism.  
1.2 The BBC and ‘Impartiality’ 
With these competing demands in place, the BBC, once transformed into the corporation in 
1928, did though attempt to establish a form of journalism not beholden to industry (broadly 
defined) or government, to produce a form of broadcasting that acknowledged the public 
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value of journalism. In the words of founder and first Director General of the BBC, John 
Reith, the BBC was established as a means to: 
Carry direct information to innumerable people who thereby will be enabled not only 
to take more interest in events which were formerly outside their ken, but who will 
after a short time be in a position to make up their own minds on many matters of 
vital moment, matters which formerly they had either to receive according to the 
dictated and partial versions and opinions of others, or to ignore altogether. (Scannell 
and Cardiff 1991: xvii)  
 
The corporation was designed and established as an outlet to provide information, and, what 
is more, information that was free from ‘the dictated and partial versions and opinions of 
others’. Additionally, if, over time, the practice of journalism became a perfect distillation of 
what Donald Matheson and (slightly differently) Michael Schudson have referred to as a 
‘news voice’ and news (as) discourse, one not in need of authority of legitimisation ‘outside 
of itself’ (Matheson 2000), then in part because of its unique (public) resourcing, thus placing 
on it specific public (service) obligations, we might therefore identify the BBC itself as the 
exemplar of a form of journalism, that was, in the words of its first Director General, both 
distanced from and separate to ‘commerce [n]or the state’. Namely: a form of journalism 
formally practised as ‘objective journalism’. In BBC parlance, this manifests as ‘impartiality’ 
or ‘impartial’ journalism and has remained the bedrock on which the BBC maintains its 
journalistic reputation. So the BBC, as the inventor of mass broadcasting in the UK, 
effectively set(s) the template for the broadcast and broadcast journalism industry.  
However, despite this now accepted association the BBC has with the term ‘impartiality’, it 
was not in its original remit:  
The strange thing is that the BBC was never officially told to be impartial. People 
often assume it was there on its birth certificate – the first Wireless Broadcasting 
Licence of 1923. It was not … nor was impartiality mentioned in the first Royal 
Charter of 1926, by which time the new Corporation was allowed to ‘collect news of 
and information relating to current events in any part of the world and in any manner 
that may be thought fit’. (From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding Impartiality in 
the 21
st






The perceived objectivity, or, ‘impartiality’, even if use of the term was unspoken in its 
formative years, did however function as an important guiding principle. The establishment 
of the BBC was founded on the principles that it would function as ‘an institutional space for 
broadcasting that was tied neither to commerce nor to the state’ (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 
31) or, to repeat, what we might understand as a(n) (impartial) public service broadcaster.  
 Once ITV had been granted a licence, and began to broadcast in 1955, and the 
legalised framework of impartiality had been enacted, the term and the practice became 
established. Over the course of the following decades, because the term was (and remains) so 
important for both the BBC’s self-image, and the image it projects to outsiders, numerous 
attempts were made to outline its precise meaning in the context of broadcast journalism. In 
fact, as late as 2007, the BBC commissioned the report: From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: 
Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21
st
 Century. 2007. Wanting and needing to both engage 
with and generate (or continue) support for its journalistic output, the commissioning and 
distribution of reports for public consultation and consumption, are in many ways of course 
laudable endeavours. However, such documents and consultations also serve other equally 
interesting functions. They essentially underpin the idea that it is possible to conduct 
journalism objectively, impartially and that in so doing, ‘we’ the public, can trust what we 
see, read and/or hear. With regards the BBC, cementing the idea of ‘impartiality’ also 
establishes a template or set of practises that the rest of the industry might be encouraged to 
aspire to and follow. 
 Even though the requirement for ‘impartiality’ is now legally defined, or at least 
defined in the terms of its licence, for those at the BBC, beyond the institutional and legal 
obligations, it still remains (and retains) something of a badge of honour, mark of quality, and 
essential for its reputation: ‘It (impartiality) is practised day in, day out, by BBC journalists, 
who have an impartiality gene implanted in their earliest days at the Corporation’ (BBC 
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2007: 23). While resisting the attempt to be too dismissive of the claim ‘journalists…have an 
impartiality gene implanted in their earliest days at the Corporation’ the phrase, used in 
public documentation as late as 2007, does demand some scrutiny and critical interrogation as 
to what it might mean exactly. We can see from BBC discussions and official documentation 
that the term itself is vital and frequently referenced, the term remains vitally important 
reputationally. How though might the ‘impartiality gene’ work in practise, and what is the 
evidence for it?  
 Despite impartiality not ‘being imposed on the BBC’ ‘Impartiality has been 
conceived by the BBC’, the term does act as a ‘foundation of its reputation around the world’ 
(From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21
st
 Century 2007). How is 
the journalistic, televisual, this most linguistic and semiotic practise, guaranteed to remain 
‘impartial’? How can the claim for an ‘impartiality gene’ possibly stand up to scrutiny? What 
exactly does the BBC mean by ‘impartiality’? Importantly, how does this measure up in the 
face of the evidence collected and analysed in this (and much other) research?  
 With regards the BBC of course, the idea[l]s of ‘impartiality’ go beyond the mere 
practices of news and journalism, and are distributed via all forms of BBC ‘content’. 
Furthermore, said content over time has accumulated a status that might be perceived as 
constitutive of ‘British values’ or British life: ‘the routine character of a country’s politics, 
entertainment and culture is embodied in the daily output of its broadcasting services’ 
(Scannell and Cardiff 1991: xi). Therefore, the BBC, because of the cultural and national 
characteristics it is assumed to uphold (and simultaneously reproduce) through its daily 
practices (broadcasts), demands a level of scrutiny precisely because as an institution, and as 
a set of practices, its content, represented in this instance by its News and Current Affairs 
journalism, sets a benchmark against which the other exponents of broadcasting in general, 
and broadcast journalism specifically, are measured and are encouraged to aspire to. If, as 
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Scannell and Cardiff identify, the content of the BBC acts as both reflector and constitutor of 
‘British values’, therefore the journalism (the high modality form, that which is most 
associated with truth and accuracy) of the BBC is in some respects the way the nation is 
accurately imagined, represented and reflected. 
 …broadcasting technologies play(ed) a fundamental role in promoting national unity 
at a symbolic level, linking individuals and their families to the centres of national 
life, offering the audience an image of itself and of the nation as a knowable 
community, a wider, public world beyond the routines of narrow existence, to which 
these (television) technologies give symbolic access. (Morley and Robins. 1995. 66) 
 
Hartley has argued that ‘television is one of the prime sites upon which a given nation is 
constructed for its members’ (Hartley, J 1982. 124). Additionally, as Ellis states, television is 
‘the private life of the nation state’ (Ellis, J 1982. 5). National(ly) broadcast Television then 
can (help) ‘imagine’ the nation into existence: 
These technologies allowed people a space of identification; not just an evocation of a 
common memory, but rather the experience of encounter and of solidarity. Thus, the 
nation is to be understood not simply as an abstraction, but as lived experience made 
possible by broadcasting technologies whose achievement was the transmutation of 
the political idea of the nation into lived experience, into sentiment and into the 
quotidian (Morley and Robins. 1995. 67) 
 
All of the above is of course particularly the case with the BBC. National Television then, 
particularly on the BBC plays an important role not only in (re)producing the nation state and 
national identity, but appearing to embed and conflate sometimes radically disparate lives 
into a coherent national whole. Given all of the above, is television journalism on the BBC 
able to act and report with ‘due impartiality’ when, for instance, ‘the state’ engages in 
potentially harmful activities, such as military conflict overseas? Given its (national 
television’s) role in reproducing the nation state, and national identity, how (if) can 
Television broadcasting possibly provide the requisite journalistic space and licence in and 
with which to critically interrogate normative assumptions about the nation?  
1.3 The Discursive Limitations of ‘Impartiality’  
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Clear definitions as to what the term(s) mean in principle and in practise can be found, as one 
might expect, within the charter of the BBC itself. Section 4 deals explicitly with notions of 
‘impartiality’. In the words of its own charter, in the section on ‘impartiality’ the document 
states that the BBC:  
4.2.1 …must do all we can to ensure that 'controversial subjects' are treated with due 
impartiality in all our output. 4.2.2 News in whatever form must be treated with due 
impartiality, giving due weight to events, opinion and main strands of argument. 4.2.3 
We seek to provide a broad range of subject matter and perspectives over an 
appropriate timeframe across our output as a whole. 4.2.4 We are committed to 
reflecting a wide range of opinion across our output as a whole and over an 
appropriate timeframe so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly 




As the charter outlines, when it comes to ‘impartiality’ the BBC seeks to represent, be 
representative of, and ‘reflect a wide range of opinion across our output’ Point 4.2.1 does not 
adequately address what might constitute ‘impartiality’ merely that the term itself, as an 
idea(l), be adhered to with regards even ‘controversial subjects’.  What might be meant by 
‘controversial subjects’? Would the Iraq war qualify as such? One imagines so. How then, 
under the rubric of the ‘impartiality’ guidelines, is the ‘controversial subject’ of the Iraq war 
journalistically, ‘impartially’ and discursively constituted by Panorama? What does it mean 
in practice? What or who would define and limit ‘controversial’? How defined, and by who, 
using what parameters? 
 Point 4.2.2 appears to lack the necessary detail as to what might constitute 
impartiality save for the mention of ‘main strands of argument’. What are ‘main strands of 
argument’ and, crucially, which sources are legitimate sources for ‘strands’ or indeed entire 
arguments, frames or positions? This is of course one of the most crucial points, what would 
constitute a ‘main strand of argument’? The discursive capacity to decide, through selection 
and amplification, what and which ‘arguments’ (and by who) constitute a ‘main strand’ is, 
what we might consider, a well-established, officially sanctioned journalistic method of 
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circumscribing debate, or the very definition of a discursive formation. In this tradition and 
with this understanding, a detailed analysis of overall BBC news content, combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering and research undertaken by researchers 
at Cardiff University in 2013: The Prebble Report, details that ‘main strands of argument’ are 
typically derived from and represented by already established political organisations (Political 
Parties and their representatives) and associated (read, journalistically legitimised) parties or 
organisations, such as Think Tanks. 
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/our_work/breadth_opinion/content_anal
ysis.pdf). 
 Point 4.2.3 ‘We seek to provide a broad range of subject matter and perspectives 
over an appropriate timeframe across our output as a whole’ makes an important point with 
regards temporality, timeframe(s), chronology and seemingly covers ‘output’ beyond the 
confines of this research sample. Given that this research sample covers Panorama’s ‘output’ 
over a period of some nineteen months, we can make reasonable assessments and 
comparisons, and thus draw certain rigorous conclusions as to the applicability of the 
impartiality model when applied to Panorama. However, ‘Output as a whole’ will of course 
necessarily include much data not captured by this research. Nevertheless, given that a) this 
research is not claiming nor necessarily making the case that the BBC as a whole tends 
towards reproducing hegemonic positions, but is instead wholly focused on Panorama itself, 
the broader point(s) remain; b) as has been stated, Panorama remains the benchmark against 
which the BBC, and wider industry is measured, it is the high modality form, the Current 
Affairs broadcast strand of record, as such, it stands as an emblem to be critically 
interrogated. 
 Point 4.2.4; ‘no significant strand of thought is knowingly un-reflected or under-
represented’ could again be easily quantified and constrained, still within the ‘impartiality’ 
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remit, through the now standardised practises of legitimate sourcing and source relations 
which inevitably produce, establish then reproduce a frame. Or, in the discursive register, a 
‘discursive hierarchy’ of sources, ‘those with most to say’ (Van Dijk). Establishing what 
constitutes a ‘significant strand’ is seemingly wide-open to, if not abuse, as that specific term 
is too loaded and assuming of deliberate malfeasance, then at least subject to debate. 
Remaining within the remit of journalistic practise, sourcing from ‘those with most to say’, 
the does seem to function as a device for delimiting. It is a form of journalistic legitimation, 
and broadly in line with an adherence to the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978). So the term 
itself, seemingly vital for broadcast journalism in general, and the BBC in particular, seems 
to be so loosely drawn that one (a journalist) could conceivably ‘define’ and ‘limit’ the frame 
of debate while still remaining perfectly ‘in-line’ with BBC guidelines on impartiality.  
 Whilst the term ‘impartiality’ is, under scrutiny, rather loosely defined, the role the 
BBC sees itself playing, and, what constitutes politics, and political activity is an altogether 
more tightly defined discourse or epistemology. What I mean by this is that in order to 
legitimate the term, the BBC has tended to construe impartiality in very specific (but narrow) 
ways. So that we can more fully understand this, discussions around BBC impartiality need to 
be contextualised and located within the BBC’s sense of ‘self-image’ and the role it sees 
itself playing in ‘civil society’ and the Public Sphere. Perhaps most importantly, if and how 
notions of the ‘public good’, ‘public service’ and, concomitantly ‘main strands of argument’ 
are constrained and contained within certain limits. 
1.4 Public Service Broadcasting 
News journalism, through the developing discursive formation of ‘objective’ journalism, 
asserts for itself the dominant framework through which ‘we’ understand the political, public 
and social world. Terms such as ‘impartial’, ‘objective’ and ‘public service broadcasting’ 
feature prominently in discussions of News and Current Affairs on television. Given the 
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emergence of the BBC and its founding principles outlined by John Reith, Public Service 
Broadcasting (PSB) can certainly be analysed and broadly located within the bounds of what 
media and social theorists would term, the ‘public sphere’.  
Over time a set of principles for public service broadcasting was established: 
universality of coverage; diversity in programming; reflection of national identity and 
culture; the servicing of minority interests; the provision of an impartial news and 
current affairs service free from the influence of business of government; and the 
delivery of innovative, ‘quality’ programming designed to inform, educate and 
entertain. (Debrett 2010: 19) 
 
Maintaining a distance from influence and conflicts of interest, government or commercial 
imperatives, ensured that BBC television journalism, from a very early stage, had to adopt 
specific principles based on public service idea(l)s. Within the News and Current Affairs 
departments this distance could be most readily assured by the adoption, and crafting, of the 
principles and practices of ‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ journalism. In this respect, television 
plays(ed) a crucial role: 
A crucial player in the struggle over legitimacy is television. This is because 
television is a form of public sphere, which presents and debates current affairs, 
providing media publics with the opportunity to make judgements and deliberate over 
issues of common interest. (Barnett 2003 in Chouliaraki 2005: 144) 
 
As already discussed (above), ‘Closely related to, but distinct from, the concept of objectivity 
is that of “impartiality”, a notion of particular importance to any discussion of British 
broadcasting journalism’ (McNair 2009: 36), the notion of ‘impartiality’ is, in some ways, the 
television equivalent of journalistic ‘objectivity’. Alongside these ideas, and enshrined within 
the BBC charter come assurances of ‘quality’. ‘Quality was also applied to News and Current 
Affairs through the principle of impartiality, and the seriousness with which the BBC 
maintained a stance of editorial “neutrality”’ (Debrett 2010: 35). In this context, the BBC 
emerges as the exemplar of PSB founded very specifically to ‘inform, educate and entertain’.  
Under the terms of the Agreement (BBC Royal Charter) in force at the time of the 
Iraq invasion, the corporation was required to offer ‘comprehensive, authoritative and 
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impartial coverage of news and current affairs in the United Kingdom and throughout 
the world to support fair and informed debate at local, regional and national levels’. 
(Department of National Heritage 1996: 6 in Robinson et al. 2010: 65) 
 
 Such principles and practices are put in place of course to ensure that the BBC continues to 
uphold the values of democracy, debate and civic responsibility, and all made possible by an 
adherence to notions of ‘quality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’.   
An integral aspect of the civic role associated with the public sphere is the provision 
of an impartial, non-commercial, national news and current affairs service – 
independent from the influence of private vested interests. (Debrett 2010: 16)  
 
The establishment of the BBC as the publicly funded embodiment of objectivity and 
impartiality, and the ways in which this can be located and analysed forms an important 
theoretical template of this thesis. For if ‘television news is still perceived to be the most 
important of all journalistic media, not least because of its reputation as an “impartial” source 
of information’ (McNair 2009: 43) then the journalistic limits enshrined within the discursive 
practices of ‘impartiality’ and of television broadcast News and Current Affairs need to be 
scrutinised and interrogated. Panorama, by adhering to the model of journalistic practice, 
public sphere and public service values, ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity’, and, because it was 
the first of its kind, and remains something of a paradigm, acts as standard bearer for BBC 
‘quality’ and public service journalism in particular, and for television journalism more 
generally.  
1.5 Discursive and Journalistic Constituting of ‘Politics’ and ‘The Political’ 
Given that ‘the BBC was never officially told to be impartial’ this hardening adherence to 
‘impartiality’ was within the confines of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), in some ways, a 
response to the fracturing of the political post-war social and political order that emerged 
after the ‘oil shock’ of 1973, and the collapse of Bretton-Woods. What is more, in the 
specific context of the UK, in 1976 the then Labour Government were forced to agree to a 
loan from the IMF. Such a deeply problematic move effectively dealt a (further) death knell 
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to the post-war social-democratic consensus. A detailed examination regarding the extent to 
which these events (and others) had an impact on the social-democratic consensus is beyond 
the remit of this research, nevertheless, this fracture does locate the BBC and its decisions 
regarding News and Current Affairs in historical, social, political and economic context. It is 
surely inarguably the case that such ‘shocks’ and fractures to the wider social, economic, 
political and cultural global system (or order) would necessitate a degree of self-examination 
across large sectors of society, and institutions such as the BBC. In fact, one could argue that 
precisely because the BBC is organised and oriented around a notion of ‘the public’ (as 
opposed to ‘the private’), an organisation, as was the dominant trend of the era, that had 
something of the ‘social democratic’ tradition about it, it would need to examine and 
interrogate itself more urgently than other private(ised) institutions. Additionally, and related 
to this changing political and ideological landscape in which, over time, ‘the market’ 
becomes the chief means of organising and managing society, the only means or form of 
legitimate social and political organisation, the very bedrock of democracy (sic), the 
‘legitimate’ sources, their ‘main strands of argument’, their ‘significant strands of thought’ 
are increasingly derived from this dominant ideological position. In short, once ‘the market’ 
dominates society, begins to dominate even parliamentary politics, then as the 
aforementioned ‘Prebble Report’ detailed, the sources, too, with their ‘main strands of 
argument’ are similarly predisposed and ‘market’ orientated. This is, in fact, how hegemony 
operates (Gramsci 2005). 
 To return to the BBC more explicitly. It is in this context (post Bretton-Woods) that 
the BBC did, during the time, engage in a series of inter-BBC discussions around what 
constitutes News and Current Affairs. What emerges from the various discussions and papers 
is instructive. The papers and discussions provide some clues as to how the BBC develops 
then cements a particular version of impartiality in News and Current Affairs. In particular, 
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some attention needs to be paid to what the BBC defines as ‘professionalism’ and the ways in 
which said ‘professionalism’ is seemingly bound within parliamentary discursive limits. As 
Tom Mills has outlined, the ways in which the BBC understood (and still understands) 
political impartiality is very closely tied to institutions of the British state. The section from 
Mills is worth quoting at length: 
It was in its appeals to parliamentary democracy that the political nature of 
journalistic professionalism, as understood by the BBC, became most explicit. The 
BBC’s 1975 discussion paper, ‘How Should We Broadcast News and Current 
Affairs?’ was typical when it stated: ‘of course the BBC totally accepts the need to 
support and maintain Parliamentary democracy.’ Another document stated that ‘the 
parliamentary democracy evolved in this country is a work of national genius to be 
upheld and preserved,’ linking it to the BBC’s ‘primary constitutional role’ as ‘a 
supplier of news and true information’. The link between parliamentary democracy 
and broadcasting professionalism was made most explicit in, ‘The Broadcasting of 
News in the United Kingdom’: ‘BBC journalists still aim to uphold the same qualities 
of honesty, accuracy, responsibility and independence [that they did during the 
Second World War]. They are the qualities at which journalists in Parliamentary 
democracies have been taught to aim, for the public good and sometimes at 
considerable cost to themselves for generation after generation. Such responsible 
journalism rests on the belief that society will, through the institutions of Parliament, 
cure itself of ills which are brought to its attention…’ (Mills 2015: 47. Unpublished. 
My emphasis). 
 
As we can see, such limited notions as to what would (and does) actually constitute ‘politics’ 
or ‘the political’ is, journalistically and discursively, narrowly defined. Explicitly political 
News and Current Affairs, what might actually constitute them, are here so closely allied with 
the state and parliamentary democracy that to be outside those limits is to effectively be 
placed outside or beyond politics or (legitimate) political expression itself. What remains 
most important here is that, given this narrow limit or remit, in such circumstances, any 
semblance of radical politics, extra-parliamentary activism, critical anti-capitalist, wider 
social formations, or (most importantly in the case of this research into Panorama’s coverage 
of the Iraq war) anti-war protests, and more specifically, ‘Peace movements’ are not 
considered or defined as ‘politics’ or legitimately ‘political’. So then, in Current Affairs 
broadcasting, in which Panorama is emblematic, any organisational forms that do not fit in or 
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flow from this rather rigid vision and version of what actually constitutes ‘politics’ in the 
United Kingdom, would not be covered by the BBC. Or rather, such forms, actions, 
groupings and activities are simply not included as forms of overtly political expression. 
They might, at times, feature in BBC broadcasts (in one-off documentaries for instance), but 
routinely not as a part of the Current Affairs ‘political’ landscape. The 2003 Iraq War was 
explicitly framed as ‘political’, the dominant sources were drawn from the discursively 
narrow political landscape, the frame, was a political one. As a consequence, the remit of the 
BBC’s political coverage, and self-fulfillingly, the view the BBC has of itself and of ‘politics’ 
means that in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, such marginal(ised) (sic) issues, themes, 
groupings, activities and social-political or ideological formations can, and were, 
journalistically, ‘legitimately’ excluded. Even while doing so, the BBC can simultaneously 
remain within the terms of ‘impartiality’ defined by their own documentation and further 
endorsed by their (continuing) licence to broadcast. Hence, ‘main strands of argument’ can 
be, and were in this case, defined too narrowly. In fact, one could go further still. It was 
certainly my experience that there was a very significant and large proportion of the 
population that were wholly against any military engagement or conflict in/with Iraq. While 
of course acknowledging that one’s own experience(s) are merely anecdotal, and further, that 
one’s own experiences are of course, in part, defined by one’s own social and political 
environment and social circle, it does remain the case that sometimes quite overt criticism 
and scepticism was vociferous. Given this, it is even more remarkable that the dominant 
themes and ‘strands of argument’ remained (broadly, though with a little scepticism) so 
rigidly ‘pro-Western’ or at least unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of more malign or 
ideologically motivated intent on ‘our’ part. In television journalism terms, my own 
experiences were not reflected back, they were almost wholly unrepresented, absent or when 
(notionally) present, diminished and side-lined and not considered a ‘significant strand of 
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thought’. ‘Significant strand(s) of thought’ are, and were in this case, similarly discursively 
framed and defined by the narrow journalistic parameters the BBC continually and 
consistently erects regarding politics or the political. ‘Impartiality’ here functions, perhaps 
unwittingly, as a form of ideological, political and discursive policing.  
 In such circumstances, it is then imagined that legitimate political subjectivity, 
‘significant strands of thought’ are not only associated with and safely contained within the 
limits of parliamentary democracy, but in fact can only be represented parliamentarily, with 
the BBC as the natural (and ‘neutral’ (sic)) conduit, all encompassed by notions of the 
‘professionalism’ of the BBC journalists which now begins to act, not only as the badge of 
honour, but as a set of learned and internalised practises. These now professionalised 
practises of sourcing, of what constitutes politics, on whom is granted legitimacy and space, 
granted a ‘legitimate’ voice, and, important for this research, through the televisual, multi-
modal forms of expression (the genre of Current Affairs represented here by Panorama) can 
be said to shape political discourse.  
1.6 Current Affairs: An inexact Generic Category 
One of the issues that arises when discussing broadcasting and analysis of this (particular) 
genre, is the solidity or concreteness (or not) of the term Current Affairs itself. In fact, when 
first approaching this thesis, I looked for a solid and rigorous definition of the term, of the 
genre. Even while consulting Glen Creeber’s invaluable ‘The Television Genre Book’ in 
amongst the many different generic categories, Current Affairs remained stubbornly absent. It 
did not appear in the ‘News’ section, nor was it present in the ‘Documentary’ chapter, and, 
even though as this thesis will argue, it has many of the hallmarks, Current Affairs was absent 
from the extensive chapter on ‘Television Drama’. This research will attempt to address this 
problem of generic categorisation.  
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 As it is currently (and historically) imagined, the specific format: a mixture of News 
frames, current events, and documentary style is a strangely and uniquely British invention. 
As Corner and Hill outline: 
Current Affairs has been an important category of work in British Television for 
many years, drawing on the production values and skills of both news programming, 
with which it has often been institutionally paired, and a range of forms of 
documentary. As a generic designator, essentially indication a category of long-form 
journalism, it has a certain relaxed vagueness which some have found amusing and 
distinctively British. (Corner and Hill. 2008: 34) 
 
As Corner and Hill outline, while ‘Current affairs has been an important category of work in 
British television for many years’ it still remains something of an inexact and slippery genre. 
It ought to be added, too, while acknowledging that it is ‘an important category’, as a distinct 
genre, it has remained largely unexamined in academic scholarly research. 
 On initial inspection, the genre of Current Affairs can be understood as cognate, or 
at least closely related to Documentary. There are of course similarities with the 
Documentary form, and while the form or status of documentary itself might be ‘always in 
play’ (Ellis 2012: 8) there are at least some well-understood parameters or signifiers of what 
constitutes the form. In the words of Grierson, documentary can be understood as ‘the 
creative treatment of actuality’ (Grierson in Ellis 2012: 8). At first glance then, this phrasing, 
this understanding and categorisation bears some relation to Current Affairs, and while it is 
clear that the forms have similarities, and are, on occasion, conflated, the forms, or genres, in 
the wider television industry, and one assumes, in the BBC Panorama office and in the 
minds of viewers, are understood as different. They (Documentary and Current Affairs) are 
not the same thing. What differentiates the forms, styles and genres of Current Affairs and 
Documentary from each other?  
 There are perhaps a number of answers to this question, however, the most 
important differences, for the purposes of this research, are as follows: Current Affairs, like 
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News, tends to concern itself with events, disruptions, actions, circumstances and incidents 
occurring ‘in the now’. That is, the tradition, the organisational principles and practices 
relating to News and ‘News Values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Harcup and O’Neill 2001, 
2017) are often the organising logic of the Current Affairs genre. This is perhaps 
emblematically represented by the words of former Newsnight editor, Peter Rippon ‘…it 
(Current Affairs) exists not to break news, but to help viewers make sense of what they have 
heard, seen or read elsewhere’ (The Observer 2011). In fact, as Holland identifies: 
Current affairs television is political television in its widest sense, a project that is 
jealous of its status and political centrality, which constantly proclaims its aim to dig 
behind the headlines and to explain, explore and challenge (Holland 2006: xiii) 
In this way then, Current Affairs broadcasts have a tendency to explore and explain explicitly 
News-related issues and events. This tendency and practice firmly locates Current Affairs 
within the practice and discourse of journalism.  Documentary on the other hand appears to 
have more licence, Documentary can (though it is not obliged to) focus on activities, events, 
incidents and people way beyond the confines of the immediacy, the recency, the 
unambiguity to be found within the more ‘News values’ related form of Current Affairs. As 
Holland (above) says, if Current Affairs has ‘status and political centrality’ then it is this 
‘political centrality’ and, in the context of this research, its relation to News which constrains 
and contains its ability to deviate from the associated normative ideals encompassed by the 
‘impartiality’ doctrine. In short, the BBC (and now industry-wide) version of and adherence 
to impartiality might be said to lock Current Affairs (with)in too narrow a frame or discourse. 
 So while there is a certain broad agreement regarding other television genres, such 
as ‘News’ and ‘Soap Opera’ for instance, as we can see, the term Current Affairs is rather 
more slippery and elastic. In a report by Ofcom, published in 2006, Current Affairs is 
described and demarcated thus:  
A programme which contains explanation and analysis of current events and ideas, 
including material dealing with political or industrial controversy or with public 
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policy. Also included are investigative programmes with contemporary significance 
(Ofcom (2006) The Provision of Current Affairs) 
 
As we can see, the explanation and template it establishes does attempt to define the term(s) 
but within it, there still remain some areas of slippage or inexactitude. While clearly related 
to but demarcated from both News and Documentary, the term has tended to be one based on 
its content, rather than its form(s) or formal characteristics. Current Affairs has, as McQueen 
notes, usually been designated or marked; 
…through its difference to news and documentary, rather than on its own clear-cut 
terms (see Tunstall 1993; Creeber 2001; Bignell 2004; de Burgh 2008). Holland 
(2000) identifies the core objectives of current affairs when she describes long-
running series such as Panorama and This Week as providing ‘a model of journalist-
led programmes whose aim was to address the news and the political agenda in 
greater depth than the news bulletins allowed’ (Holland 148 in McQueen 2010: 60. 
Unpublished) 
   
As a definition from which to work, McQueen’s (following Holland) is certainly sound. We 
can see its relevance when discussing what Current Affairs (or its proponents/producers) sees 
itself playing and is perfectly encapsulated by the above quote from Peter Rippon in The 
Observer newspaper. It exists to further the debate, or at least to help viewers ‘make sense’ of 
complex political, and in the case of Iraq, geo-political news events they ‘have heard, seen or 
read elsewhere’. Do the Panorama broadcasts scrutinised here help viewers ‘make sense’ of 
complex geo-political events? Or are they safely contained in and constrained by the 
discursive practises of the form? It is perhaps the case, as Holland identifies, that Current 
Affairs does ‘address the news and the political agenda in greater depth than the news 
bulletins allowed’ but as this research will seek to demonstrate, it does so but in quite narrow 
terms. One could go so far as to say that ‘we’ (might) get depth (of single characters and 
arcehtypes, and or single story-arcs) but at the expense of breadth (wider context).  
 With very little by way of critical interrogation in either academic or professional 
contexts, the term Current Affairs broadcasting, and the discursive practises that constitute it, 
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can become self-fulfilling or self-legitimating. However, equally important for a form that 
typically, by design and motivation, deals with vital issues of national and international 
significance, is the extent to which Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly in the case of a 
reputationally established brand, such as Panorama, also continues to legitimise and 
reproduce a particular (neoliberal, neo-imperialist) discourse as ‘common-sense’. This is 
particularly acute with regards to the BBC. What I mean by this is that with an established 
reputation and extensive archive on which to draw, in some cases, the BBC’s forms of News 
and Current Affairs broadcasting might even go so far as to function as established historical 
fact. In a detail that neatly captures the already discussed ideas delineated in point 4.2.3 of the 
BBC Charter discussion on ‘impartiality’, Gardiner and Westall (2016) outline:  
Such is the BBC’s embeddedness in state machinery that documentaries and dramas 
are quietly charged with producing saleable versions of history as history. It is now 
common, for example, for BBC documentary histories to present their own footage as 
a memory of the time without any acknowledgment of this mediation…as if the 




The phrase ‘without any acknowledgement of this mediation’ is vital here. That the BBC is 
so ‘embedded’ or anchored to ‘impartiality’, so embedded in our national cultural landscape, 
perceived as neutral mediator of historical detail(s) means that, over time, the BBC’s output 
effectively ‘stands-in’ for or as ‘fact’. Of course, in the context of this research, one can 
conceivably make the same argument for the BBC’s archive of News and Current Affairs. By 
analysing Panorama’s use of its own, and that of related News coverage archive, and because 
said archive is drawn from the already legitimated genres of News and Current Affairs, this 
research can analyse and assess the extent to which the BBC’s journalism, a form of practise 
‘not requiring legitimation outside of itself’ (Matheson 2000) can become a form of self-
fulfilling historical ‘fact’. That it might do so, or at least that it has the capacity to do so, has 
important ramifications.  
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The mixing of stock archive and recent footage might be said to have a deleterious 
effect in furthering a necessarily complex and broader understanding of the “conflict”.  The 
mixing of quickly retrievable archive footage to forge instant visual narratives seems to be a 
standard feature of the Panorama sample. It further underscores the point that Television 
(and the BBC in particular) uses archive in such a way that very often no further 
contextualisation or explanation is required when an image or set of images supports news 
narratives. 
Television current affairs therefore can be seen to promote an essential inhibited and 
oversimplified view of the past and people, not just through its paucity of detail and 
brevity of language, but because it is increasingly dependant upon the visual image 
for its direction and narrative drive. (Hoskins. A 2004. 115-116)  
 
1.7 Current Affairs Broadcasting and ‘The Mission to Explain’ 
Importantly for this research, and as discussed above with reference to generic categorisation, 
News and Current Affairs broadcasting, though sharing similarities, do have important 
differences.  However, in 1988, newly appointed Director General of the BBC, John Birt set 
himself the ambitious task of overhauling BBC News and Current Affairs journalism. The 
traditions of investigative and documentary journalism were conflated with that of News. 
Current Affairs was given a ‘mission to explain’ (Birt in Barnett 2011: 117).  
There were no concessions to the more chaotic forms of television journalism, either 
the investigative tradition or the documentary tradition that had its roots in film-
making rather than in journalism; and there was some anxiety even among his 
supporters that this rigid philosophy could stifle creativity and produce a more 
conservative and compliant approach (Barnett 2011: 117) 
 
This approach gave rise to Current Affairs practises and became well established. Further, 
‘…four specialist units were established covering politics, economics and industry, social 
affairs and foreign affairs each with a weekly programme devoted to its specialism’ (Barnett 
2011: 117). This approach to the Current Affairs broadcasting genre appropriates some of the 
discursive techniques and approaches from traditional News broadcasting. The division into 
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‘specialist units’ has a tendency to discursively form and shape the kind of stories that are 
told. In fact, one could conceivably go further and suggest that it sets up divisions where 
perhaps links might be preferable. As discussed above, Documentary practices are 
generically licensed to explore issues, events, people and disruptions (to social order) whilst 
simultaneously discarding the more-narrow contextual parameters the adherence to ‘news 
values’ and impartiality typically (re)produces. Not beholden to journalism, Documentary 
(can) necessarily include(s) a much wider contextual focus. So, having discarded the ‘more 
chaotic forms of … the documentary tradition’ (Barnett 2011: 117) the distinct ‘specialist 
units’ approach to News, and, after Birt’s intervention, to Current Affairs, could be said to 
discursively shape research, information gathering and story-telling (dissemination of) 
output. In short, the question must be asked: does this approach, in fact separate issues that 
are potentially (necessarily) linked? 
Perhaps it might be best to explain by way of example. In 2013, the BBC broadcast a 
Panorama Special Report - Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle (2013). The broadcast told the 
story of housing benefit claimants, or to appropriate the contemporary register ‘benefit 
cheats’. The story was told through the journalistic prism, or discursive formation, of the 
immediately tangible but reductive story of costs to the public purse. This has the distinct ring 
of a production perhaps by a ‘home affairs’ oriented ‘unit’. However, it produced a narrow 
discursive frame. If there are complaints to be made and heard about housing benefits, as 
perhaps there might be, then how should the story of this crisis be told? Should the Current 
Affairs narrative seek in its ‘mission to explain’ to outline and investigate the precarious and 
poorly paid nature of work in a neo-liberal capitalist economy? The running down and 
deliberate underfunding of public services? Or perhaps the selling-off of large swathes of 
social (council) housing? How about the low rate of council house (re)building? Even if 
Panorama does not draw its explicit research and production ‘frame’ from a distinct ‘unit’, 
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all of the above are (were) ideological decisions, they can be located within the discourse(s) 
of ‘politics’, and social affairs, and economics. However, the broadcast narrowly framed the 
issue within the discourse of social affairs, and in so doing, excised and excluded the political 
and economic dimensions of the ‘story’.  
How might a more critically interrogative broadcast represent the issue(s)? Perhaps by 
narratively and investigatively linking the crisis to, for instance, the trends and demands of 
the neoliberal(ised) political economy? Such long form, nuanced, and contextually rich 
approaches are perfectly possible when adhering to the traditions found in investigative 
Documentary Current Affairs broadcasting. Having seemingly discarded such an approach 
however, do the discursive templates enshrined within the ‘specialist units’, and, vitally, 
bound up within the narrow discourse and practises of television journalism found in 
Panorama allow for nuance, linkage and developed narratives?  
According to the logic of News and Current Affairs broadcast journalism as envisaged 
and subsequently established and entrenched, at least in part, by the changes Birt introduced, 
it is not the poor provision of services and resources that is the issue (in the chosen housing 
and housing benefit example), but the monopolisation of these services and resources by 
whatever Other is currently the subject of demonization. Given that there is a dominant 
narrative (discourse) established by the practices of News broadcasting, it is not therefore 
surprising to find Panorama increasingly devoting attention to issues within this narrow 
(‘news values’ oriented) discursive limit, it might, after all make perfect journalistic 
organisational sense to conjoin services, or at least to develop the story and issue within 
already established templates and frames that already dominate the News genre. However, 
these changes in approach do not necessarily achieve the purported aims of Current Affairs 
‘Mission to Explain’ oriented Journalism. In their ‘unambiguity’, they might ‘make sense’, 
but such an approach does not locate the issue(s) in the wider context. The style of Panorama 
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broadcast manifestly does not critically interrogate wider social, economic, political and 
ideological issues or motivations, does not shed any light on major issues of the day as they 
are too narrowly framed. The ways in which Current Affairs broadcasting was given the 
‘mission to explain’, aligned with the establishment of the ‘distinct units’ cannot help but 
reproduce a certain discursive logic. It is therefore the task of this research to open up, 
discuss and critically interrogate these tendencies and practices, and further to analyse the 
ramifications such adherence to practices reproduces. 
A more recent small-scale analysis of recent editions of Panorama concluded that 
‘many of the investigations appear to be based on finding popular subjects and 
presenting the results in ways that put almost as much emphasis on production values 
as editorial content’. (Barnett 2011: 161) 
 
The extent to which Panorama is able to bear this weight of responsibility, will be critically 
analysed in detail. The utilisation and (re)production of templates can, and indeed must be 
analysed within the context of the demands of television. If, ‘journalism became the art of 
structuring reality, rather than recording it’ (Smith in Alexander 2015: 9) then it might be 
germane to analyse the ways in which the specific demands of BBC television Current 
Affairs broadcasting, with its own temporal logic, its narratives and aesthetics combines with 
the practices of News journalism and ‘impartiality’, in order to produce a ‘structured’ and 
template(d) vision of the social and political world.  
Being an eminently visual medium, television excels at constructing powerful 
meanings, at creating vivid impressions, associations and eliciting emotional 
involvement. It is not so good at presenting lots of facts and the kinds of messages 
where attention to nuances, reservations and contradictions is vital. TV reportage 
seldom allows longer explanations or accounts. In studio debates speakers are 
commonly interrupted when they verge into details or dwell on specifics. (Ekstróm 
2002: 265) 
 
 As we can see from the above discussions, Current Affairs broadcasting, 
particularly in the case of the BBC flagship brand, Panorama is located in an interesting but 
problematic position. Compared with other factual genres – such as Reality, Lifestyle, 
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Consumer – Current Affairs continues to be associated with ‘prestige’ (Hill, 2007 46). Such 
prestige is even more heightened precisely because the programme is long-running and 
established, and moreover, because of its location on the BBC. As Ofcom define it, Current 
Affairs (h)as a key purpose in the PSB landscape: 
‘to inform ourselves and others and to increase our understanding of the world 
through news, information and analysis of current events and ideas’ (Ofcom 2006) 
Current affairs is defined as ‘a programme which contains explanation and analysis 
of current events and ideas, including material dealing with political or industrial 
controversy or with public policy … Current affairs …draws on the production 
values and skills of both news programming, with which it has often been 
institutionally paired, and a range of forms of documentary (Hill, A. 2007: 45) 
 
The legitimacy of the form is underscored by its ‘institutional pairing’ with that of News. 
Whereas documentary can be subject to admiration and a degree of scepticism, Current 
Affairs maintains its position as prestigious PSB oriented output. In this research, I want to 
assess the extent to which this pairing, this generic location acts perhaps as an impediment. Is 
Panorama constrained by its adherence to the more News oriented values and practises? 
Current Affairs broadcasting remains, as Patricia Holland identifies ‘a journalist-led genre’ 
(Holland, P 2001. 149). Such practises, such journalist-led approaches are particularly 
striking in case(s) regarding issues of social and (geo)political importance (such as the Iraq 
war(s)). Current Affairs as it was historically engendered and contemporarily produced to this 
day, applies particularly rigid journalistic accounts of vitally important national and 
international events. Always acutely aware of the needs for ‘impartiality’, such journalistic 
accounts can partly explain Panorama’s reluctance or inability to overtly critique ‘the state’ 
or ‘state actions’. While on occasion specific (and narrow) state actions might be subject to 
critique, the more overt critical interrogation of state and policy – and in particular their 
ramifications on wider society – such as might be found in the more elastic genre of 
documentary, remains largely absent in this particular form. Such weaknesses are directly 
contrary to the role Current Affairs – and Panorama in particular – is assumed to play in 
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contemporary society. Panorama remains the flagship brand, on the flagship Public Service 
Broadcaster. The critical question to pose is: Is Panorama, by its prescriptive generic 
characteristics, incapable of more overt critical interrogation? In some ways the above lack of 
critical interrogation of wider issues, might (again) be a result of the rigidity in UK television 
generic categorisation. Panorama is explicitly Current Affairs television but a form of 
Current Affairs ‘reportage’ as opposed to Current Affairs ‘Investigative’. Panorama exists as 
a part of the BBC’s News/Journalism field which therefore restrict and govern Panorama’s 
output. These rules or constraints – televisual, generic, journalistic, public service broadcast – 
important though they remain, do mean that Panorama’s content must adhere to the 
‘journalist-led’ reportage style and form. ‘Reportage’ approaches effectively ensure that 
Panorama adheres to and remains within the tightly defined ‘impartiality’ doctrine governing 
BBC journalistic output (discussed above). Such a rigid position provides an explanatory 
frame in the forthcoming chapters in an attempt to assess the extent to which said rigidity 
might necessarily discursively narrow down critical, counter-hegemonic approaches.  
1.8 Is the BBC an Ally or Part of the Institutions of ‘The State’? 
With regards the counter-hegemonic potential of Panorama, we can deduce that what 
emerges from Reith’s (and subsequently every BBC Director General) organisation is that 
while it might be the case that the BBC is not overtly ‘beholden to commerce or the state’ it 
is, in practice, discursively and institutionally aligned with important aspects of the state. In 
terms of Panorama, that it is ‘often institutionally paired’ with that of News, meaning it must 
adhere to ‘impartiality’, embracing a form of journalistic reportage ensures that its 
relationship with ‘sources’ remains similarly institutional(ised). As the historian AJP Taylor, 
remarking on the BBC’s performance during the 1926 General Strike, put it, certain 
institutional conditions and practises exist so that ‘the vaunted independence of the BBC was 
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secure so long as it was not exercised’ (Taylor 2001: 246). In fact, as Tom Mills, in part 
quoting Scannell and Cardiff, again outlines:  
…with its reconstitution into a public corporation shortly after the (general) strike 
(1926), the BBC 'crossed the political threshold', becoming 'a "governing institution" 
with aims and functions delegated to it by Parliament, committed to cooperation with 
government, and sharing its assumptions about what constituted the "national 
interest".' By the 1930s, they write, the 'continuous routine contact [that] had built up 
over the years between senior personnel in Broadcasting House, Whitehall and 
Westminster meant that they all abided by the same rules and code of conduct. The 
Corporation had become the shadow of a state bureaucracy; closed, self-protective 
and secretive.' (Mills 2016b; The General Strike to Corbyn: 90 years of BBC 
establishment bias. Open Democracy. My emphasis) 
 
It is precisely these aspects, these conditions and practises which allow, grant legitimacy for 
and reproduce the logic of its journalism. Particularly in times of war and conflict, is it the 
case that Panorama is in lock-step with other institutional, state and parliamentary actors? Do 
they effectively ‘share assumptions about what constitutes the national interest’? 
Assumptions regarding the universality of ‘national interest’ are surely, at the very least, 
questionable, if not wholly inaccurate. But, is it the case that the assumptions regarding 
‘national interest’ – that it is somehow naturally analogous with (all) ‘our’ interests – remains 
unexamined, remains unproblematised, and are largely assumed in News and Current Affairs 
broadcasting, particularly Panorama? Does the most vaunted and assumed to be critical, 
‘flagship’ Current Affairs strand of Panorama create the necessary space in which notions of 
(for instance) ‘national interest’ are subject to scrutiny and debate? Such considerations are 
particularly acute at times of war and conflict. As outlined by Mills (2016a), Scannell and 
Cardiff (1991), and Curran and Seaton (2005) and further discussed and developed in this 
research, one can make the case that historically, the journalistic practises of the BBC’s 
Current Affairs output can be said to be narrowly defined, an effective discourse and 
epistemology. The extent to which these assumptions and practices are embedded and still the 
case more contemporarily is forensically examined by Georgina Born.  
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1.9 Broadening the Remit of ‘The Political’? – The BBC in the 21
st
 Century 
Developing the discussion around impartiality and ‘the political’ in more detail, in her 
seminal 2005 work Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC, Georgina 
Born provides a useful contemporary framework. She identifies a number of interesting and 
important developments regarding impartiality and, as importantly, the breadth and scope of 
what might constitute ‘the political’ and to whom such a term might be applied.  
…what ‘politics’ means and where the ‘political’ resides. The changing conceptions 
of politics manifest in environmental and identity politics, in anti-globalisation and 
anti-war movements, made this an incipient theme of internal BBC debate by the late 
nineties, questioning the exclusive equation made not only between ‘politics’ and 
Westminster, but between ‘political’ programming and news and current affairs. 
(Born 2005: 376) 
 
As Born, above, indicates, given the shifting social and political movements, the BBC 
perhaps might feel duty-bound to orient their News and Current Affairs coverage around 
more representative, developed, critical, alternative and nuanced representation(s). We might 
even suggest that the very notion of what constitutes politics and ‘the political’, for the BBC, 
was ripe for scrutiny. Indeed, according to Born’s ethnographic research and analysis, this 
very idea was ‘an incipient theme of internal BBC debate by the late nineties’ (Born 2005: 
376).  
 How easy is it to shake off the ‘impartiality gene’ that, as we have seen, delimits 
what constitutes politics in the BBC News and Current Affairs output? Secondly, how do 
these claims stand up when applied to our sample of Panorama texts pertaining to Iraq? What 
is the relationship between ‘political programming’ and News and Current Affairs? How (if) 
do they feed into one another (or not)? Is there significant cross-over and/or separation? What 
is the significance of such a perceived shift in emphasis and/or representation? When it 
comes to vital issues of national security, indicated in this example by the decision and 
motivations to invade Iraq, the rationale for doing so, and crucially, which voices were 
included as visible and audible presence on screen, do the BBC Panorama team(s) fall-back 
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into tried and tested, established and hegemonic discursive actors (sources) and modes of 
address? The research will analyse the extent to which, BBC Panorama coverage of ‘the 
political’ included a range of voices from (previously) marginalised groups, campaigners and 
ideological formations. If it was ‘an incipient theme of internal BBC debate’ and the terrain 
was shifting, there should be significant moments and examples of alternate or subaltern 
representation. In what Anne Phillips has referred to as ‘the politics of presence’. Born again: 
The notion of representation itself needs unpacking. It indicates the importance of 
programmes that reflect the tastes and interests of diverse social groups – programmes 
made for those groups. But it also refers to the necessity of programming made by 
such groups, the better to represent their own interests and identities. Representational 
diversity points not only to reception but to self-expression, the right to participate 
and to be heard. (Born 2005: 380) 
 
As a means of critically interrogating and subjecting institutionalised, legitimised social and 
political actors to scrutiny, perhaps a different framework, mode of address, or alternative 
form might well emerge. Again, Georgina Born’s research indicates that this was/is indeed a 
consideration. 
The nineties also saw a mining of the inherently unstable borders between 
documentary and current affairs, while documentary succumbed to the influences of 
entertainment and reality formats, and these in turn responded to the ageing of the 
British sitcom and the problems in popular drama. Birt’s organisational changes 
interacted with these genre-bending shifts, to different effect. Documentaries 
flourished, and the Community Programme Unit continued in striking ways to portray 
little-represented aspects of social experience. By contrast, Current Affairs was in the 
doldrums – strangely, as it might have seemed the area with most to gain from Birt’s 
reorientation of the BBC’s journalism – and News had to contend with the growth of 
new formats and outlets. (Born 2005: 377) 
 
As Born makes clear above, with the reorientation towards analysis and the resources it was 
still able to garner, should, at first glance have meant Current Affairs (in which we obviously 
include as the standard bearer, Panorama) would flourish. Furthermore:  
The BBC’s democratic duty, in this view, was not only to continue its independent 
scrutiny of government and of power, but to broaden the character and range of its 




In this new(ly) formed and innovative form of BBC Current Affairs terrain, how successful 
was Panorama? Or, to put it another way: How did Panorama change, seek to represent 
previously subaltern groups or political positions, and/or orient their programmes in new and 
innovative directions? One of the crucial aspects that this research posits is that, while it 
might be the case that financial, organisational time and resources were/are still available to 
Panorama, the now professionalised practise of its journalism, these representational 
resources act(ed) as a constraining mechanism or ‘brake’. They acted as a brake on (the 
necessary) innovations required to adequately provide the spaces for alternatives voices to 
emerge; to critically interrogate ‘power’ and to orient public debate towards a more 
developed and nuanced understanding of the ‘political’ and ideological terrain. Such terrain 
was emerging in the light of recessions and the burgeoning (post Seattle, 1999) anti-
globalisation social movements, but the BBC, perhaps constrained by their own self-imposed 
limits on a) what (still) constituted the ‘political’ and b) the ‘impartiality’ doctrine 
encompassed by their journalism, was unable to adequately represent such trends and themes. 
‘If Birt steered news and current affairs towards serious analysis, he also introduced 
conditions that discouraged risk-taking and independence’ (Born 2005: 387).  
 In fact, one could go even further and suggest, it is perhaps the case, that precisely 
because Panorama exists within, is oriented around and constrained by the discourse of 
‘Journalism’ and journalistic practice that it lacks both the formal(ly) innovative techniques, 
and the polemical character that might really ‘hold power to account’. Constrained by the 
discourses of (the BBC’s version of) impartiality and journalism; the inherent faith in official 
and legitimated sources; the televisual resources, practises, discourses and techniques of 
‘story-telling’, Panorama is perfectly able to hold some ‘powerful (individual people) to 
account’ but in so doing, is simultaneously discursively and structurally incapable of 
critically interrogating the structural conditions of power, from where said power is derived, 
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and how it is seamlessly reproduced. Panorama, with its associations of ‘prestige, claiming 
the legitimacy granted to it by its adherence to, and location in, the practices of journalism, 
but encumbered by the rigidity of BBC impartiality is thus significantly ideologically 
neutralised. 
 It should be clear to see that the ‘impartiality’ principles on which BBC journalism 
continues to be based, requires and demands critical interrogation. This is an important factor 
precisely because if, as this research identifies, the content and discourse of Panorama is, in 
the case of this research sample, largely (though perhaps not wholly) uncritical of Western 
political strategies and actions, what one might refer to as ‘neoliberal’ forms of capitalism, of 
Western ‘neo-imperialist’ geo-political positions and actions, then how are such uncritical 
positions and narratives reproduced while remaining, broadly, within the confines of the 
impartiality doctrine, practises and remit?  
 Could it be the case that in fact, the BBC, rather than being overtly biased to the left 
(a claim with little academic evidence to substantiate it) or, as some claim, biased to the right, 
instead, constrained as it is by adhering to its own (narrow) remit of ‘impartiality’ with all 
this entails, the corporation might be more accurately described and defined as ‘an 
organisation which will inevitably favour existing concentrations of economic, political and 
cultural power’ (Novara Media Wire 2014). As Tom Mills outlines in his 2016 book:  
…the BBC, whatever liberals would like to imagine, does not stand apart from the 
world of politics and power and the corporate interests which predominate there. 
Rather, it is an important part of those complex networks of power and influence. It 
further shows that, insofar as the BBC can be said to exhibit any political bias, it is 
not based in political partisanship, but rather in an orientation towards those networks 
of power and their shared interests – interests which, it should be noted, are not 
necessarily self-evident or immutable, but are worked out in and through these 
networks, and in and through key political institutions like the BBC. (Mills 2016a: 
139) 
 
On this understanding, the BBC is then inextricably linked to and a part of the complex 
network(s) of institutional power. The extent to which this institutional and contextual 
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location, the effect this has on its storytelling and how this impacts on the discourse of the 
Current Affairs broadcast strand Panorama will be assessed and examined in the subsequent 
analytical chapters. It might therefore be the case, or at least we might deduce, that in fact, 
the remit, the obligations and the very practices of ‘impartiality’, the ways in which they are 
imagined and enacted (upon) are in fact, in their current guise, while perhaps laudable aims, 
in the contemporary parlance, ‘unfit for purpose’. 
1.10 Why Panorama? 
In the context of Public Service Broadcasting that has an obligation to inform and educate, to 
provide critical knowledge pertaining to world events, geo-politics and political culture, 
Panorama is considered to be the paradigm. In part because Panorama is the longest running 
Current Affairs broadcast strand in the world, it has an accumulated, discursive, semiotic, 
journalistic legitimacy and integrity. The legitimacy is, in some ways, its most valued asset. 
As perhaps the ‘flagship’ Current Affairs broadcast strand, Panorama carries considerable 
weight ‘…inter-elite communications and the culture of elites are just as, if not more, 
significant, [than elite-mass communication] for sustaining political and economic forms of 
power in society’ (Davis, A 2003: 669).  
 Its position of legitimacy is reinforced by its longevity, its position in (and as) a 
form of ‘impartial’ journalism, by its location on the primary PSB channel in the UK 
(perhaps in the world) and its resourcing. Therefore, as a form of public service television 
journalism, it has significant power to frame issues and events. One of the questions to ask 
here, is the extent to which, the risk-averse culture the Birtist changes engendered, the shift 
away from the episodic, investigative journalism of its past, and the increasing adherence to 
and reliance on journalistic television practices, means Panorama comes increasingly more in 
line with the fast(er)-paced 24 hour news culture. The obvious impact is that such a form 
leaves less space for detailed and developed critical analysis. 
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 At a time of intense political pressure and build up (to the Iraq war), Panorama 
produced and the BBC screened a series of broadcasts about the build up to, and then the 
success/failure of the war (with)in Iraq. It was of course able to produce so many because 
Panorama is seen as a vital plank in the landscape of the BBC, therefore it remains well-
resourced. Given the perceived authority of Panorama, the aim of the thesis is to outline and 
assess the extent to which Panorama is deserving of its assumed critical and scrutinising (of 
power) legitimacy. Additionally, given the place Panorama is assumed to hold in the context 
of important Current Affairs broadcasting traditions in the UK, it potentially sets the standard 
for the industry to follow. As previously stated, Panorama is the established Current Affairs 
television text, the standard bearer against which other contemporary television Current 
Affairs broadcasts are measured, I would argue that it is the key signifier of serious 
journalism on television. Therefore, Panorama, and crucially for this research, the ways in 
which Panorama represents war and conflict, is televisually, journalistically and generically 
(discursively) influential.  
The genre draws from and feeds into other forms of media production, including 
motion pictures and television series, and all these in turn shape audience perceptions 
and expectations about warfare and how the media should cover war. (Boyd-Barrett in 
Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26) 
 
Additionally, and as the theoretical framework chapter will go on to discuss;  
For critical discourse analysts, discourse is a form of social practice which both 
constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices. As social 
practice, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions. It does 
not just contribute to the shaping and the reshaping of social structures but also 
reflects them. (Chouliaraki 2006: 61) 
 
Therefore, as well as being journalistically, televisually, and generically significant, 
Panorama is ideologically exigent, for it has considerable social and political weight, it helps 
set the terms and frames for debate, it is therefore ideologically and discursively instrumental.  




…many public service broadcasters have maintained a brand identity as a trusted and 
valued source of information in many countries because their commitment to 
impartial and accurate news and current affairs provision. Those values associated 
with well-resourced and high-quality journalism lie at the heart of public service 
values, informing not only public but also some commercial broadcasters in this new 
millennium. (Cushion, S. 2012. 21) 
 
The research will examine both original and the archive deployed in the 10 Panorama 
broadcasts contained within the sample. This thesis will argue, by way of example and by 
deploying a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework that Panorama utilises and 
appropriates techniques from the canon and style of dramatic representation, and in so doing 
it will be argued that it is this debt to fictionalised dramatic conventions, and by deploying 
long-established dramatic mechanisms and archetypes (of hero/villainy; dark/light) that 
actually betray a, perhaps unwitting, ideological bias in favour of elite western (capitalist, 
imperialist) interests. As I will go on to demonstrate, that such tropes exist is not necessarily 
in doubt, however, the extent to which methods, approaches and techniques of broadcast 
journalism contribute to the wider television journalism landscape is important. Furthermore, 
these methods, approaches and techniques might also be said to contribute to and reproduce 
the ideological and hegemonic position. If Panorama typically utilises and appropriates 
signifiers typically found in dramatised forms of representation, then they need to be 
critically interrogated and examined in detail. What are the characteristics, the frames, the 
templates, the discursive practises of Current Affairs journalism? Because of its assumed 
authority and legitimacy, can Panorama be said to be (partly) responsible for a pro-Western 
ideological positioning? Whether and how the televisual, journalistic and discursive forms 
and practices endorse and underscore an unquestioning Western authority, legitimacy (sic) 
and hegemony. Furthermore, given Panorama’s critical, intellectual, journalistic, public 
service broadcast remit and reputation, it is germane to analyse and to ask, the extent to 
which Panorama lays the foundations for serious Current Affairs journalism in the UK 
Public Service Television landscape. If, as is suggested the BBC in general, and Panorama in 
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particular do in fact set the terms and bear the weight of industry practise(s), then the style, 
form(al) characteristics, tropes, signifying practises, and the content and delivery establish 
themselves as the template for reportage-based Current Affairs television journalism. One 
could even level the charge that Panorama produces a discursive formation or helps sustain a 
certain ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1977: 30). 
 Does Panorama stand as a rigorous examination of the powerful? Or, through 
specific journalistic and television characteristics and conventions, does Panorama merely 
restrict itself to an examination of those individual powerful elite actors in UK political 
culture, but does not examine the culture itself? Does the established (establishment?) neo-
liberal, neo-imperialist political elite as immovable, as benign, as structurally sound, remain 
largely, perhaps wholly, under-examined? Does the immovable, systemic and structural 
order, with all the attendant inequalities it reproduces, remain unexamined by precisely (one 
of) the organ(s) of investigation and critique entrusted with the task in the first place: Current 
Affairs broadcasting (Panorama). 
1.12 Concluding Remarks 
The principle purpose of this initial chapter has been to map out a series of key aspects and 
points regarding the BBC’s institutional framework; its adherence to ‘impartiality’; the 
specific generic position of Current Affairs journalism; and how such things relate to 
Panorama’s coverage of conflict. In the context of BBC impartiality and Current Affairs 
broadcast journalism, the specific contribution this thesis seeks to make is centred on the 
following ideas and issues: To critically evaluate and understand the Professional practices’ 
of broadcast Current Affairs journalism, particularly broadcast journalism on the BBC, 
notionally that of ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’ and to measure how such (already 
epistemologically compromised) professional practices are perhaps then further constrained 
by the idioms and tropes of television and Television journalism. The ways in which 
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adherence to such forms, within the confines of the professional practices, might be said to 
effectively (re)produce a Discursive formation. This is of paramount importance regarding 
the contribution this research makes to understanding the television Current Affairs 
broadcasting landscape as it is currently imagined. Further, even if now officially distanced 
from the Birtist ‘distinct operational units’ approach, to assess the extent to which this legacy 
might still impact on the journalistic storytelling in Panorama and that such units also 
inculcate a discursive formation. This distinct unit approach might be said to have some 






















Literature Review: From Television Tropes to the War Model 
This thesis sets out to address the notion that the BBC Current Affairs broadcasting 
strand Panorama (1953–current), operates as a discourse, effectively policing 
representation(s), identities and ideologies. Concomitantly, this discursive ‘policing’ might be 
said to effectively narrow down identity formations and alternative ideologies. If it is still the 
case that television Current Affairs strand(s), principally the BBC programme Panorama, are 
in part necessarily framed by ideas of objectivity, impartiality and balance, then, as discussed 
and detailed in the previous chapter, what exactly is this balance, what constitutes 
‘impartiality’ and how are limitations placed on what constitutes ‘acceptable’ opinion? 
Panorama is selected principally because it is the flagship Current Affairs programme on 
BBC television and as such is bound by and has come to define the BBC’s public service 
rhetoric of ‘balance’ and ‘impartiality’.  I will now seek to position this work in relation to 
other work in the area. To do this I have divided up this chapter using specific critical 
subheadings. 
2.1 Television – The Specificity of the Form  
This research is itself part of a wider intellectual tradition found within the disciplines of 
media, cultural and journalism studies. 
This analysis contributes to the larger critical project to which both cultural studies 
and critical rhetorical studies subscribe, which was also Foucault’s own objective: to 
understand how power is produced, reproduced, and maintained in culture. (Shugart 
2006: 80) 
 
Despite the development of what Cottle (2006) has described as a ‘media ecology’ in the 
twenty first century, encompassing fast-changing digital internet based mediatisation, 
television remains the primary means of expression of and engagement with the mediatised 
political public sphere and political events. This being the case, analysis of the mediatised 
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political public sphere must then engage with and critically interrogate the space where 
political communication finds its most frequent expression;  
Political actors are all trying to have an impact: on their communities, on their country 
and on the world...one thing they all share is that at one point or another they want the 
news media to help them achieve their goals. Getting coverage...can bring lots of 
benefits. (Wolfsfeld 2012: 7)  
 
In short, one must critically analyse and engage with the forms of television and political 
communication, namely: television News and Current Affairs broadcasting; 
  
...the defining characteristics of television [are] its ‘nowness’, the sense of being 
always ‘live’ which it constantly tries to promote. Film presents itself as a record of 
what has happened, television presents itself as a relay of what is happening. (Feuer in 
Fiske 1987: 18) 
 
Television is importantly defined as both instant or ‘live’ and domestic in form.  
Television offers a sense of ‘liveness, or ‘nowness’, its constant flow of images 
seeming to transmit and record everyday reality, giving us a constantly updating 
‘window on the world’. It is, moreover, a supremely domestic medium, addressing us 
directly as individuals and members of family groups, in the privacy of the home, 
which is assumed to be the space in which our identity as individuals is most fully 
expressed and preserved. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 76) 
 
Notwithstanding the recent development and availability of (mobile) television on the move, 
television is principally viewed in and engaged with in the domestic setting of the home.  
Ethnographies of media use have shown how the television set is strategically placed 
at the centre of people’s social living space…Television viewing is “utterly 
ubiquitous in Western societies, part of the fabric of everyday lives, a common 
resource for story-telling, scandal, scrutiny, gossip, debate and information: always 
there, taken for granted…television, both as communicator of meanings, and as a 
daily activity, is ordinary. (Cushion 2012a: 15) 
 
Observations of the intimate ‘nature’ of television are perhaps even more pronounced in 
relation to the high modality forms of News and Current Affairs. As Ellis reminds us;  
Television has a key role in the social process of working through because it exists 
alongside us, holding our hands…The very act of broadcast transmission itself creates 




Thus, television production and distribution has a desire (need?) to tell stories, sometimes of 
necessary complexity whilst simultaneously managing to intimately connect with the 
domestic audience. In marked contrast to other forms of popular entertainment, such as 
theatre, cinema, and live music, where one must leave the home with the explicit goal of 
seeking out specific forms, television (and radio, though this research will not include radio 
as a form) communication is more instantly, readily available and as such more readily 
embeds itself within the narrative of everyday lived experience(s).  
Television has become embedded in the complex cultures of our domesticity. We can 
no more think of television as anything than a necessary component of that 
domesticity than we can think of our domesticity without seeing both in the machine 
and the screen a reflection and an expression of that domestic life. (Silverstone 1994: 
24) 
 
This domesticity and intimacy means that in order to communicate effectively, television 
employs specific idioms, tropes and signifying practices that, through repetition come to be 
seen as normal(ised) or even ‘real’.  
In order to convincingly explain the complexities of the world to us, television has to 
master certain practicalities and representational contradictions. On the one hand television, 
and this is most urgent and obvious with regards to News and Current Affairs texts, demands 
something understandable, something familiar, a sense of location and recognition, a sense of 
the real. The sense of intimate connection, this intimacy, or perhaps ‘personal’ touch is best 
achieved by way of addressing audience members with personalised stories and narratives. 
The most apposite means of communicating stories on television is often through the 
signifying practises, tropes and idioms most often found in the ‘realist’ genre. 
2.2 Television and ‘Realism’ 
Despite the claims, assisted by the term ‘real’ being embedded in the genre itself, ‘Realism’ 
is merely an accumulated collection of recognisable signifiers and symbols, myths and 
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narratives, characters and places. Developing the work of Stuart Hall (1980) Thornham and 
Purvis (2005) discuss the ideological ‘work’ of television and television realism:  
‘Realism’ [on television]...provides images and representations of the lives, meanings, 
practices and values of social groups unfamiliar to us...provide a means of ordering 
this social imagery, by providing classification labels, ways of making sense of, these 
unfamiliar groups]...[and shake them into an acknowledged order. (Thornham and 
Purvis 2005: 76) 
 
Realism might be said to be the means by which television masters the contradictions and 
practicalities of representation. Legitimacy is conferred upon such a means of representation 
through repetition, making the unfamiliar, familiar and recognisable. Further, Fiske (1987) 
draws attention to the work of discourse in the construction of television texts: 
We can call television an essentially realistic medium because of its ability to carry a 
socially convincing sense of the real. Realism is not a matter of any fidelity to an 
empirical reality, but the discursive conventions by which and for which a sense of 
reality is constructed (Fiske 1987: 21, emphasis added.)  
 
The ‘sense of reality’ is an important facet in this instance as is the explicit reference to 
discursive conventions. It is in revealing that they (discursive conventions) are themselves 
conventions, merely part of the representational apparatus, the critical work of Media, 
Cultural Studies and Journalism Studies, where this work is situated, attempts to analyse the 
extent to which the machinery (of representation) conceals its theatricality (or 
constructedness), and, to what (possible) end.  
It is therefore suggested that realism and representation on television, constructs 
particular forms of ‘social knowledge’ by framing actions and discourses of their characters 
in relation to a central set of truths: 
...these truths are carried...in television by what the camera shows us. Seeming to 
offer ‘direct access to truth’, a transparent rendering of reality against which we can 
measure the discourses and actions of various characters. (Thornham and Purvis 2005: 
78) 
 
Many of the recognisable signifiers predominantly found in the “Classic realist” genre can be 
found across a range of television texts, and, one could argue, News, as part of television, has 
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these in abundance. These signifiers and framing devices are easily recognisable and familiar, 
in short, realism does not (simply) reproduce reality, it constructs it. The essence of the realist 
text is to reproduce reality in such a form as to make it easily understandable (Fiske 1987). 
What remains important in the context of this thesis, is that these conventions are not only 
seen to be merely conventions, but that the ‘form’ of television; the ‘work’ of television 
journalism and television Current Affairs broadcasting, appropriating the familiar, 
recognisable and ‘common sense’ tropes of the (realist) form, conceals this theatricality. In 
this way, drawing attention to the conventions of the (television) form, goes alongside some 
of the assumptions and claims made for journalism. 
Long established as a tradition that underpins the work of the ‘objective’ journalist: 
‘...the assumption was not that the media are objective, but that there was a world “out there” 
to be objective about’ (Schiller 1981: 48) it is a tradition in need of critical evaluation and 
analysis. Drawing attention to the (dramatic) conventions and the role they play in 
reproducing ‘the familiar’, remains one of the central tasks of this thesis. 
  
...realism can be regarded as a system of conventions which represent the world to us 
through a series of devices...television presents the viewer with narrative structures 
that are tightly patterned ways of organising reality. Television narratives tend to be 
recognisable, reassuring and comforting. (Casey et al. 2002: 194) 
 
According to this model, much television representation owes a clear debt to the realist drama 
genre. It therefore raises a question of how might the extended text of Current Affairs 
broadcasting utilise similar tropes and practices.  
Discussing the characteristics of television drama, Raymond Williams (1975) 
identifies three main features: television drama tends to have a contemporary setting; 
television drama concerns itself with human action, described in human terms; drama on 
television tends to be ‘socially extended’, meaning that it deals with the concerns and lives of 
‘ordinary people’. These three characteristics of course allow and encourage a sense of 
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identification necessary for the text to ‘work’. Fiske (1987) drawing on and developing 
Williams’ work states:  
‘The three characteristics’ [contemporary setting; human action; social extension] 
‘explain realism’s particular suitability for television; television’s audience, like 
realism’s content, is socially extended…television is particularly well suited to 
representing human action in human terms – its small screen and comparatively poor 
definition [pre HD] lead it to concentrate on mid-shots and close-ups of people acting, 
reacting and interacting. (Fiske 1987: 22) 
 
As suggested by Williams, Fiske, then further developed by Schlesinger (1987), unlike 
cinema film, the aesthetics of television (and for this thesis, particular attention will be paid 
to television broadcast journalism), because of the formal and discursive restrictions, offer 
fewer panoramic shots, fewer landscapes, and many more close-up shots. In order, then, to 
tell news stories, television News and Current Affairs can often find itself drawing on ‘types’ 
of story, character, narrative and event. Discussing Stuart Hall’s work, Helen Davis (2004) 
reminds us that ‘Television was, and still is, the medium of the close and the personal’ (Davis 
2004: 51). These aesthetic limitations place certain limits on television News and Current 
Affairs’ ability to provide adequate, or fully developed political, ideological, socio-cultural 
and geographic contextual detail in favour of easily recognisable ‘stock’ characters, or 
archetypes, narratives, locations and story-lines. Accordingly, these idioms and devices in 
some ways produce a sense of familiarity and comfort; 
 ...television news might not appear to be comforting or reassuring, on closer 
examination it is clear that News too is presented as a series of structured narratives. 
‘Real’ people, ‘real’ events, ‘real’ places are used, but edited and reorganised to fit a 
specific time-slot and to make a rounded news story. (Casey et al. 2002: 194) 
  
Is this assertion true of television News more generally, and Current Affairs broadcasting in 
particular? Examining and interrogating this assertion and assumption is vital in this research;   
...it (television) must give us explanations of the real in the form of narratives which 
will shape the disorder of reality into forms which are recognisable, meaningful and 
safe – forms, in other words, which comply with the requirements of cultural and 




2.3 News, Current Affairs and Media Templates 
As discussed above, both cultural and generic verisimilitude is evident through established 
tropes, forms and signifying practices, they are instantly familiar and recognisable and are 
what Kitzinger (2000) and Hoskins (2004) might refer to as ‘Media templates’. Appositely, 
for this research, discussing the US media’s coverage of the first Gulf War, Andrew Hoskins 
states: 
Throughout the US media coverage of the Gulf War the Vietnam War was frequently 
used as a template to frame events that were unfolding in real time. Frequent 
repetition and reframing of key TV images extends the past into the present (and 
perhaps the future) in new ways, creating templates with which to measure the 
present. Templates are also constructed through journalistic talk and their often 
routine contextualising of the present with reference to a past event. (Hoskins 2004: 
36) 
 
According to this model, television News sometimes explicitly represents the present through 
means of drawing on and narrating the past, ‘Journalists, like generals, are often fighting the 
last war’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 176). Moreover, the media template, in part because of the 
accumulated semiotic significance and recognition, and in order that it be easily accessible, 
imposes (on events) an overly simplistic vision(s) of the world. Instead of a ‘frame’ or 
‘window’, with their possible different vantage points or views, a template ‘implies a more 
rigid and precisely outlined perspective (which both operates within and contributes to 
specific substantive frame)’ (Kitzinger 2000: 75). It also suggests a certain transferability, the 
template can be easily transferred and seamlessly relocated into the next conflict. It might be 
argued then that the discursive ‘logic’ of media template(s) repeat relatively fixed ways of 
reporting events, and concomitantly, (re)produce relatively fixed ways of viewing the world 
and world news events. Media templates then, if widely used, by drawing on past events and 
standardised discursive signifying practices tend to present easily digestible narratives. The 
use of templates on television are vital in the representational economy, they allow News and 
Current Affairs the ‘luxury’ of representing potentially complex events in terms that can be 
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easily (enough) understood. In ‘News Values’ terms (Galtung and Ruge 1965), the templates 
are required in order to present news events with a degree of ‘unambiguity’.  
In its attempts to ‘make sense’, television and news on television, much like television 
drama, draws on established tropes and (story-telling) devices. In order to ‘tell the story’ 
television makes use of narrative, characterisation and, with regards to News and Current 
Affairs texts, embeds them within the text of a ‘real life’ narrative: ‘story-telling is 
television’s forte…everything is subject to interpretation by television as story-telling 
machine’ (Nicholls 1994: 43). This ‘story-telling machine’ extends to its (television’s) own 
capacity to influence the political culture in which it is enmeshed.  
By the 1980’s, television had reached a point of maturity where, whatever the party of 
government, it was seen as a decisive weapon in the battle for electoral hearts and 
minds. Because it was not open to the same partisan approach as the press, it was 
implicitly trusted by voters. (Barnett 2011: 118) 
 
So, not only does television ‘fall back’ on templates, it also narrates its own past and weaves 
this into the fabric of political culture and discourse. As television News and Current Affairs 
broadcasting assumes a primary role in dissemination, communication and ‘conversation’ it 
establishes itself both at and as the centre of political discourse and communication, the 
principle means and form through which we are encouraged to view and understand the 
world.  
...television journalism in particular is the main source of people’s information about 
the world...around two-thirds of the mass public of modern industrialised societies 
claim that television is their main source of national and international news. (Gunter 
1987 in McNair 2009: 19) 
 
 
2.4 Language, Discourse and Journalism (as) Strategic Ritual. 
Television and news on television is then widely seen, and seen widely as a (relatively) fixed 
form in which the population can have a degree of faith and trust. Such ideas of trust and 
faith in the story-telling capabilities and machinery of journalism develops over time and in 
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particular ways.  In order to fully undertake a critical analysis of News form, one must locate 
and outline the emergence of news and journalism (as) discourse;  
...news has to be available before journalists can choose what they consider suitable, 
and as long as official sources have the authority and resources to deliver newsworthy 
statements and events, journalists will remain dependent on them. (Gans 2004: xvii) 
 
The emergence of News ‘as a recognisably modern cultural form, and media to disseminate 
it...coincided not only with the invention of printing, but also with the development of 
capitalism’ (McNair 2009: 32). In this context then, historically the emergence of news 
practice and language could be seen to represent, and be representative of, particular 
capitalist, dominant or bourgeois values. Created in relation to and as part of bourgeois 
values, the system of news gathering, dissemination and writing were bound by the interests 
within which they were formed. This is not to suggest that such values can be so easily traced 
and thus proved to be all encompassing, but merely to locate the emergence, the very idea of 
‘News’ within a specific territory, historical trajectory and social, ‘professional’ contextual 
development, and containing specific practices representative of values. If news production 
becomes that activity, that sphere of work that informs us about the world around us, then 
what constitutes that world around ‘us’, which version(s) of the world are represented, by 
whom, and through which discursive practices? 
The ‘birth of modern news’ develops its ‘...own particular discourse, through which 
reality was refracted, and which the newspaper’s claim to authority and authenticity was 
made’ (Matheson 2000: 561). In order to ensure that the commodity of news is able to be 
disseminated coherently and consistently, what we might call a ‘news voice’ (Schudson 
1982) emerges, ‘...a journalistic discourse emerged, which allows the news to subsume these 
various voices under a universal, standard voice’ (Matheson 2000: 564). News becomes not 
merely a ‘collection of raw information’ but ‘...a form of knowledge in itself, not dependent 
on other discourses to be able to make statements about the world’ (Matheson 2000: 559). 
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Closely related to this development of news language, news as professional(ised) practise (as 
discourse) is the concept of ‘objectivity’. News and ‘objectivity’, the ‘objectivity’ able to be 
secured in part because of the appropriation of the ‘news voice’, can be discussed by way of 
reference to journalism as ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978). ‘The concept of “objectivity” is 
premised on the assertion that a person’s statements about the world can be trusted if they are 
submitted to established rules deemed legitimate by a professional community’ (Schudson in 
McNair 2009: 33). In this framework of ‘established rules’ and ‘professional community’ one 
can clearly trace the professional practice of journalism, the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978) 
using the ‘news voice’ (Schudson 1982, Matheson, 2000), as discursive. What emerges 
within this tradition is a premise that in order to ‘be objective about’ the world, a language of 
news is cultivated that places journalists in the position of story-teller par excellence  
...the news story became recognised as a self-contained language event. It no longer 
had to refer to outside itself to the source text to be able to assert a fact; the 
journalist’s role changed from a gatherer and recorder of news to a storyteller. 
(Matheson 2000: 570, emphasis added)  
 
The journalist or news-maker, with their own set of rules, practices, conventions, linguistic 
and visual tropes, is independent from, and able to stand outside other authoritative, 
authorising, legitimating state actors, in short, the journalist as ‘professional’ storyteller is a 
significant development in news and journalistic history.  
Professionalism – in particular the notion that experts should confine themselves to 
their ‘legitimate professional concerns’ and not ‘politicise’ their work – helps keep 
individual professionals in line by encouraging them to view their narrow technical 
orientation as a virtue, a sign of objectivity rather than of subordination. (Schmidt 
2000: 204) 
 
This notion of ‘professionalism’ is problematic and (ought to be) highly contentious, for as 
McChesney discusses: 
Reporters report what people in power say, and what they debate. This tends to give 
the news an establishment bias. When a journalist reports what official sources are 
saying, or debating, she is professional. When she steps outside of this range of 
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official debate to provide alternative perspectives or to raise issues those in power 
prefer not to discuss she is no longer being professional. (McChesney, R. 2002. 95) 
   
However, as we have seen with regards the BBC notion of ‘impartiality’, this roughly 
translates as in-line with elite thinking, or safely contained within the limits of parliamentary 
democracy. ‘Professionalism’ here becomes a term and a set of institutionalised practices 
which ascribe legitimacy in the first instance to ‘Primary Definers’ and, in the second, to 
‘secondary’ definers as the means through which complex newsworthy events are 
disseminated and perhaps understood.  
To use Tuchman’s term, ‘News making’ (1978), journalism practice that makes use of 
the established ‘news language(s)’, forms and tropes, whilst adhering to specific styles and 
expressions, ensures the establishment of both a perceived ‘objectivity’ and the ‘journalist as 
storyteller’. As McNair et al. have outlined, it might also be read as indicative and 
representative of dominant bourgeois values prevalent at the time of this formation. Said 
values are, however, contained (concealed, and assumed to be value free) within ‘universal’ 
ideas embodied and represented by specific techniques and modes of address, ‘...reporters 
ceased simply to report the voices of those in public life, but frame them within the voice of 
journalism’ (Matheson 2000: 564). News media practices, embodied by news journalists, 
establish(ed) for themselves the authority, and indeed the frame through which the world was 
explained.  
To produce what will constitute the public sphere [...] it is necessary to control the 
way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only 
on content – certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered 
unacceptable for public visual consumption – but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, 
felt and known. The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the 
regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as 
reality, and what will not. (Butler 2004: xx) 
 
Butler, in referring to acceptable images, makes a forceful point with regards what constitutes 
not only the public sphere, but moreover, that which is deemed appropriate, for news 
broadcast representational purposes, effectively circumscribes the limits of the form, and 
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what (or whom) is allowed to be represented and imagined in such a space. The notion of 
‘acceptable’ imagery, or perhaps imagery deemed unpalatable serves an instrumental 
purpose:  
Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of 
viability...censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes 
what is speakable and what is liveable also functions as an instrument of censorship. 
(Butler 2004: xx)  
 
These are important ideas, and as we can see, many of them find televisual and journalistic 
expression on the BBC, and, in the case of this research, in Panorama. If television 
representation, limited, in this research to Current Affairs, can confer legitimacy, then who is 
represented, and how? Not only does presence on screen provide mere visibility, but how 
such visibility is manifest requires critical interrogation. What televisual, dramatic, emotive 
and arechetypal tropes are utilised and reproduced in the service of making sense, making 
knowable, making familiar, and making empathic? Furthermore, who is invisible, or when 
visible, how is this visibility stitched on(to) our screens and, perhaps, in(to) our minds? 
2.5 The Public Sphere 
The emergence of ‘News’ as practice, as event, as commodity, genre, and discourse, and 
following Butler’s evocation of the term (above), it is necessary to locate News and the BBC 
more widely, and Panorama explicitly, within the context of the ‘public sphere’. Theorised 
extensively by among others, Habermas (1989), McNair (2009), Curran and Seaton (2010), 
Conboy (2004), Boyd-Barrett (1997), McQuail (2009, 2013) and Dahlgren (1995, 2009). 
Debates and theories about the ‘public sphere’ emphasise the importance of information, 
available to all ‘…free of attention to social status…’ (Habermas 1989: 22) where ‘issues of 
general social importance’ (Habermas 1989: 16) can be discussed and debated. Based on this 
conception, and it is a dominant and established one, it is assumed that with the emergence 
and development of a professional(ised) body of news workers, adhering to principles, voices 
and practices (discussed above) such Habermasian idea(l)s are the ‘best’ means of achieving 
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a form of mediated public sphere: ‘…the media must provide citizens with the information, 
ideas and debates about current affairs so as to facilitate informed opinion and participation in 
democratic politics’ (Dahlgren 2009: 34). If, as is suggested, this is one of the major roles of 
journalism and News media, one can see how ‘public sphere’ values sit and fit easily with the 
development of ‘news language and the emerging ‘discourse’ of news. We can also see their 
presence on the BBC.   
Media provide not only cognitive knowledge (knowledge about political facts), but 
also structure and order political reality (presenting particular frameworks – such as 
focusing on two-party conflicts, focusing on individuals, focusing on action rather 
than processes. (McNair 1999: 27) 
 
Furthermore, television in particular might conceivably have an important role to play in such 
a process: 
…television is exceptional in its ability to mobilize affective involvement and convey 
the amorphous entity called implicit social knowledge … and I would emphatically 
underscore that this quality is by no means entirely detrimental to its role in the public 
sphere. (Dahlgren in Barnett 2011: 142) 
 
So, news as language, as practice (as discourse), and as the major conduit through which the 
world is narrated, aligned together with the practices, languages and aesthetics of television, 
combine in this instance to form a public sphere. This is not to suggest that on their own, they 
embody the public sphere in its entirety, but that such things need to be analysed in relation to 
one another. 
The public sphere is briefly summarised here as a means of characterising what 
television journalism can democratically make possible rather than something it can 
tangibly achieve. What the public sphere represents, in other words, is a normative 
rather than an empirical aspiration. (Cushion 2012a: 13) 
 
 
2.6 Infotainment, Drama and The Story-telling Machine 
As discussed, television’s ubiquity, its sense of immediacy and ‘nowness’ are all important 
factors with regards the ways in which television News and Current Affairs are able to be tell 
us stories of far-away places and peoples. That television and television News and Current 
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Affairs make use of idioms, tropes, signifying practices, forms, content, narratives and 
characters is not necessarily in doubt, News and Current Affairs broadcasting has to ‘make 
sense’; ‘…television must approximate the real; that is, it must be seen to give us unmediated 
access to both the everyday and a world beyond our immediate experience’ (Thornham and 
Purvis 2005: 76). However, the extent to which this sense-making apparatus is overly 
simplified is problematic. Equally troubling is that the machinery of representation conceals 
its own theatricality and in the service of apparent ‘sense making’ transparency becomes 
something of a self-fulfilling machine. News and Current Affairs is already underscored by a 
long and accumulated hierarchy of discourses (already discussed). This discursive hierarchy 
privileges particular forms and means of explaining the world ‘...within this hierarchy, 
narrative is given an unquestioned dominant place, which sets up “reality” as unproblematic’ 
(Casey et al. 2002: 228) and positions disparate places and peoples within a hierarchical 
‘logic’ of understanding. Furthermore, particular journalistic and broadcast tropes, narrative, 
and characterisation, assumes and confers legitimacy on television journalism as objective 
‘...narrative types of description is, in this sense, instrumental in establishing objectivity, the 
quality of broadcasting necessary to legitimise the television footage as public sphere genre’ 
(Chouliaraki 2005: 150). Therefore, it is this hierarchy of discourses and the ways in which 
they lay claim on and for direct, unmediated access to real lives and real stories that must be 
held up to scrutiny. In fact, this thesis will argue that we must not only scrutinise the formal 
characteristics of the high modality form(s) but that we must go further. We must foreground 
and reveal the levels of theatricality, Panorama’s use of dramatic templates contained within 
the formal characteristics and texts, outline the dramatic templates and signifiers of the form, 
explain how and why they might be considered historically and contemporarily necessary and 
important, and finally to interrogate the ways in which Current Affairs broadcasting ex-
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nominates or conceals these characteristics and, in so doing, reproduces a vision of the world 
and those in it that is commensurate with and in the service of  dominant ideology.
1
 
Utilising the tropes of the realist genre but with the added legitimisation of the News 
text, with its attendant legitimacy conferred upon it by way of news voice, news language, to 
underpin it, the more developed and in-depth Journalism text that is Current Affairs 
broadcasting extends the ‘logic’ of ‘more rounded news story’ to its conclusion. Based partly 
on the style(s) and conventions of documentary, which tends to privilege narrative and 
location, partly on the conventions of the classic realist drama, privileging characterisation 
and the personal, and importantly, utilising the legitimating forms, tropes, styles and 
discourse of the journalistic, it combines these elements together to produce an extended 
News text, or what John Corner (1996) has referred to as ‘extended reportage’ (Corner in 
Kilborn and Izod 1997: 24). This extended text, legitimated by extensive use of news footage, 
produces a more developed extended narrative, ‘Documentaries and current affairs 
programmes […] might well allow for some discussion of the roots of the conflict, or the 
motivations of its protagonists, or even some critique of the state’s position’ (McNair 2009: 
45). The extent to which this extended News style text necessarily offers (or does not) a more 
nuanced, contextually detailed, explanatory role in our understanding requires critical 
interrogation.  
Even, or perhaps especially, in times of war and conflict, stories of a personal and 
dramatic nature become the quickly retrievable ‘fall back’ position (template), or journalistic 
rhetorical shorthand. This is in part explained by the previously outlined reliance on the 
                                                 
1
 It must be added, that this concealing or rendering invisible is not necessarily a matter of deliberate misleading 
– in fact, it would be impossible in a study such as this to level such a charge at those working in the field. It is 
more a case of the discourse, or the discursive practises of broadcast journalism being brought to bear on the 
production, writing and dissemination of news texts, or the extent to which it is simply ‘the way things are 
done’. Again, this is rather difficult to ‘prove’ but we can begin to trace links and discern certain characteristic 
‘footprints’ of the form, and then analyse the extent to which these might be said to offer or reproduce a 




Western ‘objectivity’ principle and partly in the developed and established aesthetics of 
television journalism. ‘The taking of sides […] is related less to a conscious media complicity 
and more to the news values associated with journalistic choices about how to represent the 
war on television’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 154). Located in the wider, but under explained, 
contextual logic of a war, the use of the personal dramatic template offers a quickly 
understandable, retrievable and simplified framework through which to view the ongoing 
conflict. For television News journalism, and even more explicitly with regards television 
Current Affairs, this is the ‘perfect’ mix of form and (availability of) content. There are 
concrete examples of media templates significantly contributing to stories that are told, and 
importantly, their discursive function: 
The Pentagon’s embed (sic) strategy was ingenious because it increased rather than 
limited access to information. By giving broadcasters access to highly newsworthy 
action footage from the frontline, they were encouraging a focus on the actions of US 
and British troops, who would be seen fighting a short and successful war. The story 
was about winning and losing, rather than a consideration of context in which the war 
was fought. (Lewis and Brookes in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 299) 
 
Thussu (2007) maps out this apparent need or demand for action in relation to what he terms 
‘infotainment’: ‘Given the demand of television News for arresting and action-packed visuals 
and dramatic pictures, wars and civil conflicts are particularly susceptible to infotainment’ 
(Thussu 2007: 113). One can seamlessly and usefully apply and include the notions of the 
‘dramatic’ and the ‘action-packed’ visual spectacles and their relationship to ‘infotainment’ 
to my own analysis and analytical model.  
The characteristics of television itself structure the knowledge it communicates and, 
by extension, our understanding of the world. The medium lends itself to aesthetically 
appealing and dramatic representations but is less appropriate for logical and factual 
argumentation, discriminating descriptions of reality and in-depth analyses. (Ekstrom 
2002: 262) 
 
In fact, it returns us to some of the tropes of the televisual form more generally, and the 
demands of television journalism more specifically. The demands are for accessible footage, 
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comprehensible, easily understandable in the context of fast paced demands of news 
production; immediacy, recently happened/happening events that can be located in the 
context of the developing ‘story’; visual spectacle, action-packed, dramatic, lending itself to 
easy comprehension; visual narrative, easily identifiable events and persons. Crucially, this 
visual spectacle, partly because of the aesthetic limitations of the form have, over the last 
decade, tended to feature arresting, video games-style, graphics; images of ‘surgical’ 
precision, and ‘chat-show style use of “experts”’ (Thussu 2007: 115). Using a steady stream 
of ‘experts’ and, in conflict journalism, such ‘experts’ are usually drawn from the armed 
forces, bringing to the newsroom a degree of ‘first-hand’ knowledge, can render certain 
persons as knowable and perhaps trustworthy. By dint of shear repetition such personalities 
become familiar faces. Familiarity and recognition, standard tropes of television, adds to the 
personalisation of News and Current Affairs and is consistent with the ‘drift’ towards 
personality and characterisation. This is in part, explained by news as story  
The media are dedicated more than anything else to telling a good story … it should 
have heroes and villains, conflict (especially bloody conflict), interesting characters, 
and above all a major dose of drama. Many news stories are also constructed as 
episodes in an ongoing series (“The War in Afghanistan,” “The Struggle over 
Abortion”). The best episodes need to be sufficiently gripping so that the audience 
feels compelled to come back and see how the story resolves (Wolfsfeld 2012: 73) 
 
This is important in the context of this thesis given that such ‘drifts’ are a classic 
standard(ised) trope of ‘the dramatic’ and moreover, character and characterisation are the 
staple of television, audiences tend to return for character, not plot. In fact, it is redolent of 
Propp’s ‘character function in narrative structures’ a point to which this research will return 
in the next chapter.  
Returning to some of the formal, mechanical (representational tropes) and signifying 
characteristics of realist drama contained within Williams’ thesis, (see above) we can see, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that: contemporary setting; human action; social extension are readily 
found within News and Current Affairs broadcasts, and particularly so with regards war and 
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conflict. Furthermore, the ‘infotainment’ of Thussu’s thesis is similar, in style and content, to 
this research’s mapping of the dramatic. If we are to understand drama as a means of story-
telling; that frequently employ narrative conventions; and bearing a similarity to a situation 
or succession of events in real life that have the dramatic progression or emotional effect 
characteristic of a play, then these are surely all to be located within the Current Affairs texts 
that narrate, explain, expand upon and ‘tell the story’ of the build up to, the prosecution of, 
and the, until recently, continuing conflict in Iraq to be found on British public service 
television screens. ‘The dramatic visual spectacle of violence and death grabs attention and 
engages the audience like few other media subjects’ (Thussu 2007: 113). It is the ways in 
which this [tele]visual spectacle is frequently employed that bears close scrutiny and analysis.  
Developing Judith Butler’s ideas (discussed above), Chouliaraki analyses the 
spectacle of suffering (or lack of) on television within a framework of television as ‘space of 
appearance’ and within the ‘analytics and aesthetics of mediation’ (Chouliaraki 2006: 70). 
Located within the remit of the principles and practices of journalistic ‘objectivity’ and the 
aesthetics and principles of public sphere (public service) television journalism; ’The term 
“space of appearance” seeks to define the public sphere of television not only as a space of 
language and deliberation, but also as a space of image and visibility’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 
145). Accordingly: ‘In order to be acceptable for “public visual consumption,” spectacle and 
emotion on television need to be constrained and managed, in certain ways’ (Chouliaraki 
2005: 145) it is these constraining and ‘managing’ techniques and the effects of these 
techniques and practices that demand rigorous attention and critical scrutiny.  
As already noted, because of its domestic setting, its ‘nowness’ and its aesthetic 
limitations, television, and in this example, television Current Affairs is the ‘ideal’ medium 
for such constructions and ‘explanations’ of conflict. Drawing on already established news 
narratives, and inserting into the text, already legitimated images drawn from news 
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broadcasts, often no further contextualisation or explanation is required, precisely because the 
image or set of images supports, dramatically rendered, news narratives. Television Current 
Affairs therefore can be seen to promote an essential inhibited and oversimplified view of the 
past and people, ‘not just through its paucity of detail and brevity of language, but because it 
is increasingly dependent upon the visual image for its direction and narrative drive’ 
(Hoskins 2004: 115‒116). 
Television’s dependence on the visual sits seamlessly and easily with the rhetoric, the 
exaggerated and the dramatic story-telling templates;   
…one typical transformation is overstatement, which is of the same general category as 
over-generalisation as we know it from stereotypes and prejudices or ‘extreme case’ 
formulations in conversations. In addition to a change of semantic content or meaning, 
such a structural transformation relation between source discourse and news discourse 
may also be rhetorical, since rhetoric deals with the way information (meaning, content) 
is emphasised or de-emphasised for various reasons. This may be to emphasise the bad 
characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups … but also for dramatic effect: 
where scholarly discourse tends to hedge, media discourse tends to be much more 
categorical and exaggerated – with the tacit assumption that readers [viewers] will be 
more in, or will better remember the ‘exaggerated’ news. (Van Dijk in Wahl-Jorgensen 
and Hanitzsch 2006: 195) 
 
The aesthetics and visuals of television News and Current Affairs broadcasting, drawing on 
easily-sourced and memorable dramatic pictures, and rendered comprehensible by the 
accumulated audience knowledge, can, in this way function as a sort of rhetorical shorthand. 
It is not merely the ‘dramatic effect’ of Van Dijk’s thesis, which is always difficult to 
measure, but the dramatic tropes that are of interest, precisely because such representations 
render the ‘events’ and ‘characters’ ‘knowable’, understandable, familiar and recognisable. 
Or, in the case of Butler’s and Chouliaraki’s theses (echoing Foucault 1969), the limits of 
what is ‘speakable’, ‘liveable’ and ‘viable’ are effectively rendered visible (or not) by the 
mechanics and practices of television Current Affairs journalism and the perceived ‘values’ 
inherent within the discourse. What one effectively ends up with, is a model of broadcast, a 
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style that can render complex events legible. It is in this tradition that Altheide and Grimes 
(2005) developed what they refer to as ‘The “War Programming” model’. 
2.7 The War Programming Model 
In this model, Altheide and Grimes map out in some detail the patterns of reporting in the 
pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; and the post-conflict phase. These patterns and 
techniques include: the demonisation of certain individual leaders; a focus on the ‘battle’ on 
the ‘front-line’ during conflict, and a post-conflict shift to a more critical approach to the 
conflict and a questioning of the necessity of war. It is the pre-conflict phase that is most 
important in the initial stages of this study. As the ‘flagship’ Current Affairs ‘show’ 
Panorama played an integral role in, what Altheide and Grimes have termed the ‘media 
logic’ (2005) or the ‘ecology of communication’ (2005) and as McQueen has commented 
‘the media do not start the war, but they do shape the context, the audience expectations, the 
discourse and the production of symbolic meanings’ (McQueen 2009: 52). This ‘ecology of 
communication’ does not suggest an overt bias, nor does critique of it posit bias either. 
Rather ‘News becomes slanted not because of partisan bias on the part of reporters but rather 
because Western rules of “objectivity” lead the press to be beholden to elite, government 
sources’ (Aday, Livingston and Hebert 2005: 6). This echoes, of course, the already 
discussed notion(s) of news as discourse (Matheson), legitimated by ‘news voice’ 
(Schudson), the ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman) and of the ‘Primary Definers’ (Hall 1978a) see 
next Chapter. What all this means is that once, perhaps perfectly reasonable ‘media logic’, 
decisions are made to cover and report on elite government and policy-maker debates and 
actions, then the ‘War programming’ narrative becomes, at least partially, self-fulfilling, a 
self-fulfilling logic or ecology. ‘Journalists continue to be primarily messengers who mainly 
simplify and dramatize what their sources say and do’ (Gans 2004: xviii). 
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Gans’ suggestion here seems to be that war correspondents act almost as 
stenographers. This is perhaps a little difficult to sustain, however, as Altheide and Grimes 
suggest; 
…each new ‘war situation’ is presented by the producers as something unique and 
novel, while the informational and emotional context for relating to it is historically 
embedded in previous wars, often experienced mainly through the mass media. 
Analysis of news media coverage of previous wars indicates that each current war is 
greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience associated with 
previous wars, including demonization of the enemy, the virtues and necessity of 
waging war, and the social and political benefits of doing so. (Altheide and Grimes 
2005: 621–622) 
 
‘The “War Programming” Model’ does seem to suggest, if not overt complicity, then at least 
an adherence to a set of ‘professional’ practices inadequate to the task of ‘Holding power to 
account’ (Barnett 2011: 248). It does of course also fit the terms of this thesis that the second 
logic and pattern mapped out by Altheide and Grimes also discusses the importance of 
covering the ‘battle on the front-line’ (2005). This representational trope is entirely 
appropriate (for this research) in that the focus on battle readily lends itself to the ‘dramatic’. 
Signifying practices and representational modalities already firmly embedded, established 
and reproduced in a form of televisual representation more readily associated with dramatic 
fiction, can be, and are, easily appropriated and reproduced in News and Current Affairs 
broadcasting.  
Broadcasters found themselves irresistibly drawn into the action-packed drama of war 
against a rarely seen enemy: if Iraqi civilians were enigmatic, the Iraqi soldiers were 
almost invisible – rarely seen or discussed, but generally assumed to be supportive of 
Saddam. This left very little time for discussions about the war’s purposes or 
outcomes […] the great majority of reports, 92% on the BBC […] were simply about 
the coverage of war. (Lewis 2004: 305) 
 
This thesis, while making use of Altheide and Grimes’ War Programming Model (WPM), 
seeks to develop an additional discursive and critical frame through which ideological 
analysis can be undertaken. Where the WPM establishes a set of incisive and useful temporal 
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frames, this research develops the temporal, and constructs a rigorous additional frame that 
focuses on the dramatic templates and tropes employed in order to ‘tell the story(s)’. In all 
three narrative stages of this media logic, the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; the post-
conflict phase, different but related elements of the dramatic are accentuated. The stylistic 
devices, the signifying practices, the tropes of story-telling are akin to those commonly 
associated with dramatic or fictional accounts of events. But as we shall see, they are not 
merely present in Current Affairs broadcasting of war and conflict, they are in fact 
consistently a key feature, even its organising logic. Such signifying practices and 
representational tropes fit perfectly with the established values and practices of television 
journalism; the professional(ised) ‘news voice’ of journalism; and the aesthetics of historical 
and contemporary public service Current Affairs journalistic discourse(s). 
Said practices are also consistent with what Hoskins (2004) has called ‘Media 
memory’. Such practices and tropes play an increasingly important role in the defining and 
(re)production of events, places and peoples. ‘A logic’ of regretful necessity, of benign 
intervention is established.  As Altheide states ‘the informational and emotional context for 
relating to it is historically embedded in previous wars’ (Altheide 2009: 143). The extent to 
which the Panorama broadcasts end up reproducing this sense of regretful but necessary and 
benign intervention will be analysed in detail;  
…the pro-war camp were able to build on a well-established discourse about the 
depravity of the regime, and to stress the moral obligation to liberate the Iraqi people 
from such an oppressive dictatorship. While this did not provide the legal basis for 
intervention, it became increasingly important as a de facto justification for war. 
(Lewis 2004: 299) 
 
That support for such interventions is able to be mobilised is partly explained by the news 
journalists’ reliance on ‘official’ sources, already discussed, and easily retrievable narratives, 
characters, forms and aesthetic styles.  
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It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this change to a war mode of reporting. 
Claims and counter-claims about the justification for military intervention became 
secondary as attention turned to questions concerning the actual combat. Who’s 
winning? What does the battle look like? What does it feel like? How many of our 
people are getting wounded and killed? What’s the strategy? What weapons are being 
used? When will the ground war start? Will there be a cease fire? Are the Americans 
going to go after Saddam Hussein? (Wolfsfeld 1997: 182) 
 
Moreover, this reflects the previously discussed notion(s), mapped out by Gans, Wolfsfeld, 
Kitzinger, Altheide, McQueen and Lewis that refers more explicitly to established temporal 
and socio-political discursive frames. A more critically developed and nuanced understanding 
of the geo-political situation might be considered a necessary detail for anyone wishing to 
fully comprehend a developing war situation. Such understanding(s), and the means through 
which nuanced, critical perspectives and understandings might be mobilised, are not often to 
be found however within the frames and representational apparatus of Panorama. In the 
discourse of television Current Affairs broadcasting, it is far easier and more economical to 
simply rely on already existing templates, and the narrow perspectives such templates 
reproduce. ‘It is always much easier to create frames than to change them’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 
175), how much easier still to simply continue with the well-established frame, perhaps 
tweaked a little in order to ‘fit’ the developing situation, particularly when such frameworks 
rely upon and appeal directly to the theses of ‘law and order’ and the benign nature of 
Western intervention. Based on such assumptions (of benign and well intentioned, if at times 
‘badly planned’ or ineffectually prosecuted interventions (conflicts)), News and Current 
Affairs narratives seemingly require no further explanation or critical discussion. All the 
news consumer ‘needs’ to know is that there appears to be disruption and dislocation of the 
social order, somewhere and that ‘we’ will intervene to ‘restore order’.  
The disruption of social order is a recurring theme of news stories, identified by 
Herbert Gans (1979) as an important value in the news. That value is underscored on 
television. Opening with attack and disruption is the beginning of a good news story. 
Dramatic conflict, especially visually depicted, is exciting and gains the attention of 
the viewer, as the crisis unfolds, the viewer remains engaged, waiting to see how it 
will be resolved. Crisis is made to order for television news reporting of the 
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developing world, because little or no background information is needed to 
encapsulate an exciting story. (Andersen 2006: 72) 
 
2.8 ‘The War on Terror’ Narrative 
The most developed framework of the last decade has been the ‘War on Terror’ narrative. 
Little, if any, extra background information, at least within the narrow confines of News 
media and Current Affairs, is required when the ‘War on Terror’ is the explanatory narrative. 
This is not to suggest that the ‘War on Terror’ receives no critique or overt criticism, it has 
been critically interrogated by, among others, Altheide (2006, 2009), Price (2011, 2013), 
Hodges (2011), Entman (2004), Butler (2005, 2009), Solomon (2005), Cottle (2006), Jackson 
(2005), Freedman and Thussu (2012), Moeller (2010), and Allan and Zelizer (2002, 2004) 
but in the context of News and Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly Current Affairs 
broadcasting that deals with conflict, it functions as the explanatory format. Even when 
subjected to questioning, or when reduced to background detail, there can be little doubt that 
it at least places the forthcoming or ensuing social disruption and conflict in an easily 
understandable, ‘necessary’ story and framework. What begins, or certainly could at least be 
more fully explained, nuanced, textured and differently framed, becomes by causal link (of 
course unfounded) a matter of defence against ‘terror states’ in the developing and unfolding 
‘War on Terror’ narrative.  
It is as this point we can see how the Bush administration and its allies have exploited 
the elliptical nature of the news media’s influence on public opinion. Those involved 
in advertising – our culture’s most abundant persuasive discourse – have long 
understood that you make claims not by argument but by association. You do not say 
that a product will make you attractive or popular – such claims may be proved 
untenable – you simply associate the product with attractiveness or popularity. In the 
same way, those making the case for war with Iraq would juxtapose it – vaguely, 
intangibly, but repeatedly – with the war on terrorism. For a public with a limited 
knowledge of geo-politics, these associations become the building blocks for making 
sense of the world. (Lewis 2004: 297) 
 
In a piece of research that is not explicitly ‘Political science’ but one rooted in Media, Culture 
and Journalism, the point here is not (necessarily) to offer overt critique of actions taken but 
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to notice and critique the lexical, semiotic, discursive choices and consequently to ask 
questions regarding the applicability of the phrase ‘The War on Terror’ as narrative or 
legitimising phrase. Adopted uncritically, the term functions as a legitimising phrase used to 
justify a range of different approaches to a range of different contextual (and actual) fields. 
The number of different events to which such a term is applied bears scrutiny. Used across a 
range of different actions, territories and events, whether Syria, Georgia, Pakistan, Yemen, 
Israel/Gaza, or as in this case, Iraq, all with their own geographical, political, social, cultural 
contexts, does the phraseology serve to actually define the context, or merely to sweep up 
different actions too broadly into a dominant narrative arc, thus erasing the local contextual 
(battle) field? 
Because the ‘War on Terror’ narrative exists beyond the immediate confines of the 
Iraq conflict, once present, in fact dominant, it can be seamlessly linked with forthcoming 
and ensuing conflicts. Post September 11
th
 2001, ‘the meaning of terrorism changed from a 
method to a condition of the world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626). 
If, as stated here, terrorism shifts exponentially from a mere technique to something 
akin to a constant state, a ‘condition of the world’ then it is not too difficult a task for elite 
political actors and the(ir) agents of dissemination to construct ‘our’ response to ‘terror’ in a 
similarly urgent manner. What I mean by this is: if terror is a constant, and moreover, an all-
encompassing, all consuming, all pervading state (of our very conditions of existence) then 
the ability to move beyond this state, to move outside, are curtailed to such an extent as to be 
considered impossible. Journalistically and televisually, the discursive ‘logic’ is set.  
What has changed, since September 11, 2001, is the ability of this discourse 
(discourse of terror/terrorist states) to engage public opinion, making terrorism highly 
newsworthy and a key area of public concern. If the problem of terrorism can be 
linked to the need to take military action, it provides a rationale for military spending. 




The ‘rational’ response of Western governments’ and the similarly ‘rational’ agents of 
dissemination (in this example, broadcast Current Affairs broadcasting in the form of 
Panorama) are trapped in a circular logic. Western military actions become mere responses. 
Responses to the all-pervading violent, irrational, inconsolable state and ‘condition of the 
world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626). ‘Suddenly, from a technique that is available to any 
organisation, state or “non-state”, which has access to the means of coercion or intimidation, 
terror(ism) becomes something entirely alien to democracy’ (Price 2010: 23). 
This inconsolable state and condition is located within the discourse of fear, of the 
maniacal ‘Other’ (Said 1978), marked against the rational agents of western states. ‘The Gulf 
conflict represents an excellent example in which the news media enthusiastically adopted the 
authorities’ law and order frame and virtually ignored the injustice and defiance frame being 
promoted by the challenger’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 170). So the Iraq conflict beginning in 2003 
was, and continues to be characterised by the rationale of the ‘War on Terror’ and a ‘law and 
order’ frame and its logical extension: the assumed ‘values’ inherent in the ‘benign’ and 
necessary Western intervention. 
Given the focus on ‘Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programme’ that 
dominated the build up to the 2003 conflict, the ‘law and order’ frame was easily mobilised 
and perfectly able to fit within the war programming model, or the crisis mode of reporting 
(Wolfsfeld 1997). Once breached, this mode of reporting proves rather difficult to retreat 
from.  
Research on “news decision making” suggests that commercial news organisations’ 
tend to select items and events for news reporting that can be told in narratives that 
express ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small town 
pastoralism, individualism, modernism, social order, and national leadership (Gans 
1979; Wasburn 2002). In other words, reports are favoured that sustain news 





This particular reading and approach fits perfectly within the realm of what Chomsky and 
Herman might term the bounds of acceptable opinion (1988) and what we might refer to as 
the discursive limit;  
…the media are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of balance and 
objectivity when a conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing the 
ability of government to achieve the goals it has set. (McQueen 2010: 64) 
 
As Cottle (2006), Lewis et al. (2006), Altheide and Grimes (2005), and Barnett (2011) 
discuss, once conflict is underway, reporting the war becomes about immediacy and drama. 
The needs of the story, to depict the heat of the battle, as opposed to the ‘light’ of analysis, 
take precedence over any need or desire to adequately contextualise the bigger picture. With 
regards the BBC Current Affairs output there are precedents. Most notable perhaps was the 
case of the Panorama programme covering the ‘arms to Iraq’ scandal that engulfed the 
Government of the day.  Due for broadcast in January 1991: 
Birt unilaterally pulled the programme, not because he had any problem with the 
integrity or accuracy of the journalism but because, in his own words, ‘I was 
extremely concerned that the BBC should maintain the trust of the British people at a 
time of war’. (Barnett 2011: 120) 
 
One of the interesting things to note with regards ‘maintaining the trust of the British people 
during a time of war’ is the internalised and embedded journalistic ‘logic’ that trust is 
somehow maintained by concealing, delaying, subverting or just plain absenting issues of 
socio-political and geo-political importance from public service Current Affairs output. 
However, we can take this further. The reproduction of not only the content but the method of 
dissemination then serves to reinforce dominant idea(s) about what constitutes a reasoned and 
reasonable ‘response’ to the constant ‘condition of the world’. The extent (or existence of) 
these ‘threats; the response(s) to said threats; and, most of all, the limitations prescribed by 




…thus reports will be less favourable or sensible to audiences if they suggest that the 
institution of government has failed, that the process of selecting leaders is corrupt, 
and that decisions about life and death, such as declaring war, are made with neither 
the national interest in mind, or with the well-being of citizens as a priority. (Altheide 
and Grimes 2005: 629) 
 
This has wider philosophical, political, social, cultural and professional (journalistic 
discourse) ramifications. The desire for wider critical ‘self’-examination, of systems and 
values, perhaps considered ‘innately’ superior and thus ‘exportable’, is not easily located. 
Conversely, the assumption regarding a level of institutional governmental corruption of 
‘Othered’ societies is well established. A narrative that ‘they’ require ‘our’ benign 
intervention (the new Divine Intervention) to free them from the despotic, irrational, 
undemocratic, regime under which they labour, is, given this context, very easily mobilised. 
Of crucial importance in this mobilised narrative is the erasure of wider social, geo-political, 
military/industrial contextual detail. By this I mean: any trace that ‘we’ might have some, 
even minor, role to play, or have played, in this ‘institutionally corrupt’ ‘regime’, in its 
foundations, its perpetuation, its underpinning, its (covert) financial support via the 
instruments of oppression (torture; military machinery; diplomatic support and aid; compliant 
marketisation of economy; etc.) is almost entirely absent. Absented by (geo)-political and 
ideological ‘necessity’ (sic) it might be but, it is surely the task of critical broadcast Current 
Affairs journalism, such as the exemplar, Panorama, to critically interrogate this position. 
Therefore, this research asks the question: to what extent is this near total absence (of 
counter-hegemonic narratives) a condition of the televisual and journalistic practices, 
aesthetics and discourses of the Current Affairs form? News journalism’s (particularly on 
television) most repeated trick is the erasure of historical and contextual detail. This erasure 
seems to be particularly acute when such detail represents ‘us’ in less favourable light. The 
extent to which this can be explained by journalistic news values; news gathering techniques; 
the practices and belief in the ‘impartiality’ principle found in ‘public service’ and ‘public 
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sphere’ broadcasting; the dramatic templates; the aesthetics of television journalism; the 
established frames; and concomitant ‘values’ such broadcasting practices (re)produce, will be 
analysed and critically interrogated in detail during the course of this thesis. For the purposes 
of this thesis, and the position it sets out, these analytical frames serve as a demonstration of 
the social and cultural power of dominant, accepted and established practices, media forms 
and codes and conventions of broadcast, and the(ir) concomitant ability to establish then 
reproduce particular interpretations and representations of various crises.  
2.9 Panorama as Exemplar of the Form 
As has been outlined in Chapter 1, given that the very currency on which Panorama trades is 
precisely that it has been and continues to be a critical perspective that ‘digs behind the 
headlines’ (Holland 2006: xiii) how do the specificities of the ‘War Programming Model’ and 
the ways in which ‘dramatic’ modes of representation are used, work in this contextual 
frame? The extended timeframe (each Panorama episode analysed in this research is 50 
minutes in length) is purportedly designed to provide a level of detail, critique, explanation, 
investigation and wide-reaching critical interrogation of those in power and the decisions that 
they make. To what extent Panorama is commensurate with ‘objective’ (or ‘impartial’) 
journalism; embodies the traits and tropes of television Current Affairs practice; and is 
related to the wider rationales found within television News, is one of the central questions 
this thesis sets out to examine. The extent to which Panorama functions discursively, as a 
‘constraining and managing’ (Chouliaraki 2005: 145) text, and the journalistic and dramatic 
tropes it employs in order to ‘tell the stories’ of conflict (in Iraq) will be critically examined. 
In short; whether, under scrutiny, Panorama functions as a rigorous examination of the 
powerful (Lindley 2002) or as a necessary fig leaf of critique. Or whether criticism and 
scepticism are allowable (even encouraged) but within acceptable limits (Chomsky 2003). 
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‘Criticism is included within the overall discourse of War Programming; it has a place, but 
not larger than is warranted by a script that has emerged through numerous interactions 
between journalists and politicians over several wars’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 630). Over 
the coming chapters I will attempt to map out this terrain and interrogate the extent to which 
Current Affairs broadcast journalism, specifically Panorama, is seen to be upholding the 
practices and ‘values’ of ‘objective’, ‘impartial’ journalism. For if it is still the case that;  
…television matters because it remains central to people’s lives, and television 
journalism matters, partly because it still commands proper resources and mass 
audiences, and partly because it upholds the central tenets of professional practice: 
truth telling and holding power to account. (Barnett 2011: 248) 
Then are said ‘central tenets’ and ‘professional practices’ adhered to by Panorama adequate 
to the task they have been set, and are largely assumed to uphold?  
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
While there is a reasonably long and well-established history of ideological analysis of 
television News, and, what is more, some focused lengthy analysis of the BBC’s tendency to 
take a consensual approach to news reporting, and, notably, that the BBC News reports tend 
to produce misunderstanding because of a lack of context, most notably Philo’s 1990 Seeing 
and Believing: The Influence of Television and Philo and Berry’s 2004 Bad News from Israel, 
there is a lack of focused attention paid to, and analysis of Current Affairs television. As 
discussed above, regarding the term (and practice) there is an elasticity, a flexibility to the 
‘genre’ of Current Affairs television journalism. As such, often, it either entirely disappears 
as a form to be analysed, or, more frequently, it is conflated with that of the News genre. 
While of course sharing some subject, content, journalistic and stylistic conventions with 
television News, the form or genre is, as discussed above, however different. These 
differences and similarities need to be foregrounded and identified precisely because the 
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forms function differently. So, there is a paucity of academic studies into the ‘long(er) form’ 
journalism that is Current Affairs broadcast television. Equally problematic though is the fact 
that, the longest running Current Affairs broadcast strand in the world, one largely 
acknowledged as the BBC ‘flagship’ brand, Panorama is almost entirely overlooked in 
academic (and popular) analyses. The fact of this lack of attention is somewhat surprising, 
and is an oversight that demands to be addressed. Other than Lindley’s 2002 (non-academic) 
book Panorama: Fifty Years of Pride and Paranoia, the only other significant book length 
study is David McQueen’s (as yet unpublished) PhD, BBC TV’s Panorama, conflict coverage 
and ‘Westminster Consensus’ (2010). This research makes occasional reference to 
McQueen’s work (he kindly made his PhD available) and where there are similarities, not 
least the focus on Iraq, and the general findings that the coverage tends to be favourable to 
(Western) political elites (in McQueen’s language ‘The Westminster Consensus’), these will 
be acknowledged. However, there are marked differences. Firstly, combining a number of 
frames and approaches, not least my own focus on the dramatic elements and discursive 
focus, means this research develops an original and quite different methodology. Using, but 
developing Altheide and Grimes War Programming Model, the methodological approach 
here seeks to examine the discourses, the televisual and journalistic practices, and assess the 
preponderance of dramatic signifying practices employed. In so doing, this research is an 
attempt to construct a critical and systemic analytical and methodological approach to the 
analysis of Current Affairs broadcast journalism. While the analytical and discursive focus 
remains specifically trained on the BBC (and Panorama in particular), and conflict coverage, 
it is proposed that the developed methodology and methodological frames will provide an 
original analytical approach suitable for being applied across a range of Public Service-
oriented Current Affairs ‘journalism-led’ (Holland, P. 2001. 149) broadcasts, and, 
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additionally, an analytical frame, a methodological approach that is applicable across a range 
of subject matters (not merely Conflict programming).  
This chapter has sought to locate my own developing research in the context of the 
relevant academic literature in the field(s). The academic literature engaged with is that 
which principally concerns itself with:  
Television – as form, as domestically located, further, that its representational tropes are 
dominated by the genre of ‘Realism’.  
Television News – it’s formal characteristics and tropes. 
Current Affairs broadcasting – its generic flexibility and inexactitude, its style, its relation to 
the News genre, and as demarcated from News. 
Journalism – the discourses of journalistic practices, the languages, the source-relations.   
The Public Sphere – its currency and validity. 
Public Service Broadcasting – it’s relation to the Public Sphere, its relation to televisual 
forms, its adherence to ‘impartiality’ and the extent to which this adherence is sufficient, or 
whether such adherence amounts to a narrow discursive formation.  
The contemporary trend for ‘Infotainment’ in News and Current Affairs broadcasting – the 
contemporary focus on entertaining forms for explaining complex events. 
The ‘War on Terror’ – the extent to which this forms a dominant explanatory format in the 
early twenty-first century.  
The ‘War Programming Model’ – the efficacy of this mode of analysis with regards critically 
interrogating Panorama and its coverage of conflict.  
All of the above establish a thread, a framework, and lead to my own focus on the various 
aspects of the ‘dramatic’ elements that are employed by Panorama in order to tell the story of 
the Iraq conflict. This thesis will assess and analyse the extent to which, whilst adhering to 
(restricted by) the tenets developed and enshrined within professionalised journalistic practice 
and principles of ‘impartiality’; Adhering to and restricted by the aesthetic limitations of the 
televisual form, and further; in utilising the tropes and characteristics of ‘the dramatic’, 
Panorama might be said to discursively reproduce both journalistic and societal normative 
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‘ideals’. Such normative ideals though, instead of rigorously challenging the powerful, 
dominant, hegemonic interests, are instead perfectly commensurate with perceived ‘values’ 
of western hegemony and (the always unspoken) imperialist interests. 
Having outlined, discussed and analysed much of the complimentary academic 
research in this chapter, in the next chapter I will not move on to discuss the theoretical 





Theoretical Overview and Methodological Approach 
Having located this research in the context of the BBC, its adherence to notions of 
impartiality, and the generic specificities of Current Affairs; and having identified, critically 
interrogated, and located my own research within much of the academic scholarship in the 
field(s) relating to my research, the purpose of this chapter is a) to develop, outline and 
provide a critical overview of some key theoretical terms, and to discuss the ways in which 
said key terms are applicable in the context of my research. Chief among the theoretical terms 
are the notions of the ‘archetype’ and its relation to ‘stereotypes’ and dramatic forms of 
representation; the ways in which ‘Primary Definers’ are used and functionalised in Current 
Affairs broadcasts and discourse; the ways in which such practices effectively reproduce 
already-existing narratives and ‘hegemony’; b) to clearly identify, discuss and outline the 
research methods most apposite to my task. The following chapter will also identify and 
examine the methodological approach best-suited to analysing the television Current Affairs 
form, and outlining the overall theoretical approach the remainder of the research adopts.  
3.1. Key Terms and Theoretical overview 
Given that one of the main focal points and key contributions this thesis will make centres on 
the somewhat unexpected use of drama in Current Affairs broadcasting, this section will map 
out some of the key theoretical terms. It will be argued and demonstrated that the use of 
drama and related dramatic signifiers – the like of which one tends to expect to ordinarily 
find in fictional(ised) accounts and representations – are here employed in Current Affairs 
broadcasting. In so doing, the question arises: does the Current Affairs strand Panorama 
essentially reproduce hegemonic discourse? And if so, how? In order to outline and discuss 




3.1.1. Primary Definers 
As discussed in the previous chapter, News is made-up of institutionally recognised and 
legitimated social actors and sources. By ‘actors’ in this context I mean those in various 
positions who take key decisions. In the tradition of Media and Cultural Studies, these 
sources are referred to as ‘Primary Definers’; 
In the main, journalists position themselves so that they have access to institutions 
which generate a useful volume of reportable activity at regular intervals…[these are] 
professional ideological rules in journalism. The important point is that these 
professional rules give rise to the practice of ensuring that media statements are, 
wherever possible, grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from 
'accredited' sources. This means constantly turning to accredited representatives of 
major social institutions. (Rock in Hall et al. Policing the Crisis 1978: 60) 
We know that News (and Current Affairs) perform(s) a vital social function, and according to 
Wollacott: 
The news' performs a crucial role in defining events, although this is seen 
as secondary to the primary definers: accredited sources in government and other 
institutions. The media also serve 'to reinforce a consensual viewpoint by using public 
idioms and by claiming to voice public opinion (Woollacott 1982: 109) 
 
In this light, building on the ideas articulated by Hall et al, Wollacott, and Tuchman, Aeron 
Davis goes on to comment; 
Journalists, in attempting to fulfil ‘public interest’ aims and present authoritative 
accounts, purposively seek out those who already appear knowledgeable, authoritative 
or representative. As such they reinforce as well as reflect power imbalances by 
awarding such ‘primary definers’ greater visibility and legitimacy. (Davis 2007: 40) 
 
According to this logic, said sources primarily define the event itself, the narrative 
orientation, the spheres of influence, and, importantly, the parameters of (legitimate) debate. 
In this context then, the frame(s) are primarily defined by both institutional sources of 
primary information (officially designated and trusted sources/voices) and secondarily, those 
definers of dissemination (journalists as ‘secondary definers’), both of which, when 
combined, engage in a mutually beneficial, or symbiotic relationship. If the institutional and 
structural relationship between Primary Definers (accredited, legitimated sources) and 
90 
 
‘Secondary Definers’ (journalists and reporters) is relatively fixed, then this symbiotic 
relationship between sources and reporters will effectively go some way to circumscribe the 
limits and parameters of debate.  
However, is the relationship, the interaction and interrelation between ‘Primary’ and 
‘Secondary Definers’ that neat and tidy? Are there complexities and difficulties? Does the 
very notion of the primary definer assume too much passivity on the part of the journalist or 
reporter? Does the assumption of the Primary Definer and its primary role in journalistic 
reportage overlook or side-line competing interests even among elite sources? Does it provide 
no room or space for journalistic agency? In this light, there are a number of criticisms 
levelled at Hall et al’s notion of Primary Definers, most notably by Schlesinger and Tumber 
(1994). These ideas are discussed below.  
3.1.2 The Problem(s) with ‘Primary Definers’ 
Schlesinger and Tumber identify six issues, flaws or at least overlooked and less than 
satisfactory assumptions with the Primary Definers framework. Given this thesis’s overall 
concerns and partial reliance on the idea and frame, I will discuss each point in detail as they 
relate to my research, below. 
First, the notion of ‘primary definition’ is more problematic than it seems. The broad 
characterization offered does not take account of contention between official sources 
in trying to influence the construction of a story. In cases of dispute, say, amongst 
members of the same government over a key question of policy, who is the primary 
definer (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258) 
 
According to this first point then, the notion of the ‘Primary definer(s)’ overlooks or 
‘does not take account tension of contention’ among elite sources as to who and which 
version of events, the ‘primary definition’ will emerge. It might in fact be particularly the 
case when the issue is a highly contentious and dangerous one of global conflict, in which 
case, the above may well be pertinent to this case study. It is certainly true that in some of the 
sample episodes there is some visible (televised) contention and dispute among elite ‘primary 
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definer’ sources, some of whom are members of the same government. However, across the 
sample, the primary and hegemonic definitions do dominate. Straw, Blair, assorted military 
sources and commanders, US policy-makers, individual soldiers, chiefs of staff et al literally 
‘have most to say’ (Van Dijk. 1993 in Wetherell 2001), are not consistently challenged, 
certainly not ideologically so, and even when subject to some critique or minor challenge, the 
challenge is phrased and framed as one of practicalities, and not counter-hegemonic or 
ideological. Even with some notable moments of dispute and contention, the extent to which 
the overall objectives, and the view of ‘us’ are remarkably similar, such that even if not easily 
traced as emerging from easily identifiable ‘primary definers’ there simply is a primary 
definition, an assumption of (hegemonic) benign intent. So even if and when there are ‘cases 
of dispute, say, amongst members of the same government over a key question of policy’ 
(Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258) what remains dominant (or hegemonic), certainly in the 
sample collated and analysed here, is the ‘benign intervention’ thesis.  
Second, the formulation of Hall et al, fails to register the well-established fact that 
official sources often attempt to influence the construction of a story by using ‘off-
the-record’ briefings – in which case the primary definers do not appear directly as 
such, in unveiled and unattributable form (Schlesinger and Tumber. 1999. 258) 
 
With regards the above criticism, while ‘off-the-record’ briefings can of course shape 
policy and narrative orientation, they can alter things in the background, in the sample 
collated and analysed in this research, there are no discussions or mentions of ‘off the record’ 
sources. Perhaps this is usual, after all, ‘off-the-record’ might mean exactly that. However, 
usually, when such briefings are present, they are at least acknowledged even if the ‘source’ 
is not directly identified. In the many hours of coverage included in this research, there are no 
references to such sources, they do not appear. Equally important however is that in the 
period of conflict, perhaps imbued with desire for ‘World Statesman’ status, most sources 
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were only too happy to ‘own’ the policy, thus ‘off-the-record’ briefings were seemingly 
redundant. 
The third criticism bears some close resemblance to the second, insofar as it revolves around 
potentially competing elite sources: 
Drawing of boundaries of primary definition…presumably, primary definition is 
intended to include all consensually recognised ‘representative’ voices. But access to 
the media is plainly not equally open to members of the political class. PM’s and 
presidents routinely command disproportionate attention and politicians may also use 
media strategies to gain attention for themselves in competition with others. There is 
nothing in the formulation of primary defining that permits us to deal with such 
inequalities of access amongst the privileged themselves. (Schlesinger and Tumber 
1999. 258-259) 
 
While the above has merit, they are correct, the formulation seemingly does not allow for 
dealing with ‘inequalities of access amongst the privileged elites themselves’, this research – 
as an analysis of discourse - is chiefly concerned not necessarily with the processes of 
selection (of sources) but with their dominant presence on screen, in the narrative, as ‘those 
with most to say’. As the analysis goes on to demonstrate, it is the extent to which clearly 
identifiable ‘primary definers’ are present that is important. By dint of their presence (and 
dominance), particularly those with the highest profile, able to help ‘set the agenda’ on the 
screen itself that identifies specific actors to be ‘primary definers’ and not the relationship 
between them and the Panorama journalists. This research is interested in the final ‘product’ 
(content), not necessarily with process of selection itself. Many that ‘have the most to say’ in 
fact end up saying remarkably similar things. Thus, Primarily Defining the parameters of 
debate and the subsequent narrative orientation. 
Fourth, there is the unconsidered question of longer-term shifts in the structure of 
access. Writing in the 1970’s, it may have been obvious to talk of the CBI and the 
TUC as major institutional voices. But with the disappearance of corporatism in 
Britain under successive Conservative Governments, such interests have lost their 
one-time prominence. What this point reveals is the tacit assumption that certain 
forces are permanently present in the power structure. It is thus an atemporal model, 
underpinned by the notion that primary definers are simply accredited to their 
dominant ideological place in virtue of an institutional location. (Schlesinger and 




The ‘atemporal’ point is interesting and certainly important. Does the model assume too 
concrete and immovable structural conditions? For instance, in the ‘neoliberal era’ the 
formerly institutional voice and presence of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) might indeed 
be less legitimate, (though of course the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) remains 
preeminent) it certainly plays a smaller, less significant role in public, political and 
journalistic life, but who replaces it? What I mean is that even though the ‘atemporality’ point 
has credence and relevance, it is not as if the TUC has now been replaced (in the journalistic, 
sourcing relationship) by a more radical group? The TUC have not been replaced by the 
radical coalition of Marxist Accountants. In part, a version of this argument has already 
featured (see Chapter 1) insofar as, post Bretton-Woods, the wider social, economic and 
political forces that emerged, means that the BBC had already shifted focus towards those 
same forces – and (as) sources – that dominate public discourse. As former BBC labour and 
industrial correspondent, Nicholas Jones has documented, labour correspondents became 
something of a ‘lost tribe’ replaced by a stream of ‘city’ and ‘business correspondents’ 
(Jones, N 2011). What this means is that while the individual and institutional relations might 
fluctuate, hegemonically, things stay the same (or even get worse). 
So, using the above critique, in our example of the Iraq war, who precisely could or 
would provide a contrary institutional voice. Who becomes or is cast as an oppositional 
‘accredited’ ‘legitimate’ social and political actor? Parliamentary opposition was muted other 
than the ‘usual suspects’. When the assorted ‘Peace movements’ were cited – and in fact, as 
we shall see, actually featured in Panorama: Blair’s War – they were largely delegitimated 
and ‘cast’ or characterised as rather maverick, and on the ‘fringes’ of society. As such, in the 
Panorama sample, they might serve a useful and necessary (impartiality) function, but they 
remain largely cast aside, on the ‘fringes’ of debate. To assume that mere presence in the 
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broadcast is equivalent to having the ability to help set an agenda is mistaken. Mere 
protagonists are manifestly not the same as Primary Definers. They never quite achieve the 
position of a legitimate or ‘significant strand of thought’ 
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/pdfs/Section_04_Impartiality.pdf). 
Schlesinger’s and Tumber’s fifth explicit criticism revolves around passivity and the 
seeming lack of journalistic agency: 
The media are characterised as a subordinate site for the reproduction of the 
ideological field: in effect, they conceived as ‘secondary definers’…Hall et al tend to 
overstate the passivity of the media as recipients of information from news sources: 
the flow of definitions is seen as moving uniformly from the centres of power to the 
media…Aside from seeing the media as excessively passive, this way of conceiving 
of their relations to news sources tends to elide the variations that exist within and 
between different news media. Access for ‘alternative’ viewpoints differs as between 
the press and television, and indeed, as between different newspapers. (Schlesinger 
and Tumber. 1999. 259) 
 
Again, while this point is certainly interesting and potentially important, this research is 
chiefly concerned with what actually appears on screen as the final ‘product’. No doubt there 
was a degree of scepticism, some agonising over angles’, approaches, challenges but the end 
point, the discourse that appears is largely, if not exactly uniform, then at least hegemonic 
and uncritical of Western imperialist power (the term seems totally disavowed). It is also true 
that the expectations might in fact suggest some semblance of conflict would in fact make for 
‘good television’ but there is seemingly little call or need for conflict, for drama between ‘us’ 
when the Iraqi ‘Other’ serves up a far more compelling set of contrasting characters and 
narrative orientations.  
The final critique from Schlesinger and Tumber revolves around:  
…the conception of the ‘primary definition’ renders largely invisible the activities of 
sources that attempt to generate ‘counter-definitions’. This rules out any analysis of 
the process of recognition about policy questions between power-holders and their 
opponents that may occur prior to the issuing of what are assumed to be primary 




Again, in practice this may well indeed be the case – in fact, television, reliant, as it is, 
on the ‘dramatic’ might be more inclined to represent arguments and ‘counter-definitions’ 
than other forms of representation precisely because such ‘counter-definitions’ set up 
moments of character conflict, and ‘plot twists’. Nevertheless, the actual discourse on 
display, the dominant (and largely hegemonic) discourse(s) present never really gain much 
counter-hegemonic momentum. For example, there are some notable moments of dispute as 
to Primary Definition in the episode: Panorama: Blair’s War in which Ken Clarke features as 
highly-critical of ‘Blair’s War’. However, this narrative and character is easily embedded 
within ‘parliamentary’ politicking. As a Conservative, Clarke is expected to challenge Labour 
Government. Also, his presence does not puncture the Primary Definition too fully, his 
character, his position as protagonist but not ‘Primary Definer’ functions as a mere addendum 
not a counter-hegemonic narrative arc. The contention around primary definition in this case, 
is not one of dispute as to whether ‘we’ ought to prosecute war against Iraq. There is certainly 
some critique and contention allowable and present in the sample. The ‘Primary Definition’ is 
instead the assumption that – even if mistaken – ‘our’ motivations are/were wholly benign 
and well-founded. This is definitively linked to notions of hegemony and to characterisation 
and archetypes. It might very well be possible to concede some dispute, some contention, 
some disagreement on some minor policy goals, or means of achieving certain policy goals, 
but the hegemonic – which the next section discusses – remains precisely that.  
So perhaps the notion of the ‘Primary Definer’, at least on first reading, may appear to 
place the media in too subordinate or passive a position in relation to their sources. However, 
given that the focus of this research is not necessarily concerned with the detailed sourcing 
processes journalists go through, but is instead ‘textual’ and discursive, then some of the 
criticisms by Schlesinger and Tumber adroitly identify are less relevant here. What I mean is 
that this research is not overly concerned with the processes the journalists go through in 
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order to source the information. At the analytical stage of this thesis, the decisions have been 
made, the evidence is before us, what is on screen before us, and the hegemonic narrative it 
reproduces is the chief concern of this discourse analysis. High-profile and already-
legitimated sources seemingly provide a relatively easy access route to official and 
legitimated opinion, positions and policy options, in the example of the data captured here, 
while not being wholly in-hoc to them (Primary Definers) said elite sources certainly 
dominate. This assessment is, in some ways, consistent with Hallin’s critique: 
...the routines of objective journalism, which tied the news closely to the official 
sources and the Washington agenda, and the ideology of the cold war, which locked 
events in a framework of understanding that made fundamental questioning of 
American foreign policy unthinkable. (Hallin, D 1986. 110. Emphasis added)  
 
In his case study of Vietnam, Hallin explains ‘that television coverage was highly dependent 
both on official sources in Washington, and probably more important in the early years of the 
war, on military sources in Vietnam’ (Hallin, D. 1986. 111). Such practises, it is argued, have 
the effect of placing the war beyond ‘the sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin, D. 1986. 
111). Nearly 50 years later, broadly similar themes seem to be present here. 
While many of the critiques and criticisms regarding the theoretical and practical 
issues with the term ‘Primary Definers’ are valid, the extent to which the presence in the 
Panorama sample of (assumed) Primary Definers is consistent. This means the use of the 
term, critically but nevertheless still deployed, is relevant here. This is to not suggest that 
Primary and Secondary Definers, with their ability to ‘reinforce as well as reflect power 
imbalances’ (Davis, A. 2007) can wholly explain Panorama’s largely hegemonic discourse. 
The point here is to analyse the extent to which Panorama deploys particular dramatic 
elements and techniques, and whether such techniques hegemonise particular discourses and 
epistemologies. Is Panorama able to build-on the established characters and archetypes of 
dramatically rendered Primary Definers? The extent to which both Primary and Secondary 
Definers adhere to a series of hegemonic narratives is striking. The discourses in the 
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examples contained in this research are almost wholly uncritical of Western power (assuming 
its general benevolence) meaning that to some extent, the term(s) have critical and 
explanatory validity and currency in this research. The (relative) straightjacket of 
‘impartiality’; the ‘News Values’ orientations of recency, clarity and unambiguity; the 
televisual demands and requirements for narrative structure(s), archetypes and narrative 
closure; the over-reliance on ‘key legitimated sources’ all combine to produce a discourse 
largely in-line with many of the dominant Primary Definer political actors. Importantly, as 
discussed by Schlesinger and Tumber (above) even when there are, even among the elite 
political and social actors, some competing narratives, this ‘competition’, this apparent battle 
for narrative dominance never translates into overt critical interrogation of the assumed 
benevolence of Western power. Or, to put it another way: even when there are competing 
narratives from (notionally) competing Primary Definers, it is rare that counter-hegemonic 
discourse(s) emerge, solidify, perpetuate or gain the necessary legitimacy or currency. To 
adopt the BBC charters own terms, the competing narratives and voices are rarely awarded 
the status of ‘significant strands of thought’; or ‘main strands of argument’, never really 
permitted to challenge the existing legitimated ‘strands’. In other words, the battle for 
narrative prominence (even dominance) is often conducted as an ‘inter-elite’ (Davis 2003) 
struggle, and one that never transforms into anything close to counter-hegemonic. Primary 
Definition ‘sets the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the problem is’ (Hall, 
S et al. 1978. 59) and what (and who) the problem is in these examples turns out to be 
remarkably consistent across the sample.  
3.2  Television Journalism, Current Affairs Discourse and Hegemony 
 Both because it directly relates to the above discussed notions of elite actors Primarily 
Defining the political, economic, social and cultural landscape, and because it provides a vital 
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analytical frame and helpfully explains a number of issues this thesis concerns itself with, the 
concept of hegemony is vital. Simply put: 
Hegemony describes the general predominance of particular class, political, and 
ideological interests within a given society. Although society is composed of varied 
conflicting class interests, the ruling class exercises hegemony insofar as its interests 
are recognised and accepted as the prevailing ones. (White, M. 1992. 167) 
 
Principally then, that ‘ruling class interests are recognised and accepted as the prevailing 
ones’ is the chief concern. The various means by which such interests are naturalised, 
normalised and secured as common-sense is then of vital interest.  
As Barker (below) outlines, the hegemonic model (of analysis) provides a framework 
for understanding and interrogating cultural (media) ‘products’’ propensity for securing 
hegemony or at least reproducing ruling class interests as analogous with all our interest.  
Within cultural studies the hegemonic model has been popular. Any given culture is 
constructed in terms of a multiplicity of streams of meaning. However, it is argued 
that there is a strand of meanings that can be reasonably called ascendant or dominant 
(Hall, 1981; Williams, 1973). The process of making, maintaining and reproducing 
these authoritative sets of meanings and practices has, after Gramsci (1968) been 
dubbed cultural hegemony (Barker, C. 2008. 319) 
 
One of the most important discussions around the concept of hegemony lies in its covert or at 
least concealed nature. What I mean by this is that ruling-class interests are seemingly able to 
institute themselves as common interests, or ‘common-sense’. Convincing (a) subaltern 
class(es) to acquiesce in their own oppression, disenfranchisement or at the very least to 
operate in ways that actively disenfranchise, and act in ways which harm their (our) own 
material interests, is remarkably prevalent. However, how are such things achieved? How are 
they able to persuade a mass of people to acquiesce?  
Some clues as to how are elucidated by (among others) Lawrence Grossberg. He 
explains that hegemony is not:  
…limited to the ideological struggle of the ruling class bloc to win the consent of the 
masses to its definitions of reality, although it encompasses the processes by which 
such a consensus might be achieved. …Hegemony need not depend on the consensus 
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nor consent to particular ideological constructions. It is a matter of containment rather 
than compulsion or even incorporation. (Grossberg, L. 1996. 163) 
 
Herein lies one of hegemony’s key facets. It is precisely because coercion is not required, 
indeed for Grossberg, not even consent, but ‘containment’. What are the methods of both 
persuasion and containment and where can one readily find examples?  
Some answers can be located precisely in the unique mix of the journalistic and the 
televisual found in Panorama. One of the journalistic containing mechanisms can be found in 
the already discussed notion of Primary Definition, and Primary (and Secondary) Definition 
is inextricably linked to the idea of cultural hegemony, for, as Barker explains:  
Within a hegemonic model, ideological processes in news production are not the 
result of direct intervention by owners or even a conscious attempt at manipulation by 
journalists. Rather, they are an outcome of the routine attitudes and working practices 
of staff. (Barker, C. 2008. 319 emphasis added) 
 
The above ‘routines’ and ‘working practices’ certainly has echoes of Tuchman’s 
institutional(ised) ‘strategic rituals’, and latterly with Aeron Davis’s work on financial 
journalists: that in order to do their job, journalists routinely and consistently ‘purposively 
seek out those who already appear knowledgeable, authoritative or representative. As such 
they reinforce as well as reflect power imbalances by awarding such ‘primary definers’ 
greater visibility and legitimacy’. (Davis 2007: 40). It is through this kind of frame, at least in 
part, that this research operates and seeks to examine Panorama. 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is important for introducing and reconfiguring notions 
of cultural as well as political leadership because it privileges civil society and hence 
the element of consent rather than coercion’ (Landy, M. 1994. 58) 
 
Precisely because hegemony is not operationalised through coercion, but through ‘consent’ 
and/or ‘containment’, and being non-coercive, but instead persuasive, the flagship broadcast 
journalism text Panorama requires critical interrogation and analysis. The extent to which 
Panorama might be said to, at least partially, operationalise, concretise, temporarily secure 
and reproduce hegemonic discourse by, among other things, ‘the attitudes’ and working 
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practices of staff’ (Barker, C 2008. 319), and the narratives and discourses produced by such 
practices, must be examined. Having a well-established legitimacy, and utilising the 
televisual tropes of the form, Panorama can certainly be ‘persuasive’. However, by 
restricting counter-hegemonic voices, while simultaneously foregrounding Primary Definers, 
Panorama can also perform a ‘containing’ function: ‘the definition of the alternatives is the 
supreme instrument of power’ (Schattschneider 1960: 68 in Perloff 2014: 121). Does 
Panorama then function as a hegemonic text?  Or is there sufficient space provided for 
counter-hegemonic discourse(s) to emerge, take shape, institute themselves, to become 
‘issues of common concern’ (Habermas) or, ‘significant strands of thought’ (BBC)? These 
are some of the questions this thesis sets out to examine. 
3.3  Television and Narrative Structures and Drama 
Televisually, one of the means through which ‘containment’ is operationalised, might be 
found through the presence and examination of the traditional ‘narrative structure’ first 
identified then systematically theorised by Vladimir Propp. These narrative structures appear 
to be consistently applied, and consistently appear across different story genres:  
Propp’s work (1968) provides the most extreme example of syntagmatic structuralist 
analysis. He analysed one hundred Russian folk tales and found an identical narrative 
structure in each of them (Fiske, J. 1987. 135) 
 
According to this analysis, an identical structure is common to dramatic (or dramatized) 
stories. As Livingstone (1990) outlines: 
Various partially compatible schemes exist for understanding narrative, many 
prompted by Propp’s (1968) scheme for folk tales. Propp realised that apparently 
diverse stories all draw upon a constant underlying structure. This structure has a 
standard set of character roles (hero, villain, magical helper etc.) and a standard event 
sequence (setting, discovery of a problem or lack, hero sets out on a journey, and so 
on until the goal is reached and overcoming of the lack is celebrated). (Livingstone, S. 
1990. 74-75) 
 
If the above prognoses – that ‘apparently diverse stories all draw upon a constant underlying 
structure’; and that ‘…this structure has a standard set of character roles (hero, villain, 
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magical helper etc.) and a standard event sequence’ – are true, then Propp’s model could 
provide a workable analytical and practical schema for understanding perhaps all story 
genres, including television representation, and even that found in the notionally non-
dramatic, such as Current Affairs. The characters that feature in Current Affairs tend to be 
‘the hero’; ‘the villain’ with perhaps the media in general functioning as ‘the dispatcher’, the 
one who makes the evil of the villain known and sends the hero off in pursuit.  
Furthermore, Propp’s classical narrative structure could provide evidence that 
television representation effectively acts to ‘contain’ alternative or subaltern narratives. 
‘Functions of character serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how and 
by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of a tale.’ (Propp, 
V. 1968. 20) By seeing in Propp’s model – ‘standard set of character roles… standard event 
sequence’ – a critical televisual (drama) template, a critical analysis of the discourse of 
Panorama can shed light on the extent to which the ‘constant underlying structure’ is present 
even in television Current Affairs broadcasting. This is not to suggest that Propp’s overview 
provides an exact template in this research, merely that the narrative structure form, and the 
characters identified in the classic folk tale, can, and perhaps have, provided a useful template 
for many dramas – on television, and beyond. If said constant underlying structure is present, 
what are the representational, televisual, journalistic and wider ideological ramifications? In 
the context of this research, are there identifiable ‘constant underlying structures’ and 
‘standard character roles’ through which the stories of Iraq are told? Do they go some way to 
Primarily Define a largely hegemonic narrative? And if so, is there a lack of sufficient space 
devoted to counter-hegemonic narratives? 
3.4  Narrating and representing the story through Archetypes and/or Stereotypes 
 To address the question of the means through which the stories are told, we need to 
identify some of the particular televisual and television journalism mechanisms or practices 
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commonly deployed. Given that one of the main focal points of this research is oriented 
around drama, dramatic forms of representation, and that such forms are a perhaps 
unexpected means of story-telling and communication in the high modality form of Current 
Affairs broadcasting, it is vital to undertake an overview and analysis of specific televisual, 
narrative and dramatic tropes. Propp’s model is instructive with regards the ‘standard event 
sequence’ the ‘constant underlying structures’ and ‘standard character roles’ but also in terms 
of the notion of the archetype. According to McKee (1999), an archetypal form of storytelling 
differs from that of the stereotypical in particular ways: 
The archetypal story unearths a universally human experience, then wraps itself inside 
a unique, culture-specific expression. A stereotypical story reverses this pattern: It 
suffers a poverty of both content and form. It confines itself to narrow, culture-
specific experience and dresses in stale, non-specific generalities…an archetypal story 
creates settings and characters so rare our eyes feast upon every detail, while its 
telling illuminates conflicts so true to humankind that it journeys from culture to 
culture…stereotypical stories stay at home, archetypal stories travel. (McKee, R 1999. 
4) 
 
The most illuminating excerpts from the above quote are the ideas that ‘stereotypical stories 
stay at home, archetypal stories travel’ meaning that the notion of the archetype is able to 
embed itself more fully, more roundly, and with more nuance than that of the stereotype. 
Archetypes can, via recognition, find a sympathetic audience who can relate to the specificity 
of each character, while simultaneously recognising their applicability and universality: 
‘archetypal stories unearth a universally human experience’ (McKee. 1999. 4). The 
archetype, and its apparent universality is an important theoretical frame in the context of 
understanding Panorama’s methods of storytelling. If and how does Panorama represent the 
‘universal human experience’ through the deployment of the archetype? Or perhaps, to 
rephrase it: does Panorama tell the story(ies) of the Iraq conflict through ‘universal’ 
archetypes? Does Panorama hegemonise a particular perspective through ‘universal(ised)’ 
archetypes, and what is more, what might the wider ramifications be?   
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According to this schema then, it seems probable that one finds, in all representation, 
the presence of the classic structuralist narrative forms. In the context and discourse of this 
research, they are a key element of what we might refer to as dramatic tropes (in television). 
Contained within the model of the classical structuralist narrative, Propp’s account of 
character functions is instructive: 
Propp called these narrative morphemes ‘functions’ because he wanted to emphasize 
that what they do to advance the narrative is more important that what they are. …the 
narrative functions are, according to Propp, always in the same sequence and they are 
common to all fairy tales, though not every tale will have every function. (Fiske, J. 
1987. 137) 
 
In classic television drama such as ‘Soap operas’ with its longevity, its regularity on screen, 
and in our homes on a (more than) weekly basis, there tends to be a consistent cast of 
characters with whom the audience identifies as regular and knowable characters. In this case 
then, ‘what (and who) they are’, is important. However, Panorama has an irregularity (at 
least in terms of subject matter), its subject matters change, no consistent News event 
schedule is present, thus it has fewer regular consistent characters. As such, the ‘narrative 
morphemes’ their ‘functions’ and ‘what they do’ are ‘more important than what they are’. 
Does Panorama storytelling adhere to this form? As has already been discussed (see Chapter 
2), Current Affairs, in part because of its close relationship with news, with the news values 
of immediacy and unambiguity; because it trades on the fact it is ‘current’, particularly when 
telling stories of conflict, tends (has?) to deploy certain storytelling templates. News 
templates are a vital part of the Current Affairs Journalism representational repertoire. In this 
regard, archetypes, drawing on their own version of a (character) template, serve a useful 
televisual and dramatic shorthand function, and are the perfect complement to the journalistic 
shorthand described above. Recognisable archetypes anchored in and by news templates are 
effectively a symbiotic match.  
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However, even the notion of the archetype might be problematic. As we have seen, 
McKee asserts that archetypes ‘travel’, and that they say something ‘universal about human 
experience’. However, in contrast to McKee’s assertions of the value(s) of the archetype, 
Gray (2008) instead asserts that the archetype itself is, or can at least become, just a(nother) 
form of shorthand:  
Over time, too, television’s various cartographers have learned bad habits from 
previous shows and writers, and thus many stereotypes and regressive depictions have 
become archetypes. A stereotype is a fixed, reductionary image of a particular type of 
person, whereas an archetype is a stock character of the storyworld, used to save a 
writer in establishing motivation and psychology. When archetypes take on 
stereotypical overtones, the storyworld becomes invaded by prejudicial and 
demeaning images. Sadly, though, television has developed numerous archetypal 
characters with worrying depictive potential…while such characters serve an 
archetypal role within the given programme, reflected out to reality, they serve a 
stereotypical role (Gray, J. 2008. 106-107) 
 
While archetype is certainly a more nuanced and perhaps more judicious term than that of 
‘character’, given that the genre under scrutiny and analysis in this research is explicitly not 
drama per se, but that (as this research claims) has elements of dramatic representation, do the 
‘characters’ in Current Affairs broadcasting ‘travel’? Or are they ‘reductive’? As Gray attests, 
‘When archetypes take on stereotypical overtones, the storyworld becomes invaded by 
prejudicial and demeaning images’ (Gray. 2008. 107) is the distinction somewhat blurred in 
any case? Given the discussion above regarding the requirements of Panorama to tell a 
sometimes-complex story, one with contemporary relevance and currency, in an 
unambiguous way, there are certainly elements of stereotyping in the Panorama sample. 
Similarly, while there is certainly evidence to suggest an attempt to be more rigorous, more 
‘impartial’ and to provide a more rounded and nuanced story in Panorama, it is also true that 
‘while such characters serve an archetypal role within the given programme, reflected out to 
reality, they serve a stereotypical role.’ (Gray. 2008. 107). Who, in the representational 
repertoire is afforded the characterisation of one who ‘unearths a universally human 
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experience…(who) illuminates conflicts so true to humankind’ (McKee. 1999) and one who, 
contrastingly, is reduced to ‘a vivid but simple representation that reduces persons to sets of 
exaggerated, usually negative, character traits’ (Barker. 2004. 188).  
 One of the classic television genres that successfully deploys archetypes is that of 
the ‘cop show’ and/or ‘police procedural’. In some ways there are marked similarities here 
between the representational form of Panorama with that of the classic ‘police procedural’ 
drama, and with some elements of the ‘cop show’ genre. The Police Procedural is 
characterized by the lack of emphasis on the character's personal lives but with an increased 
focus on the nuts-and-bolts of law enforcement. Whereas the classic ‘cop show’ tends to 
depict an idealised representation of police work, one in which the police officers or 
detectives concerned are individually inspired and use significant individual prowess in order 
to ‘get their man’. The focus on individual(isation) and personal character(isation) and 
investigative prowess are a classic of this dramatic genre. The question is, to what extent are 
these elements of the genre applicable to the Panorama broadcasts analysed here? Rarely are 
the ‘heroes’ of police procedurals or cop shows the site of complexity or moral ambiguity, is 
the same true in these instances of Panorama? It should be stated that it is not the intention 
here to suggest that the producers, writers, journalists, editors and directors of Panorama 
deliberately and explicitly set out to replicate or imitate the genres, such a claim would be 
impossible to prove, highly unlikely to actually be the case, certainly beyond the remit, and 
not the intention of this research. The case being made here is that, particularly post the Birt 
revolution in BBC news and Current Affairs, the four units approach; the ‘mission to explain’ 
with all the attendant shifts away from documentary journalism such moves engendered, the 
very mechanics, the now established tropes of Current Affairs, and multi-modal forms of 
expression so easily and seamlessly found on television drama, make recourse to such 
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representational modes an obvious choice with which to communicate the message[s] and tell 
the sometimes complex stories.  
 Aside from US show(s) Homicide: Life on the Street (1993-1999) and The Wire 
(2002-2008), and in the UK The Cops (1998-2000), in which socio-political, ideological, 
characterisational, and economic complexity is foregrounded, typical Police Procedural and 
‘cop shows’ operate through reinforcing and reproducing hegemonic discourse. They are in 
fact, remarkably similar in structure to Propp’s classic narrative structure: 
Traditional television ‘cop shows’ achieve meaning through symbiosis between 
ideological assumptions and dramatic structure – the ‘beginning’ involves disruption 
to the status quo by a ‘deviant’ agency (the villain); the ‘middle’ is occupied with the 
police procedural as the villain is identified by a usually ‘maverick’ detective hero; 
resolution involves the apprehension of the villain, the neutralisation of the threat he 
poses to the status quo (coded here as ‘law and order’), and, since the audience is in 
tacit agreement that he is justly ejected from ‘legitimate’ society, the verification of 
that society as ‘right-thinking’ and valid. (MacMurraugh-Kavanagh 2000 in Carson 
and Llewellyn-Jones) 
 
One of the questions to pose in this research is, does Panorama operates through using 
similarly simplified, semiotic, televisual, journalistic and dramatic mechanisms and 
representational forms?  
 There is an extent to which the two dramatic genres (Cop Show, Police Procedural) 
are combined in the Panorama broadcasts devoted to conflict. As with the ‘cop show’ and the 
police procedural which, in place of examining the structural conditions of society as 
necessary (and partial) ‘causes’ of (some) crime(s), the focus is on procedure and/or 
individual pursuit. In Panorama, in place of a critical interrogation of the structural 
conditions and considerations of, for instance, the neo-imperialist and neoliberal ambitions of 
the US/UK (Western) coalition, Panorama’s focus, tends to home in and focus on a 
combination of individual stories, characterisation and narrative arcs. Using the above quote 
as the template for Police drama, we can clearly trace and find many of the same tropes, 
‘heroes’ and ‘deviant’ agents within the texts of Panorama.  
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Whatever the relative merits of archetypes, and the extent to which they significantly 
differ from stereotypes, what remains important in this research is that some form of 
recognisable ‘type’ exists and is deployed in Panorama. Both Archetypes and Stereotypes 
tend to function (or be functionalised) as a series of relatively stable representational forms 
that are consistent over time. 
The traditional narrative pattern, as discerned for example by Propp’s narratology 
(Propp 1968), sees the forces of stability engaged with those of disruption. In this 
view a problem or force threatens the equilibrium in the social formation at the outset 
of the narrative only for order to be restored by the end, typically in Western culture 
by the agency of a white male protagonist. (Nelson, R 1997. 33. Emphasis added). 
 
That they exist, are present in a genre typically associated with truth, accuracy, and 
impartiality needs to be critically interrogated. Whose equilibrium? Who are the dominant 
hegemonic social and political actors that define said ‘equilibrium’ and who or what are 
‘disruptive’ agents who threaten the ‘equilibrium’? Who or what forces or agents ‘restore 
order’? What would constitute ‘Order’? In the Panorama sample, what matters is the extent 
to which the representational affordances of archetype and stereotype are (or are not) equally 
distributed.  
3.5  Television, Journalism and Emotion 
Given that there is here a focus on the dramatic elements typically employed by and 
on Television, and that what this research refers to as character (whether through archetype, 
stereotype or a more nuanced and developed representation), plays an important role in 
orienting and driving a narrative, communicating ‘message(s)’ what then of television and 
emotion? What role might the ‘sincere performance of emotion’ (Ellis 2009) play in 
encouraging a viewing audience to engage in the narrative, via an emotional connection with 
those present on screen? Though this research does not deal explicitly with audience 
engagement, it is not extensively discussed in this research, there are, unsurprisingly given 
the nature of conflict, examples of emotion in some of the broadcasts. Though its 
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manifestation is, perhaps surprisingly, rare, on occasion, (particularly in the conflict and post-
conflict phases) it is clear that the emotionally literate performance(s) of some key characters, 
is present, and that such televisual emotional literacy does journalistically, ideologically and 
televisually assist in underscoring and reproducing the overall discourse of the broadcasts. On 
occasion, the televisual performativity, the emotional literacy of (some of) those people cast 
in Panorama, helps to carry the story(line)?  
Given that Panorama has a public service obligation for the communication and 
analysis of often difficult and complex situations and events, how best to adequately 
communicate complexity while simultaneously adhering to its PSB obligations? For if, as 
Ellis writes, ‘Television has given visibility and prominence to the emotional’ and that ‘TV 
has enabled us to take a close look at people who previously were distant or invisible.’ (Ellis, 
J. 2009. 103), then how do the two (emotion; visibility of previously invisible) marry 
together? Such visibility of the previously distant or invisible is of course one of the key 
claims public service television makes for its vitality, its continuing validity and its ability to 
provide the ‘window on the world.’ One of the principle contentions of this research of 
course is that the main mechanism(s) deployed, are that of dramatic codes and conventions. 
When dealing with, and telling complex events and storylines, Current Affairs broadcasting, 
often reverts to kind of storytelling template. Echoing this notion of a journalistic template or 
shortcut, in research based on an ethnographic study of journalists in Finland and 
Netherlands, Mervi Pantti reveals that many journalists themselves acknowledge the role 
emotions, and emotional expression can play: 
Emotional expression is seen to provide an intellectual shortcut for telling a story: 
‘[Emotion] is an element that is in fact very suited to telling a really big story in a 
very short time, sometimes even in a few seconds’ (reporter home affairs 1, NOS)’ 




Within these sets of dramatic signifying practices, these storytelling templates, the 
representation of emotion can play an important role. Perhaps understandably, as Wahl-
Jorgensen writes, on occasion, and perhaps with increasing regularity, journalists effectively 
‘outsource’ the storytelling to protagonists: 
…unavoidable subjective appraisals are carefully managed through a distinctive series 
of discursive strategies…there is a strategic ritual of emotionality in journalism which 
operates alongside the strategic ritual of objectivity, drawing on some of its practices 
and enabling what is often profoundly emotional story-telling to emerge through a 
form of ‘outsourcing’ of emotional labor to the subjects of the stories. (Wahl-
Jorgensen 2013: 130) 
 
There are occasions in which this ‘outsourcing of emotional labour to the subjects of the 
stories’ is present in the Panorama sample(s). In fact, this should not surprise us, for as Pantti 
(again) writes:  
It has also been claimed that emotion has gained more ground in news reporting, to 
the extent of becoming a new ‘news value’ Recent events such as 9/11 have been seen 
to accelerate a trend towards embracing emotion as a legitimate part of the journalistic 
culture (Tumber and Prentoulis, 2003: 228. (Pantti. 2010. 169) 
Therefore, the previously discussed News Values considered vital in this research, namely: 
‘immediacy or recency’, ‘unambiguity’, ‘availability of pictures’ has another potential News 
Value ally – emotion. Is emotion(ality) a key trope of Current Affairs broadcasting? As I 
wrote above, particularly given the nature of the event, there are some moments of emotional 
expression, the outsourcing of ‘emotional labour’. This is particularly true of one post-
conflict broadcast (see Chapter 6) and when this occurs, it will be discussed. In short, 
emotion and emotional literacy, though surprisingly rarely represented, is occasionally 
present and when it is so, it will be discussed and contextualised as one small element of the 
dramatic frame(s) this research situates as a key part of Panorama’s discursive and 
representational repertoire.  
3.6 Discourse and Epistemology 
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When assessing the various and varying possible methods available, one must take account of 
what it is precisely one hopes to demonstrate, prove, achieve or at least critique. One must 
also take note of previous studies in the field, identifying both the strengths and the flaws 
contained with previous work. As discussed, academic scholarship in Current Affairs 
Television broadcast journalism is rather scant, what research does exist, while excellent, 
does not apply a critical discursive approach. Given the topic and the temporal focus, a 
Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seems to be the most useful and applicable 
for the needs of this research. Chiefly because: 
Critical discourse analysis is critical in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of 
discursive practices in the maintenance of the social world, including those social 
relations that involve unequal relations of power. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 63) 
 
Undertaking critical analysis of Current Affairs broadcasting thus requires a rigorous 
theoretical framework. This chapter will outline the theoretical template, the methodological 
approach and the rationale for selecting a specific form. In short, this chapter will map out an 
explanation regarding the theoretical frame in order to ensure that a suitably applicable and 
rigorous lens is cast on the object(s) under scrutiny.   
Discourse, Foucault argues, constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of 
our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and 
reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate 
the conduct of others. Just as discourse rules in certain ways of talking about a topic, 
defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write, or conduct oneself, so also, 
by definition, it ‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting 
ourselves in relation to the topic of constructing knowledge about it. (Hall 1997 in 
Wetherell et al. 2001: 72) 
 
Taking the above statement as a starting point, we can readily postulate that if discourse 
simultaneously defines and limits ways of speaking about topics and events, then an 
analytical model that has at its heart an understanding of this and of the practical limitations 
discursive formations impose upon public knowledge and understanding of events is a 
necessary resource. Additionally: 
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Discourse never consists of one statement, one text, one action or one source. The 
same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any 
one time (what Foucault called an episteme) will appear across a range of texts, and as 
forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within society. However, 
whenever these discursive events ‘refer to the same object, share the same style and 
… support a strategy … a common institutional, administrative or political drift and 
pattern’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984: 84‒85) then they are said by Foucault to belong 
to the same discursive formation. (Hall 1997 in Wetherell et al. 2001: 73) 
 
This being the case, the theoretical framework needs to take account of the ways in which 
different texts, but from within the same (and similar) canon or genre, can be said to 
epistemologically produce a discursive formation (or, discursively produce an epistemology 
of Iraq), and, what is more, what such discursive formations essentially limit. The CDA 
approach used in this research is able to cast a consistent critical lens on a very particular set 
of television journalism practices, on the flagship Current Affairs strand Panorama, and 
across an extended temporal frame (19 months) to assess the extent to which, even while 
‘fronted’ by different journalists, dealing with different events in the Iraq War (pre-conflict 
phase; conflict phase; post-conflict phase), the sample (of 10) broadcasts over the time period 
can be said to constitute a discursive formation. Do the sample texts constitute a consistent 
(dramatic) story-telling method of communication and inform(ation)?  
Logonomic systems have rules that constrain the general forms of text and discourse. 
Such systems often operate by specifying genres of texts (typical forms of text which 
link kinds of producer, consumer, topic, medium, manner and occasion). These 
control the behaviour of producers of such texts, and the expectations of potential 
consumers. Genre-rules are exemplary instances of logonomic systems, and are a 
major vehicle for their operation and transmission. (Hodge and Kress in Wetherell et 
al. 2001: 295) 
 
Hodge and Kress identify an important idea in the context of this research. Discussing both 
the ‘behaviours of producers’ and ‘expectations of consumers’ they highlight the ways in 
which both production and reception are themselves discursively loaded. Dealing, as it does, 
with television broadcast journalism in the form of Panorama, this research notes that it 
remains important to take account of the intended (and likely) audience. Given its position in 
the social, political, journalistic and cultural environment, Panorama therefore draws its 
112 
 
likely audience from a particular class or group(s) with significant cultural and social capital 
(Bourdieu 1986). The content is thus devised with those constituencies in mind. Is such a 
constituency sufficiently wide when it comes to the case of the Iraq war? Given the level of 
vocalised scepticism from large swathes of ‘the public’ surely a wider range of opinions 
would be sought and included within the texts?  
As already stated, the Panorama texts for study will be limited to ‘Special Investigations’ 
that deal with Iraq from September 2002 until April 2004. The 10 texts selected for critical 
analysis have been chosen precisely because the debate about the Iraq conflict (in the pre-
conflict phase); the ongoing but short conflict (the conflict phase); and the fall-out from, and 
the ‘rebuilding’ of  Iraq (the post-conflict phase) were all broadcast at a time of intense social 
and political debate. Furthermore, war and conflict Current Affairs events and coverage are 
also considered (perhaps quite rightly) as highly securitised, dangerous, and subject to issues 
of ‘national security’. Therefore, the selection(s) of source(s), the central protagonists 
featured in the broadcast(s), and the values, legitimacy and authority attributed to them is an 
important ideological, discursive and contextual feature. Who has authority to speak, and on 
whose behalf? Who is disavowed? Who is excluded and why (if we can know why)? When/if 
alternatives are represented, how so? What value and character is attributed to them?  How do 
legitimate and delegitimized figures feature within both the micro-narrative of individual 
broadcasts and across the range of texts dealing with (broadly) the same issue? If and how 
alternative voices do feature across the ‘range’ is there a shift in tone, narrative and 
characterisation as the situation (actual combat operations for instance) develops? All of the 
above can be analysed using a CDA method.  
To remain credible and responsible in times of social upheaval, journalist may need to 
cover alternative groups (students, feminists, anti-war protesters) and thus be partly 
pulled to an alternative ideological direction. In this way, hegemonic frames may slowly 
shift if such coverage wants to be credibly consistent with how the world is perceived. 




The requirement for journalists to engage in such hegemonic shift or ‘drift’ is certainly an 
important point that bears closer scrutiny. For instance, how do dominant and mainstream 
news operations credibly cover, what at certain times seem to be cases of large scale social 
upheaval? We can assess such discursive features by way of a more contemporary example.  
During the Higher Education protests of autumn 2010 – and into spring 2011 – the 
BBC News covered the protests in some detail. The evening BBC News broadcast at 6:00 pm 
on November 10
th
 2010, informed the watching public in the following way: ‘Thousands of 
students have clashed with police at Westminster today during a mass demonstration against 
plans to increase university tuition fees in England’ (BBC Six O’Clock News: November 10
th
 
2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=he51eQBYrNM) followed by pictures of gathering 
students (and UCU staff members). This single sentence and the accompanying imagery can 
be analysed using the critical discourse model. Despite the fact that the protest was co-
organised by the National Union of Students (NUS) and the University College Union (UCU) 
the ‘objects’ of news coverage were the gathering thousands of students. That only students 
were mentioned is significant. It allows a very specific act of categorisation. Students as 
represented in this instance are denied a certain legitimacy (albeit a rather loose legitimacy 
that is often applied to ‘striking’ union members). Secondly, and discursively most important, 
is what the news story elides. In the above example, repeated ad infinitum from that moment 
onwards, was that the protest was entirely concerned with the ‘rise in tuition fees’. While this 
is and was certainly a concern, what this particular discursive formation ‘achieves’ (the 
epistemology) is to represent those protesting as merely disaffected consumers of education, 
as if the students are merely unhappy at the potential cost. The actual protests, surely at least 
in part, were centred around the 80% cut in the teaching funds available to universities. In the 
Arts, Humanities and Social Science subjects the cut in the teaching fund was (and is) in fact 
100%. The protests were in effect against the de facto privatisation, personalisation and 
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financialisation, in protest against the total transformation of Higher Education in the UK. 
However, that part of the story was erased, and has been absented from that point on. The 
story is now one of cost benefit analysis, fees and consumption.  
3.7 Critical Discourse Analysis 
For the questions this research is concerned with, the most apposite approach for analysing 
Panorama is critical discourse analysis (CDA). From the outset, one must of course identify 
and acknowledge that all methods and approaches are necessarily limiting. CDA should be 
seen clearly as an approach, as opposed to a methodology. By which I mean, CDA says, 
‘these are the tools we have, and what we can do with them’. It is an iterative, a general and 
generative approach to analysis of texts and their related ideologies, what we might call a 
critical ideological stance. In this way, CDA helps us understand texts and their ideological 
underpinnings. It is an ideal approach for providing a ‘toolkit’ that allows a level of detailed 
analysis that other methods do not, and yet it works in a complimentary way with other 
methods. For instance, in this research, the Primary definers – who they are (the meso) - help 
give us a toolkit for the CDA (the micro-analysis). Then when measured across a large 
sample, we can make reasonable and rigorous assertions regarding the wider structural issues 
(the macro).  
It should also be noted here that such a theoretical approach should not be seen as 
politically or ideologically neutral, but as a means of intervening in the construction of the 
social, political and cultural world.  
Critical discourse analysis does not … understand itself as politically neutral (as 
objectivist social science does), but as a critical approach which is politically 
committed to social change. In the name of emancipation, critical discourse analytical 
approaches take the side of oppressed social groups. Critique aims to uncover the role 
of discursive practices in the maintenance of unequal power relations, with an overall 
goal of harnessing the results of critical discourse analysis to the struggle for radical 




In this respect, the analysis begins from a position that assumes Panorama itself is similarly 
not neutral but is in fact discursively and ideologically compromised. This is not to suggest 
that this particular broadcast strand is biased per se (if we take bias to mean a deliberate 
attempt to deceive of persuade) but that: 
…news making is based on cultural routines and professional practices that are taken 
for granted and hence implicit and hard to observe directly. Analysis of news talk is 
therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of 
journalists. (Van Dijk in Wetherell et al 2001: 196) 
  
However, what is posited here is that precisely because, 
 
…journalism, in its various forms, is clearly among the most influential knowledge-
producing institutions of our time. Renderings of reality are produced and published day 
in and day out, with unparalleled penetration. People obtain knowledge of the world 
outside their immediate experience largely from mass media, where journalistic content 
predominates. (Ekstrom 2002: 259) 
 
It is therefore incumbent on social science, media scholars that are so inclined, to pay critical 
attention to the role such powerful social and communicative forms of information gathering 
and dissemination continue to enjoy, and, to what end. Such focused attention and scrutiny is 
of course required at all times but is perhaps particularly urgent when scrutinising the 
representations and assumed policy goals pertaining to war and conflict. CDA provides a 
theoretical framework that pays explicit attention to, and takes account of ‘discursive 
practices, through which texts are produced (created) and consumed (received and 
interpreted)’ which ‘are viewed as an important form(s) of social practice which contributes 
to the constitution of the social world including social identities and social relations’ (Phillips 
and Jorgensen 2002: 61). Furthermore an examination of the televisual forms and modes of 
address, journalistic practices (relations with sources and the perceived legitimacy of elite 
sources), news reporting templates, the ‘War Programming Model’ (Altheide and Grimes 
2005); the ‘operational units’ favoured by BBC News and Current Affairs during this period, 
the visual and linguistic tropes, and the over-determined dramatic characters and dramatic 
templates identified, provides a clear Current Affairs broadcast template that CDA is best 
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placed to scrutinise.  The analytical model seeks to ‘uncover the role of discursive practices 
in the maintenance of unequal power relations’ (Fairclough 1989 in Phillips and Jorgensen 
2002: 65). With this in mind, and with this critical approach, this thesis asks questions 
regarding the BBC and neutrality; the place of Panorama both within and beyond the BBC; 
the role of Current Affairs broadcasting and how it differs and is demarcated from News; the 
construction of particular identity formations, ideologies and narratives, and furthermore, the 
role such broadcasting plays in the reproduction of power. For if, as is suggested here, News 
and Current Affairs are discursive formations, then in what way might such practices restrict 
debate? Do they, by adhering to practices internalised as ‘best practice’ effectively reproduce 
hegemony ‘the work of hegemony, all in all, consists of imposing standardised assumptions 
over events and conditions that must be “covered” by the dictates of the prevailing news 
standards’ (Van Dijk in Wetherell et al 2001: 197). Of vital importance for this research is the 
fact that a CDA method and approach is able to provide the requisite tools to undertake micro 
(individual broadcasts) and macro (across the sample, generic) analysis. 
In the build-up to and subsequent fall-out from the Iraq conflict, and the increasing 
rhetoric directed towards Iran, ISIS and Syria, the need for critical, interrogative media is 
acute and, in fact, urgent. This thesis will therefore limit its scope to a critical discursive 
analysis of programmes dealing specifically with conflict, or the war time narrative. 
Furthermore, it can certainly be argued that Current Affairs broadcasting is a necessary 
adjunct and plank of democracy. News and Current Affairs broadcasting has the ability and 
capacity to ‘hold power to account’, the extent to which it does so is one of the principle 
questions of this research;  
…the media have accumulated a level of influence through their control of the flow of 
information, such that they vie with the more traditional political channels in the 
process of pluralistic power bargaining, creating agendas … the media must be 
viewed as agencies with semi-autonomous influence over politics. This is the basic 
reason that the study of news production is essential, the public must become more 
aware of the news as a political process; yet the media have only the most primitive 
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capacity to examine themselves critically. (Kline 1976 reviewing Altheide, D., 
Creating Reality: How Television News Distorts Events) 
 
According to Kline, news media organisations and operatives are (largely, though one 
presumes not wholly) incapable or unwilling to critique their own practices and forms. 
Consequently, analysis of the discursive formation of this resource (Current Affairs media 
texts) by media scholars is necessary as (an)other form of democratic accountability. CDA 
tracks form(s), styles, imagery, language, patterns, practices, sourcing and the generic 
characteristics of form. Precisely because CDA not only focuses on individual texts, but 
extends the analysis to entire genres, what links them and what divides them, means it is the 
ideal theoretical approach. Understanding the ways in which both the signifiers and the genre 
specific signifiers ascribe value(s) to statements, officials, statements by officials, imagery, 
sources, et al. is of paramount importance, not least when the genre under scrutiny remains 
the principle means through which intricate geo-political discussions, decisions and 
narratives are imagined and brought into focus. Whereas discourse analysis (DA) restricts its 
focus to what merely appears in the text(s), CDA extends the focus to what might be erased. 
In other words, CDA assumes that other salient points, issues, debates, characters, and 
narratives might be elided, not necessarily through any conspiratorial manoeuvring, but 
instead through the demands and practicalities of the form(s), of both journalism, and of 
journalism on television.  
The research focus of critical discourse analysis is accordingly both the discursive 
practices which construct representations of the world, social subjects and social 
relations, including power relations, and the role that these discursive practices play in 
furthering the interests of particular social groups. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 63) 
 
Thus, News and Current Affairs media texts play an important, perhaps crucial role in 
narrating issues of political, social, cultural, geo-political and public interest. It is therefore 
vital that they are subject to scrutiny. The scrutiny required is best served by the theoretical 
frame of CDA.  
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 A critical discourse approach is best suited to analysing the Current Affairs text(s) 
of Panorama for it asks questions regarding, amongst other things: the limit[s] of acceptable 
opinion; limits of acceptable identity formation[s]; the construction of the feared ‘Other’, and 
all the while understanding and mapping out that limitations and identity formations are 
brought into vision, focus and understanding by way of language, imagery, characterisation 
and narrative drive. Further, the approach is based on 
…the premise that any instance of discourse is simultaneously a piece of text (written 
or spoken language) an instance of discursive practice and an instance of social 
practice (Fairclough). The aim of analysis is to show how imagery and a range of 
discursive strategies can be used to legitimize a particular policy. (Fairclough 1992: 4)  
 
For example: the uses of the terms ‘violence’ and the ‘restoration of order’ are used in News 
and Current Affairs discourse. These terms are laden with positive and negative assumptions 
and connotations. The pejorative term: ‘violence’, and the more ‘security’ laden, urgent but 
less menacing term: ‘restoration of order’ and to whom those terms are applied are important 
contextual, linguistic and discursive strategies or features of News and Current Affairs texts. 
As Steuter and Wills remark: 
The language of war, which includes the metaphors it draws on, does not simply hold 
a mirror up to the enemy. It does not reveal a clear, objective or pre-existing image of 
what we fight. What is reflected in language is not reality but construct, something 
conditioned and assembled, put together from fragments of information and 
observation. Parts of these observations may very well be accurate, but they are 
always influenced and shaped by the processes and contexts of their assembly (Steuter 
and Wills 2008: xv) 
 
If one accepts, as one surely ought, that the construction of texts is not accidental but guided 
by principles and practices (contexts and processes), then, what are these principles and 
practices? Are they internalised and naturalised? How are they manifested in the economy of 
representation? And how does this reflect the social world and, as importantly: how does it 
constitute the social world? In short, and for the purposes of this research: what are the 
linguistic, aesthetic, organisational, televisual, journalistic, textual, characterisation and 
dramatic narrative devices of Panorama? And how can a CDA theoretical framework 
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critically interrogate the ways in which Panorama might be said to discursively reproduce 
hegemonic, normative assumptions and values? 
3.8 Television Journalism as ‘Communicative Event’ 
As Gray (2008) notes, ‘television entertainment’s power to invoke, depict, augment, create 
anew, and/or criticize reality demands that we constantly study its representations’ (Gray 
2008: 130). Television still has the power to narrate the world to (for) us, despite the fact that 
on entry into office, the coalition Government (2010‒2015) capped the licence fee at £145.50 
per annum (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/8074703/BBC-ordered-to-
accept-six-year-freeze-in-licence-fee.html) television News and Current Affairs continues to 
‘enjoy’ considerable (though diminishing through inflation) funding for its output, this was of 
course certainly the case in the ‘relatively’ buoyant period of 2002‒2004 which is the period 
to which this thesis devotes its critical attention. ‘Television journalism matters because it 
still commands proper resources and mass audiences’ (Barnett 2011: 248). Given this fact, it 
should come as no surprise to discover that many people in the UK rely, and certainly did 
rely in 2002‒2004, on the trusted output of the principle Public Service Broadcaster.  
 What role then can and did the television Current Affairs output of Panorama play 
in the war in Iraq? Or more pertinently, what role might Panorama have played in orienting 
debate and discussion of Iraq around specific issues, specific elite policy goals, and 
concomitantly, within narrow discursive frames? Were elite policy goals the normative 
against which alternative strategies and objectives (anti-war; peace-campaigning; anti-
imperialist) were marked? If so, how did Panorama represent alternatives, if at all? Was the 
discourse of Panorama seemingly contingent with those of western policy elites? If so, how? 
And how can a CDA theoretical framework shed light on these issues, factors, and concerns? 
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 Firstly, of course Current Affairs broadcasting on television has a visual dimension 
that one must take into account. CDA contains within its analytical framework and method, a 
forensic appreciation of verbal, aural and visual semiotics 
Discourse encompasses not only written and spoken language but also visual images. 
It is commonly accepted that analysis of texts containing visual images must take 
account of the special characteristics of visual semiotics and the relationship between 
words and images. (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 61) 
 
It is precisely because critical discourse analysis tends towards ‘multi-modal’ analysis that it 
is particularly apposite in this instance. ‘The term “multimodality” designates a phenomenon 
rather than a theory or method – the phenomenon in texts and communicative events whereby 
a variety of “semiotic modes” (means of expression) are integrated into a unified whole’ (Van 
Leeuwen and Kress in Van Dijk 2006b: 107). Moreover, not only does this theoretical 
approach take account of multi-modal forms of semiotic expression, CDA also seeks to locate 
individual texts within wider trends, themes, genres and forms of communication. Thus, news 
media, or in this case, Current Affairs broadcasting, are routed back and rooted in an 
understanding that each text is, in some way beholden to the genre and form to which it 
belongs. CDA thus scrutinises and understands the importance of visuals and linguistic 
tropes, contextual detail (and its elision by News and Current Affairs broadcasting), and 
legitimised sources, whilst simultaneously outlining that such forms have a generic and, as 
such, an ideological footprint. 
…Foucault is concerned with the production of knowledge and meaning through 
discourse. He does indeed analyse particular texts and representations, as the 
semioticians did. However, he is more inclined to analyse the whole discursive 
formation to which a text or practice belongs. (Hall 1997 in Wetherell et al. 2001: 78) 
 
This being the case, whereas the micro-narratives produced by individual News and Current 
Affairs broadcasts, and the analysis undertaken by adherents of semiotics tends to separate, 
or perhaps dislocate, CDA makes the necessary generic links. CDA does not therefore 
‘involve making claims for universal objective truth. Rather it involves making claims for the 
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context-bound veracity generating achievements of consensually validated sets of 
procedures’ (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 23). It is the context dependent, and the 
consensually validated procedures that are important in the context of Current Affairs 
broadcasting, particularly so in the case of Panorama. Panorama is able to draw on already 
validated and pre-legitimated news archives; draw on a range of (legitimated) semiotic, 
social, cultural, journalistic, and economic resources, and, most importantly, draw on its 
reputational ‘flagship’ resource. In so doing, it will be argued that BBC Panorama, drawing 
on these accumulated resources, adopts a consensual approach to information gathering (via 
source-relations) and dissemination (via broadcast). The consensus approach though is 
dominated by elite-level sources and by established formal, discursive and televisual forms of 
Current Affairs broadcast conventions and dramatic representations. The various approaches 
in CDA are united by ‘a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse, 
and political-economic or cultural change in society’ and furthermore united by ‘…a) its view 
of the relationship between language and power; b) by its critical approach to methodology’ 
(Fairclough, Muldering and Wodak 2011 in Van Dijk 2011: 357). As a theoretical approach, 
CDA, is able to sustain a more developed ideological analysis. It is the developed, sustained 
ideological and discursive analysis to which this research devotes itself.  
3.9  Visuals, Aesthetics and the Specificities of Television Journalism 
The primacy of presentation is a trait that journalism shares with art and advertising but 
not science. It makes the practice of journalism directly dependent on the characteristics 
of the medium… Visualization is television’s forte. Knowledge about the world is 
articulated visually. The medium represents reality, creates powerful engagement, 
identification, fascination, thoughts and values through pictures. (Corner 1996 in Ekstrom 
2002: 264) 
 
What remains important here is that the very form of television, its ‘visuality’; its 
domesticity, combined with the routinized practices of journalism, endorses Current Affairs 
practice as a transparent, visually arresting ‘window’ on the world.   
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What rules, routines, institutionalized procedures and systems of classification guide the 
production of knowledge, and how do TV journalists decide what is sufficiently true and 
authoritative? This is the area of TV production and journalistic practices, including 
institutionalized relations and patterns of action that are essential to this particular kind of 
knowledge production. (Ekstrom 2002: 261) 
 
Given the above apparent limitations, that the principle means through which the discussion, 
debate and eventual decision to ‘go to war’ with Iraq was mediated (partly) through the high 
modality form of Panorama is somewhat problematic. The form is seemingly incapable of 
bearing the weight of its own responsibility (Postman). 
Neil Postman analyzes how characteristics of television itself structure the knowledge it 
communicates and, by extension, our understanding of the world. The medium lends 
itself to aesthetically appealing and dramatic representations but is less appropriate for 
logical and factual argumentation, discriminating descriptions of reality and in-depth 
analyses. (Ekstrom 2002: 262) 
 
Perhaps the most important debate and decision of the early part of the twenty-first century 
was enacted by officials who were notionally held accountable for their decisions by the 
public perhaps largely informed by a form that has built into it, too many circumscribed, 
formal and journalistic limitations. What is more, as Ekstrom outlines, with an echo of 
Matheson (2000), often ‘Journalistic accounts of reality are frequently cited and often serve 
as starting points in public discourse’ (Ekstrom 2002: 263). Journalistic accounts then serve 
as the starting and end point(s) of public debate, or certainly they serve as the principle means 
through which debate is staged and subsequently largely understood by the public. The 
efficacy of such mediated representations to provide the knowledge necessary for a fully 
informed public understanding is in need of critical interrogation and analysis. To what extent 
does News and Current Affairs broadcasting on the public service broadcaster, particularly 
Panorama, circumscribe the limits of available public knowledge? Utilizing the journalistic, 
televisual and representational apparatus available, Panorama in fact could be said to merely 
reproduce the ideological norms perfectly commensurate with unquestioning pro-western and 
pro neo-liberal market ideologies. Drawn from and oriented around this neo-liberal, neo-
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imperialist ideology, Panorama is itself constrained by the very journalistic and televisual 
practices it has long championed.  
The form of knowledge that television conveys best arouses feelings and empathy on 
the part of the viewer. Television journalism does not generally invite critical 
reflection or questioning of the facts presented. This is not to say that television 
mesmerizes its audiences, rendering them totally uncritical. Reception studies that we 
have conducted show, however, that viewers’ criticism tends not to focus on the truth 
or validity of statements and stories but rather on the persons involved in the stories, 
their actions and appearance or on the programme and programme format. (Ekström, 
2000a in Ekström 2002: 265) 
 
That ‘viewers’ criticism tends not to focus on ‘truth or validity of statements or stories but 
rather on the persons involved in the stories, their actions and appearance or on the 
programme and programme format’ is both indicative of the limits of journalistic forms 
(narrow focus, narrow range of opinions from experts, insertion into an already established 
media template (Kitzinger 2000)) and constitutive of television journalism itself. Perhaps we 
can go further still. According to this analysis, criticism is safely contained within the 
discourse of presentation. In other words, it might merely be the performance, or the lack of 
convincing performance that renders some statements by official, legitimated sources subject 
to critique. Not overtly critical of the content, or even perhaps uncritical of the policy goals, 
but of the degree of plausible or implausible performativity of key sources and interlocutors. 
The broadcasts under scrutiny reveal that the representation, the narratives and the ways in 
which these are mediated set the frames and terms of debate in such a fashion that only 
narrow policy options and possibilities are ever foregrounded. In this respect, Sayer’s notion 
of retroduction is apposite (1992). 
The epistemological concept of retroduction, associated with critical realism, can help 
us to be even more precise. Retroduction is a mode of inference whereby ‘events are 
explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them’. (Sayer 1992: 107) 
 
In short, as Sayer explains, News and Current Affairs, by rigidly adhering to the discursive 
logic so long established and entrenched, not only contain and constrain the frames of debate, 
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but in so doing, establish the ‘solutions’ to ongoing crises within a narrow discursive limit. 
‘The knowledge TV journalism produces is regarded with ambivalence. On the one hand, it is 
made use of without further ado, not only in everyday life but also in the spheres of culture 
and public affairs, politics and science’ (Ekstrom 2002: 263). In this respect, television 
journalism is something of a self-fulfilling practice, a source of legitimation in and of itself, 
and of course bears striking similarities with the form and practice of journalism itself, as 
Matheson reminds us, journalism becomes ‘a self-contained language event. It no longer had 
to refer to outside itself to the source text to be able to assert a fact; the journalist’s role 
changed from a gatherer and recorder of news to a storyteller’ (Matheson 2000: 570). This 
discursive formation and the ways in which television specifically draws on imagery from the 
canon of its own historical and contemporary production means that the television journalism 
of Panorama can, in many cases, act as its own authenticating agent. 
 Ekström and Eriksson go farther still and in fact suggest that the very form itself is 
problematically compromised by its over-reliance on the visual, not only because previous 
examples act as an authenticating resource, nor only for its ability to tell stories in too 
simplistic or ‘arresting’ a fashion, but that ‘the visual’ in fact plays a major role in the ways 
in which television journalism develops.  
Innovation in television journalism is largely a question of developing new 
programme formats, new dramaturgical solutions and aesthetics. Even in the case of 
investigative journalism a good portion of the production process is oriented directly 
or indirectly toward visualization. Access to good visual material actually decides 
what gets investigated. Interviews are carried out with a view to fitting them into the 
dramaturgical structure of the narrative. (Ekström and Eriksson 1998 in Ekström 
2002: 265. Emphasis added) 
 
As such, it is perhaps incapable of the nuance one might expect or need. Of course, that such 
visually arresting or stimulating images are available and put to use is in some ways to be 




Journalism’s presentational aspects, its visuality and its discursive visualizations, can 
be understood not as the unfortunate contaminants of an otherwise pure and factual 
realism but as the very purpose of journalism, from the very start. (Hartley 1996: 43) 
 
So television journalism, constrained and bound up in ‘the visual’ has obvious links to the 
dramatic, or perhaps the kind of story-telling, characterisation, narrative tropes one might 
expect to find within the canon of fictionalised representation. Ekström again develops this 
theme:  
Investigation and presentation are, in some sense, common to both journalism and 
science but, in the case of journalism, presentation is a sine qua non. It is a defining 
property of journalism and a key to its unique contribution. But it is (in principle) 
quite possible to perform journalism without any sophisticated method of 
investigation. (Ekstrom, M 2002: 264) 
 
It might be too much to suggest that the television journalism produced by Panorama is 
possible without the need for ‘any sophisticated method of investigation’ but what is 
instructive is despite the fact that there is much original documentary footage (or ‘evidence’) 
in the texts under scrutiny, the way(s) in which some of the footage is visually arresting, 
dramatic and character-driven does give some credence to Ekström’s prognosis.  
 Furthermore, the use of action-packed archive footage, the high-intensity interviews 
with central protagonists, the insertion of emotive and, in some cases, high-tempo music into 
the broadcast, all combine to present the viewer with a dramatic, dramatised narrative.  
Being an eminently visual medium, television excels at constructing powerful 
meanings, at creating vivid impressions, associations and eliciting emotional 
involvement. It is not so good at presenting lots of facts and the kinds of messages 
where attention to nuances, reservations and contradictions is vital … The medium 
lends itself to aesthetically appealing and dramatic representations but is less 
appropriate for logical and factual argumentation, discriminating descriptions of 
reality and in-depth analyses. (Ekström 2002: 265) 
 
The lack of in-depth analysis is directly counter to the claims made for Panorama. It remains 
one of the most celebrated and revered of all Current Affairs television broadcast strands. The 




3.10 War, Conflict, Television and (as) Drama 
Classic warfare is the epitome of a ‘good story’, high in tension and drama, with 
complex main plots and sub-plots played out within traditional binary oppositions of 
aggressor and victim. (Boyd-Barrett in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26)  
 
The theoretical framework outlined above explains how CDA focuses critical attention on 
structure, language, and multi-modal critical discourse analysis. Important and pertinent for 
this research is that CDA seeks to locate the representational tropes and signifying practices 
of each object(s) under scrutiny within the characteristics, guiding principles and demands of 
professional practices and standards (Journalism); tropes, form and formal characteristics 
(television) and the genre, or discourse to which the text of Panorama belongs (Current 
Affairs broadcasting). In the case of this research, the objects are a series of Panorama 
broadcasts pertaining to Iraq. The theoretical approach is therefore able to draw direct 
analytical comparisons across the ‘range’ of broadcast examples and draw suitably rigorous 
conclusions based on their similarities and differences. In this respect, the CDA analytical 
model developed in this research, paying attention to generic, lexical, linguistic, visual, oral, 
aural (musical score) detail, can, and does, elicit new understandings about precisely how 
each broadcast draws on a series of learned practices or tropes of the form, and 
concomitantly, the ways in which, using such tropes, Panorama discursively shapes events 
and might orient our understanding of events as they unfold.  An adherence to a rigorous 
theoretical approach allows one to notice and track patterns in the representational apparatus.  
 One of the most prominent features of Panorama is its use of stylistic conventions 
one might ordinarily associate with fictional representations. This is not to suggest that 
Panorama is fictionalising the accounts, characters, narratives and events contained within 
the broadcasts. However, the question posed here is: to what extent do such styles of 
representation locate and render unfolding events within a dramatic stylistic template? And if 
so, do such representational tropes necessarily restrict understanding? Or perhaps more 
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pertinently at least, orient such understanding in specific directions? In some regards, this can 
be traced back and related to the forms and practices constitutive of television journalism:  
Television journalism is produced primarily for presentation and visualization. The 
form of presentation is the actual point of the production. All TV journalism is 
produced with the presentation and the viewer in mind. Interviews are not conducted 
primarily to elicit information, but are staged performances produced for an 
overhearing audience. (Heritage 1985 in Ekström 2002: 264) 
 
According to this framework, ‘the form of presentation is the actual point of production’ 
suggesting that broadcast journalism is oriented around the demands and characteristics of the 
form, and that this orientation places visuality ahead, or at least equal to, and in an intrinsic 
relationship with journalistic content. In part because of the visual dimension, historically, 
television has been, and remains, the form most closely associated with drama. As already 
discussed (see Chapter 1) Raymond Williams reminds us, television specialises in: 
‘representing human action in human terms – its small screen and comparatively poor 
definition [pre HD] lead it to concentrate on mid-shots and close-ups of people acting, 
reacting and interacting’ (Williams in Fiske 1987: 22). For instance, to what extent might the 
focus on ‘reaction and interaction’ (of character or central protagonists) preclude a deeper 
and more developed understanding of geo-political issues and events? This is not to say that 
the dramatic elements should necessarily always be excluded, after all, there are many 
examples of fiction providing more nuance, subtlety and understanding of many issues, 
sometimes of an overtly ‘political’ nature, through character and characterisation. Similarly, 
that such central protagonists, in the form of policy elites, military generals, expert witnesses, 
et al., feature in the non-fictional Current Affairs broadcasting is to be expected and 
understood, they are, after all, the very same elite political, diplomatic and military personnel 
orienting policy, and then, in some cases, engaging in the conflict. Nevertheless, it is 
proposed that the over representation of specific people (character), combined with the style 
and insertion of character into narrative structures, might compromise understanding. After 
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all, Panorama is inextricably the high modality form, it presumes and bases its entire 
reputation on the journalistic bedrocks of impartiality, accuracy and truth, therefore the 
(over)-utilisation of dramatic devices might render understanding(s) as necessarily narrow.  
In short, does the focus on characters in a narrative disavow a systemic analysis of the 
structural conditions of Western, imperialist, neoliberal discourse? In fact, do such factors 
(structural, neoliberal, neo-imperialist ideologies) even figure in the Panorama broadcasts 
under scrutiny? Are such overtly ideological considerations absented from Panorama? Is it 
the case that forms of visual story-telling are the ‘primary’ drivers of content, and if so, do 
they render complex events too simple (unambiguous) or easily ‘solved’?  
 In some ways then, this approach to covering conflict means ‘War-reporting’ might 
even constitute a genre in itself. 
To the extent that the news agenda is determined by its potential for gathering 
audience ratings (and therefore advertising revenue, in the case of commercial 
networks), newscasts will consistently prioritise stories revolving around drama, 
conflict and controversy over and above (expensive, less ‘ratings-efficient’) 
investigative journalism. War reporting is no exception to this general rule. (Allan and 
Zelizer 2004b: 12) 
 
If, as Allan and Zelizer propose ‘war-reporting’ in News broadcasts ‘is no exception to this 
general rule’ then this research will further examine the extent to which the needs and 
demands for drama are even more pronounced in the ‘War Reporting’ produced in and by the 
genre of Current Affairs television journalism. If it is indeed the case, then such issues remain 
problematic and thus demand rigorous analysis and critique.  
 In the 10 Panorama broadcasts selected, characterisation – perhaps through the 
form of archetypes and stereotypes – is certainly a feature and in some cases, the central 
feature. The titles of Panorama broadcasts in themselves are instructive in this instance. In 
the pre-conflict phase the following titles are used: Panorama: The Case Against Saddam 
(September 2002); Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History (November 2002); 
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Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons (February 2003). In all three of the above-mentioned 
pre-conflict phase broadcasts pertaining to Iraq, ‘Saddam’ is not only a feature, but is the 
central protagonist. ‘He’ is essentially identified as the issue to be dealt with. Furthermore, as 
will be discussed later (see Section 2) the explicit reference and allusion to the Nazis means 
that attempting to mount a forceful critique of Western policy is difficult when located in this 
narrative, context, epistemology and discourse. The broadcast, from the title alone, means 
critique of policy, the stated policy goals, and the fundamentally benign (sic) nature of 
Western ‘intervention’ effectively ensures critique is, if not wholly marginalised, then set 
against the normative criteria of Western (as ‘good’) intervention as benign. Furthermore, 
when located and marked against the uniquely evil Saddam, the narrative, discursive and 
epistemological orientation demands scrutiny. Within the confines of such a broadcast, and if 
this characterisation of Saddam is replicated across the sample, then any possible critique of 
the stated policy-goals is set against this demonized narrative and character. Those who seek 
to critique or criticise the stated policy-goals are represented as having chosen the wrong 
side, chosen the side, in fact, of the evil dictator (to whom ‘we’ sold weapons in the past). In 
such a journalistic, broadcast and wider socio-political environment, is mobilising overt 
critique, or even merely attempting to question the stated policy aims of political and military 
elites replete with problems? If so, and as this thesis proposes, then to what extent did and 
does Panorama contribute to this difficulty? In what ways does Panorama discursively and 
ideologically frame the issues and events? Using which journalistic and televisual forms and 
tropes? The three broadcasts mentioned above (plus one other, the more sceptically and 
critically titled: Panorama: The Case Against War) will be critically analysed in Chapter 4. 
The remaining six – three conflict-phase, and three post-conflict phase broadcasts – will be 
analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. It is hoped that this systemic analysis will go some 
way to demonstrate that Panorama, contrary to expectations, reproduces a journalistic, 
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discursive, and ideological formation, what is more, a discursive and ideological formation 
that almost entirely uncritically cements Western hegemony. 
3.11 Metaphor, War and Drama 
As this research proposes then, as a means of ‘explaining’ necessarily complex ideas, in this 
case: the build up to, prosecution of, and fall-out from war and conflict in/on Iraq, Panorama 
typically utilises tropes, and signifying practises of drama. This dramatic rendering of stories 
lends itself readily to metaphor. At times of vital national geo-political interest, ‘we’ look to 
News and Current Affairs as guides, they are a vital and necessary conduit through which our 
world, the geo-politics, the social formations are narrated, understood and comprehended. 
Given the complexity of the issues, combined with the relative scarcity of broadcast space 
and time, do News and Current Affairs broadcasts require a series of simplifying mechanisms 
in order to render stories understandable? If so, what might the ideological effects of this be? 
Because of information processing demands, people cannot pay attention to all 
aspects of political evidence. Therefore, something is needed to simplify decision 
making, and metaphor and other shortcut devices (e.g. cognitive heuristics) address 
this need. (Mio 1997: 130) 
 
Mio accurately explains one of the primary functions, or at least representational strategies of 
news media. Information needs are typically addressed by and catered for by News and 
Current Affairs media. One of the standard representational means of communicating 
complex ideas is through metaphor. The(se) aforementioned metaphors, or perhaps 
metaphorical ‘shortcuts’ are typically used as a means of explaining difficult or complex 
decisions and socio-geo-political situations. Furthermore, such shortcuts and techniques 
establish themselves as routine practices to such an extent that they constitute an 
epistemology: 
…epistemology … refers to the rules, routines and institutionalized procedures that 
operate within a social setting and decide the form of the knowledge produced and the 




Epistemologies tend to remain unexamined, they become internalised as common sense, or 
even institutionalised. Perhaps under pressure of time, resources and limited access to 
alternative sources, journalists take such approaches for granted: 
…news making is based on cultural routines and professional practices that are taken 
for granted and hence implicit and hard to observe directly. Analysis of news talk is 
therefore able to reveal the (usually not explicit or intentional) ideologies of 
journalists. (Van Dijk in Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch 2009: 196) 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), the journalistic discursive shorthand techniques 
are subject to a degree of over-simplification, based on an existing (and concomitantly 
(re)producing) series of media templates (Kitzinger, Hoskins). In this regard, dramatic 
metaphors serve the story well. The extent to which such stories, narratives and metaphorical 
tropes serve the needs of the public (sphere) though, is debateable. As Steuter and Wills 
discuss:  
The literal meaning of the word metaphor is to ‘carry over’; metaphor symbolically 
transfers aspects of one object to another, even if the objects are originally in no way 
connected. Through this transference, metaphor shifts ideas or meanings from one 
thing to another to achieve “a new, wider, ‘special’ or more precise meaning.” With 
repetition, this happens so adeptly that the transference is invisible and comes to be 
seen as inevitable. When the media repeatedly return, therefore, to similar patterns of 
image and language, these patterns begin to appear both familiar and natural (Steuter 
and Wills 2008: 3) 
 
Metaphors assist in the structuring of reality but, as important, through repetition, they begin 
to take on the form of reality, or at least specific ways of describing events, places and 
peoples become ‘familiar and natural(ised)’. Metaphors literally ‘carry over’, they take on the 
appearance of familiarity, a natural(ised) way of describing events and situations. They shape 
reality and our comprehension of it. 
 In his extensive research into media narratives about ‘immigration’ Jonathan 
Charteris-Black explains some use of metaphor by policy elites thus: 
Conceptually, metaphors referring to liquids are preferred because of the knowledge 
that, by their nature, liquids – tides, rivers, waves, etc – move around: they can 
therefore be related to a more primary conceptual metaphor: Changes are movements 




Such metaphors are instructive insofar as they are typically employed as exculpatory, as a 
means of absolving the speaker of guilt for the ways in which events unfold. Metaphors serve 
many functions and are discussed in detail by, among others, Charteris-Black (2005, 2006), 
Steuter and Wills (2008), and Lakoff (1990). In important ways, metaphors signify that some 
actions and events are beyond control, they simply happen or exist. In the case of Charteris-
Black’s analysis, immigrants are part of a ‘flow’ or a ‘tide’ which is almost impossible to 
stem. Approximating the physical movements of people with that of natural, and physical 
geography underlines that to fight or stem the flow is in this case analogous to halting nature 
itself. These sometimes subtle, often difficult to spot ‘event structure metaphors’ are present 
across the sample of Panorama texts, and when they appear, they will be discussed and 
analysed in subsequent chapters of analysis. 
 A common representational metaphorical technique is to place distance between or 
to disavow ownership of specific policies that might (re)present distinctly problematic 
ideological positions. For instance, when discussing media representations of ‘immigration’, 
again Charteris-Black’s work on critical metaphor analysis is instructive:  
…an accusation of incompetence is an explicit way of undermining the legitimacy of 
political opponents because competence is a basic requirement of government. The 
argument is that the cause of popular resentment is not immigration as such, but the 
government’s incompetence in dealing with it. (Charteris-Black 2006: 573) 
 
The non-ownership of policy direction, to be replaced by the ability (or not) to carry out the 
onerous actions of government is an act of disavowal and a rhetorical and metaphorical act. 
According to this analytical lens, we have clearly reached a stage where apparent 
‘incompetence’ is preferable to any ideological position beyond the mythic ‘centre ground’. 
 To take another example from events and issues that are central concerns of this 
research. One of the stated policy goals in the build up to conflict often used, and 
consequently, and understandably repeated, by News and Current Affairs journalism was the 
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‘search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ A linguistic critical discourse analysis of 
the term ‘WMD’ is itself revealing, particularly when located and represented by 
metaphorical language. The weapons themselves, which of course remained stubbornly 
absent (about which, more in subsequent analysis) were often represented in metaphorical 
terms. As a means of explaining, narrating and contextualising the events, BBC News 
focused on speeches made by policy makers, chiefly, in this and many other cases, Tony 
Blair:  
If we do not confront these twin menaces of rogue states with weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism, they will not disappear. They will just feed and grow on our 
weakness (BBC News 15 February 2003 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2765763.stm)   
 
In the above example, ownership of weapons of mass destruction is seamlessly linked with 
terrorism: ‘twin menaces’. Further, positioning those that would resist the march to war as 
somehow partly responsible for weakness (those ‘not confronting’), and what is more, 
creating a weakness, either real or imagined, for ‘Others’ to exploit is a classic case of using 
metaphor in the service of conviction rhetoric. Representing the threat in animate terms, that 
‘feed and grow’ is also directly from the metaphor and conviction rhetoric playbook, ‘…in 
this case terrorism and the ownership of such weapons are described as if they are animate 
entities that – like malign offspring – are fed by the indecision of the UN’ (Charteris-Black 
2005: 162). The speech features as part of the pre-conflict phase build-up to the Iraq war, and 
sets the frame through which the subsequent ‘hunt’ for weapons is viewed.  
 Even the term WMD itself – [W]eapons of [M]ass [D]estruction – demands 
rigorous critical interrogation. A CDA focus reveals that three principle words all signify 
terrifying, menacing and deadly consequences likely to be suffered (by not confronting). [W] 
actual physical objects connoting a deadly threat; [M] to large numbers (of people) and/or 
areas (of land); [D] they destroy, resulting in devastation. At this point it should be added that 
this analysis does not seek to deny the possibility that such objects might (will) indeed wreak 
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such devastating consequences. However, the focus of critique is not their deadly ‘quality’ 
per se, but that when phrased uncritically, assigned such deadly quality, and most importantly 
assumed to be in the possession of the demonised Hitler-like figure of ‘Saddam’ the ‘service’ 
to narrative is far from the objectivity or impartiality (‘The Case Against’) promised by 
various Panorama broadcasts. Finally, when such objects (WMD) are featured as in ‘our’ 
possession, though this is itself a rarity, they are simply referred to as a ‘deterrent’ sometimes 
a ‘nuclear deterrent’ a term with less deadly, more ‘security’ focussed connotations. ‘Our’ 
weapons are to ‘deter’ those that would cause ‘us’ harm, such as ‘Saddam’, with his 
(stubbornly absent) WMD. 
 At this juncture, it should be added that of course the focus on WMD was not 
created by journalists working for the BBC more broadly, or those working on the Panorama 
programme(s) more directly, but were in fact specific stated policy objectives of political 
elites. However, the frame created by policy elites, then reproduced by BBC Panorama, of 
‘the regime’ made specific and forceful assumptions regarding the presence of WMD. This 
narrative, character, template and utilisation of rhetoric, metaphor and dramatic 
representation framed the issue so as to leave us in little doubt that he (Saddam) was in 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, and that it was merely a matter of hunting them 
down. I will return to this analysis in Chapter 4, and again in Chapter 6, I use it here merely 
as an example, to outline the focus and direction of this research, and, most pertinently, 
because such a narrative orientation exists not only within single episodes but across the 
Panorama sample, to exemplify the applicability of the CDA method.  
3.12 Access to Discourse 
As stated above, the policy focus, searching for, and assuming the presence of ‘WMD’, was 
not, nor could it be, at the behest of News and Current Affairs journalists. In this, and in other 
regards, both News and Current Affairs journalism is responding to and reflecting the policy 
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orientations of political elites and their assorted advisors. Van Dijk, with admirable clarity, 
refers to this social and political formulation as a ‘hierarchy of power’.   
…some members of dominant groups and organisations have a special role in 
planning, decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the 
enactment of power. These (small) groups will here be called the power elites 
(Domhoff 1978; Mills 1956). For our discussion, it is especially interesting to note 
that such elites also have special access to discourse; they are literally the ones who 
have most to say. In our discourse analytical framework, therefore, we define elites 
precisely in terms of their ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu, 1982), as measured by the 
extent of their discursive and communicative scope and resources. (Van Dijk 1993 in 
Wetherell et al. 2001: 303) 
 
‘Having the most to say’ both literally and discursively is an important aspect to consider and 
takes us beyond the remit of mere Current Affairs journalism onto the terrain of political 
science. Such terrain is beyond the scope of this research but, the ways in which such 
hierarchies coalesce with political Current Affairs broadcasting cannot be overlooked. For if 
it is true that political elites have ‘symbolic power’, or social, symbolic and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu 1986) then how is it imagined, challenged, enacted, and reproduced in and by 
Panorama? Is it the case that the assumptions and orientations of political elites are 
reproduced largely uncritically? To analyse this, we can trace back via the practices and 
traditions of journalism and its reliance on sources, and source relations (Hall et al.’s 
‘Primary Definers’) and Hallin’s ‘Official sources’: 
…the routines of objective journalism, which tied the news closely to the official 
sources and the Washington agenda, and the ideology of the cold war, which locked 
events in a framework of understanding that made fundamental questioning of 
American foreign policy unthinkable. (Hallin 1986: 110) 
 
It is what we might refer to as proximity with or access to discourse. Persons with a 
legitimated position, and precisely because of this legitimacy, have access to and location in 
the dominant discourse. Such personnel are able to use their positional and discursive 
resources as a means of persuasion and in some cases, manipulation. As Van Dijk outlines: 
One crucial power resource is privileged or preferential access to discourse. One 
element of such complex access patterns is more or less controlled or active access to 
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the very communicative event as such, that is, to the situation; some (elite) 
participants may control the occasion, time, place, setting and the presence or absence 
of participants in such events. In other words, one way of enacting power is to control 
context (Van Dijk 1993 in Wetherell et al. 2001: 303) 
 
The ‘control of context’ is one of the most crucial points. Of course such control is exerted by 
both policy elites (as sources and ‘Primary Definers’) and journalists (as disseminators or 
‘Secondary Definers’) alike. Ethnographic studies of BBC Journalistic content (Born 2005, 
McQueen 2010 (unpublished)) might point towards the ways in which journalists’ access to 
and reliance on their key sources guides the content, narrative and context. The methodology 
of this study is not ethnographic, nor should it be, both Born and McQueen have undertaken 
admirable work in this respect, but discursive. In fact, it is not necessary in this instance to 
undertake any great detailed ethnography in order to realise the extent to which certain 
hierarchies of power (Van Dijk) are operationalised. A CDA approach is enlightening with 
regards ‘who gets to speak’ and ‘on which topics’. The ‘control of context’ is detectable by 
analysing and tracking the very presence of particular people on screen, and the lexical and 
linguistic choice(s) both the sources and the Panorama journalists make when representing 
the issue(s) and event(s). Do they, by definition of presence, have symbolic discursive 
power? Are they dominant social and political actors with access to knowledge and 
discourse? Are they subjected to challenges by way of journalistic questions? Importantly for 
this research and its focus on the dramatic elements used to represent the issues, to what 
extent are they in control of their representation of character, are they allowed moments of 
self-reflection and self-examination? In what way does this impact on the narrative direction 
of the broadcasts? By analysis of character(isation) and framing we can gain insights into the 
narrative direction and the ways in which such narrative direction begins to constitute an 
allowable frame or discursive formation. If Panorama in this instance can ‘dig behind the 
headlines’ (Holland 2006: xiii) provide more context ‘Help viewers make sense of what they 
have seen and heard elsewhere’ (Rippon 2011, The Observer) then precisely who maintains 
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or cont(str)ains the narrative? Panorama does indeed provide extra detail but who controls 
the context? And, as important what is the context allowed and through which forms and 
practices might certain contextual details be foregrounded, whilst others remain absent(ed) 
(and thus delegitimated)?  
 One of the key areas of difference between News and Current Affairs broadcasting 
is that the extended form of Current Affairs is precisely the space in which context can and 
should be developed. The Panorama broadcasts under scrutiny in this research are all over 50 
minutes in length. This length of broadcast afforded the ‘flagship’ broadcast strand is 
indicative of; 1) The seriousness of the issue and event being covered; 2) The continuing (at 
the time of broadcast at least) resourcing of Current Affairs broadcast journalism; and 3) The 
necessity for and (perceived) ability of Current Affairs broadcasting to offer critical, 
interrogative, long-form journalistic accounts of issues of social, cultural and (geo)political 
importance. This perception, now well established and entrenched, is what we might call the 
normative understanding of the form. Precisely because it is normative, it remains (largely, if 
not wholly) unexamined by practitioners. Therefore, it is imperative that such analyses are 
undertaken by critical scholars of news, journalism, television and cultural studies.  
 Developing this analytical focus, and further, underscoring precisely why analysis 
must be undertaken by scholars, Van Dijk suggests that the ideological position(s) or 
narratives of journalists are perhaps likely to be unintentional, and that analysis is even more 
vital and urgent because of it: ‘Analysis of news talk is therefore able to reveal the (usually 
not explicit or intentional) ideologies of journalists’ (Van Dijk in Wetherell et al. 2001: 196). 
As (Tuchman 1978) identified, journalistic practices are routinized and assumed to be a 
‘strategic ritual’. Schmidt develops the theory that the ‘narrow technical orientation’ is 




 To develop the ideas proposed by Schmidt, we can undertake some analysis of the 
BBC’s use of the ‘correspondent’. For instance, on BBC Radio and BBC Television such 
titles as ‘political correspondent’ exist as taxonomy, such a title confers upon the journalist a 
degree of assumed expertise, it is a demarcated and idealised figure. On Newsnight Allegra 
Stratton was the ‘chief political correspondent’ and on Radio 5 Live John Pienaar is similarly 
titled. In these instances both Pienaar and Stratton provide ‘expert’ commentary and insights 
into very specific and rigid spheres of ‘political life’. During the (ongoing) economic crisis, 
both Stratton and Pienaar have, at various times, been called upon to comment on and explain 
the debates and decisions of policy makers and politicians, and the ‘political’ context in 
which said decisions take place. As (one of) the flagship current affairs broadcast strands (in 
this example), Newsnight, and given the overarching ‘responsibility’ for analysis, context, in-
depth investigation and explanation, Current Affairs broadcasting carries significant weight. 
This being so, one could read the discursive formation of the BBC ‘correspondent’ positively 
insofar as it does at least attempt to locate decisions within specific contexts, in the case of 
the current ‘economic crisis’ BBC ‘economics correspondents’ also comment, of course. 
However, the rigidity materialised and manifest in the ‘political correspondent’ role separates 
and importantly, makes little effort to ‘join the dots’ of policy and its material affects beyond 
the soap opera characterisation of ‘Westminster politics’. In the case of ‘chief political 
correspondent’ commentary is informed by the narrow discursive formation of what 
constitutes ‘politics’ (usually the two (or three) party system and the ‘logic’ that this 
reproduces) and ‘political decisions and debates’. It renders decisions that have mass and 
wide material and social impact as the mere machinations of party machines and party 
politicking, or what one might sceptically term ‘the theatricality of democracy’. For the BBC 
(and much journalism) ‘politics’ simply is electoral politics. In many ways of course this is a 
consequence of the UK’s particular brand of parliamentary ‘democracy’ and as such laying 
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(even partial) blame at the feet of broadcast journalism might be considered misplaced. 
However, we should be wary of such claims, cast as they are within a narrow discursive 
terrain and further, demonstrating a (perhaps wilfully) limited appreciation or understanding 
of the ways in which News and Current Affairs journalism operates and influences both 
‘politics’ and public perception and understanding of politics.  
3.13 Mediatization and the ‘Political Correspondent’ 
Scholarship in Journalism and Media studies has increasingly turned to analyses of the 
potential influence of media on both elite actors within the frame(s) and those lay-persons 
outside. Often referred to as a process of ‘mediatization’, Strömbäck perhaps most pertinent 
for our purposes, puts it best. Mediatization, he writes: 
 … can be taken to mean the dominance in societal processes of the news values and 
the storytelling techniques the media make use of to take advantage of their own 
medium and its format, and to be competitive in the on-going struggle to capture 
people’s attention. These storytelling techniques include simplification, polarization, 
intensification, personalization (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978), visualization and 
stereotypization, and the framing of politics as a strategic game or “horse race” 
(Mazzoleni 1987; Patterson 1993). (Strömbäck 2008: 233) 
 
Furthermore, John Street (2010) develops the point that in fact: 
Politicians are adapting to the medium upon which they have come to rely. They 
design their campaigns and their approach to fit the media. Their schedules are timed 
to coincide with journalists’ deadlines; their public performances are intended to look 
good on screen. (Street 2011: 8) 
 
If ‘Politicians’ and other associated legitimated political actors ‘design their campaigns … to 
fit the media’ then journalists, too, are seemingly caught in this bind. The ‘political 
correspondent’, the ‘economics correspondent’ and for the purposes of this research the ‘war 
correspondent’, and in the case of John Simpson, the ‘world affairs correspondent’ thus 
become rigid frames applied to experts beyond which they are seldom encouraged to trespass. 
In the case of the ‘political correspondent’, important decisions are thus reduced to the 
pantomime of party politicking (as political as opposed to ‘Political’ or ideological). 
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Legitimacy and authenticity are conferred upon these practices by discursive operational 
expertise of the generic ‘correspondent’. As Kline, reviewing the work of media sociologist 
David Altheide, comments, there are ‘…various ways a slant will evolve out of the 
pragmatics of covering an event. Moreover … several ways in which the journalistic 
practices predispose the reporter to a particular range of angles on the story’ (Kline 1976), 
reviewing Altheide, D., Creating Reality: How Television News Distorts Events). Thus, in the 
developed News and Current Affairs broadcast strands of Newsnight and Panorama, in place 
of analyses that link together stories, narratives, decisions and their potential wider social 
impact, such extended texts serve merely to discuss, perhaps in more detail, the already 
legitimised micro narratives and the machinations of the assorted characters contained 
within. What appears to be lacking, are critical Current Affairs debate and analysis strands 
that link together (seemingly) disparate, but of course related events. Such links are able to be 
found in the Documentary genre, but here, constrained by, and contained in the logic of 
journalism, Current Affairs broadcasting, particularly Panorama is seemingly incapable of 
developed contextual analysis and focus. This is of course problematic in itself but 
compounded by the fact that, as we have seen, such News and Current Affairs broadcast 
strands lay claim to do more: ‘Newsnight exists not to break news, but to help viewers make 
sense of what they have heard, seen or read elsewhere’ 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/21/debate-newsnight-lost-its-way). 
 Given the statement above, we can begin to understand the view broadcast Current 
Affairs has of itself: as an explainer of events, adding the (context) detail. But which detail(s) 
are included and which context(s) are excluded...and why/how? We can also begin to see 
traces of the ‘Four key units’ approach adopted post the Birt revolution in BBC News and 
Current Affairs broadcasting.  
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 Defending the role of Newsnight, in the Observer newspaper debate, the already 
quoted Rippon explained that, the need to obtain (and maintain) viewing figures has perhaps 
led to a general drift toward populism, as such, he suggests they: 
…attempt(s) to do too much too quickly. There is an addiction to haste and 
compression. Complex subjects are necessarily trivialised because of the desire to 




Faced with competition and threats to its licence fee, in such an environment, the BBC, 
perhaps understandably resorts to populism and filters political, social, cultural and geo-
political discourse through the narratives of dramatic characterisation, political intrigue, 
political (in)fighting and all explained, contextualised and materialised through the discursive 
templates of correspondents and their respective ‘beats’. But need it be the case that in such 
an environment, public service broadcasting of Current Affairs act as containing devices for 
the more progressive or radical alternatives to dominant (neo-liberal, neo-imperialist) 
narratives? That Newsnight, Question Time and (for the purposes of this research) Panorama 
are discursively limited and limiting is problematic. What Panorama (and others’) appear(s) 
to lack is the ability or journalistic and televisual resources to adequately provide the in-
depth, developed, nuanced, contextual detail necessary to link together rather than separate. 
Equally troubling is the near total absence of any other alternatives. 
 The Panorama broadcasts under scrutiny in this research were the product of this 
specific type of orientation towards expertise. Such demarcated orientation though was not by 
way of reference to any particularly sophisticated expertise with regards the geographical, 
political, sociological or cultural knowledge, but was instead largely filtered through the 
narrative expertise of the ‘Correspondent’. To what extent then does this epistemology, this 
taxonomy and this discursive formation of expertise readily lend itself to nuanced, developed, 
142 
 
contextually rich, socio-politically, ideologically informed interrogation? And to what extent 
might (in particular) the ‘war correspondent’ already pre-suppose a direction of travel? 
 In some ways this bears a resemblance to what has been referred to as ‘parachute 
journalism’. If we understand the term as ‘the practice of thrusting journalists into an area to 
report on a story in which the reporter has little knowledge or experience’. Of course it also 
has significant differences. No doubt the journalists concerned, in the case of this research 
these are, principally though not exclusively, Jane Corbin and John Simpson, would critique 
the assertion of ‘little knowledge’, and in some ways they would be correct to do so.
2
 Both 
Corbin and Simpson have a wealth of experience ‘overseas’ as ‘foreign correspondents’ (or 
‘world affairs correspondent/editor’ in the case of Simpson) and in some cases, as they make 
clear in the Panorama broadcasts, they have experience of the country (Iraq) concerned. 
However, the way this experience is developed, in what context, covering which stories and 
events, bears close-scrutiny. Both Simpson and Corbin have devoted significant time, energy 
and resources to reporting from that country (Iraq). Both are ‘seasoned campaigners’, have a 
wealth of experience, and are (rightly) admired for their journalistic output. However, the 
extent to which their experience(s) have been developed whilst Iraq itself has been ‘on a war 
footing’ might mean that the journalistic styles, templates and forms are discursively framed 
and epistemologically cemented. This of course resonates with the earlier suggestions 
regarding the generic nature of ‘War Reporting’. ‘Genre is not only about text but is also a 
feature of the “routinization” of production that shapes audience reception and perception as 
much as it is shaped by them’. (Boyd-Barrett 2004 in Allan and Zelizer 2004: 26). Even if in 
                                                 
2 The ‘foreign correspondent’ role speaks to wider issues concerning the ability, wherewithal, resources and 
desire of News and Current Affairs to cover overseas issues and events. Foreign correspondent, overseas 
editor et al. are themselves generic and inexact terms. Such terms also indicate the inexact, generic, discursive 
‘over-thereness’ of news pertaining to overseas. This is an area related to the ‘news values’ of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and the relative merits of this approach. As it stands Panorama is therefore constrained in some ways by this 
adherence to ‘news values’ though one could make the argument that Current Affairs broadcasting could and 
should be the location in which such values are challenged. These issues are covered extensively by, among 
others, Galtung and Ruge (1965), Harcup and O’Neill (2001; 2017), Bennett (2015), Thussu (2007), Cottle 
(2006), Brighton and Foy (2015) and Allan (2004). 
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these cases, both Simpson and Corbin can point to significant research, experience and 
expertise beyond the micro narrative and discourse of conflict, the extent to which their 
anchoring of the broadcasts positions the programmes themselves, and the viewing audience 
on a ‘war footing’ is surely important and problematic. In the case of John Simpson, he is 
already established, somewhat unfairly perhaps, as ‘The Liberator of Kabul’ 
(https://www.theguardian.com/media/2001/nov/13/warinafghanistan2001.bbc). In short, the 
journalists have expertise, but such expertise, and audience knowledge of them is oriented 
around and filtered through their ability to narrate and tell the story of conflict. Orienting the 
Panorama broadcasts around this specific form of correspondent expertise is a particularly 
pressing concern when the programmes are broadcast prior to conflict or war beginning, in 
the pre-conflict phase. Their visible presence on screen, their narration and guidance through 
the events, their perceived ‘war correspondent’ expertise already establishes the discursive 
terrain and template. It might perhaps lead one to assume or posit the question: ‘Well, if 
Simpson’s there, surely war is not far away!’  
 Significantly, the epistemological and taxonomical position of the ‘War 
Correspondent’ the ‘Overseas Editor’ or ‘World Affairs Editor’ is not only a mark of 
authority and legitimacy, it is an essential point about News and Current Affairs’ place in the 
journalistic and public sphere environment. Furthermore, for the purposes of this research, in 
the specific context of British broadcasting, such positions are essential aspects and part of 
the ‘trustworthy’ repertoire that underpins and contributes to the BBC as an institution and 
broadcaster of, to and for the nation. 
3.14  Chronology and Temporality 
Chronological and temporal logics have a great deal of importance in the overall context and 
narrative of war, likewise, and partially located as it is within the WPM, pre-conflict phase; 
conflict phase; post-conflict phase, the chronology and temporal ‘logic’ is important in the 
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narrative and context of this research. Chronology and temporality are of course equally 
important in broadcasting (of stories). Therefore, the analysis chapters are organised both 
chronologically, and in the conclusion, thematically. By which I mean: so that one can 
ascertain then outline the dominant themes that emerge, in all three Chapters of analysis, each 
broadcast will be analysed in turn. The conclusion sections of each chapter will then draw 
together the analysis in order to assess and outline the extent to which the sample can be said 
to constitute particular discourses and epistemologies regarding the conflict (phase) in Iraq. 
 Given that the second Gulf War is the most consequential foreign policy news event 
of the 21
st
 Century, and that the BBC remains the primary Public Service Broadcaster in the 
UK, as one might expect, in the build-up to, the prosecution of, and the fall-out from the war 
in/on Iraq, Panorama produced and broadcast a number of programmes pertaining to the 
issue, and the ‘event’.  Beginning in September 2002 and ending in March 2004, the sample 
contained here is comprised of 10 Panorama broadcasts. These 10 broadcasts will be 
analysed as a means of critically interrogating what one might call Panorama’s ideological, 
journalistic and discursive footprint.  
 For reasons of organisation and for generic consistency, this research will devote 
itself to analyses of 10 broadcasts. The rationale for this selection remains rigorous and is in 
fact based on the ‘type’ of broadcast under scrutiny. This research is a media, cultural studies, 
journalism doctorate, therefore, even though the methodological approach and theoretical 
overview explicitly makes comment and specific claims regarding the wider social, 
ideological, and political issues, and I do claim the Panorama broadcasts played an important 
role in reproducing dominant hegemonic discourse, the main point of the analysis is the 
specificities of the form, the formal characteristics, the generic and journalistic discourses of 
Panorama, and the ways in which they establish the genre, set the precedent, and in so doing, 
reproduce a dominant discursive and ideological hegemonic discourse.  
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 Additionally, and relatedly, this research is restricted to those broadcasts that have, 
as their central components, large sections of ‘original material’. That is: original material 
filmed explicitly for use (and assumed insight) in(to) the topic and news events under 
scrutiny. The action, and the ways in which such ‘action’ is represented helps frame the 
issue(s). Furthermore, there is also, in some cases, extensive use of archive material, usually 
drawn from BBC News broadcasts and previous editions of Panorama. The use of already 
established and legitimated archive material is also a key aspect of the ways in which the 
debate can be framed, or the stories can be told. The above type of broadcast also functions as 
the archetype, and as such has set something of a (now much imitated) broadcast journalism 
precedent or template.  
 Principally then, the chapters of analysis are based on a rigorous analysis of a 
sample of Panorama episodes produced and broadcast in the pre-conflict phase; conflict 
phase; and post-conflict phase. The texts, stretching across 19 months in total, via specific 
journalistic and televisual signifying practises produce epistemological and discursive themes 
as a means to ‘tell the story’ (of conflict). Further, the extent to which the dominant themes 
inherent in each and all broadcasts ‘produce’ a vision and version of the world will be subject 
to scrutiny, analysis and critical interrogation. 
 The three chapters of analysis involved undertaking rigorous discourse and multi-
modal critical discourse analysis. In so doing, I was able to identify specific consistent 
thematic, televisual, representational, and journalistic themes inherent in each broadcast and 
across the entire sample. The analysis then goes on to outline, explain and critically 
interrogate the ways in which particular discursive actors (functioning as ‘Primary Definers’) 
shape the themes, concretise the discourse, and ‘produce’ a vision and version of the world. 
The analysis provokes questions regarding the extent to which the discourse of Panorama 
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across the sample of 10 different but related broadcasts produces an epistemology, and the 
extent to which said epistemology and discourse is commensurate with elite-centred interests. 
3.15 Organisation of Analysis 
 Each of the broadcasts were analysed and critically interrogated by drawing on the 
summary paragraphs the BBC themselves use to publicise the programmes. These officially 
designated and publicised summaries are vital, they make explicit what the focus, the 
storyline(s), of each broadcast will be. The summary paragraphs literally mark out in stark 
press release (and trailer) terms, the specific aspects, storyline(s), characters, themes and 
focus points as both the most politically and journalistically significant. In short, the BBC 
Panorama summary paragraphs identify the main players in the wider socio-political 
landscape, and in the broadcasts themselves, they simply become the main actors in the story, 
they shape and frame the narrative orientation. In so doing, does this narrow focus exclude 
and excise wider structural and ideological considerations? Using the summary paragraphs 
the BBC themselves deem worth using ensures that the analysis does not simply become a 
case of finding those examples, those frames which merely confirm my own view. By clearly 
remaining within the narrative and storyline arcs BBC Panorama themselves highlight, the 
research is able to avert the potential for ‘data (or semiotic, discourse) mining’, or 
‘confirmation bias’. The analysis will identify and examine the ways in which said dominant 
concerns, themes and issues of the broadcasts are discursively, televisually, and 
journalistically communicated.  In so doing, the research is able to draw conclusions as to the 
overall themes of each individual broadcast, and latterly, the overall discourse and 
epistemology of the sample as a whole.  
To ensure that the research is rigorous, and that the approach is consistent and transparent, 
the ways in which the approach was operationalised is set out below. 
3.16 Operationalising the Approach and the Selection of Textual Sample 
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The particular method and approach applied in this research was as follows.  
1. Firstly, the timeframe was identified, in part this was somewhat self-selecting because 
the ‘news agenda’ became dominated by discussions of Iraq. The sample begins with 
the first broadcast (post 9-11) in which conflict in Iraq – as a real and enduring policy 
proposal – was discussed as a possibility, and the sample ends once Saddam Hussein 
was captured. These dates and the broadcasts are the most important principally 
because this was when ‘debate’ around the rights and wrongs of embarking on 
conflict were under most urgent consideration by policy elites, and consequently, by 
News and Current Affairs broadcasting, and the public more generally. Or to put it 
another way, the Panorama episodes in question were broadcast at a time when the 
issues were driven by the news agenda, the ‘news values’ of the time. Once Iraq 
dominated the News, Panorama, being the preeminent Current Affairs strand in the 
UK, as expected, followed suit. Given that the methodological approach here is CDA, 
which involves more detailed textual analysis than some other methods require, the 
sample had to be contained enough to manage, but simultaneously large enough to 
constitute a representative sample. The selection of ten episodes across 19 months 
achieves this aim. 
2. Once the (19 month) timeframe had been established, I then identified each 
Panorama broadcast that had Iraq/Saddam/WMD/Conflict in Iraq as its storyline. 
Over the timeframe selected, it became clear that, adhering to the template identified 
and established by Altheide and Grimes (2005) the broadcasts could be grouped 






The War Programming Model (WPM) provides a useful analytical framework. As 
listed above, in the WPM, the programmes divide broadly into three categories: 1) 
The pre-conflict phase: designed to analyse and deal with threat (‘the threat of 
Saddam’s weapons program’); 2) The conflict phase: broadcasting updates on the 
progress of the war (sometimes through the experience of coalition troops); 3) The 
post-conflict phase: dealing with the ‘reconstruction’ of Iraq and the search for 
Saddam (once ‘combat operations were effectively over’ (Bush, G., 18 April 2003)). 
In the post-conflict phase, Panorama tended to focus on the ‘reconstruction 
programme’ and in at least one edition: Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons, 
the continuing search for WMD. 
The style and approach to News and Current Affairs broadcasting demonstrated by 
Panorama from 2002–2004 are broadly consistent with Altheide and Grimes’ model. 
This analysis, however, develops the model in three particular ways: 1) The analytical 
model developed by this research is a wholly critical discourse analytical one. This 
ensures this research is able to track, trace and analyse the consistently applied 
signifying practices; 2) The focus of this research also deals exclusively with Current 
Affairs as opposed to News. As already discussed, the length of time devoted to each 
broadcast means that, in theory at least, these broadcasts are well resourced, well 
researched, and by devoting more time to the issue, are able to tell the more detailed 
and longer story. As such, Panorama carries considerable weight (and responsibility) 
for contributing to the public sphere. This resourcing, and location on the principle 
public service broadcaster in the UK, in turn feeds into and cements its established 
currency of legitimacy, the very commodity on which Panorama trades; 3) That the 
broadcasts tend to locate the action in broadly dramatic terms provides an analytical 
focus often overlooked by other contemporary studies, and certainly overlooked by 
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Altheide and Grimes. In all three narrative stages of this media logic, the pre-conflict 
phase; the conflict phase; the post-conflict phase, the dramatic is accentuated in 
sometimes similar, and sometimes different ways. Although differences exist, the 
(most) dramatic is demonstrably and forcefully present. The stylistic devices, the 
signifying practices, the forms of story-telling correspond with those commonly 
associated with dramatic or fictional accounts of events. Such extensive use of 
dramatic forms and tropes of story-telling have the potential to render understanding 
of events as narrowly focussed and therefore potentially incompatible with the claims 
often made for and of public service broadcast journalism. Each ‘phase’ will provide 
some critical underpinning in the subsequent chapters, and the dramatic templates 
employed to tell the stories will be referred to, alongside significant examples, in each 
Chapter of analysis.  
3. Selecting the sample: Over the 19-month period selected, Panorama, as one would 
expect, produced and broadcast a number programmes devoted to Iraq. Using the 
WMP’s phases template, these can be divided as follows: 
Pre-conflict phase = 7 
Conflict phase = 5  
Post-conflict phase = 6 
Total = 18. 
So to remain consistent, and to ensure that the sample contained programmes of 
similar style, the next step in the process was one of differentiating the form: The 
focus of this research is explicitly trained on a particular form, type, or style of 
Current Affairs broadcasting. The particular form of broadcasting that constitutes this 
sample is what is referred to (above) as Current Affairs ‘reportage’. This is a mode of 
broadcast in which a significant proportion of its content is original filmed footage 
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combined with archive material drawn from News and previous iterations of Current 
Affairs broadcasts. During the chosen time-period, those broadcasts not under 
scrutiny in this research are ‘studio-based’ discussions. Studio-based discussions are 
an entirely different ‘form’. Their conventions and characteristics sit uneasily in this 
research, based as they are on entirely different temporal, locational and formal 
logic(s), as such, they are, not extraneous, but at least peripheral in this research. This 
is not to say however, that they played no part in the narrative of war, and indeed they 
appear to fit fairly-seamlessly into the ‘war programming’ model as outlined by 
Altheide and Grimes (2005). As such, they play some role in shoring-up the wider 
political discourse of the period, they play some role in the ideological footprint and 
the reproduction of the dominant narrative. However, in the context of Panorama as it 
is currently imagined, studio-based discussions remain an anomaly. As anomalous, 
and as a Critical Discourse Analysis theoretical framework proposes, while they 
might produce and contribute to interesting and important aspects and narratives, they 
might be said to help circumscribe limits of debate (Chomsky 2003) their very 
different (and more rarely-used) characteristics are less formally, journalistically, and 
televisually interesting. Such forms are also less imitated, their currency is 
diminished, they are certainly not the standard Panorama template. The studio-based 
discussions and debate format is one found in different, though related broadcast 
strands, principally Question Time and Newsnight.  Both Question Time, and, to a 
lesser extent, Newsnight are certainly ripe for analysis and perhaps will feature as 
objects in future research, but in the meantime, this research restricts its analysis to 
the Panorama broadcasts with the standard(ised) format, containing a combination of 
archive material and new original footage.  
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Of the broadcasts adhering to the style and form with which this analysis concerns 
itself, the above total of 18 is reduced to 12. 
Pre-Conflict phase = 4 
Conflict phase = 3 
Post-Conflict phase = 5 
Selecting four in the pre-conflict phase was an obvious choice because, firstly, there 
were only four. Additionally, to explain why this chapter of analysis contains a 
sample of four, whereas the next two chapters contain a sample of only three in each 
one, the pre-conflict phase was the most urgent period, one in which the preeminent 
Current Affairs broadcaster ought to be devoting itself, its attention to the whys and 
wherefores, the competing arguments of embarking on a conflict with a foreign 
power. It is the time-period in which some critique, some resistance might be able to 
be mounted and sustained.   
In part explained by the fact that the ‘official’ conflict was so short, and with the 
gestation period for Current Affairs typically being longer than for News, sampling 
and analysing only three broadcasts in the conflict phase was equally self-selecting. 
There were only three Panorama broadcasts in this ‘phase’. 
In the final post-conflict phase, the selection of three (from a possible five) was 
based on the following complimentary considerations: a) the simple practicality of 
management of material. Each analytical chapter ought to have a sense of balance, of 
reciprocity. b) Having closely watched and analysed all 5 from the post-conflict 
phase, episodes in this phase end up saying essentially similar things. c) Most 
importantly, the most interesting and obvious reason for the selection of the three 
chosen is based on that fact that each programme under scrutiny and analysis ‘echoed’ 
and followed up from a programme from the earlier pre-conflict and conflict phase(s). 
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There is a return to the same storyline(s) and the same Primary Definers. Discourse 
and narratives are reiterated, in some (minor) cases challenged, but largely, drawing 
on, and echoing drama and adhering to the (partly Proppian) template identified in 
this research, the post-conflict phase broadcasts tie up the loose ends, they conclude 
the storylines developed in earlier in the ‘series’. In the terms of Robin Nelson, above 
(echoing Propp) the final three broadcasts offer a cogent illustration of how ‘Order is 
restored’. In this case, such order is political, ideological, televisual and journalistic.  
4. The next step in the approach was to view each of the programmes in their entirety, 
and in order. By adhering to their temporal sequence, I was able to assess the extent to 
which they might begin to constitute a discourse, an epistemology of the conflict in 
Iraq, and, more interestingly, a televisual dramatic storytelling template. This process 
was then necessary in order to familiarise myself with the editorial, journalistic and 
televisual approach (to storytelling). In research such as this, the categories of analysis 
are ‘emergent’, they are part of an iterative research process. By which I mean, while 
ensuring that the analysis always paid close attention to Panorama’s own publicity, 
its own purported storyline(s), the categories, the tools of analysis, the frames, the 
terms and the salient issues and methods are gradually set and settled through the very 
process of close watching and subsequent analysis. To assess the extent to which 
Panorama has a generic style, I then closely analysed the visual, aural signifiers (the 
semiotics) present in the text(s), and with the assistance of the official BBC transcripts 
if any speech was unclear, I was able to begin the linguistic and lexical analysis.  
5. The process was then to watch each Panorama episode all the way through, and this 
time while examining the extent to which each episode bore close relation to the 
salient features the BBC themselves identified as most pressing, most urgent, the 
focus of their attention.  
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6. Having examined and analysed each programme, and the extent to which they did 
comply with the promotional paragraphs, the salient issues BBC Panorama produced 
to go alongside each broadcast,  I then assessed the extent to which each episode 
made extensive (even dominant) use of original material;  The extent to which each 
episode made extensive use of Primary Definers – as storytellers, who they were, 
their position in a cultural, social and political hierarchy, with the attendant ability to 
frame the event(s), and ‘have most to say’ (Van Dijk). The questions I posed to 
myself in each circumstance was: Did Panorama deploy particular journalistic and 
storytelling methods? If so, what were these? Were dramatic elements prominent? 
Was character, archetype(s), stereotypes, and narrative deployed? How so? What did 
they communicate? How did this meet and match the BBC PR paragraphs?  
7. Once these elements were identified and became clearer, the specificities of CDA and 
multimodal analysis could come to the fore. On repeated viewing of the broadcasts, 
the principal CDA tools that became most applicable were: 
Ideological squaring and attributes;  
Over-lexicalisation, Lexical Absences; 
Nominalisation and Transitivity.  
3.17  Ideological Squaring and Attributes 
Given that the Iraq war was a highly politically charged, a much-debated topic, with 
significant opposition, how (if) does Panorama include and represent dissident voices and 
opinion(s)? 
In the case of conflict, hegemonic boundaries are not overstepped. As he (Gitlin) 
argues, the “work of hegemony, all in all, consists of imposing standardised 
assumptions over events and conditions that must be ‘covered’ by the dictates of the 




What are the ‘prevailing standards’? Who is afforded space and voice in the discursive 
formation? In what ways are dominant and/or dissonant and subaltern voices and opinions 
represented and narrated? Analysing the ways in which such (wider) opinions, if present, are 
(stage) managed; their place in the unfolding narratives; the extent to which resistant or 
critical voices are themselves discursively and dramatically constrained is of vital importance 
when discussing News and Current Affairs. With regards the specificities of this research, 
Current Affairs television coverage of war and conflict, (Panorama’s coverage of Gulf War 
II) how are sources and protagonists represented? How are sources and protagonists 
legitimised and/or de-legitimised? In what ways can the theoretical model provide the 
necessary critical rigour? Van Dijk’s extensive analysis and his theoretical model are 
instructive in this respect: 
Since the underlying ideologies (and the social attitudes and personal opinions influenced 
by them) are generally polarised, this also tends to be the case for ideological discourse, 
typically organised by emphasising the positive representation of Us (the in-group) and 
the negative representations of Them (the out-group) – and its corollary (mitigating the 
negative representation of Us and the positive representation of Them). We call this 
combination of general discursive strategies the ‘ideological square’. (Van Dijk in 
Wetherell et al 2001: 193) 
 
One way in which this ‘ideological square’ is completed is to over-represent specific 
protagonists while simultaneously under-representing (when complete absenting would be 
impractical) others, or ‘Others’: 
One typical transformation is overstatement, which is of the same general category as 
over-generalisation as we know it from stereotypes and prejudices or ‘extreme case’ 
formulations in conversations. In addition to a change of semantic content or meaning, 
such a structural transformation relation between source discourse and news discourse 
may also be rhetorical, since rhetoric deals with the way information (meaning, content) 
is emphasised or de-emphasised for various reasons. This may be to emphasise the bad 
characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups … but also for dramatic effect: 
where scholarly discourse tends to hedge, media discourse tends to be much more 
categorical and exaggerated – with the tacit assumption that readers [viewers] will be 
more in, or will better remember the ‘exaggerated’ news. (Van Dijk in Wahl-Jorgensen 




For example, in the sample drawn upon in this research, the (oft-repeated) claim: ‘Saddam 
Hussein is able to launch chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes’ was frequently 
cited. That this claim emerged from elite policy-makers (Primary Definers), chiefly Tony 
Blair, means that it was immediately afforded legitimate newsworthy status. This is to be 
expected and accepted. However, despite the fact this claim became perhaps the most 
critiqued, the most urgently debated, the most cited and most subject to critical interrogation 
does not diminish its resonance within a ‘war programming’ mode of address and discourse. 
In fact, despite its critical reception, the phrase itself assisted in setting a template of menace 
and fear. In this instance, it is not even that ‘he’ (Saddam) could launch an attack within 45 
minutes, such a claim proved (too late of course) fairly easy to disprove (and was 
conclusively disproved). It is precisely because, through repetition, ‘He’ is already demonic, 
unhinged and clearly demarcated as ‘Other’, so much so that ‘he’ already has attributed to 
‘him’ a certain cumulative semiotic, discursive and epistemological resource (of uniquely 
menacing). This ‘resource’ (of menace), this process of ‘Ideological squaring’ means we 
understand that it is not necessarily that ‘he’ can launch weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), it is that ‘He would if he could’. Even critical Current Affairs broadcasting, and 
Panorama is the paradigm, seeking to unpick and ‘dig behind the headlines’ (Holland 2006: 
xiii) potentially faces (and might end up reproducing) this accumulated semiotic and 
discursive template. Furthermore, and with the additional deployment of already-legitimated 
archive footage, does Panorama actually reproduce this characterisation and locate it within a 
narrative of ‘Othered’ menace set against benign Western intervention? The analytical 
resource of ‘ideological squaring’ is therefore a valuable one. As befits research that utilises 
the CDA methodology, we know that stereotyping, (see above) because it can ‘emphasise the 
bad characteristics of out-groups or the good ones of in-groups’ (Van Dijk in Wahl-Jorgensen 
and Hanitzsch 2006) plays a major role in the process of Ideological Squaring. The analysis 
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will assess and critically analyse the extent to which such ‘Ideological squaring’ is a common 
feature, a common representational ‘resource’ in the chapters of analysis.  
3.18  Over-Lexicalisation and Lexical Absences 
Discourse (and critical discourse) analysis, being a linguistic form of analysis, provides 
useful resources with which to critically interrogate the ways in which language ascribes 
value(s) to ideas, places, events and agents (and non-agents) in various storylines and events 
covered by the Panorama sample. First extensively theorised by Halliday (1978; 1985) the 
term ‘Over-Lexicalisation’ refers to ‘the existence of an excess of quasi-synonymous terms 
for entities and ideas’ (Fowler, R 1991; 85). Machin and Mayr (2012) put it as follows, over-
lexicalisation, they argue ‘results when a surfeit of repetitious, quasi-synonymous terms is 
woven into the fabric of news discourse, giving rise to a sense of over-completeness.’ 
(Machin, D and Mayr, A. 2012; 37). Sometimes referred to as ‘over-assertion’ (Bell, A in 
Bell, A and Garrett, P 1998 83) it describes and analyses the ways in which language is 
deployed, ideas and characterisations repeated, and synonymous terms used to underscore a 
way of understanding the events in question. In making strong assertions, ‘Over-
Lexicalisation’ attempts to make definitive that which might be more nuanced and complex.  
 In addition to the linguistic tools, the visual and aural aspects present in television 
representation means that the Over-Lexicalisation can take on an even more powerful means 
of over-emphasising the ‘in-group’ v ‘out-group’ dichotomy. Visual framing, edits, close-ups 
for emotional expression, and musical accompaniment can represent or ‘cast’ people and 
events in particular light(s). This is particularly acute when dealing with contentious and 
dramatic issues such as conflict, where the actions of agents involved (can) have deadly 
consequences. Because of its repetitions, its analogies, its synonyms, the practice of Over-
Lexicalisation is an obvious means through which the afore-mentioned ‘Ideological squaring’ 
can be sustained and strengthened. 
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 A distinct but related linguistic and lexical approach is ‘Lexical Absences’. The 
term refers to ‘suppression, where certain terms we expect to find are absent’ (Machin and 
Mayr 2012; 38). This particular approach proves very useful for critical and reflective 
ideological analysis. However, it also requires more detailed contextual overview, by which I 
mean, in order to identify an absence, one must have a detailed understanding of wider 
contextual and ideological fields.  The ‘News Values’ oriented journalistic practices of 
clarity, unambiguity and simplicity might assist in ease of understanding, but the CDA tools 
applied with these approaches ‘ask what has been left out or added and the ideological work 
this does’ (Machin and Mayr. 2012; 39). Over-lexicalisation, and its discursive bedfellow 
‘Lexical Absences’ is perfectly commensurate with news discourse, news practice(s) and 
‘News Values’. Over-Lexicalising specific terms (particularly when one finds repeated 
examples, as a developed and well-defined CDA approach does) while simultaneously 
absenting others, often absenting complex terms (as Lexical Absenting often does) reduces 
ambiguity. In ‘News Values’ terms, that which might be complex, is, via ‘Over-
lexicalisation’ and ‘Lexical Absenting’ made unambiguous.  
3.19  Transitivity and Nominalisation 
‘Transitivity’ and its subtle use in media representation is vital to understand. In short, the 
term refers to ‘agency structures within the narratives, the way in which ‘doing things’ is 
represented in discourse, including who is positioned as doing which kind of things, in 
relation to what, or whom’ (Barker and Galisinksi 2001; 144). The transitive verb in fact only 
makes sense if it actually exerts its action on an object (or a person). This has obvious 
consequences for the apportion(ing) of blame, or its opposite, the denial or excision of blame. 
For instance, in conflict journalism, the difference between the Transitive verb – a participant 
being ‘Killed’ – someone performed the action; ‘Killed by’ – an agent is more directly 
responsible, and the Intransitive ‘dying’ which is agentless, is vitally important. In the above 
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example, identifying who is most often the agent responsible (for ‘killing’), and 
contrastingly, which actions are signalled as agentless can help us understand the discourse, 
the epistemology and the ideological work going on in texts. The critical lens provided by 
Transitive analysis means the ‘focus is on how events and processes are connected (or not 
connected) with subjects and objects’ (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; 83). It is necessary 
therefore to apply the above analytical approach of assigning agency via transitive and 
instransitive verbs to Panorama sample.  
 Closely related to Transitive analysis is the process of ‘Nominalisation’. While still 
engaged in the transformation of active into passive, ‘Nominalisation’ takes a step further 
from the above transitive and instransitive, and instead changes verbs into nouns. So for 
instance, a politician is less likely to say ‘we are going to privatise the railways’, they instead 
might say ‘There will be a privatisation of the railways’. This choice of grammatical form is a 
discursive practice. Its effect is to constitute a set of actions (the transfer of public goods into 
private hands) as 'agentless'. However, we know that this promotes the interests of certain 
groups in society. During the financial crisis, one of the most frequently occurring acts of 
‘Nominalisation’ is to say ‘These are tough economic times’ in place of taking ownership of 
policy that is explicitly the (at least partial) cause of said ‘tough economic times.’ Again, this 
particular analytical approach is useful and applicable to the sample contained within this 
thesis.  
 Nominalisation is frequently to be found in government dispatches and reproduced 
by Current Affairs broadcasting. For example, as we shall see, discussions and debates 
regarding the prosecution of war on Iraq, and the officially sanctioned opposition to it, can 
become oriented around the practicalities of engaging in conflict, and what is more, in 
questions of competence, competence regarding the UK/US coalition preparedness in ‘taking 
on the task/Saddam’. In this event, officially sanctioned narratives and challenges, by which I 
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mean Political opposition in the House of Commons (again, via institutionalised sources, 
Primary Definers), becomes oriented around the (lack of) support for ‘our troops’ or ‘our 
boys’. Such traits are particularly pronounced and (over) represented in broadcasts pertaining 
to ‘conflict-phase coverage’ and ‘post-conflict phase coverage’. In short, this is the very 
definition of a discursive formation and the extent to which, instead of overt challenge, it is 
reproduced by the Panorama broadcasts under scrutiny provides a framework for some of 
this analysis. As opposed to any rigorous wider contextual, geo-political critique, the 
criticism that is present becomes focused on the unfolding events themselves. Echoing 
Chomsky (again) (2003), critique is allowed, even encouraged but within narrow terrain 
(discursive limit). 
 Within the analysis chapters there are also some other notable discursive techniques 
employed. For the most part, these did not appear with sufficient regularity as to deserve their 
own category. Nevertheless, on occasion, discursive categories and techniques (such as 
‘Salience’, Lexical Choices’) do appear, and when they do so, they will be discussed, even if 
only briefly. The ways in which all of these particular representational and discursive 
techniques were, through ‘routine attitudes and working practices of staff’ (Barker, C. 2008) 
deployed in order to establish, reproduce and cement particular narrative(s), discourses and 
epistemologies will be analysed in detail in the three chapters of analysis. 
3.20  What and who constitutes a ‘Primary Definer’ in Panorama discourse. 
Equally important in the methodological approach is the ways in which definitions are 
applied and operationalised in the research. Having identified the notion of Primary Definers 
and Primary Definition as an important, key part of the Current Affairs repertoire, one also 
has to have, in the textual examples, some method of defining what constitutes a ‘Primary 
Definer’, what is more, what differentiates a Primary Definer from a mere protagonist? 
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Through the iterative and generative process of designing the CDA approach applicable in 
this sample, these particular aspects were decisive.  
1. The extent to which specific persons had a particular location in social and political 
hierarchy. In the television and Proppian narrative structure terms, the ‘who they are’ 
combined with the ‘what they do’ (or say). In this regard, the Proppian narrative structure is 
matched with and by their location in a political, social and discursive hierarchy. The ‘who 
they are’ (hierarchical) was in something of a symbiotic relationship with ‘what they do’ 
(say). In short, does the ways in which both the ‘who they are’ and ‘what they do’ (say) 
(re)produce hegemonic narrative(s). 
2. The extent to which their discourse matches that of the Panorama PR, do they essentially 
shape the discourse and epistemology. Do their words and actions orient, reflect and 
constitute the dominant Panorama discourse?  
3. Do they have ‘most to say’ (Van Dijk 2001)  
4. How much their words, their explanations, their discourse, is challenged by the Panorama 
journalists.  
All of the above contribute to the constitution of the ‘Primary Definer’ and Primary 
Definition (of events). In short, and, importantly for this research, deploying a particular 
CDA method and approach, one can assess the extent to which they (Primary Definers) both 
reflect and simultaneously constitute the dominant Panorama discourse. 
3.21 Drama, Music Score and Non-diegesis  
 The final piece of the analytical jigsaw comes in the guise of perhaps one of the 
more surprising signifying practices in many of the Panorama broadcasts. Namely: the 
presence of music. News rarely (if ever) includes music, certainly non-diegetic musical 
scores are extremely rare. Music within the scene, the diegetic, might be present at times, 
depending on the scene. However, the additional post-production layering of a sound or 
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musical score over top of the on-screen footage demands scrutiny. The rationale for the non-
use of music in News broadcasts is well established. Music can function as an emotive and 
emotional driver or setter of mood. It can help establish character, setting and guide the 
viewers’ emotional response to the on-screen ‘action’ or footage. Therefore, were music to be 
a regular feature in the News genre its presence would understandably compromise its high-
modality, public sphere credentials. However, non-diegetic music does appear in Panorama, 
and, given its post-production materiality (the addition of music as non-diegetic has to be a 
deliberate production decision) what is the mood, character or setting to which music 
contributes? Furthermore, how might non-diegetic music shape and contribute to mood, 
feelings or establish character in Panorama? If it does so, does this compromise the high-
modality, public sphere credentials of Panorama? What decisions are made and how might 
music be used in Panorama? As this research is not ethnographic, but is instead discursive 
and textual in nature, it cannot lay claim to know why certain editorial decisions were made. 
However, the research can certainly identify trends, themes and analyse the potential effect 
such editorial (musical) decisions might have on the narrative, and ideological orientation of 
the text(s). In what ways might the addition of a non-diegetic musical score act as an enabler 
or setter of narrative and characterisation?  
Musical soundtrack in scenes of acted narrative and dramatised setting, perhaps 
underneath dialogue, guides us in our imaginative responses to a fictional world, a 
world that is the rhetorical project of the film or programme to encourage us to be 
drawn within. (Corner 2002: 358) 
 
As Corner suggests, music is frequently employed in ‘acted’ and ‘dramatised’ setting(s). 
Further, music ‘guides us in our imaginative response’ therefore the association is dramatic 
and encourages an imaginative response. If, as is surely the case, music is there to ‘encourage 
us to be drawn within’ (the unfolding narrative) then, with the inclusion of music, what is the 
imaginative response sought by the production? 
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Within the aural profile of television, music plays varying roles and functions ...these 
functions include generating thematic support for what is on screen – indications of 
historical time, of geographical place and of appropriate mood being prominent – and 
providing formal support for programme organisation, pacing and shifting intensities 
of portrayal. In all these modes of application, the ways in which rhythm, tempo, 
harmony, melody, etc. feed into contextual associative patterns of cultural meaning 
will be a matter for careful production judgement, however ‘intuitively’ exercised. 
(Corner 2002: 357) 
 
There are numerous examples of music, to which I will return in due course, but suffice to 
say that its deliberate and considered inclusion in many of the broadcasts, locates Panorama 
in something of a contradictory position. It trades on its currency of legitimacy and its 
association with the paradigmatic high modality form of news broadcasting, and yet, with its 
frequent use of non-diegetic music, it seems to utilise an emotive register, deploying 
techniques that fit more obviously in a dramatic ‘Narrative Structure’ form, and, I would 
suggest, all in the service of characterisation and narrative development.  
3.22 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has sought to outline the theoretical framework and the methodological 
approach, and the rationale for said methodological approach. If we accept that ‘Discourse’ 
refers to a body of knowledge that both defines and limits what can be said about specific 
topics and events, then by analysing a relatively large sample of Panorama texts that engage 
with and represent the conflict in Iraq, we can assess and critically analyse the extent to 
which Panorama is a discourse, or, effectively functions as a discursive formation. By 
identifying and assessing the precise patterns, narratives, (tele)visual and aesthetic styles, use 
of sources (‘Primary Definers’, legitimated discursive actors), and location in wider political 
and journalistic frames, the selected research approach can effectively analyse the ways in 
which specific representations are given value and endorsed. In CDA terms, the methodology 
provides a critical and theoretical framework that allows one to assess how the social object 
is being constructed by the discourse's choice of description, and the associations it implicitly 
makes. Simultaneously, though this task is notoriously more difficult, through rigorous and 
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close analysis, the CDA method can also ascertain which ‘ways of speaking about’ 
(representing) the social object (of Iraq) are excluded or ‘ruled out’. Assessing the extent to 
which particular words, phrases, terms of reference, metaphors, rhetorical styles, and 
journalistic methods effectively produce an epistemology of Iraq. This method looks for how 
things are constituted by discursive practices, in this case, the discursive practices are 
contained within the PSB television Journalism of Panorama. The value of a critical 
discourse analytical approach adopted for this research is precisely that CDA seeks to 
identify, track and trace examples from not only the same generic category, but, explicitly in 
the case of this research, from the same journalistic ‘stable’. The tracking, tracing and 
analysing, across different phases, across a temporal sample, allows one to develop an 
understanding as to how (and which) material is used and reused in order to tell the story 
(stories) of Iraq.  
 To summarise: perhaps constrained by the televisual form; utilising the specific 
formal characteristics and tropes of its genre; limited by the discursive context and frames 
encompassed by BBC Impartiality; limited by the rigid frames of the journalistic form and 
practices; and the utilisation of communicative templates more often found in other forms, 
most notably, drama, the multi-modal CDA approach, assessing broadcasts over a time 
period of 19 months, covering and analysing 10 Panorama broadcasts, offers critical insights 
regarding the ways in which Panorama effectively circumscribes ‘ways of talking about’ 
Iraq.   
 Concomitantly, attention to previous research: principally that produced by the media 
sociologists Altheide and Grimes and their creation of the ‘War Programming Model’ of 
broadcast, and analysis, helps us to understand the ways in which already established patterns 
and narratives for telling the stories of conflict effectively provide a storytelling template. 
Finally, to critically interrogate the significant and dominant use of dramatic templates. The 
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use of music and non-diegetic score within a paradigm of Current Affairs broadcasting, and 
the use of such tropes to measure the extent to which the appropriating of the dramatic, as 
story-telling device(s), might narrow down public understanding of critical, vital, geo-
political issues and events.  
 The theoretical approach of CDA pays critical attention to individual broadcasts but 
locates them in and as a template, as a legitimated style and form, a genre, a discourse, 
producing an epistemology (of events and issues) in this case, an epistemology of Iraq.  
The multi-modal critical discourse analysis when applied to a sample of Panorama conflict 
texts is able to draw conclusions regarding the extent to which, by incorporating dramatic 
story-telling tropes and devices, Panorama is able to effectively circumscribe the limits of 
debate. I will argue that we must examine Panorama as it draws on different forms of 
archive: both its actual archive of already legitimated historical footage, the forms these take, 
its televisual signifiers, its styles of broadcast, and the extent to which such forms, signifiers 
and styles set a journalistic story-telling template for Current Affairs broadcasting. I would 
argue that drawing on its ‘flagship’ resource(s) of legitimacy, it also (of course) reproduces 
wider social, economic, cultural and political hegemony. 
 The principle purpose of the initial three chapters of this research has been to map 
out a series of key aspects and points regarding Panorama’s coverage of conflict. The 
specific contribution this thesis seeks to make is centred on the following ideas and issues: 1) 
The extent to which the ‘central tenets’, particularly on the BBC, of ‘professional broadcast 
practices’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’ are adequate to the task they have been set, and are 
largely assumed to uphold? 2) Do the specific idioms and tropes of Television (Journalism) 
(news values – intimacy; immediacy; unambiguity) constrain our ability to fully comprehend 
complex events? 3) Does the legacy of the separating of News and Current Affairs at the 
BBC into distinct units further discursively form and narrow down frameworks for 
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understanding; 4) With specific focus on war and conflict, does (in this instance) Panorama 
adhere to the ‘War Programming Model’ and if so, what are the ramifications? 5) Does news 
media and Current Affairs broadcasting’s need for drama and attachment to long-established 
dramatic tropes, archetypes, classic narrative structure, and representational forms further 
limit frames for understanding? 
It might be the case that Panorama remains rigidly within the confines required of it 
as a Public Service broadcaster of journalistic content, it also (largely) remains the standard 
bearer against which others are measured. However, adhering to these practices ensures that 
to some extent, Panorama discursively reproduces normative ideals perfectly commensurate 
with perceived ‘values’ of western hegemony and (unspoken) imperialist interests. 
 The most important elements are thus identified as follows: Discursive 
terms: Over-lexicalisation and Lexical Choices; Ideological Squaring; Transitivity; 
Nominalisation. Dramatic (televisual) elements: Archetypes; Classic (Proppian) Narrative 
Structure; Character(isation) (through either archetypes or stereotypes); Use of Music. 
Journalistic elements: Primary Definers (sources); News Values of unambiguity (clarity), 
Us and Them (which can of course be seamlessly linked with the above discursive tool(s) of 
‘Ideological Squaring), Recency (immediacy). Ideological elements: Hegemony; 
Epistemology.  
The ways in all the above come together and frame this research will be documented 











Introduction to the Analysis Section 
Having outlined and located this research within the broader terms, environment and terrain 
of the BBC, both historically and contemporarily, and argued that Panorama is the paradigm 
of Public Service Broadcast (PSB) Current Affairs journalism on British television (Chapter 
1), discussed and located my own research in the critical academic landscape (Chapter 2), 
established and outlined some of the key theoretical terms, and the appropriate research 
approach and theoretical framework (Chapter 3), the remainder of this research is devoted to 
undertaking the necessary critical discourse analysis of Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq War 
(Gulf War II) in each ‘phase’ of the conflict. 
Policing the borders …of legitimacy 
 
‘Who controls the present controls the past. Who controls the past controls the future.’ 
(Orwell ‘1984’, 1969: 309) 
As the infamous quote alludes to, political and ideological battles are fought in the arena of 
representation. Or perhaps to adapt it slightly, ‘…those who control access to images and 
narratives of the past’ will also have some control over the present and the future. 
Importantly, access to, and ownership of specific, trusted and legitimised images of ‘the past’ 
and the ability to seamlessly (re)use or (re)introduce said images into contemporary (news) 
events, gives established and legitimated broadcasters and broadcast strands a particularly 
powerful role in public (sphere) life. To frame, shape and emphasise particular narratives, 
characters and events in certain, even apparently honest and credible, ways, is both a 
responsibility and one that has enormous and resonant power. Drawing on the already 
legitimated footage and inserting it/them into contemporary reports, acts as a storytelling 
frame and can function as a means to guide the audience through the complexity of the 
stories. The reference to legitimated footage is of course redolent of well-established research 
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into ‘news values’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Harcup and O’Neill 2001; 2017) one of which is 
of course the simple yet crucial resourcing issue ‘the availability of pictures’ (Harrison 2006 
in Brighton and Foy 2007: 9)  
 As the longest-running, and best-established Current Affairs programme, and as 
part of the well-established, publicly funded, and largely ‘trusted’ BBC, Panorama has fewer 
resourcing issues. In fact it has a wealth of available footage, some of it drawn from its own 
‘canon’. Therefore, given its own reputation, its well-established history, its ‘availability of 
pictures’ on which to draw, its ‘control of the past’ (Orwell), that it provides (and can draw 
on) an enormous wealth of footage, means that Panorama (perhaps inevitably) ends up 
narrating the upcoming conflict in relation to the past. ‘Journalists, like generals, are often 
fighting the last war’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 176). Additionally, Panorama can use its (and the 
BBC’s more widely) own archive: 
…the informational and emotional context for relating to it (conflict) is historically 
embedded in previous wars, often experienced mainly through the mass media. 
Analysis of news media coverage of previous wars indicates that each current war is 
greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience associated with 
previous wars, including demonization of the enemy, the virtues and necessity of 
waging war, and the social and political benefits of doing so. (Altheide and Grimes 
2005: 621–622) 
 
Therefore, there is a demand and need to scrutinise and pay attention to Panorama as text, as 
discourse and the potential effects such discursive power, and use of archive, has on 
television journalism storytelling, and the ways in which such storytelling might (help) set an 
agenda. If it is indeed the case that Panorama plays a significant role in shaping the agenda, 
then in which direction(s), and how so? 
 In what ways might Panorama represent and produce a particular vision and 
version of the world? If it is the case that, by chiefly responding to, and repeating the 
assertions of elite political actors, who with their social, political and cultural capital 
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(Bourdieu), with their proximity and access discourse (Van Dijk), and their position as 
Primary Definers (Hall et al.) do they effectively pose the questions ‘what actions can “we” 
(and only we) take’? If so, how then might this shape the coverage, the discourse of conflict? 
Or in the methodological lexicon of this thesis, the analysis is designed to understand and 
interrogate: 
…how ‘some aspects of a perceived reality [were made] more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (1993: 
52)… which ‘treatments’ were promoted as legitimate and credible. (Boyce-Kay and 
Salter 2014) 
In the forthcoming analysis regarding Iraq, this research will outline and assess the ways in 
which Panorama is partly responsible for representing which of said actions are deemed 
credible? Which actions are ‘salient’, and what possible ‘treatment recommendations’ and 
options are given credence? Which options are promoted as legitimate and credible? 
Conversely, which ‘alternatives’ are deemed non-credible or fanciful, and in some cases 
excluded (beyond the discursive formation), and crucially, from how wide a range of possible 
actions and scenarios? As the American political scientist E.E. Schattschneider reminds us 
‘the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’ (Schattschneider 1960: 
68 in Perloff 2014: 121). 
 To phrase it another way: if it is a truism of political communication that political 
victories are secured not by having the best answer, but by setting the question, then it is 
incumbent on us to assess precisely who sets the question(s), shapes the narratives, 
establishes the frame and, crucially for this research, what role Panorama, as the flagship 
Current Affairs Broadcast strand in the UK, plays in reproducing (or challenging) the 
question, the frame, the narrative. Such analysis remains important in the context of the BBC, 
for as previously discussed (see Chapter 1), the BBC must account for and ensure that its 
version of ‘impartiality’ is adhered to: 
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News in whatever form must be treated with due impartiality, giving due weight to 
events, opinion and main strands of argument…We are committed to reflecting a 
wide range of opinion across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe 




 In light of all this, the analysis chapter(s) will consider specific concerns: a) 
Journalistic; the sourcing and resourcing, who are the sources (‘opinion(s)’ formers), the 
Primary Definers deemed to possess the necessary legitimacy, therefore producing (and 
reproducing) which discourses (or ‘main strands of argument’) are deemed ‘legitimate’. Are 
some ‘significant strand(s) of thought…unreflected or under-represented’? b) Televisual; 
which are the dominant styles and types of specifically televisual journalistic broadcast 
tropes? Are particularly dramatic forms typically found in the stories pertaining to the issue? 
c) How do both the above contribute to the overall content or storylines; what is the content, 
what are the storylines produced through both the journalistic activities and the televisual 
forms? Outlining the ways in which each content theme is underscored and legitimated by the 
specific practises, tropes and discourses of the Current Affairs broadcast journalism form. Do 
the discourses produce a frame of legitimacy (for particular actions)? If so, to what extent this 
might constitute and establish an epistemology? 
 Each phase of the conflict can be observed, firstly by the most obvious fact of the 
dates of broadcast. However, importantly for this research, each phase can also be discerned 
by a number of journalistic, televisual and dramatic characteristics or repertoires. In the 
following three chapters, each phase of the conflict will be examined as a specific phase, with 
its own variety of televisual and dramatic repertoires. The research will then assemble the 
findings together to assess the extent to which, using a series of dramatic, televisual, 
journalistic and discursive techniques, Panorama can be said to establish and reproduce a 
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Current Affairs television template, while simultaneously constituting specific (and narrowly 











































The Pre-conflict Phase 
 
 
 In the post-September 11 2001 world, as one might expect for the flagship Current 
Affairs broadcast strand that focuses on current news events, we did not have to wait too long 
before Panorama broadcast an episode devoted to bin Laden and al Qaeda. The programme: 
Panorama: bin Laden’s Biological Threat, was broadcast on BBC1 on Sunday the 28 
October 2001 (just short of seven weeks after the terrorist attack in New York). However, 
this episode, while firmly located within the newly emerging, soon to be cemented ‘War on 
Terror’ narrative was not firmly focused on Iraq per se. It was not until 11 months later that 
Panorama broadcast an episode devoted to Iraq. Given the wider political debates and 
discussions around the time, and given Panorama’s firm position as a form of Current 
Affairs inextricably located in and as a part of the wider News organisational form and 
discourse, the decision to focus on Iraq is to be expected. For the purposes on this research 
then, we can say that the overall Iraq ‘conflict phase’ begins explicitly in September 2002 
with the broadcast of Panorama: The Case Against Saddam, 23 September 2002. Alongside 
P:TCAS the other three pre-conflict phase Panorama broadcasts selected for analysis in this 
research are; Panorama: Saddam A Warning From History, 3 November 2002; Panorama: 
The Case Against War, 8 December 2002 and Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons, 9 
February 2003. In most instances, the titles will forthwith, be abbreviated: P:TCAS; 
P:SAWFH; P:TCAW; P:CSW.  
4.1 Aspects of the ‘War Programming Model’ 
In this, the ‘pre-conflict’ phase chapter, the main elements of the WPM are features one and 
two. 
1) Reportage and visual reports of most recent war (or two);  
2) Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending war, including 




 As previously discussed, the above model is partly applicable here. However, while 
the WPM is interesting, and provides a useful framework, it provides only a partial blueprint. 
This research utilises a CDA method, it further develops the frame and of course includes 
analyses of the long(er) form, and the employment of dramatic conventions used to aid the 
journalistic and televisual storytelling.  
 The first of the pre-conflict phase Panorama broadcasts is Panorama: The Case 
Against Saddam. The following provides an outline and explanation for the programme and 
its focus. As the drumbeat for war intensified in the wider political environment, Panorama 
broadcast the programme with the following summary paragraphs.  
4.2 Panorama: The Case Against Saddam 
 
The war of rhetoric between the Bush administration and Saddam Hussein threatens 
to spill over into a bloody confrontation that may change the regime in Baghdad but 
in the process spark a conflagration throughout the Middle East. Amidst this rhetoric, 
what is the real truth - the real case against Saddam? 
Panorama investigates the evidence against the Iraqi dictator ‒ his ambition to create 
weapons of mass destruction, the instability of a leader described as a psychopath and 
the corruption of his cronies that has let the Iraqi people suffer while militarisation 
continues in secret. 
Discovering the truth 
Using testimony from top scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the 
regime carrying its secrets, Panorama examines Saddam's history of developing 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and reveals just what he still has in his 
arsenal and where it is hidden. 
In New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding 
and destroying his weapons of mass destruction and talk to the 
weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability. Just how close did the 
Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads during the Gulf War? And how real 
now are the claims that Iraq will soon have enough uranium for four nuclear bombs? 
Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the 
Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. 
And we speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action 
then and whether they support a new war. 
‘The cult of Saddam’ 
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We examine the real motivation of Bush and his inner circle and explore the fears of 
would-be allies in Britain and Europe, afraid of the price both their own troops and 
the Iraqi people will pay. We also investigate the cult of Saddam himself and his 
cronies to assess how he would react with his back to the wall and what that means 
for Israel and the Middle East. It may be unfinished business for America but what 
will a war amidst the oilfields in countries where Islamic extremists wait in the wings 
mean for the rest of the world? 
Jane Corbin, the award winning Panorama reporter, has made a number of films about 
Saddam's secret weapons programmes and first brought the public’s attention to the 
threat posed by his nuclear, chemical and biological projects. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2264844.stm) 
 
The above provides a quite detailed and lengthy outline as to what the programme will be 
about, its focus, its attention, its discourse. Within the quite lengthy descriptions, there are a 
number of salient points. Most notable perhaps are the mentions of ‘examines the evidence’ 
which locates Panorama within, and as a part of a critical journalistic tradition. References to 
‘Saddam’ (villains, at times, require only a single-name); Saddam as ‘psychopath’, 
‘corruption’ ‘cronies’ ‘Ambitions to create Weapons of Mass Destruction’, the ‘cult of 
Saddam’, ‘Nuclear bombs’ ‘Saddam’s secret weapons programmes’, ‘Islamic extremists’ 
(seamlessly framing this new conflict within the ‘War on Terror’ discourse) and references to 
‘biological, chemical and nuclear projects’ all of which is assumed to be in ‘his’ possession. 
These features signify an obvious orientation that ‘demonizing certain individual leaders, for 
example…Hussein’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622) (in this broadcast signified by ‘the cult 
of Saddam’), is a consistent ‘feature’ of this particular pre-conflict phase broadcast. It is also 
our first evidence of the ‘Over-Lexicalisation’, ‘Attributes’ and ‘Over-Completeness’ 
(Machin and Mayr. 2012). As we can see below, when measured against the representation of 
‘us’, we can also see some evidence of ‘Ideological Squaring’. 
There are a number of notable caveats regarding the motivations of the ‘west’: 
‘unfinished business’ and the ‘price’ paid by ‘their own troops and the Iraqi people’. So, even 
if relatively muted, there is a degree of sceptical enquiry regarding Western actions. A clear 
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framework, identified by Wolfsfeld, and Altheide and Grimes, notably, the location of current 
(or upcoming) conflict ‘…greatly informed by images, symbols, language and experience 
associated with previous wars’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 621‒622) is alluded to with the 
following phrase: ‘Just how close did the Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads 
during the Gulf War’. There are also clear indications as to the role of high-profile sources 
(functioning as Primary Definers) to which Panorama has access, ‘Using testimony from top 
scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the regime carrying its secrets’; ‘In 
New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding and destroying his weapons of mass 
destruction and talk to the weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability’, and:  
Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the 
Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. 
And we speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action 
then and whether they support a new war. (P:TCAS 2002)  
The references to such high-profile sources has a dual function here. It provides the 
necessary frame(s) of legitimacy, and it showcases Panorama’s own flagship, journalistic 
role. The summary paragraph then clearly indicates that this episode of Panorama will base 
much of its testimony on trusted, high-profile, legitimated ‘Primary Definer’ sources. By 
doing so, it will ‘examine the case against Saddam’ using said sources and its own archive. It 
appears to be the case that this, the first broadcast of the pre-conflict phase ‘season’ will 
devote significant time, energy and resources into Over-Lexicalising and (re)presenting 
Saddam Hussein as villainous ‘psychopath’. However, from the summary at least, through 
the analytical frame of Ideological Squaring, Saddam is ‘Attributed’ specific characteristics 
and cast as a villainous character seemingly dislocated from any Western complicity in his 
‘dictatorial’ ‘regime’. 




In the opening sequence (prior to the opening credits) of Panorama: The Case Against 
Saddam, as one might expect given the title, images of Saddam dominate. Lasting one minute 
and twenty-two seconds, a range of images, diegetic and non-diegetic ‘strategies’, some 
‘Primary Definers’ and the journalistic endeavours (secondary definers) are all employed in 
the introductory ‘front-page’ scenes.  
 The opening visual is one of an image of a war plane as it takes off from a warship 
(aircraft carrier). This is against a sun setting/rising sky. The beauty of the sunlit landscape 
and bright blue skies that typically frame ‘our’ planes are in stark contrast to, and in some 
cases directly ‘cut against’ the grainy darker footage of the ‘Other(ed)’ Iraqi armed forces. 
The non-diegetic of a George W. Bush speech overlays these opening shots of war planes. 
The various shots of scans signify the West as keeping a watchful eye on ‘him’; they are also 
resonant of (most likely drawn from) official military images. That they are obtained from 
high-level sources means: a) The programme makers enjoyed a level of access to official and 
‘legitimate’ social, military and political actors in the wider public sphere. b) Related to a), 
such images and the location from which they are drawn means that, discursively and 
journalistically, they assume legitimacy. That the scan image(s) are present, also foregrounds 
Panorama’s own role. In short, the presence of the scans essentially demonstrates the (high) 
level access which Panorama has. Access to and proximity with dominant legitimated 
Primary Definer discursive actors means that once inserted into the frame(s) or discourse, 
they are established as documentary ‘evidence’ (sic). Officially sourced scans of course 
signify something authentic, even scientific.  Lest we be in any danger of underplaying or 
misunderstanding the precise threat posed by Saddam Hussein, Panorama chose to allow the 
words spoken by George W. Bush (the diegetic) to be played out but with various visual 
stimuli and interventions.  




 On the word ‘danger’ the image cuts away from the president speaking to an image of 
Saddam aimlessly firing a gun into the air. Visually, semiotically over-emphasised and Over-
Lexicalised, he is represented as uncontrollable, menacing, not to be trusted. Such danger is 
not only assumed to be in ‘his’ possession, we can see it, in his hands, albeit in the less 
harmful form of a rifle. Nevertheless, he is shown firing a weapon, the evidence is in front of 
us, an action or activity often erased from the representational form of ‘our boys’. ‘Our’ 
troops are rarely represented actually firing weaponry, less still, represented firing wildly, 
uncontrollably and aimlessly in the air. A Lexical (or semiotic) absence of ‘our boys’ 
combined with Saddam aimlessly and dangerously firing a weapon is a further early example 
of the Ideological Square. To underscore the dramatic representation of demonization, the 
decision to layer a diegesis of Bush’s statement over the top, as narration while the image of 
Saddam firing the rifle is quite a compelling casting of character. To multimodally 
underscore ‘his’ menacing character, the shot firing appears on the cue word ‘danger!’ 
Although this specific moment is, by its nature, very short, in the context of the opening 
minute, it adds significantly to ‘his’ characterisation, the danger facing ‘us’. It also provides a 
very clear example and indication of the editorialising. Such close and tight editing, is a 
journalistic and televisual cultivation of an archetypal villain. A cultivation of menace, of 
danger, and all contained within the character of ‘Saddam’. It introduces the representation 
that will be significantly cemented and solidified over the subsequent broadcast (and 
broadcasts): 
Bush: …to suggest otherwise [beat] …is to hope against the evidence. (P:TCAS)  
 
Again, the visual stimulus added to the oral/aural diegetic is significant. On the cue word 
‘evidence’ the threat (and apparent evidence) of chemical warfare is clearly represented 
through aspects of the visuals, what we might refer to as a semiotics of ‘science’ imagery. 
Visuals of unspecified chemicals/germs, in green and under a microscope, are used to 
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represent both that the weapons programme is a clear and present danger, which would of 
course be true if such a weapons programme existed. Here though, the semiotics of vague, 
unspecified, most-likely library footage ‘science’ imagery provide a sort of sheen of scientific 
legitimacy and journalistic evidence (sic). In this way, the deliberate decisions as to how one 
might visually signify said threat, the multi-modal, the semiotics, works to underscore this as 
evidence, while simultaneously representing ‘danger’. That the ‘evidence’ is merely generic 
library footage, not actual evidence is problematic but all a part of the developing 
characterisation. When inserted in this way, the imagery solidifies the narrative orientation. 
Simultaneously, any such reference as to ‘our’ weapons capability, surely at the very least, 
equal to Saddam’s, are absented. ‘Our’ weapons, if mentioned at all (they are not mentioned, 
certainly not as weapons per se, later on they are referred to as ‘coalition troops’, ‘coalition 
forces’, ‘military build-up’ or ‘military machine’), are a ‘deterrent’. ‘His’ weapons (which 
‘he’ did not have, at least, not in any substantial proportion) pose a unique threat. Of course 
‘our’ weapons are represented, but in such a way as to render them necessary in order to stave 
off the threat. I will return to an analysis of ‘our’ military machinery later in the chapter.   
 This opening sequence from P:TCAS, which includes a range of semiotic indicators 
and broadcast journalism techniques, sets up an interesting frame through which to view, 
firstly ‘the regime of Saddam’, secondly, the remainder of the broadcast, and thirdly it might 
in fact set up a discursive frame through which the entire, forthcoming, conflict is narrated, 
characterised and contextualised. So important are these pre-conflict broadcasts in the initial 
framing that they demand scrutiny as a means of critically interrogating the extent to which 
they largely shape the unfolding events. The first frames, and the narratives and 
characterisation they engender certainly adhere to what one might expect having read the 
BBC Panorama summary paragraphs.  
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 Even the very title of the first broadcast in the strand is in itself instructive. 
Interestingly titled, ‘The “Case” Against Saddam’ it is clearly located within the discourse of 
‘law’ (and order). (Tele)visually substantiating this discourse, semiotic indicators of ‘hard 
evidence’ signified by images of ‘scientific’ data, biological and chemical germ cultivation, 
maps, and radar images are utilised. There is also grainy library footage of weapons being 
amassed. The use of library archive footage acts to further underscore and augment the 
(historical and contemporary) ‘threat’ by means of the authenticating legitimising tropes of 
the News and Current Affairs ‘form’. In the discourse of Panorama, the presence of weapons 
is presented, via archive, library footage and multi-modal forms, simply as evidence.  
The above analysis constitutes the opening minute of the broadcast Panorama: The Case 
Against Saddam. As a means of establishing the frame, it certainly goes some way to 
potentially shaping perceptions of the ‘threat’ of ‘Saddam’ as threat, and albeit briefly, the 
role Western forces might have in reducing the threat by ‘tackling Saddam’. 
 Panorama’s role in explaining the world is also journalistically foregrounded.  In 
the longest unbroken footage of the opening minute, a camera slowly pans across the room. 
Jane Corbin goes in and out of shot as her image disappears behind large bank of computer 
screens, windows, and a water cooler. Her attention is focussed on the ‘evidence’ before her, 
signifying forensic attention to detail. This focus is broken, though not the shot, by a direct 
address to camera. The camera then continues to pan around. In the background are two 
computer screens visible. One with an image of Saddam (in sunglasses); the other is an 
(green – night vision) image of a missile. Also visible in front of the screen(s) on her desk are 
a number of maps and bits of (unspecified) data pertaining to weapons (we assume). 
 This entire sequence could be designed to signify a range of different things. Firstly, 
the narrative into which the images are inserted or located can be analysed as specifically 
designed to mobilise an image of Saddam as unique threat. These images are ‘cut against’ 
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images of Western forces. The Western armed forces are represented not as any threat but as 
keepers of order. Some of the images are direct from the Hollywood playbook, action, 
sunsets, military technology and machinery (about which, more in subsequent analysis).   
 One of the other interesting aspects of this opening sequence is quite how much 
detail and effort is devoted to foregrounding the signifiers of journalism. Firstly, of course 
there are sequences from Panorama’s own archive. However, having Corbin, not only as the 
narrator but also placing her at the centre of the visuals, in a long, unbroken shot, should 
leave us in no doubt that, whatever the outcome, Panorama has left no stone unturned in 
the(ir) quest to put the case before us. These tropes are journalistic, (tele)visual and dramatic 
resources that signify we are party to previously undisclosed information, detail(s) and 
documents. We are televisually and journalistically ‘peering behind the curtain’. Given that 
this is an examination of the ‘case’ against ‘Saddam’ and that this is prior to the official 
launch of conflict, much of the footage in this opening minute of P:TCAS certainly seems to 
work hard at simultaneously representing the impending ‘threat’ of ‘him’ together with the 
dramatised, Hollywood style representation of ‘our boys’, thus completing (for this minute at 
least) the Ideological Square. 
 To continue the theme of demonization, immediately following the opening pre-
credit sequence of Panorama: The Case Against Saddam (2002), the programme proper 
begins with archive images of Saddam pictured on a ‘peaceful shopping spree’ (Corbin 2002, 
P:TCAS) in Paris in 1975. Interestingly, and related to other discursive, journalistic frames, 
archive footage of him is used. Saddam Hussein is pictured here dressed, unusually, in a 
laboratory coat. The laboratory coat is instructive here. Admittedly, while it was of course 
Saddam Hussein himself that wore the garment, the selection of such footage here in this 
instance does serve an instrumental, narrative, discursive and potentially characterisational 
purpose. In a broadcast entirely devoted to examining the ‘case against Saddam’ and one that 
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has already (during the opening two minutes) included a plethora of references to chemical 
and biological weapons, depicting Saddam Hussein in the white lab coat of the archetypal 
(evil) scientist serves to underscore this representation. In the context of a programme that 
has, through the generalised signifiers and semiotics of ‘science’, already clearly represented 
the dangers of ‘chemicals’ and ‘germs’ as weapons, the lab coat seems to build on the 
characterisation of Saddam as an archetypal ‘dangerous madman’ and even to cast him as a 
maverick scientist hell-bent on nefarious purposes.  
 What further underscores this dramatic characterisation though is the use of specific 
non-diegetic music. The visual representation of Saddam here is accompanied by the opening 
bars of The Godfather (1972) soundtrack. Such a deliberate musical non-diegetic choice is 
surely selected in order to dramatically characterise Saddam as ruthless criminal. The 
selection of this particular film score is indicative of the time period represented on screen 
(1970s) and is simultaneously a form of characterisation, playing on an intertextual nostalgia 
and media-memory in order to cast Saddam as mafia figure. Saddam (and family) as 
archetypal ruthless gangster(s) is a characterisational theme returned to in the post-conflict 
phase sample. 
 Again in the very early scenes of P:TCAS  (3m 49s) we see a long close-up of a 
painting of Saddam’s eyes, the semiotics designed perhaps to signify his menacing 
‘character’, and that he watches over, like a menacing prison guard, the entire society. This is 
substantiated by Corbin’s voiceover: 
Corbin: For 11 years Saddam Hussein kept Dr Shahristani in prison. (P:TCAS) 
 
We then cut to archive footage of Saddam walking through a sand-bagged trench in battle 
fatigues and sunglasses. This is familiar media memory, scenography, and archetypal 
characterisation. A series of shots/cuts follow: A man kissing the hand of Saddam while 
Corbin’s voice-over explains: 
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Corbin: The dictator still needed a more compliant scientist to develop his bomb 
programme. (P:TCAS) 
 
At this point there is a cut to more archive footage taken from another (unspecified) time. The 
sequencing and temporal frames are unspecified in place of generic archive. Using a 
collection of archive images edited together and decontextualized has the effect of 
cumulatively developing the character. So despite the fact that this, and other broadcasts in 
the sample (Saddam: A Warning From History; Chasing Saddam’s Weapons), are attempting 
to provide an overview of Saddam, and of his weapons, strict temporal and historical 
accuracy does not appear to be the organising logic. Instead, via Over-Lexicalisation and 
Ideological Squaring, cementing the archetypal representation, cultivating the demon appears 
to be the organising logic. 
 The next image is of Saddam with left arm raised smoking a cigar. These sequential 
but temporally fractured images are straight out of the Proppian, Narrative Structure of Folk 
tales, and Hollywood playbook of villainous character tropes and representations. It is a 
route-one archetypal caricature. People cowering in fear, kissing the hand of the dictator. In 
fact, the lingering shot of Saddam Hussein smoking a cigar perhaps only lacks the white cat 
of the Bond villain Blofeld to make it complete.  
 Further explicit references to ‘Saddam’s weapons ambitions’ are narrated in 
P:TCAS (5m 3s). This time using Panorama’s own archive, referenced by the non-diegetic 
title music of Panorama and a visual of the titles, we see, slowly emerging, panning across a 
computer screen, Saddam in military fatigues (again) and customary sunglasses (again) 
surveying his nuclear facility. 
Corbin: Saddam Hussein was undeterred. In 1993 Panorama revealed how a British 
company sold machine tools to Iraq. (P:TCAS) 
 
The reference to British complicity is an important point, and one to which this thesis will 
return in due course. However, for now, depicted in his ‘nuclear facility’ the narrative has 
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more pressing (archetypal demonizing) concerns. More archive footage, this time very fast-
cut, as follows: soldiers running through desert: close-up of feet; a series of quick jump-cut 
images, diagrams, centrifuges, a point-of-view (POV) image zooming through the landscape 
(redolent of a missile); image of weapons launcher launching three missiles in quick 
succession; Saddam again in military fatigues entering Iraqi Parliament to ‘rapturous 
applause’ (P:TCAS). 
Corbin: He scoured the world for nuclear technology…he couldn’t resist gloating 
publicly that despite Western embargoes he could still smuggle in forbidden parts into 
Iraq. (P:TCAS) 
 
That ‘he’ scoured the world in search of nuclear technology is interesting for it conceals as 
much as it reveals. Significantly, that the technology exists is somehow not considered 
problematic, possibly reasonably so, but the verbs he ‘scoured’ and that ‘he couldn’t resist 
gloating’ are certainly Lexical devices in the service of archetypal characterisation. The 
‘British company’ that ‘sold machine parts’ has also been quickly discarded. In the original 
broadcast, which was something of a coup and in part helped cement Panorama’s reputation 
as a broadcast strand of record, the focus was, again, on ‘his’ egregious pursuit of ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’. In defence of Panorama, there was certainly a large element of the 
original broadcast that did in fact critically interrogate one of ‘our own’ companies but, the 
focus was very much on the individuals involved, as perhaps an example of the ‘bad apples’ 
theory. The use of this information in this broadcast however, in 2002, has a dual purpose, 
neither of which is to critically interrogate Western complicity in any meaningful sense. It 
seems that the reason for its inclusion here is a) to foreground the journalism, the historical 
accuracy of Panorama, that the BBC itself stands-in for or functions as historically accurate 
‘evidence’, b) it contributes to the narrative orientation and characterisation of the archetypal 
villainous Saddam. In so doing, via Lexical Absence, Attributes and Ideological Squaring, it 
erases, or at least chooses not to scrutinise, the systemic manoeuvring (or failings) of our own 
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Western elites and hypocrisy. Any hypocrisy that was in evidence was quickly discarded then 
effectively neutralised by way of characterisation of Saddam. 
 At 16 minutes into P:TCAS, further archive visual evidencing is utilised, this time 
in the form of yet more archive imagery of Saddam, complete with battle fatigues and 
sunglasses (again) this time projected onto a computer screen behind Jane Corbin. Adjacent 
to Saddam on screen is a computer-generated map of Iraq with nuclear facilities indicated by 
flashing lights. The demonized archetype here located, in shot adjacent to (alleged) WMD. 
The image of Saddam is thrown into sharper focus when contrasted and measured against the 
next section of the broadcast. Given the overt focus on WMD, the next sequence of shots is 
illustrative of a particularly problematic narrative direction.  
 From 18 minutes and 15 seconds, continuing for one minute and 25 seconds, the 
narrative, via imagery and via comment from legitimated political sources, is of ‘9/11’. The 
opening image in the montage is of the Twin Towers, shot from a distance so as to locate the 
Twin Towers geographically and discursively in ‘The nation’s greatest city’ (Corbin 
P:TCAS). Smoke billows from the buildings as a siren howls, slow haunting music is the non-
diegetic score. As the phrase ‘the nation’s greatest city’ is uttered, the image is of New York, 
at dusk, a setting sun peeks from behind a skyscraper (though not the Twin Towers as these, 
by then, had collapsed to the ground). We know the image is from September the 11
th
 2001 
because of the sounds of sirens and that smoke still permeates the atmosphere (and the 
representation). A cut to another shot of New York, different buildings, but a recognisable, 
even familiar landscape is evident. The final landscape shot is again of a bright red-orange 
setting sun, closer this time, the setting sun dominates the picture, sirens still wail signifying 
that an emergency is unfolding, but the somewhat beautiful image solidifies that the US (New 
York in particular) is recognisable, familiar, the aesthetically appealing sunset able to cast 
light onto a troubled world, that some beauty still exists in amongst the horror. This imagery 
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is, what we might refer to in multi-modal CDA and Television Studies scholarship as an 
Over-Determined or Over-Coded representation. 
 It is the next section though, and that it is directly cut against the previous images 
that cements the representation and demands critical interrogation. The legitimated sources, 
primarily defining the narrative orientation and direction of the broadcast speak the following 
words: 
 Dr David Kay - Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92: 
 9/11 is a prism through which American political leaders are examining everything  
 that occurred since 9/11 and every threat. 
 
 Perle:  What September 11 did was bring home in a way that no amount of  
 abstract debate could have, the dangers of waiting until it’s too late.   
 
 Kay:  They’ve realised they can’t… cannot count on intelligence to provide them  
 with the warning of when he truly becomes dangerous and consequently they have  
 to deal with him in the here and now as opposed to try to interrupt him after an  
 attack has begun. (P:TCAS) 
 
Following on from over one minute of emotionally resonant imagery (described above), to 
seamlessly link 9/11 with ‘his’ desire for WMD is intensely problematic. Particularly given 
the preceding 18 minutes, the three high-profile sources here function as Primary Definers. 
They help set the scene. The narrative, underscored by said Primary Definers, is, via 
Ideological Squaring, inextricably bound up in cultivating a story arc in the classic narrative 
structure of Propp’s classic folk tale(s). Via various lexical, semiotic, journalistic and 
televisual methods, the archetypal villain has been crafted in contrast to the hero(ic) figures 
of the ‘West’. While Panorama itself, the journalists and the primary definers are careful to 
not make an explicit link, between 9/11 and Iraq/Saddam, such a suggestion would be 
fantastical and damage the credibility of the sources and of Panorama itself, the edits, the 
selections, the choice(s) of shots to accompany the apocalyptic statements does carefully 
construct (not a causal but) a correlative relationship:  
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Those involved in advertising – our culture’s most abundant persuasive discourse – 
have long understood that you make claims not by argument but by association. 
(Lewis 2004: 297) 
 
In the above example, the juxtaposition, and the narrative it created is problematic. To 
establish that the terror wrought on New York on September 11
th
 2001 is a part of the same 
overall template, ‘the condition of the world’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 626) and that ‘we’ 
must ‘deal with him in the here and now’ (Kay P:TCAS) acts as a fairly forceful statement in 
the circumstances. The statements are not immediately challenged, they simply are, as David 
Kay (actually rather caustically and critically, suggests): ‘The prism through which American 
political leaders are examining everything’ (Kay P:TCAS). The problems here lie in the fact 
that the statements receive no rigorous challenge from Jane Corbin. In a clear example of 
Primary Definition, because they are not challenged, and are instead permitted to frame the 
events, the three sources can clearly be identified as not mere protagonists but Primary 
Definers. It is true that they do receive some muted challenge from the source, however, it is 
that the statements form a part of an already dramatized and emotionally resonant template 
over the preceding minute of broadcasting that is problematic. To punctuate the images of 
New York, the still raw devastation wrought on that city with comments about the need to 
confront Saddam before he ‘truly becomes dangerous’ (Kay, BBC P:TCAS) reveals that the 
narrative and characterisational drive is not sufficiently nuanced. There is also a sense of 
urgency represented by the statement: ‘and consequently they have to deal with him in the 
here and now as opposed to try to interrupt him after an attack has begun’ (Kay P:TCAS). 
The inclination that he must be challenged, or ‘interrupted’ before rather than ‘after an attack 
has begun’ also seamlessly links the dreadful attacks we have just (re)witnessed with ‘His’ 
capacity to inflict similar damage. This, at the very least, reveals a worrying tendency to 
multi-modally and discursively connect, attach or articulate Saddam Hussein with the terror 
of 9/11, not the actual attack, but that he could inflict similar carnage unless confronted with 
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urgency, ‘in the here and now’ (P:TCAS). The full-stop in this section, certainly in terms of 
imagery, comes via news archive footage of George W Bush, his arm around a firefighter 
amidst the rubble of the Twin Towers. Such emotionally resonant images, particularly when, 
narratively speaking, so visibly cut, thus, via editorial decisions engaging in Ideological 
Squaring, marked against the archetypal villainy of Saddam, not only begins to prepare the 
ground for UK and US troops engaging in conflict, but perhaps begins to generate the 
justification for doing so. There are many other examples of images of and references to 
‘9/11’ used across the conflict phase (Chapter 5), and post-conflict phase (Chapter 6) sample. 
This research will return to those examples in subsequent chapters.  
 The dominant narrative of Panorama: The Case Against Saddam is one of 
demonization. The broadcast devotes significant time and space to characterising Saddam by 
associating him with menace, and by associating him with ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 
(WMD). Having done so, it is therefore interesting to analyse the extent to which the 
associations with weapons are differently phrased and framed when it is ‘us’ in possession of 
them. The example below is telling: 
Corbin:  The Chief Civil Servant at the MoD during the Gulf War was Sir Michael 
Quinlan, the man who developed Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy. But he’s 
sceptical about the urgency of dealing with Saddam. (P:TCAS) 
 
 In the above statement delivered to camera, Jane Corbin introduced her next 
interviewee, granting him legitimacy as a ‘Primary definer’ no less, the term ‘Britain’s 
nuclear deterrence policy’ is the one to which attention ought to turn. The phrase passes by, 
not only unremarked upon, but his very legitimacy is explicitly granted by this functional 
honorific. He is a primary definer, he is explicitly marked as such precisely because he 
‘developed Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy’. To describe him as above is of course a 
Lexical Choice, it Attributes specific values to him – and, by extension, to us – and when cut 
against previous imagery completes an Ideological Square. In an exchange, in an entire 
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broadcast, and, as we shall see, in an entire ‘phase’ devoted to forcefully and explicitly 
detailing the dangers of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in this instance and when referring 
to this specific Primary Definer, the weapons in ‘our’ possession are lexically, linguistically 
and discursively (safely) contained within a discourse of ‘deterrence policy’. It is an actual 
fixed and still ongoing or ‘live’ policy, organised, debated and operationalised at the very 
highest level. Despite the UK and US being signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NNPT), a policy of possession of ‘nuclear deterrence’ is, by absence of critique, 
considered perfectly laudable and acceptable. In fact, the different linguistic appellation 
applied to ‘our’ weapons (of mass destruction), and that Quinlan developed them, is precisely 
what grants this source his legitimacy. ‘We’ are afforded, via Lexical Choices, Lexical 
Absences and Ideological Squaring, a position directly contrary to the archetypal villain of 
Saddam. 
4.4 The ‘Media-memory’ Discursive and Ideological Function of Halabja. 
The city of Halabja, or rather, what the city comes to stand for across the sample of 
Panorama broadcasts is interesting and demands critical scrutiny and interrogation. In the 
pre-conflict phase the extent to which the city of Halabja, or at least, what happens to/in 
Halabja, features as a discursive and representational means to cement the process of 
demonization. While Halabja could have been ‘folded in’ to the overall demonization 
schema, so significant were the examples that they warranted their own subheading. The 
Halabja example is also interesting particularly when located in the process of Ideological 
Squaring, when it is assessed and measured against the Hollywood style representation 
afforded the more recognisable, trusted and relatively familiar city of New York (discussed 
above). Both cities effectively stand-in for and function as recognisable signifiers. Halabja 
signifying lawlessness, the uncontained demagoguery of Saddam, of ‘His’ brutality. New 
York signifying law and order (represented by the UN), recognition, familiarity, even 
188 
 
‘comfort’ in familiarity. So Halabja as specific ‘event’ in Iraq’s history, stands as a 
benchmark, as a signifier of Saddam’s now entrenched archetypal brutality.  
 Even on the occasions whereby there is some degree of nuance, or acknowledgement 
of Western culpability, the event of Halabja is our reminder, frequently returned to, used as 
journalistic and televisual shorthand that demonstrates Saddam’s uniquely evil character. In 
the example below, not only is the Saddam as threat narrative foregrounded, but the frame 
through which the forthcoming conflict is narrated is an emotionally resonant one. So while it 
is true that a high-profile, Primary Definer legitimate source, Sir Michael Quinlan, expresses 
reservations (below), these reservations are a) filtered through the prism of ‘9/11’, b) 
bookended by images of Halabja: 
Sir Michael Quinlan: Permanent Under-secretary. Ministry of Defence, 1988-
92: I understand very well that the appalling thing that was done to America on 
9/11 has changed psychology.  I don’t myself believe, though, that it directly affects 
the Saddam situation.  Saddam was not behind it. We still have to assess the Iraq 
 problem in terms which are directly relevant to Iraq. It doesn’t create some special 
 new legitimacy that didn’t exist before. (P:TCAS) 
 
The phrase ‘Saddam was not behind it’ is highly significant and is an important caveat that 
challenges the (apparent) drive to war being mobilised by the ‘US Hawks’. Not only has the 
critical Primary Definer, Sir Michael Quinlan, overtly referenced the fact that ‘Saddam was 
not behind it (9/11)’ but in so doing, potentially poses a challenge to the overall narrative 
direction, epistemology and discourse of Iraq and ‘Saddam’ contained within the pre-conflict 
sample. The phrase itself and Panorama’s inclusion of it, does warrant some critical acclaim. 
However, it quickly becomes apparent that once again, such a statement is not sufficient to 
interrupt the overall discourse (of Saddam as threat). While Quinlan speaks, he is in frame, 
and Corbin is not present on screen. At the conclusion of his speech, Corbin, via voiceover 
narrates and swiftly hangs up the next peg onto which the story will hang (as follows).  
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 The Panorama spinning globe motif or emblem, and a few bars of the signature 
theme tune is used to signify Panorama’s own archive (Panorama’s archive functions as the 
authenticating and legitimating agent) it introduces us to the next ‘act’. This is the very next 
scene after Quinlan speaks. As Corbin speaks the words below, archive footage of Halabja 
are on screen.  
 Corbin: It’s not just Iraq’s nuclear threat that’s being viewed differently through 
 the prism of 9/11. In 1986 Panorama revealed the pesticide plant at Samara. 
 Saddam was developing chemical weapons. He used them first against Iranian 
 soldiers in the long and bitter war with his neighbours in which a million men were 
 sacrificed. And then in 1988 he turned them against his own people. A cloud of 
 poison gasses enveloped the town of Halabja. Five thousand people died, most of 
 them women and children. Chemical weapons were outlawed by every 
 international convention, but Saddam was then the ally of the west against the 
mullahs in Iran. Nothing was done. (P:TCAS) 
 
The above commentary from Corbin is significant here. Firstly, it follows immediately after 
the critical nuanced commentary and insight from a legitimate and authenticated, sceptical 
source or Primary Definer. In her defence, and developing the newly found critical position 
sketched out by Quinlan, Corbin does reference that Saddam was, at the time, ‘an ally of the 
west’. Furthermore, when referring to Halabja, the phrase ‘nothing was done’ indicates a lack 
of action to address the atrocity of Halabja. However, used in this way, the phrase ‘nothing 
was done’ performs an interesting discursive function. It is perhaps too nuanced. Framed so 
as to place some distance between the actions of ‘Saddam’ and the West. To an extent, the 
Nominalisation (placing discursive distance between actions and agency) is understandable, 
after all, it is not ‘us’ that actively engaged in the slaughter of innocents, but ‘him’. However, 
the discourse operationalised here ‘…Nothing was done’ has no overt agent, it is not ‘us’ that 
stands by (though of course, as allies at the time, it was) doing nothing, but an abstract non-
agent. How different it would be had the phraseology been Transitive, had the 
Nominalisation of ‘nothing was done’ been differently phrased, had some agency been 
assigned to ‘us’, for instance: ‘his Western allies did nothing’. The images are of death, and 
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of demonized Saddam, firmly linking (albeit understandably) the deaths of civilians with that 
of the dictator. The use of the images of death, themselves a rarity on British Television 
News and Current Affairs, visually and discursively demonstrate the ‘problem’.  
 Another key aspect to the above discussed section, and this demonstrates the 
swiftness with which such critical positions are discarded, Corbin uses the scepticism 
regarding Iraq’s nuclear capability (sic) to move the story forwards, away from the ‘nuclear’ 
to the ‘chemical’. The threat of chemical weapons is viscerally and visually documented by 
the images on screen. The images are of death by mass poisoning, signified here by dead 
bodies lining the streets. The final image is of a young child.  
 Alongside Jane Corbin’s voiceover, there is an extra dramatic dimension to this use 
of archive and the ways in which it might ‘fit’ the overall narrative direction. The images of 
Halabja used in Panorama: The Case Against Saddam are accompanied by the non-diegetic 
score, the staccato haunting and rhythmical Le Sacre Du Printemps Part ii – The Sacrifice. In 
fact, the final shot of a young child, laid flat out and lifeless on the pavement, is frozen on 
screen, the frozen image then zoomed in on so three times with each ‘beat’ of Le Sacre Du 
Printemps Part ii – The Sacrifice. Two further significant aspects about the non-diegetic 
score need to be addressed. The haunting rhythm is surely chosen precisely because it has a 
particular rhythm, a haunting quality, its slow ominous ‘movement’ representing the creep 
and reach of Saddam. Even if on initial viewing, one does not know that the score is called 
‘The Sacrifice’, the editor or producer that made that selection must have chosen it for such 
reasons, either its title, but more-likely for its haunting rhythm and the picture it helps to 
paint. In research that focuses exclusively on the textual and discursive, that does not 
undertake ethnographic research or interviews with the journalists concerned, such 
assumptions must remain just that, assumptions. It surely remains the case though that such a 
musical selection would certainly seem an odd choice to have been made by accident. In this 
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case, overlaying images of innocent people literally sacrificed for Saddam’s own ambitions, 
with the non-diegetic musical accompaniment of ‘The Sacrifice’ does seem rather bleakly 
fitting. This is not drama, but this multi-modal representation is however, dramatized for 
maximum effect.  
 So it appears that even when critique is foregrounded, such critical positions are not 
permitted to alter the narrative orientation? One could argue that the critical reflections used 
here are for the purposes of marketing. To explain: if Panorama is to maintain any semblance 
of critical legitimacy, the above facts (that Saddam was, for a time, an ally of the West; that 
Saddam was not behind the terror attacks on 9/11) need to be acknowledged. By which I 
mean, this is the very least that Panorama ought to acknowledge. Perhaps that reads as too 
critical, sceptical or dismissive. However, I would argue that the remainder of the sample 
substantiates that claim. It is simply the case that despite evidence of Western complicity, 
very little overt scepticism is allowed to puncture the representation of Saddam as archetypal 
villain. The ‘Demonization of Saddam’ is further substantiated when, using the CDA 
approach of the Ideological Square, representations of ‘us’, very often via Primary Definers is 
more muted, more measured thus underscoring ‘His’ demonic villainous characterisation. 
 As briefly outlined above (p124), and will be discussed in more detail below, the 
very title of one of the broadcasts in this, the pre-conflict phase sample, Panorama: Saddam: 
A Warning from History, draws on BBC drama as history. However, the title of that 
particular broadcast is not the only implicit or explicit reference to Saddam Hussein as Hitler. 
In Panorama: The Case Against Saddam, Primary Definer, Richard Perle is allowed to frame 
him in precisely this way, thus continuing the process of demonization. Responding to a 
degree of sceptical questioning from Jane Corbin as to the rights and wrongs of engaging in 
military conflict, Perle responds as follows: 
 Perle:  Well the same logic would have said alright we throw up our hands and  
 leave Hitler forever, he can do what he likes. We can’t oppose him because if we  
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 oppose him he will do the thing we’re trying to stop.  It only gets worse with the  
 passage of time. (P:TCAS) 
In the above section, Perle makes the case for ‘confronting Saddam’ by firstly directly 
comparing the fascist ambitions of Hitler, with the (more muted though of course still brutal) 
more local(ised) ambitions of Saddam Hussein. The two are simply not analogous, located 
here however, they are precisely that. Secondly Perle subtly references (and of course 
criticises) the strategy of appeasement prior to the Second World War. The notion of 
comparing those resisting the upcoming conflict with appeasers is repeated in the conflict 
phase broadcast, Panorama: Blair’s War.  
 Though Corbin does not directly challenge this frame, the next two interviewees 
(former UNSCOM inspector, Terry Taylor, and former Chief of Defence, Michael Quinlan) 
do at least provide some alternative critical viewpoints, some ‘balance’. However, in this 
section of the broadcast Panorama: The Case Against Saddam, the rhetoric returns to the 
individualised, characterisation and dramatic arc the majority of the broadcast has devoted 
itself to: 
Corbin: But for those on both sides of the Atlantic who’ve made up their minds to get 
rid of him, the decision is based on the nature of Saddam’s regime.  They want to act 
pre-emptively before he reaches his goal of nuclear weapons. (P:TCAS) 
 
‘The nature of Saddam’s regime’ is an interesting phrase. The ‘nature’ of his ‘goal’, to 
accrue ‘nuclear weapons’ (referred to as deterrent when in ‘our’ possession), is taken as fact, 
as importantly though, the representation, the ‘nature’ of his regime, effectively dislocates 
Saddam and Iraq from local, global political contexts. Such an assertion is not sufficiently 
challenged. In fact, that assumption has been developed over the course of this, the first (of 
four) pre-conflict phase broadcasts, and used here to ‘sign-off’ the broadcast in suitably 
menacing fashion.  
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The second broadcast in the pre-conflict phase is Panorama: Saddam: A Warning 
from History. 
4.5 Panorama: Saddam: A Warning From History 
As the USA plots to remove the world’s most durable dictator, Panorama investigates 
Saddam’s past in a search for clues to his future actions. BBC World Affairs editor 
John Simpson speaks to witnesses who have watched first-hand the Iraqi leader’s 
ruthless rise to power ‒ and the methods he has employed to hold onto office ‒ to 
reveal new insights into Saddam's volatile personality.  
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2371697.stm) 
 
A much more concise summary this time, but what does it reveal about the narrative 
orientation, the discourse of this individual episode, and, furthermore, the discourse or 
epistemology of the wider (and longer) pre-conflict phase sample? Reference to ‘durable 
dictator’ is interesting insofar as, from the summary paragraph at least, his ‘durability’ is 
dislocated from any historical complicity. This episode, we are informed, will examine 
‘Saddam’s past in a search for clues to his future actions’. Interestingly, this sort of approach 
gives a clear indication of the ability of the BBC in general, and Panorama in particular, to 
draw on its own historical archive and footage. In a reference to the already used (above) 
quote from Orwell, its position as flagship Current Affairs broadcaster, able to use its wealth 
of already legitimated archive means it maintains a semblance of ‘control’ …of the ‘present’ 
ensuring that it can also ‘control the past’, and because its archive means it ‘controls the past’ 
it can subsequently ‘control the future’ (Orwell 1969). In what ways might access to, and use 
of already legitimated archive orient the present, past and future direction and understanding 
of Iraq? We are also informed that John Simpson will ‘speak to witnesses who have watched 
first-hand the Iraqi leader’s ruthless rise to power’. Important as this undoubtedly is, will 
those ‘witnesses’ be comprised of some of the previous Western elite political actors who 
ensured, to some extent at least, that he was able to ‘hold onto office’. The ‘ruthless’(ness) is 
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another example of the dramatic archetypal characterisation of the television journalism form. 
How will ‘he’ be represented? Through which dramatic and televisual methods? We are 
promised that the investigation, the witnesses, the journalism of Panorama will ‘reveal new 
insights into Saddam’s volatile personality’. Again, such focus on individual mendacity, on 
his unpredictability (‘volatility’), on personality, is a classic dramatic characterisation 
repertoire communicated and represented through dramatized forms of storytelling. 
Furthermore, the linguistic and lexical features, the focus on personality is a discursive act 
that will potentially dislocate the wider geo-politics of Iraq from ‘our’ previous actions, and 
will instead attach all responsibility (for Iraq’s ongoing problems) on to a ‘demonized’ 
individual.  
 Equally problematic though, is the title of the programme itself. Panorama: 
Saddam: A Warning from History draws on the mythologised, already well-established media 
and popular culture narrative of villainy by explicitly referencing a previous television 
broadcast, The Nazis: A Warning from History (1997, BBC Television). Perhaps more 
evidence that the ‘BBC’s televisual output is itself history’ (Gardiner and Westall 2016). This 
programme, or at least its title, essentially dramatically casts ‘Saddam’ as the modern-day 
equivalent of Hitler. Saddam: A Warning from History not only casts ‘Saddam’ in the central 
position, as the issue to be dealt with, but draws on such emotional, evocative imagery, 
character and aspects of well-documented twentieth century history (and Media Memory), 
that the narrative and characterisation of villainy is solidified. The normative criteria that 
Saddam deserves to be seen, cast and characterised as cognate with the, until now, uniquely 
evil Hitler is certainly problematic, and an over-statement. Nevertheless, not only does 
Panorama not challenge this view, by using such an emotive, dramatized, historically 
resonant, provocative (and provocatively titled) broadcast, Panorama: Saddam: A Warning 
from History, from the name alone, establishes, then sustains a very specific and explicit 
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narrative through characterisation. It sets a template, and through subsequent representation 
of archetypal character and the classic narrative structure, it consequently structures the 
complexity of Iraq’s history, and the forthcoming Iraq conflict in too simplistic (and 
individualised) a manner. 
 Significantly, though the term ‘plotting’ does hint at something slightly nefarious or 
underhand on the part of the US, the associated US actions are coded here as ‘removing’. The 
actions that were planned (‘plotted’), and subsequently undertaken, can surely be represented 
in more forceful terms. The ‘removal’ was ‘achieved’ by way of a mass bombardment during 
‘Operation Shock and Awe’ then subsequently continued (in the conflict and post-conflict 
phase(s) as ‘Operation Enduring Iraqi Freedom’. The lexical, linguistic and discursive 
selection of terms are important. ‘Operation Enduring Iraqi Freedom’ is almost comically 
propagandistic, whether the term is used (and challenged) is an important aspect.  
4.6 Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History – Solidifying the Archetypal Demon 
characterisation 
 
There are a number of journalistic and televisual methods by which each Panorama 
broadcast in the sample effects to demonize Saddam Hussein, the broadcast P:SAWFH begins 
with footage from the newly released (at time of broadcast) video game: ‘Conflict: Desert 
Storm’. Overlaying footage of scenes from the game, video pixel soldiers run across the 
screen: 
Simpson: A brand new game has hit America’s computer screens as Saddam Hussein 
lurks in his bunker the forces of freedom and democracy close in for the kill.  It treats 
Saddam as just another cartoon villain. (P:SAWFH) 
 
The narration continues to outline the ways in which such products reduce Saddam to a series 
of flat images, similarly ‘flat and cartoon like’ (Simpson P:SAWFH) are the representations 
of Saddam on Iraqi television screens. This serves an interesting function, presumably the 
following broadcast is designed to resist such overly reductive representations and is instead 
designed to move beyond the flat caricature, away from archetype (or even stereotype), and 
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perhaps give flesh to the character. However, as a means of introduction, it does reduce 
Saddam to the very flatness the programme purportedly deigns to critique.  
 As the computer game images shift to television images of Saddam, Simpson 
assures us that  
Simpson: In Iraq, he seems equally two-dimensional…every single night, state 
television broadcasts a different music video, starring….Him…but which of 
Saddam’s many faces, is the real one? (P:SAWFH) 
 
Excerpts from Iraqi state television, with the less than clear pictures, works as a form of 
Media memory, this is particularly the case when, using their extensive archive, Panorama 
uses some potentially familiar images. In particular the image of him standing, arm aloft in 
battle fatigues (an image that is often repeated across the sample, pre-conflict, conflict and 
post-conflict). The image then shifts back to one taken from the new computer game. 
Overlaying the imagery, Simpson continues: 
…and, as the final showdown comes, what lessons can we draw from the past, about 
what he’ll do now? (P:SAWFH) 
 
That the above non-diegetic verbal introduction overlays imagery taken directly from a newly 
released computer game, and that the computer game has, as its central narrative ‘the forces 
of democracy and freedom’ (P:SAWFH) capturing Saddam, is significant. The phrase: ‘what 
lessons can we draw from the past, about what he’ll do now?’ is uttered whilst Saddam, 
within the game, and within the frame of this broadcast, is pictured, in digital game imagery, 
firmly located and held within the gun-sights. However, the potential that ‘we’ might be 
represented as the aggressors is partly neutralised by the fact that the gun-sights in which he 
is located and held, are the already mentioned Over-Lexicalised ‘forces of “democracy and 
freedom”’ (Video Game: Conflict Desert Storm featured in P:SAWFH). The title of the 
broadcast Saddam: A Warning from History is then super-imposed over the image. Saddam, 
wearing his infamous battle fatigues, cornered, within the gun-sights provides the narrative 
drive necessary to establish the archetypal characterisation of ‘dangerous madman’. In fact, 
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even prior to the broadcast, the news anchor as ‘lead-in’ states ‘BBC’s John Simpson reveals 
the ‘warnings from history’ about how Saddam acts…when he’s cornered’ (BBC News, 3 
November 2002). While locating him in a mode of response, ‘when he’s cornered’, it does 
signify ‘Saddam’s’ feral like qualities, he is, of course assigned a transitive quality in the text, 
he has ownership of his (nefarious) actions. He is potentially animalistic with feral responses 
to threat, though the agents of threat, its carriers are absent, merely hinted at, or when 
articulated, via the linguistic (even noble) Over-Lexicalised choice of phrase: ‘forces of 
democracy and freedom’. This serves as an introduction to the broadcast. The sequence 
finishes with the aforementioned title Saddam: A Warning from History super-imposed over 
the computer-generated image. The title of the broadcast alone draws allusions with a 
previously demonised and murderous figure of the Western and European political landscape. 
As discussed (above p190), reference and title alluding to The Nazis is no accident, it simply 
must be by design and acts as a means of characterising Saddam as the new Hitler. 
 As a means of attempting to explain his rise, his character and his, until now, 
unique, evil personality, even (or especially) Hitler has of course been subject of and to 
television ‘treatment’. In this pre-conflict phase broadcast, similar discourses are mobilised as 
a way of explaining Saddam. In some ways of course, the opening shots from particular 
broadcasts serve as an important mark against which the upcoming broadcast can be 
measured. Simpson has assured us, though, that this broadcast is designed to resist and re-
imagine Saddam, beyond the ‘one-dimensional, flat and cartoon-like’ to examine Saddam, his 
‘rise’ and the reasons for his ‘endurability’ (P:SAWFH, summary paragraph). Such re-
imagining is, though, rather contained within the overly simplistic characterisation of villainy 
which, while at least slightly developed, is hardly more nuanced. At the most, perhaps we 




 When not overtly representing Saddam as Hitler-like, alternative linguistic and 
(a)historical forms are employed. Having previously identified Saddam as comparable with 
Hitler, lest this be insufficient, in Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History an additional 
historical and murderous figure against which Saddam is measured is alluded to: 
Simpson: Soviet Communism never attracted Saddam and yet he became fixated on 
Joseph Stalin, his hero … Having taken over as leader he put his Stalinism to work.  
He called a meeting of the party leadership which was carefully filmed. Exactly as in 
Stalin’s show trials, a senior figure was persuaded through torture, to reveal details of 
a supposed conspiracy…Like Stalin Saddam made himself the embodiment of the 
country, the central figure of its history and culture. (P:SAWFH) 
 
In the space of this particular broadcast, we have two infamously murderous historical figures 
against which Saddam can be assessed. Even though such an assessment might be 
problematic in any case, within the text of Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History no 
such critical assessment is forthcoming. The above mentioned murderous historical figures 
are used merely as devices or hooks onto which the story of Saddam’s brutality is hung. What 
I mean by this is: even if one could make the case that Saddam is the contemporary 
equivalent of Hitler and/or Stalin, which is problematic in any case, this Panorama broadcast 
seemingly lacks the critical capacity to do so. Stalin, Hitler and Saddam reduced to mere ‘flat 
or cartoon-like’ (Simpson, P:SAWFH) archetypal villainous characters. Saddam is merely 
being inducted into a similar and familiar Dictatorial Hall of Fame. Panorama’s use of 
‘history’ and historical evidence (via the extensive archive), centre on using these examples 
from the pre-conflict phase as means of erasing and de-contextualising the ‘West’s’ 
prominent (though largely disavowed), historical, political, ideological and military role in 
his regime. By uncritically and seamlessly dramatically casting Saddam as the menacing, 
demonized contemporary equivalent of Hitler (and now Stalin), and by suggesting that all the 
ills of Iraqi society can be hoisted onto the shoulders of this one (dimensional) demonised 
archetype of Saddam, it seems that no additional geo-political context is required. Despite the 
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claims for, and use of ‘history’ and historical evidence, representations of Saddam’s history, 
seem to be strangely ahistorical.  
 There are numerous attempts to psychologise Saddam and characterise him in specific 
ways, these are littered throughout the pre-war Panorama sample. Such attempts are 
particularly marked and significant in this broadcast Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from 
History. Elements of this particular broadcast are akin to some sort of forensic psycho-social 
analysis, assuming such an approach can provide some unique insights into the formation of 
his character. What is more significant however, is that the conclusions the analysis draws are 
then assumed or claimed to provide the necessary insight into understanding Saddam, and by 
seamless extension, understanding Iraq itself. Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History 
in particular, and via Attributes, Over-Lexicalisation and Ideological Squaring constructs a 
frame that presents Saddam as ‘dangerous’ (two references), ‘unpredictable’ (two references), 
‘brutal’ (four references) and ‘ruthless’ (one reference). None of this critique is designed to 
deny that he may well have been all of these things, and much more besides. However, the 
gleaning and presenting of the ‘evidence’ provides a frame of understanding. Such a frame is, 
it seems, perfectly in-keeping with the summary paragraph (above). It is (seemingly) 
designed to cumulatively establish his ‘dangerous’, ‘unpredictable’ and untrustworthy 
personality. In one (of a series of) broadcast(s) prior to the start of conflict, and that the 
broadcast was ostensibly commissioned, so it is claimed, in order to examine the case, or 
provide a ‘warning’, the partial representation is, here rather stark. Even in the moments 
whereby there are some notable references made regarding the West’s role in his coming to 
power and his continued longevity, these are lost amidst a litany of representations and 
dramatic signifiers of Saddam. These representations of dramatic character, of the archetypal 
villain constructed in a classic narrative structure, particularly acute in a broadcast devoted to 
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focusing on his psychological profile, are, on occasion more redolent of Mafia films, and 
Bond films than they are of a flagship Current Affairs broadcast strand.  
In a broadcast that purportedly attempts to reveal Saddam’s ‘Volatile Personality’ 
(P:SAWFH summary paragraph) perhaps fittingly, there are occasions in which the language 
used to describe Saddam’s character and early life are, via a source, given a psychological 
legitimacy:   
Jerrold Post - Former CIA political psychologist: After the invasion of Kuwait, 
finally he had the world by its throat and he was now recognised as an important 
world leader. (P:SAWFH) 
 
Having devoted significant time and space to thoroughly representing Saddam as ‘brutal’, the 
phrase ‘he had the world by its throat’ is significant. Via Transitivity, its phraseology attaches 
agency to Saddam specifically in the context of global threat. Over the course of the 
broadcast(s), by way of selected imagery and repeated phrasing, we have been shown his 
brutality. In the above example, a legitimate high-profile source informs us that, if left to his 
own devices, the very same brutal practises that have terrorised his own population, might 
well be inflicted on a global scale. This sense of agency is significant insofar as it represents 
Saddam in specific ways. If left alone, unchallenged, he will be (en)able(d) to ‘grip the 
throat’ of the world. The previous broadcast: Panorama: The Case Against Saddam, already 
discussed above, also documented Saddam’s ruthlessness and brutality (broadcast six weeks 
earlier). So a discourse and epistemology is emerging and being solidified. This example, 
coming, as it does, midway through a broadcast that has already demonstrated his brutality, 
means the phrase is transformed from mere metaphor to actual threat, and one we can easily 
(tele)visualise. Furthermore, when measured against ‘our’ own military forces and those in 
command of them, no such agency is present. The very next scene and line from Simpson is 
instructive: 
 Simpson: But while President Bush was assembling a force to evict him from  




While the phrase ‘assembling a force’ does not wholly deny Bush’s (Senior) agency, the 
phrasing of the actions means that there is a degree of Nominalisation. ‘Assembling a force’ 
is certainly more neutral, less overtly threatening than ‘gripping the throat’ of the world. 
Similarly, the word ‘evict’ is redolent of a more low-level dispute as one might find in the 
more domestic context over property or tenancy for instance. A classic example of the 
application of the Transitive and the Instransitive verbs in the discourse. 
 As in the previous Panorama broadcast, through archive footage, reference to and 
representation of Halabja is used as a means of foregrounding Panorama’s historical 
accuracy, to demonstrate Saddam’s brutality, and to imbue the contemporary characterisation 
and narrative of brutal menace with a degree of individual(ised) agency and with some 
historical and journalistic legitimacy. In short, Halabja is again used as an instantly visually 
arresting means to continue the process of demonization. BBC News and Panorama archive 
is again deployed.  
 Simpson: Halabja provided another warning. A small Kurdish town in Northern  
 Iraq which had gone over to the enemy. When I went there a few days afterwards I  
 found that Saddam’s chemical weapons had killed 5,000 people as a punishment. 
 
 BBC News March 1988: 
 The bodies which litter this town were those of people who ran out of their houses  
 to try to escape the gas and then were killed out in the open either by more gas or  
 by high explosive. (BBC P:SAWFH 2002) 
 
As in the previous example (from P:TCAS), BBC News and Panorama’s own archive is 
drawn on here. Also, as above, immediately preceding the above section, John Simpson had 
in fact outlined some elements of the geo-political context. We are informed that in fact the 
US had been allies of Saddam. However, the context of this particular broadcast, and as a part 
of a series of pre-conflict broadcasts, this extra historical, geo-political context, whilst vital 
and acknowledged as such, is here used as a means not to examine the West’s complicity, but 
is instead used to further underscore, entrench and endorse the character of Saddam, he is, 
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again, the ‘flat and cartoon like’ archetypal villain. The explicit ‘warning from history’ could 
in fact refer to Western complicity with the demonized Saddam, but of course, that particular 
warning is disavowed in favour of a narrative that Saddam is not to be trusted, that he is 
uniquely untrustworthy and dangerous. By repeatedly using them, the images of Halabja, of 
bodies, the ‘evidence’ (sic) literally and visually piles up. In so doing, it helps create, cement, 
sustain and reproduce the demon archetype that ‘we’ must ‘deal with…in the here and now’ 
(P:TCAS).   
 The third programme in the pre-conflict phase sample promises to be more critical, 
perhaps even self-critical, by which I mean, potentially critical of Western power. 
4.7 Panorama: The Case Against War 
Worried about war with Saddam? Panorama reveals your doubts are shared by many 
you'd expect to back invading Iraq. 
In the last programme of Panorama's widely-acclaimed year, Steve Bradshaw 
examines the arguments of critics on both sides of the Atlantic, including some whose 
lives could be at risk. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2535973.stm) 
 
As summary paragraphs go, in contrast to the first two Panorama episodes in the pre-conflict 
phase sample, this particular example offers a rather sparse summary. The opening sentence 
is an explicit mode of address, it addresses concerned citizens, and in so doing, perhaps aims 
to put such citizens at, if not ease, then at least to make clear that the audience’s own 
reservations, ‘worries’ and ‘doubts’ are shared by (some) members of the political, military 
and social elite. Interestingly, again, from the summary and the title at least, the reservations 
are here coded via the prism of (all too human) ‘worries’. Additionally, some of the sources 
furnishing the worries with legitimacy are those ‘whose lives could be at risk’. Whilst 
resisting the urge to be overly critical, this broadcast is at least an attempt to foreground some 
of the concerns, it must be highlighted that, from this short summary, there is little indication 
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that the reservations will be framed by ethical, legal or moral concerns. From the summary, 
the programme is an examination of ‘both sides of the Atlantic’. It is unclear whether this 
refers to the US and UK. If so, then the absence of ordinary Iraqis is stark.  
4.8 Panorama: The Case Against War – Challenging the ‘March to War’ 
There are, with varying degrees of force and nuance, significant moments presented within 
all the pre-conflict phase Panorama texts that counter the ‘march to war’ narrative. Some 
significant moments wherein Jane Corbin (The Case Against Saddam; Chasing Saddam’s 
Weapons), and John Simpson (Saddam: A Warning From History) do explicitly reference a) 
some of the historical Western support for Saddam Hussein; b) include sources expressing 
reservations regarding the contemporary desire for engaging in conflict. The most explicit 
and most-considered and critical are, though, as one might expect, present in the December 
2002 broadcast, Panorama: The Case Against War.  
 Having devoted the previous two broadcasts to developing and sustaining the 
Saddam as demon character (examining the case against Saddam), as a critical and public 
service broadcast oriented brand, Panorama devotes its next broadcast to examining The 
Case Against War. It is certainly the case that Panorama: The Case Against War is, for the 
most part, overtly critical. In fact, within this sample, the broadcast is striking precisely 
because it seems so anomalous (it is this incongruity that is key). While it would be too much 
to suggest that Panorama: The Case Against War is counter-hegemonic, it is, at the very 
least, highly sceptical of and highly critical regarding US and UK political-elite claims. The 
journalism contained within the broadcast certainly provides a critically interrogative 
position. It would be intellectually dishonest to suggest that The Case Against War adheres to 
the exact same template as the other three Panorama broadcasts in the sample. It does remain 
the case that lengthy sections of The Case Against War has a critical focus. There are 
significant examples and moments in which the doubts of (some) sources are foregrounded. 
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Some of the sources even go so far as to express grave misgivings regarding the possibility of 
forthcoming conflict, perceived Western complicity, geo-political strategies, and even, 
motivations: 
Major General Patrick Cordingley: My reservations are all to do with the 
numbers of Iraqis that might be killed, you could argue, unnecessarily. (P:TCAW) 
 
And: 
 Haifa: Iraq could be the largest reserve oil country in the world after Saudi  
 Arabia and Britain is fighting to gain access to that, to have a share in the spoil of  
 the war. The British involvement at the moment in Iraq, or trying to involve in this  
 war, is definitely will be looked upon by the Iraqis as another colonisation of Iraq,  
 something which they fought very hard during the whole last century to get rid of. 
 
 Bradshaw: Now Iraqis fear their natural resources are being coveted by a new  
 imperial power.  As the US builds up its forces in the Gulf, Haifa fears the world’s  
 solo superpower is starting to behave like Britain before it with the arrogance of  
 empire.   
 
 Haifa: Iraq is only the beginning I think. There was Afghanistan of course, I  
 mean this is Iraq here, and probably Iran or Syria next. What else? I mean is there  
 an end to it?  This is real expansion of power. There is one power in the world  
 nowadays and it is the US, and the US wants that area. (P:TCAW) 
 
 
However, despite the above (and other) examples, even in this critical broadcast, the 
ways in which the evidence of the more critical (even anti-war) sources are represented in 
Panorama: The Case Against War is not quite as critical as might first appear to be the case. 
As has been discussed, different dramatic conventions are used to (for example) cast Saddam 
a) as analogous to Hitler, b) in more generalised demonized terms. Although non-evidence-
based, and as such, highly problematic, such conventions are an incredibly powerful dramatic 
device. It represents an attempt, through dramatized codes and conventions (typically the 
classic Proppian narrative structure; the archetypal representations found in Propp’s analysis 
of Folk Tales), to invest the more pro-war view with emotional weight and legitimacy. 
However, in this particular broadcast (P:TCAW), one in which there is a significant 
orientation towards critical and sceptical inquiry, the representation of the sources is, even 
though occasionally ‘dramatic’, comparatively much more detached and even emotionless.  
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 The broadcast, Panorama: The Case Against War is largely oriented around and 
narrated through seven critical sources. Each character is still dramatically multi-modally 
introduced, afforded a functional honorific, or perhaps more accurately, afforded a 
characterisation more readily found in fictionalised drama. However, such dramatic 
rendering, in this instance does not mean each ‘character’ is rendered or imbued with 
dramatic emotional depth. Furthermore, we must examine the extent to which, even though 
largely deriving from elite social and political locations, the seven sources are afforded the 
designation of Primary Definer. Do they Primarily Define the story, the context, the narrative 
orientation, the discourse? Are they subject to (more forceful) challenge by the Panorama 
journalist? In another classic of the dramatic repertoire, each character is instead reduced to a 
kind of route one caricature: ‘The Spy – Robert Baer’; ‘The Bishop – The Right Reverend 
Richard Harries’; ‘The Ambassador – Sir Andrew Green’; ‘The Presidential Advisor – 
Jessica Stern’; ‘The General – Major General Patrick Cordingley’; and ‘The Senator – Chuck 
Hagel’. The one striking deviation from this representation and casting comes via ‘The Exile 
– Haifa Zangana’. Her testimony, though only relatively short, is at least imbued with some 
emotionally resonant force, she is characterised and rendered all too human. However, the 
remaining sources are each afforded approximately seven minutes, but the case(s) are 
dislocated from the wider context. Their only narrative link (though of course invaluable) is 
their scepticism regarding the necessity of engaging in conflict. In the context of this sample 
of pre-conflict broadcasts, such overt scepticism is certainly noteworthy.  
Vital as this broadcast is, the general presence, and the contents of their testimony is 
important, in the context of these broadcasts their presence might be characterised as 
journalistically incongruous. Crucially for this research, they are anomalous in form and 
representation, too. What I mean by this is that, other than ‘The Exile – Haifa Zangana’ the 
remaining six sources are not presented in ways which allows for dramatic human 
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engagement. They are much closer to what one might expect to find in a traditional Current 
Affairs broadcast. In this respect, the(ir) representation(s) are much more in-line with generic 
expectations.  
This being the case, one could argue that when located as a part of a larger (and 
temporally longer) discourse across the sample, their representation is not designed to engage 
or encourage an empathic response. As a consequence, the emotional investment in these 
more critical perspectives is harder to achieve. So perhaps, it is not necessarily that emotional 
and dramatic forms of representation are employed, but who in the representation is afforded 
the relative luxury of televisually engaging characterisation and representation. Furthermore, 
how such characterisation is deployed in order to sell a vision, to persuade the audience 
regarding the rightness (or otherwise) of the geo-political events. Are we persuaded by the 
more rational, cold, detached and emotionless perspectives (re)presented in P:TCAW? Or is it 
now the case that in the early twenty-first century, Current Affairs television broadcasting, by 
utilising the various journalistic, televisual, dramatic forms, ensures we are more likely 
persuaded by drama and emotional engagement?  
The case can certainly be made that, having attached highly emotive 
characterisational depth to ‘our side’ while simultaneously reducing ‘Others’ from the 
‘enemy side’ to simplified (but no less dramatically rendered) archetype and caricatures 
across the pre-conflict phase broadcasts, when confronted by more cold, emotionless, 
detached, though still reasonably dramatically rendered, caricatures represented here by the 
critical sources in P:TCAW, the lack of emotional dramatic engagement, certainly when 
measured and assessed against the other broadcasts in the sample, means the audience might 
be less inclined to invest in the narrative orientation (of critical inquiry and scepticism 
regarding ‘our’ march to war).  
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 Additionally, even here in P:TCAW what remains vital is the continuing 
representation of Saddam. Many of the same narrative structure and archetypal forms are 
employed. So within this highly critical and, in some ways exemplary piece of broadcast 
Current Affairs journalism, some aspects, focus and critical attention is centred on a) Western 
strategic interests; b) previous Western complicity. However, in part at least, that critical 
position is slightly diminished by the fact that, within the narrative of this individual 
broadcast, subsequently fitting well within the overall discourse, through the various sources, 
Saddam Hussein, while not represented as an immediate threat, still remains a problem to be 
solved: 
Harries: He is a long-term worry, but the policy of containment and deterrence has 
worked for the last ten years. (P:TCAW) 
 
…as such, he is still subject to demonization. That Saddam remains one of the major focal 
points, while not surprising, does mean in some ways, even while less visible and less 
dominant, his dramatic characterization is consistently rendered and broadly adheres to the 
previous archetypal, discursive and journalistic template established by the remainder of the 
pre-conflict phase sample. This is most obvious by the ways in which much of the very same 
archive imagery is deployed. An example of the semiotic Ideological Squaring is in the 
neutral visuals of ‘our’ combat ‘operations’ (e.g.); repeated (though less frequent) images of a 
menacing Saddam, firing a rifle (once), smoking his cigar (once); dressed in combat fatigues 
and sunglasses (twice). These images might be fewer and further between, but it remains the 
case that Saddam is presented as having a case to answer. Saddam still remains the 
demonized mark against which everything else is measured. 
 Another important and significant aspect regarding the critique of the desire for 
conflict as found in Panorama: The Case Against War is that still, even in this broadcast, 
208 
 
criticism or reluctance to engage in conflict is, on occasion, made on tactical, strategic and 
practical grounds: 
Jessica Stern: There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq. Saddam poses 
a threat to the entire world. However, we need to consider whether the risks of going 
to war exceed the benefit and I believe they do. (P:TCAW) 
 
 So the desire for conflict is critically questioned at times in all four broadcasts. 
Significantly the journalistic is also foregrounded, Corbin, Bradshaw and Simpson all use the 
BBC and Panorama’s own archive as authenticating agent, revealing the role that Panorama 
has played in telling us the story of Iraq. Corbin and Simpson themselves feature in the 
archive material further endorsing their own role as expert(s), interested, and critical 
observer(s) of both Iraq and the West’s role in Iraq. It is through archive that one of the most 
interesting and critical possibilities for countering the march to war narrative comes. 
However, surprisingly, it comes not from Panorama: The Case Against War, but in the 
Panorama broadcast The Case Against Saddam. 
 Deriving from archive (from 1993), at 23 minutes into Panorama: The Case 
Against Saddam, there features an interview with Alan Clarke MP who, at the time (1992) 
was Minister of State for Ministry of Defence, 1989‒92. In the original broadcast, Panorama 
outlined how British companies had been selling weapons technology to Saddam: 
Clarke: I think our attitude on this is very much coloured now by the fact that we 
did actually subsequently go to war with Iraq and it is a risk that is always present 
when you're selling to dictatorships. You just have to weigh up the probabilities and  
weigh that probability against the economic advantages of the trade. (P:TCAS 
Panorama archive) 
 
This particular narrative thread is consistent with some of the threads developed in P:TCAW 
(a degree of complicity, a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ frame). The archive (from 1993) also 
indicates that such brilliant, rigorous, critical journalism is possible, Panorama demonstrates 
that it is so. What role does it play in the Panorama broadcast(s) that, I have argued, 
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devote(s) such significant representational, over-emphasising (ideological squaring) resources 
to demonization? The above section from P:TCAS, including the quote from Alan Clarke 
MP, foregrounds and acknowledges a degree of Western complicity, of the powerful role the 
UK and US play(ed) in the region. The point made by Alan Clarke MP is hugely significant. 
That ‘we’ ‘weigh up the probabilities and weigh that probability against the economic 
advantages of the trade’ is fairly stark. It is an explicit foregrounding of political elite-level 
discussions of geopolitics, discussions regarding the extent to which (though never overtly 
and explicitly admitted as much), on occasion, economics and ‘trade’ might in fact trump 
(distant) human life. A significant admission and quite a journalistic scoop for Panorama in 
1993. Such an admission does serve here to punctuate the developing narrative in 2002. 
However, this brief sojourn, this critically interrogative frame is then quickly discarded. In 
this particular broadcast in 2002, Corbin does not develop that particular (journalistic) 
‘angle’. This critically interrogative, self-critical content does not impact or in any way shape 
the discourse of this broadcast, nor does it materially affect the remainder of the sample. 
Firstly, save for this one statement from Panorama’s own archive, the theme(s) or possible 
frame(s), notably, Western geopolitics, energy resource capture, economics and imperialist 
ambitions, are simply not returned to, certainly not from legitimated sources. That the 
forthcoming war in Iraq might also be shaped by the ‘economic advantages of’ the war (oil 
resources, strategic geo-political position) remains stubbornly absent in most of the sample. 
They are absent in favour of overt dramatic demonization of Saddam. Instead, the use of 
Panorama archives merely stands-in for critique. The few examples that do exist (mainly 
from P:TCAW), feature in one single episode, subsequently largely dislocated from the 
remainder of the sample, and then in this case, mainly archival, showcase the journalism but 
do not materially affect the narrative orientation.  
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 To put it another way, and the reason I consider this particular very brief excerpt as 
having a potentially counter-hegemonic or critical role to play is because, Panorama could 
use Clarke’s narrative, or the contemporary equivalent of an equally critical, sceptical 
questioning, high-profile and legitimated source as the starting point or the frame through 
which the subsequent broadcasts are viewed. Panorama could, perhaps should have 
developed the journalistic angle from such a critical perspective. They could have researched, 
sourced and represented this particular narrative, it could have been the dominant frame. For 
instance, Scott Ritter, who was absent, or Hans Von Sponeck, who was (re)present(ed), are 
never allowed to fully set the frame, or orient the discourse in a suitably critical and rigorous 
direction. Given that there is evidence to suggest that such economic and geo-political 
considerations do (or did historically) weigh on global decision-makers (Panorama’s archive 
has just revealed as much), the overall narrative arc of any number of Panorama broadcasts 
prior to the conflict, could, and perhaps should start and end with such sceptical critique, such 
critically reflective accounts. In short, that the very political elites now arguing for conflict 
and ‘overthrowing the regime’ might be energized and driven by less than benign motivations 
could be the starting and end points, the frame through which to examine the forthcoming 
conflict. Western geopolitical strategy, the capture of energy resources (which of course is 
discussed endlessly by the critical ‘left’ in the UK, but who do not substantively feature in the 
pre-conflict phase sample), the installation of a neoliberal market economy in Iraq, or any 
number of counter-hegemonic angles, could have been the frame. Even on the most basic 
journalistic level, surely such a critical frame would be worth pursuing. That they never were 
the frames is instructive. In the context of War Programming, the absence of such subaltern 
frames is also consistent with regards point seven of Altheide and Grimes ‘War Programming 
Model’, ‘Return to the point 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622). Despite the fact that 
Panorama’s own archive and research demonstrates that ‘our’ motivations are not always 
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benign, the assumptions, developed then solidified over a number of months, are that ‘our 
intervention’ if it comes, will be reluctant but motivated by higher more noble considerations 
than ‘the economic advantages of the’ war. That this remains the case goes some way to 
demonstrate that, despite some notable but largely minor, then discarded angles, the narrow 
discursive epistemological template Panorama employs in its coverage of conflict continues 
to be oriented around representing Saddam as the ultimate demon, the menace requiring 
urgent intervention. 
 Again, the existence of P:TCAW is striking here. There were possibilities for 
mounting rigorous critique, and, vitally given that this is one of the claims made for and by 
the BBC and Panorama, for locating the current debate in a historical context. Despite the 
fact that in many cases the sources quoted in P:TCAW are (or were) manifestly high-profile, 
they do not quite accrue the same level of legitimacy. This has something to do with a) the 
ways in which each source is characterized and dramatically represented; b) their total 
absence from any other broadcast in the sample. In short, their single appearance(s), means 
they never solidify into Primary Definers, at least, not across the entire sample. As a result, 
their perspectives are not permitted to reorient the narrative direction. The potentially 
counter-hegemonic never quite becomes a ‘main strand of argument’ (BBC).   
In the context of this research, one tracking and assessing a collection of different 
Panorama broadcasts across an extended time-frame, and one employing a Critical 
Discursive lens, we can measure the potential for narrative subversion or critique across the 
sample. Despite P:TCAW being a demonstrably critical broadcast in the pre-conflict phase, I 
would suggest that it remains critical only within tightly defined narrowly framed discourse. 
The principle reason for this is the fact that, save for two brief examples from the conflict 
phase broadcast Panorama: The Race to Baghdad, in which Robert Baer, and Major 
Cordingley briefly appear, no other source featured in this broadcast (re)appear(s) in any 
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other broadcast across the entire sample. The alternative positions, the subaltern narratives 
and critical commentary each source provides is (for the most part) overtly critical, and, at 
times even critical of Western motivations:  
 
Major General Patrick Cordingley: Isn’t it a throwback to days of empire, back to 
the last century when armed force was used whenever we wanted to around the world 
for particular foreign policy aims.  Surely we’ve moved on from that now. (P:TCAW) 
 
Sir Andrew Green: I think this talk about Saddam being a threat to the west frankly 
is largely manufactured.  I think the policy is misguided and misconceived.  I think 
any attack on Iraq will be a huge bonus to Osama bin Laden, it will destabilise the 
Gulf and we’ll have consequences that cannot be foreseen or indeed predicted. 
(P:TCAW) 
 
Jessica Stern: I think there would be a far more compelling argument for going to 
Iraq if we had intelligence that Saddam was about to strike the UK or the United 
States. I don’t believe that any intelligence has been uncovered. (P:TCAW) 
 
However, their near complete absence from the remainder of the broadcasts in the pre-
conflict phase, conflict phase, and post-conflict phase, means they are journalistically and 
ideologically at variance with the remainder of the sample(s). Because five of the seven do 
not appear or reappear, their presence, their casting here is somewhat ‘maverick’. Perhaps 
their testimonies, their ‘storylines’ are not thought sufficiently rigorous, interesting or 
‘salient’. Their absence from the remainder of the sample certainly goes some way to 
delegitimating them. The social and cultural positions of (some of) the sources, as formerly 
adjacent to or even as ‘Primary Definers’ seemingly not sufficient, not legitimated (enough) 
such that they might be granted further representational licence to reappear in other 
broadcasts in the sample. They are present, but only in this one example, on the edges of 
‘primary definition’, cast here, in this one single, critical broadcast, they fulfil the BBC 
function of ensuring ‘no significant strand of argument is under-represented’, but as a mere 
fig-leaf of impartiality but not such that they are able to (re)orient, reorder, subvert or 
challenge the dominant narrative arc of the Panorama conflict-based sample. They do not 
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become a ‘main strand of argument’. Even if Saddam as the problem is a legitimate and 
defensible narrative arc, in adhering to the now established discourse this broadcast 
diminishes the critical position P:TCAW could have developed.  
 One final point with regards this relatively more critical broadcast P:TCAW. As in 
other pre-conflict phase broadcasts, Richard Perle features. In this broadcast, Perle is in fact 
identified as a founder-member of The Project for the New American Century (PNAC). In 
the academic literature already quoted by this research, PNAC are referenced extensively by 
Altheide and Grimes (2005). Perle is directly attributed as a PNAC member and signatory to 
a controversial and highly inflammatory letter. This controversial fact is alluded to, then 
outlined by Bradshaw in P:TCAW. What remains vital, interesting, and identified as 
problematic in this research, is why this direct attribution and textual positioning within one 
single broadcast is not enough to discredit him in P:TCAS and P:CSW. Despite Richard 
Perle’s clearly demarcated, easily retrievable and proven ideological position, when he 
(re)appears within the text and discourse of P:CSW and P:TCAS, he is still granted authority 
as a primary definer. The texts continue to position him in such a way as to ensure that he still 
maintains authority and legitimacy, Corbin still defers to his expertise, his statements pass by 
unchallenged. Such discursive features are indicative of an ideological position or at least 
indicative of a narrative orientation that is in part reproduced by the largely uncritical use of 
and legitimacy granted to specific primary definers. That Panorama are willing to continually 
grant uncritical authority to legitimate sources, clearly indicates its adherence to the WPM. 
However, we need not wait for ‘the next war’ before Point 7 ‘Return to the point 1’ (Altheide 
and Grimes 2005: 622) even within the context of this single conflict, journalistic myopia and 
amnesia is all that is required. 
 Given Panorama’s location in and as a News form, as one might expect given the 
increasing focus (at the time of broadcast) on the hunt for ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 
214 
 
the final broadcast in the pre-conflict sample has an explicit focus on the search for said 
weapons. Summarised and thematised as follows. 
4.9 Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
Panorama goes to Iraq in search of the ‘smoking gun’ that could lead to war. The 
attention of the world has been focused on the UN Weapons Inspectors’ search for 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. During this time, Panorama has gained access to 
both sides in the game of hide and seek that stands between Saddam’s Iraq and war. 
Panorama’s Jane Corbin reports from Baghdad as it braces itself for conflict. She 
visits the weapons sites where inspectors have been concentrating their efforts, and 
interviews the Iraqi officials and scientists who run them. 
Panorama has followed the inspectors for three months, in Iraq, New York and 
Vienna, during a period which has taken them from early planning, to the battle for 
more time, as they come under increasing pressure from Washington. As one of the 
few documentary crews that has managed to get into Iraq, Panorama visits the sites at 
the centre of the dossiers compiled by the British and US Governments and provides a 
unique insight into a nation on the brink of conflict and invasion. We assess what has 
happened to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and whether there are breaches of the 
UN resolution which support those who are calling for war. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2706841.stm) 
 
The title itself is interesting. In a more critical or nuanced sample, one in which the same 
level of scrutiny was cast on elite Western political actors (and their motivations), as was cast 
on ‘Saddam’ (and his alleged ambitions), the title could be defended on the grounds of 
nuance and questioning. The title however, lacks the crucial addition of a question mark (?). 
Also coming, as it does, at the conclusion of fully five months of otherwise largely 
demonizing narratives, in which, from the titles and summaries (above) alone, Saddam has 
been consistently rendered and ‘cast’ as ‘dictator’, ‘volatile’, ‘ruthless’, ‘unstable’, 
‘threatening’, akin to Hitler, Stalin, and ‘psychopath’, the title Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
takes on a more sinister tone. It strongly suggests that Saddam is in possession of such 
weapons, and it is merely a matter of tracking them down, to find (the dramatic signifier of) 
‘the smoking gun’.  
 Panorama again make much of their proximity to primary high-profile sources 
‘Panorama has gained access to both sides’, ‘She (Jane Corbin) visits the weapons sites 
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where inspectors have been concentrating their efforts, and interviews the Iraqi officials and 
scientists who run them’. We are also informed that Panorama has followed the inspectors 
across the world, and that the broadcast can ‘provide a unique insight into a nation on the 
brink of conflict and invasion’. So the dominant themes for this, the final pre-conflict phase 
sample, are the (continuing, though perhaps more muted) demonization of Saddam; the 
search for weapons of mass destruction, and that said weapons are (likely to be) in ‘his’ 
possession.  
4.10 Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons – Searching for the ‘Smoking Gun’, the 
Ideological Square: Demonizing Saddam v Fetishizing ‘Our’ Military Machine. 
 
This, the final broadcast in the pre-conflict phase Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons, 
was broadcast a matter of weeks (five weeks, to be exact) prior to the second Gulf War 
beginning. By this stage of the pre-conflict phase, the image of Saddam (that of the 
archetypal villain in classic folk-tale style narrative arc), in part solidified by Panorama (and 
others) is firmly entrenched. It is also the case that by this time in the wider social and 
political sphere, the dominant debate was around the possible evidence of, and search for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As befits the remit of Panorama, this, the final 
broadcast prior to conflict, centres on the search for said weapons in Iraq.  
 Once again, this time in Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons (P:CSW) images of 
Halabja are used. Again directly cut against the familiarity of New York. In this example, the 
horror of Halabja is foregrounded, archive footage in black and white, dead bodies literally 
piled up in the back of a truck, accompanied by more (unspecified) haunting music. This is 
followed by a black and white image of a young boy, lying dead on the street while the non-
diegetic narration by Jane Corbin that overlays these horrific images of dead bodies in 
Halabja is as follows: 
 Corbin: Saddam Hussein developed his weapons of mass destruction to give him  
 power in his region, and as he showed in 1988 he was prepared to unleash poison  
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 gas against his own people to crush internal dissent and ensure his regime's 
 survival.  It raised the question would Saddam ever reveal what had happened to his  
forbidden weapons.  Would he not gamble everything and try and keep them? 
(P:CSW) 
 
The screen then fades to black for one second, (the transition shot) before the next scene 
begins. The scene is New York, Jane Corbin crosses the street as the camera pans upwards to 
capture the UN building. In quite a stark multi-modal act of Ideological Squaring, the relative 
calm and familiarity of New York stands in sharp contrast to the horrors of Saddam’s 
Halabja. The non-diegetic score used to introduce us to the more familiar sight and site of 
New York is the cello score Documentary by Rolan Vega. The cello, often associated with 
classical music, in this instance at least might be said to signify Western taste, class and 
urbane sophistication. The music functions as a lead-in to the equally urbane and 
sophisticated ‘…quiet Swedish diplomat, Dr Hans Blix’ (P:CSW) (referred to again in similar 
terms ‘the mild-mannered Swede’ at 44 minutes and 31 seconds). Over the course of the next 
14 minutes, the multi-modal Ideological Squaring is stark. As the images and Jane Corbin 
herself flit between Iraq, Vienna and New York, the narrative development is such that shots 
of western cities are often sharply contrasted with that of the darker, more desolate, more 
threatening images and shots of Iraq (including one shot of Saddam Hussein holding a rifle 
aloft). At 24 minutes, we return to New York.  
 The image begins from up-high, possibly shot from one of the ‘skyscrapers’ of 
which New York is synonymous. In contrast to the darker (bleaker, less-known, more 
threatening) hues that depict various Iraqi cities, New York is captured not only in bright 
colours and contrasts, but the shot selections themselves are indicative. A bright blue sky 
containing one single cloud and a very bright sun is our opening image, the camera pans 
down to reveal the (familiar) Manhattan skyline. The next shot is, one assumes, selected 
precisely to render New York familiar (again), knowable and recognisable. Shot from the 
217 
 
ground, the image is of a yellow New York cab sat in heavy traffic on a Manhattan Street. 
The recognition that it is New York is cemented by the steam rising from grates; the 
‘Walk/Don’t Walk’ roadside signs so familiar from Hollywood(ised)/New York movies. 
Corbin herself is captured walking along the street clutching an armful of paperwork, 
signifying (as she does repeatedly by way of visuals) that she is on the journey to track down 
Saddam’s weapons. The final two shots in this section are of the United Nations building 
complete with flags of every nation fluttering in the gentle New York breeze. The non-
diegetic score is again the cello score of Documentary by Rolan Vega. This score, together 
with the shots of the New York skyline, and with the additional, now becoming customary 
shots of yellow New York cabs (used again at 44 minutes) ensures that, within the confines 
of this broadcast at least, Vega’s Documentary becomes a part of the character of New York, 
used to punctuate the images of that city, as if New York itself is becoming one of the central 
characters in the dramatized story-line of the Panorama discourse. These are images we in 
the west are supposed to trust, or at least be vaguely familiar with. While such images might, 
strictly speaking journalistically at least, be almost obsolete and unnecessary, their location 
and insertion here certainly televisually and dramatically assists in the telling of the story. 
New York has and is a recognised trustworthy character. If a military intervention is 
forthcoming, such military actions will be sanctioned by the (frequently framed in New York) 
UN and, we can rest assured that, only after the best efforts of the Over-Lexicalised and 
positively Attributed ‘quiet Swedish diplomat’ have been exhausted. The ‘military option’ 
while ‘regrettable’ will be undertaken by thoughtful, familiar and trustworthy allies.  
4.11 The Fetishisation of ‘The War Machine’ 
We have seen then, repeatedly, though usually only through repeated legitimated archive 
images of Halabja, what Saddam’s weapons can do. But, in-keeping with the now more 
urgently represented near inevitability of forthcoming conflict, the Western ‘Military 
218 
 
Machine’ (P:CSW) needs to be foregrounded and represented. So what of the representations 
of our military might and technology? Given that there has been some focus on the ‘military 
build-up’ (P:TCAS) how might ‘our’ weapons and weapons technology be represented?  
 A particularly interesting and highly stylised example appears at 28 minutes into the 
broadcast Panorama; Chasing Saddam’s Weapons. In this sequence, we are treated to 
perhaps one of the most filmic sections in the pre-conflict phase sample. In the following 
sequence - again via the Ideological Square method - cut against a previous representation of 
a dark and dreary Baghdad, are images of Western forces.  
 The sequence, lasting 35 seconds, contains a range of images. The first image in the 
35 second sequence, is of a large ship as it cuts through the water. Shot from on board, ‘we’ 
the viewers are on the journey. The next image, shot from the air, a US navy aircraft carrier 
(possibly the same ship, though this is never made clear) with troops on board spelling out 
the words ‘READY NOW’ (the exact same image shot from the air with the troops spelling 
out ‘READY NOW’ has been used already in Panorama: The Case Against War). The 
following shot is of two pilots on board the aircraft carrier, dressed in military uniforms, one 
strides towards the other, they salute then shake hands, and one warmly wraps the other on 
the shoulder. Then cut to (different) military personnel loading a missile onto a fighter-jet. 
The next shot is a close-up of a pilot, now in the cockpit, visor down, the glass of the cockpit 
comes down over his head. As it does so, the pilot gives another salute and raises his index 
finger to signify that he’s ready (for action). Cut to a member of the ground-crew as he 
visually counts down for take-off. Next shot is from inside a cockpit, perhaps more library or 
archive footage. In this shot, from inside the cockpit, we see what the pilot sees, the viewers 
are on board (literally, (tele)visually, discursively and ideologically). Cut to another shot 
from the cockpit, but this time camera facing back, as the plane takes off, the aircraft carrier 
and the sea very quickly recede into the distance. The moving image perfectly captures the 
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overwhelming speed of the take-off and places the viewer at the centre of the ‘action’.  Now 
back on board but facing forward, we are on the journey across the ocean with the pilot on his 
mission. The final shot is again from inside the cockpit, this time however the focus is on the 
pilot, the sunlight glinting off his visor. These images all signify, by way of explicit action 
shots, that ‘our boys’ are ‘ready now’ for action. An interesting non-diegetic dramatic 
addition is that the musical score that accompanies the previously discussed montage is 
Celestial Annihilation by Unkle. This very fast tempo, upbeat soundtrack perfectly conforms 
to a Hollywood vision of conflict. The Western armed forces are here represented not as any 
threat but prepared, action-oriented keepers (or restorers) of order. Some of the images are 
direct from the Hollywood playbook, action, sunsets, military technology and machinery. The 
commentary by Jane Corbin is also instructive: 
Corbin: Saddam Hussein was courting war while America was very publicly building 
up its forces on his doorstep.  And Britain too announced it was sending troops and 
aircraft to the Gulf. (P:CSW) 
 
 We see the build-up of troops, but in this instance, they are represented via the 
imagery and narratives drawn from a Hollywood vision of conflict. Following directly from 
the above depiction of the ‘military build-up’ Jane Corbin’s voiceover asserts, somewhat 
counter-intuitively: ‘…with Saddam now courting war’. Given the build-up of ‘our’ 
Western/Coalition military personnel in the region, the notion that ‘Saddam is/was courting 
war’ would, ordinarily, be hard to sustain. However, given the overt demonization focus, 
coupled with the polished, Hollywood style representations of the Western ‘military 
machine’, Saddam as ‘courting war’ makes journalistic, televisual, and narrative ‘sense’.  The 
next image is of the high-profile source, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, sat in his office in London 
(framed by a picture of London behind him):  
Greenstock: This is actually for real, but it’s being done in a way which can be 
switched off if Saddam Hussein decides to comply 100% and hand all his stuff in. So 
he's got his hand on the switch actually, and if he declines to use it, then the military 
machine will roll onward as it’s being prepared now.  But he's got to come forward 
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credibly with all those explanations ‒ with the materials behind them that are gaps in 
the declaration – now. (P:CSW) 
 
 His words carry implicit threat but, his calm, assured and measured delivery ensures 
the words are coded as the reasonable response to the Transitive ‘Saddam courting war’. The 
assertion from Greenstock that ‘…he's got to come forward credibly with all those 
explanations’ is interesting. Given the discourse in which this series of broadcasts is located, 
including much suspicion of Saddam from the elite US sources, it is rather difficult to see 
what precisely would constitute ‘credibility’, but the viewers are left in little doubt that, as 
yet, this credibility has not been granted. The phrase ‘So he's got his hand on the switch 
actually’ has the effect of, again, coding Saddam as the principle agent of aggression. The 
Transitive is applied to Saddam, he is the agent, and that it is somehow in his control how the 
immediate future plays out. Such Lexical Choices are further strengthened of course by the 
fact that agency is ascribed to Saddam by a legitimated ‘Primary Definer’. 
 After the brief appearance of Jeremy Greenstock, the very next sequence of images 
returns us to more action oriented montage. This time shorter in length at a mere 18 seconds 
but the focus and effect remains the same. An image of a fighter-jet at very fast pace taking 
off from an aircraft carrier; the next shot is from inside the cockpit, the viewer is again 
televisually (and ideologically) located with the military forces, ‘Our Boys!’, as it flies across 
the open sea; cut to the fighter-jet dropping its load (bombs) before quickly cutting back to 
(UN Weapons Inspector) Jacques Baute. This cut away is important. When interviewing the 
Iraqi scientists (historically) involved in the research and development of weapons (of mass 
destruction), Corbin et al. forensically question Saddam’s former defence researchers. They 
are not only questioned, but confronted with over-coded phrases that reveal the impact of 
their weapons: 





Similarly urgent and deadly phraseology was used in the earlier pre-conflict broadcast, 
Panorama: The Case Against Saddam.  
Corbin: They found thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinium, an aflatoxin which 
causes liver cancer. (P:TCAS) 
  
This phrasing simultaneously reveals to the viewers the likely deadly effect and reality of the 
Iraqi scientists’ work, and of course such phrases reassert the dangers of an uncontained 
Saddam.  
 Both montages, interrupted by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, appear to show ‘Our’ 
‘military machine’ in a more neutral light. Firstly, by the quick-paced sequencing of dramatic 
images and by the non-diegetic up-tempo musical accompaniment. Then by the fact that the 
commentary locates the Western ‘military machine’ as somehow distance(d) from human 
agency and complicity, as a machine, not as the aggressors but in a mode of response. 
Saddam has already been characterised by the representation in a specifically archetypal 
demonized fashion, it is of course also the fourth and final broadcast in the pre-war sample, 
therefore the overall discourse is well-established. 
 These more neutral but simultaneously ‘action’ oriented images need to be 
measured against the already repeatedly framed and characterised Saddam, his WMD (sic) 
and his attack on Halabja. Action montages are inserted or located into a narrative that has 
largely been devoted to specifically mobilise and solidify the image of Saddam as a unique 
threat. These images are ‘cut against’ images of Western forces. The Western armed forces 
are represented not as any threat but as keepers of order. Some of the images are direct from 
the Hollywood playbook, action, sunsets, military technology and machinery. Another 
necessary critique is that, given the explicit reference to serious injury, long-term disease 
(‘liver cancer’) and death (‘suffocate their victims’), when referencing ‘Saddam’s weapons’, 
it is a striking ‘omission’ that ‘our’ bombs, while actually (re)present(ed) on screen, are 
spared the same scrutiny. They may appear (in action shots) but their deadly qualities are 
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semiotically, discursively and Lexically Absent. ‘Our weapons’ are not granted the same 
deadly ‘qualities’. In discourse and multi-modal analytical terms, this is an act of 
Nominalization: ‘Our’ weapons, which ‘we’ do possess, are distanced from ‘us’; they are 
visually, semiotically, and aesthetically fetishized, coded by their actions, not by their deadly 
material effects.  
The final words spoken in Chasing Saddam’s Weapons are by Jane Corbin: 
 Corbin:  Three months ago when I started out, the Inspectors hoped they could  
 avert a war, but Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets.   
 The Inspectors may soon be just a footnote in history as America warns Saddam  
 has thrown away his last chance. (P:CSW) 
 
 Saddam is again over-coded as somehow in charge of the events. Despite some 
vague critique within the text, and very good reasons to cast scepticism on US and UK 
officials’ claims, Corbin asserts, without critical scrutiny that ‘Saddam Hussein has still not 
been prepared to reveal his secrets’. The claims are simply assumed to be true, that ‘he’ is 
still prepared to deceive. At the programmes conclusion, with the images of preparation for 
battle in front of us, Corbin assures us that war now seems almost certain. Discursively and 
multi-modally, it remains significant that Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons is the final 
pre-war broadcast (broadcast in February 2003) weeks prior to conflict actually beginning. 
That the narrative focus and images, a mixture of archive, newly filmed and library footage, 
is here on the forthcoming action. This is indicative of the move towards action in a literal 
and in a representational sense. During conflict, war programming tends to focus on action at 
the expense of context or explanation. Despite claims that the pre-conflict phase Panorama 
broadcasts examine the case (against Saddam, or against war) by representing action(s), 
Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons actually, discursively, epistemologically and 




4.12 Concluding Remarks: The Mission to Explain …The Build-up to Conflict 
According to both the summary paragraphs and the subsequent analysis, the identifiable and 
dominant themes that emerge(d) in the pre-conflict phase sample are as follows: 
1) Demonization of Saddam.   
2) The threat and/or presence, and search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
3) The need to take action. 
4) Representations that challenge or counter the ‘march to war’. 
5) The journalistic and television position of, and reliance on, sources (Primary 
Definers). 
6) Extensive use of the BBC’s and Panorama’s own archive as legitimating force. 
When assessed and tracked across the pre-conflict phase sample as a whole, one theme and 
characterisation certainly dominates. The discourse is one of demonization, the epistemology 
of Iraq is that of a place of brutality and lawlessness that only ‘Our intervention’ can salve. 
Principally by selectively deploying specific archive material, via Over-Lexicalisation, 
Attributes and selective use of Transitivity, by granting authority and legitimacy to Western 
sources and Primary Definers, by repeatedly representing Saddam as an archetypal brutal 
‘character’ with very little by way of overt focus on ‘our’ complicity, the overall discourse 
and epistemology of Iraq is of an urgent threat to world peace. The critical positions alluded 
to, on occasion given significant time and space within (some of) the broadcast sample, are 
almost always measured, assessed, discursively and multi-modally repeatedly marked against 
the consistent characterisation of Saddam as uniquely threatening. Saddam, and often 
representatives of the Iraqi ‘side’ are not afforded the same levels of legitimacy and 
authenticity granted to ‘our own’ Western sources or Primary Definers. We need to recall that 
the sample analysed here were all broadcast prior to the second Iraq war (Gulf War II) 
actually beginning. Though this might seem self-evident, the extent to which Panorama 
significantly ramps up the war drumbeat needs to be considered in that (pre-conflict) context. 
The consequences of weapons are demonstrably represented when ‘he’ is the possessor (and 
architect of previous atrocities). This is particularly evident in, and by repeated references to, 
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and archive shots of Halabja. Such brutal and devastating consequences are represented via 
the archive and as such, presents Saddam as uniquely dangerous; as brutal and untrustworthy. 
Our intervention, represented first by political and military elites, and second represented via 
a displaced and simultaneously fetishized ‘Military machine’ is urgently required and only 
ever as motivated by benign intent.  
 The term ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ is repeated across the sample: Three 
uncritical references in P:SAWFH. There are a further eight uncritical references, and six 
neutral or sceptical references in P:CSW. And a further 10 uncritical references in P:TCAS. 
When the mere mention of the term ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ is not sufficient, 
Panorama frequently turns to the semiotics of science, green screen, microscope (library) 
pictures of biological weapons, computer generated images of missiles and dead bodies in 
Halabja, in order to substantiate the threat. So in the narrative(s) examining ‘the case against 
Saddam’ or ‘the case against Iraq’, even ‘the case against war’ the overall thematic concern, 
narrative orientation and characterisation dramatically represents Iraq, via the demonized 
archetypal villain characterisation of Saddam, as a uniquely dangerous threat to us all. 
 Finally, given the sheer number of representations of ‘Saddam’ and that they always 
cast him as an evil ‘to be confronted’, might there be a case for deducing that this 
representation is in fact not an archetype – able to ‘travel’, and recognisable ‘across 
boundaries’ – but is instead a rather clumsy stereotype. As McKee reminds us, stereotyping 
‘confines itself to narrow, culture-specific experience and dresses in stale, non-specific 
generalities’ (McKee. 1999. 4). In the cases analysed here, there are some attempts to cast 
Saddam beyond mere stereotype. I would argue that this is principally because there is a 
degree of political analysis of Iraq, some ‘backstory’ and even some familial history (about 
which, more in subsequent chapter(s)), some attempts to psychologise the ‘demon’. However, 
it remains the case that this potentially more nuanced representation is constrained by the 
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overall narrative(s) in the pre-conflict sample. When measured against representations of ‘our 
boys’, and ‘our’ Primary Definers, he is Over-Lexicalised, Over-Determined and Over-
Coded. Via Ideological Squaring, Saddam is in danger of being represented as a ‘flat and 
cartoon like’ stereotype. Sure, he may be fleshed out a little, but the role he plays in the 
storyline(s) are typically one-dimensional: ‘while such characters serve an archetypal role 
within the given programme, reflected out to reality, they serve a stereotypical role (Gray, J. 




How is the War Going? 
 
5.1 The Conflict Phase 
For the purposes of this chapter, conflict phase coverage will refer to the time period from 19 
March 2003 until 1 May 2003 or until President George W Bush, on board the USS Abraham 
Lincoln, beneath a banner declaring ‘Mission Accomplished’ officially declared ‘an end to 
military operations’ and thus the successful completion of the mission. Bush arrived in a 
fixed-wing aircraft on the aircraft carrier
 
USS Abraham Lincoln, the ship had just returned 
from combat operations in the Persian Gulf, he then posed for photographs with pilots and 
members of the ship’s crew while wearing a flight suit. However (and interestingly for a 
research project largely focused on media representation), the shots were tightly framed so as 
to promote and produce a particular a vision to the world. Most of the News reported that 
Bush had swept into the Gulf and delivered his speech to the personnel fighting in the Gulf 
conflict. Or at least if this was not overtly said, the news media chose not to foreground the 
fact that the naval vessel was, in fact, anchored off the shore of San Diego. This minor detail 
goes some way to explain that the US government and military forces were (and are) engaged 
in acts of overt (but concealed) propaganda. In this propagandistic endeavour, they are ably 
assisted by news media who chose to elide the location of the USS Abraham Lincoln. Despite 
News archive shots of Bush aboard this very vessel in Panorama, Bush’s actual geographical 
location was not explicitly referenced, the visuals were inserted into the narrative arc, and in 
the same way that the News coverage used the footage, as a form of ‘commander in chief’ 
characterisation. In the context of this research, what is equally interesting is, alert to the 
‘effects’ of mediation, even Bush’s speech focused on imagery over and above reality. As 
Hammond (2003) notes: 
It was telling, in this example, that in his 1
st
 May ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech, 
Bush stopped short of declaring the conflict over. Instead, he emphasised the image, 
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rather than the fact, of victory, claiming that: ‘in the images of falling statues, we have 
witnessed the arrival of a new era’; and that ‘in the images of celebrating Iraqi’s, we 
have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom’. (Hammond 2003: 24)  
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the term Current Affairs is rather a loosely defined one. Unlike the 
News genre, Panorama does not broadcast ‘live’ footage. Instead it presents a series of 
filmed events referring-back to a period of time, sometimes very recent footage and film, 
employing some of the signifying practices of News, and in some cases, utilising the already 
‘legitimated’ News footage as points of anchorage, legitimacy, news values and 
‘authenticity’. Such usual practice is designed, one assumes, to provide a means of looking 
back, developing, critiquing, ‘digging behind the headlines’ (Holland 2006), providing 
context and detail on recent news events. As such, and as a(n emblematic) form of Current 
Affairs broadcasting, Panorama lacks the immediacy of broadcast News. This being so, 
Panorama instead presents itself as a broadcaster of record, able to make use of its significant 
resources as a means of referring back, reflecting and critically interrogating the events as 
they unfold(ed). As discussed (see Chapter 2), Panorama functions and sits between the 
margins of Documentary with all the attendant points of realism, anchorage and legitimacy 
assumed by such forms, and that of News, which of course also obtains similar levels of 
legitimacy, authority, and with the additional urgency, ‘recency’ and other associated ‘News 
Values’ characteristic of that form. The above point is elucidated here in this chapter 
precisely because, with the somewhat urgent nature of conflict coverage, its immediacy, is, 
when represented in Current Affairs coverage obviously slightly compromised. This lack of 
‘liveness’ means that there are fewer examples of conflict coverage ‘as it happens/is 
happening’ in these broadcasts and in this chapter than one might find were the analysis 
focussed on News (such as in Altheide and Grimes’ WPM) and not Current Affairs. 
Nevertheless, examples of conflict coverage do remain, in fact they dominate, but they are of 
course slightly temporally distanced when compared with News coverage. There are 
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significant instances of ‘cross-over’ with regards the filmed examples pertaining to battle and 
conflict that appear in pre-conflict phase, conflict phase and that of post-conflict phase 
broadcasts. All phases in the overall sample in this research utilise some examples from 
‘battle scenes’ as a means of rendering the dramatic story-lines and narratives legible and 
‘meaningful’ in the context of the wider socio-political and media discourse. 
5.2 Aspects of the War Programming Model 
 Panorama devoted a number of broadcasts to Iraq during the conflict-phase. Of 
these, three will be included for analysis. One of the broadcasts not selected for analysis is 
Panorama: After Saddam which was an entirely studio-based discussion (see Chapter 3). It 
therefore lacks the usual discursive, aesthetic, formal, multi-modal practices and, for this 
reason, it is not particularly representative of the Current Affairs broadcast model as 
exemplified by the usual Panorama style. While the panel discussion, and possibilities for 
feedback via email and text messaging, does provide a degree of public sphere, public service 
engagement, an opportunity to ‘speak back’, and therefore an opportunity, however muted, to 
enter and affect the dominant discourse, Panorama: After Saddam does lack the standardised 
formal multi-modal characteristics one has come to expect from Panorama. Such broadcast 
styles are also now absent from the ongoing Panorama canon, panel discussions are now 
limited to BBC Question Time and, to a lesser extent, or at least in a different format, on 
Newsnight.   
 As already stated, any footage sourced from the time period 19 March 2003 until 1 
May 2003 can be included as in war-time and as part of the template. It is important to trace 
the practices and examples within the developed theoretical framework, while simultaneously 
acknowledging that Altheide and Grimes’ War Programming Model is not as immediately 
applicable to Current Affairs broadcasting when compared with News. However, the WPM 
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still provides a useful template. In this, the conflict-phase, points two and three are the most 
apposite: 
2. Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending war, including 
demonizing certain individual leaders. 
3. Coverage of subsegments of current war, using the best visuals available to 
capture the basic scenes and themes involving the battle lines, the home front, the 
media coverage, the international reaction, and anticipation of war’s aftermath. 
(Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622)   
5.3 Panorama: Blair’s War 
The first of the broadcasts from the Conflict phase ‘season’, broadcast on 23
rd
 March 2003 
(only days into the conflict-phase), was Panorama: Blair’s War.  
Panorama: Blair’s War 
Could Tony Blair lose his job over the Iraq crisis? For two months Panorama has 
been following the opposition to him, in the anti-war movement, in the Labour Party, 
and in Parliament. This is the real-life political drama of a Prime Minister, accused in 
the past of being guided by focus groups, yet apparently now determined to override a 
million demonstrators and over a hundred of his own MP’s ‒ the story of the war on 
the home front. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2858047.stm) 
The most obvious and immediately clearly identifiable theme is the extent to which the 
broadcast will focus on the ‘threat’ to Tony Blair, or at least to his ‘job’ and reputation. It is, 
we are informed, ‘A real-life political drama’ as such, the focus will be on the individual 
(character) of Blair. Once again there is a reference to (reliance on) access to sources (those 
Primary Definers), and in this case, some potentially alternative sources. The summary 
paragraph suggests that the broadcast will provide the necessary space and time to critics and 
oppositional voices. Explicit mention of the ‘anti-war movement’ is some indication that, as 
detailed by Georgina Born, this episode of Panorama might take seriously its remit ‘to 
broaden the character and range of its representations in tune with new social and political 
times’ (Born 2005: 376). It is a focus on ‘the war on the home front’.  
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5.4 Panorama: Blair’s War – The Human(e) Deliberations (Rationalisations) of the 
Primary Definer(s) 
 
Panorama: Blair’s War is largely oriented around and chiefly concerned, perhaps 
unsurprisingly given its title, with the personal and political risks Tony Blair was taking with 
his own premiership, political position and ‘legacy’. The fact that it is titled as a war, and 
with a sense of ownership attached, might, at first glance (15 years hence) seem surprising. 
However, at the time, there certainly was a sense of ownership of the (impending) conflict, 
and this was something Blair seemed only too happy to contribute to. Blair did ‘own’ the war, 
certainly in a UK context, and this first broadcast in the conflict phase is chiefly devoted to 
exploring this position.  
 Some insight into the narrative orientation Panorama: Blair’s War might take 
comes via the very first words of the broadcast. In the following segment, Blair is represented 
as simultaneously risk-taking but all too human for that. The very first lines of the broadcast 
Panorama: Blair’s War are accompanied by News archive shots of Blair (in slow-motion) 
jacket slung across his shoulder, striding through the corridor of Parliament (the ‘corridors of 
power’). The words which open the episode come from high-profile primary definer, Foreign 
Secretary of the time: 
Jack Straw: This man, Blair, has taken really very significant risks with his own 
future as a Prime Minister, and there have been some dark moments when weaker 
people might have simply given up. (P:BW) 
 
Straw, granted legitimacy and authority as a Primary Definer by his status, literally and 
visually framed by the accoutrements of high office, outlines that Blair is the necessarily 
strong man for the task ahead. He reveals the ‘dark moments’, thus characterising Blair as an 
all too human subject engaged in moments of agonising despair. He then communicates that 
because Blair is not weak, he will not give up. In the context of a conflict phase narrative, 
such a statement demonstrates Blair’s resolve, and his determination. In immediate contrast 
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to the ways in which ‘Saddam’ has been reduced to stereotype, or at best, an archetypal figure 
(the demon to be confronted), Blair is here over-coded, Over-Lexicalised and given positive 
(human) Attributes. Furthermore, the risks are here framed as personal risks. A most-likely 
bloody conflict that may well (and did) cause great suffering and as yet still unknown 
numbers of deaths, is here entirely framed through the purview of risk to Blair’s ‘own future 
as Prime Minister’. Such a statement reveals the narrative orientation of this, largely (though 
not wholly) uncritical conflict phase broadcast. We are to be guided through the (very) early 
stages of conflict via the pensive reflections of Blair, ventriloquized, in this instance by Jack 
Straw.  
 In this broadcast, not only is this characterisation replete with institutional and 
hierarchical connotations, Blair, via Jack Straw, has ‘most to say’, and has the luxury of 
institutional knowledge and insight, it also reveals that here, even in the very first stages of 
the conflict, ‘character’ takes centre stage. Very little, zero minutes in this broadcast, focus on 
the material effects the current conflict would have/is having on the people of Iraq, the British 
soldiers involved in the actual fighting and very little concern about the wider geo-political 
landscape. However, as the BBC’s own summary paragraph identified, this is an examination 
of the ‘war on the home-front’, therefore the micro-political landscape certainly is 
foregrounded insofar as the narrative continually focuses on Blair’s future (or not) as Prime 
Minister. While under some scrutiny and while many critical voices are present, what appears 
in the broadcast itself remains largely oriented around the rationalisation for the ‘actions’. It 
is not the wider social and geo-political ramifications (beyond the US/UK ‘special 
relationship’) that feature, and that Blair is symptomatic of and the sympathetic cypher for 
this special relationship, but Blair’s personal mission that is foregrounded. As such, it and his 
character(isation) provides the template and narrative orientation. Even when the actions are 
questioned, or rendered questionable, such as by Ken Clarke MP:  
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Ken Clarke MP: I listen to a man who preaches at me with deep, deep conviction 
and I'm afraid I sit in the congregation and think, and I don’t really think we should be 
there and I don’t really think your allies on the other side of the Atlantic see it quite 
like that. (P:BW) 
 
And his motivations scrutinised, Blair, with his ‘deep, deep conviction’ remains characterised 
as essentially ethical, as moral, as motivated by the best of intentions. Or, despite the fact that 
‘There is no present and clear danger to British interests’, Blair is, in the words of another 
criticising and critical ally: 
John Lloyd: …doing it in a sense out of a missionary duty to the world, to rid the 
world of evil people. (P:BW) 
 
The most heavily featured voice in the broadcast belongs to the Foreign Secretary of the time, 
Jack Straw, and his commentary (of course supportive) is dominated by Blair’s position, 
Blair’s strength of character, his beliefs, his desire to ‘do what he believes to be right’ 
(P:BW). Here, Blair is cast as a perhaps flawed character but nevertheless a moral one. 
Afforded the luxury of, if not direct then vicarious and characterised, discursive presence, 
with the possibility for (self)-reflection and, what is more with the narrative actually oriented 
around such contemplative, moralising, self-reflection, Blair takes centre stage in a classic 
drama. Given that the previous broadcasts (already discussed) cast and caricature ‘Saddam’ 
(in absentia other than by archive) as ‘dictator’, ‘volatile’, ‘ruthless’, ‘unstable’, ‘threatening’, 
‘psychopath’ (see Chapter 4) and affords him no such self-reflexive space, this broadcast 
grants to Blair, and other similar Primary Definers, the relative luxury of televisual self-
representation, and character development. Blair is certainly not a stereotype, he may be an 
archetype, and he is certainly fleshed-out, human, self-examining, critical, pensive, ‘not 
weak’ and doing ‘what he believes to be right’.   
 Using the dramatic elements of the televisual form, one can again (continuing the 
critical position developed in Chapter 4) posit that the drama is established as one between 
good and evil. Even if the ‘good’ is cast as flawed, prone to ‘mistakes’ and likely to take 
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political risks (with his own position) those representing the ‘good’ are still, after all, human. 
In fact, one can conceivably go further. It might in fact be precisely because Blair (or Straw) 
is flawed, prone to mistakes and willing to risk it all, that he is rendered all the more human. 
Flawed? Yes. A political gambler? Yes. Human? Yes. ‘Ruthless’, ‘Psychopath’? …no, for 
that is reserved for the caricature, not the more rounded, contemplative, reflexive and pensive 
political actors of Western imaginary, of which the character of Blair is emblematic.  
 Perhaps one of the best examples of the fact that the broadcast frames the entire 
forthcoming conflict as an issue for Blair, that the ‘cost’ will be borne by him is the 
following: 
Tony Blair: I simply ask the marchers to understand this. I do not seek unpopularity 
as a badge of honour. But sometimes it is the price of leadership and it is the cost of 
conviction. (P:BW) 
 
Despite the many thousands of deaths suffered by Iraqi citizens, Blair is discursively, 
journalistically and televisually distanced from them, from the material effects his bombs 
cause. How different it might be if Current Affairs and News broadcasting had a similarly 
forensic and televisually, dramatically rendered focus on the deaths caused by Blair’s 
sanctioning of war. In the above quote though, Iraqi subjectivity is of course entirely 
Lexically Absented. Any ‘cost’ here is simply narrated as a personal price worth paying for 
having ‘conviction’. In fact, unpopularity as the price worth paying for having ‘conviction’ is 
given added force and ‘legitimacy’ in the following example. Straw’s statement below serves 
a dual function, there is conviction rhetoric located in historical precedent. This direct 
reference to historical precedent also reacquaints us with the notion of Saddam as somehow 
the equivalent of Hitler we found in Chapter 4: 
Jack Straw: There have been other leaders of ours who have been profoundly 
unpopular and in the 1930s – and I’m not suggesting there are exact parallels, there 
never are – but in the 1930s it’s worth remembering that there were huge marches in 
favour of what was… came to be called pejoratively ‘appeasement’.  I understand, 
indeed sympathise with the stand they took, although history later told us that they 




The above statement delivered in interview is certainly consistent with the narrative Blair and 
his government (including Jack Straw) mounted during the build-up to the Iraq war, and was 
therefore represented (with some critique) within the confines of Panorama: Blair’s War. 
More problematically though is that, as in the previous chapter, there was no direct challenge 
to this narrative orientation. It might be the case that within the discourse of Panorama: 
Blair’s War other political actors do challenge this narrative, and do seek to insert counter-
arguments to that discourse within the Panorama text. However, as the analysis detailed in 
Chapter 4 outlined, within the texts of the pre-conflict phase sample, particularly in 
Panorama: Saddam: A Warning from History and Panorama: The Case Against Saddam, the 
Iraqi president is repeatedly associated with the most uniquely evil leader of the 20
th
 century. 
Straw’s statement and Panorama’s lack of challenge to this assertion essentially casts those 
resisting or critiquing the decision to engage in war as equivalent to the ‘appeasers’ of Hitler. 
Lest we forget, Straw reminds us ‘history later told us that they were wrong’. Even prior to, 
but especially now, in the context of a post-Chilcot Inquiry world, such a statement is 
offensive and, I would argue an overstatement of absurd proportions. That such an Over-
Lexicalised statement passed by unchallenged tells us that Panorama is certainly not in the 
business of positing a counter-hegemonic position. A similar reference to Iraq, Saddam and 
Nazi Germany are made by Jane Corbin in Panorama: The Race to Baghdad. 
 As mentioned above, in Panorama: Blair’s War the most dominant figure is Jack 
Straw. Straw speaks over 720 words in total and is the most dominant figure of the broadcast. 
He, more than any other figure Primarily Defines the narrative arc. So even though this 
particular broadcast contains many critical commentators, and, what is more, some have a 
degree of profile, though perhaps are less legitimated as sources, Straw dominates, in terms 
of both time afforded, and televisual space. He is granted the televisual space in which to 
ruminate and does so in broadly very sympathetic terms. Facing questioning by Panorama 
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reporter Vivienne White, Straw again represented Blair as reflective, thoughtful, strong, able 
to ‘stand the heat’. Straw, this time, casts Blair as the statesman. 
Jack Straw: Well you get used to these things in politics and if you… as Truman 
famously said:  ‘If you don’t like the heat, get out of the kitchen’. I think the Prime 
Minister thrives on the heat. 
 
White: He thrives on the heat? 
 
Straw: Yes, he thrives on the pressure. I mean the interesting thing about taking on a 
job like mine, a job like his still more, is that amongst many things you find out about 
yourself and what happens when you are subjected to very considerable pressure. As 
far as the Prime Minister is concerned, he is very resilient, very determined, and he 
responds magnificently to challenges. (P:BW) 
 
The decision to go to war here explained and narrated (‘you find out about yourself’) via the 
logic of a sort of ‘personal growth’ narrative and character. We are reliably informed that 
Blair is ‘resilient, very determined’ and that ‘he responds magnificently to challenges’. If we 
are to assess this through the prism of a classic narrative structure, then the above words by 
Straw certainly go some way to casting him (Blair) as a heroic archetype, someone 
recognisable and sympathetic. In the overall theme and discourse of this Panorama text, Blair 
simply is the focus and central protagonist. As such, certainly in this, the earliest stages of the 
conflict (and conflict-phase broadcasts), the decision as to whether British forces ought to be 
sent to war is almost entirely narrated and represented through the micro-political sphere, the 
characterisation of one man, his ‘resilience’, his fortitude, his ‘determination’ and the ‘very 
significant risks with his own future as a Prime Minister’. Such themes are returned to time 
and again. Towards the conclusion of the broadcast, Blair himself appears (via very recent 
News footage archive). Taken from the House of Commons, even in the midst of personal, 
political crisis, Blair delivered what came to be seen as his tour-de-force.  
Blair: This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this House, not just this 
Government or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this House to give a lead, to show 
that we will stand up for what we know to be right, to show that we will confront the 




The above casts Blair, again, as a man of moral conviction. The references to ‘our way of life 
at risk’ recurs in Chapter 6 through the words of Bernard ‘Bernie’ Kerik. Despite the flaws, 
or perhaps because of them, Blair is represented as fundamentally human. What is more, he is 
granted the right, as Primary Definer, as elite political source, and able to present himself as a 
man of conviction, even moral courage. There may well be a number of perfectly rational 
journalistic and televisual reasons for this. However, in the context of this research, those 
reasons identified are not enough, not so insurmountable that an alternative, more critical, 
more forensically questioning, counter-hegemonic representation could not be possible. Such 
alternative or subaltern Current Affairs broadcasts ought to be imaginable, however, those 
constructing the broadcasts need to be able to see beyond the narrow journalistic and 
televisual practices that continue to define their world view, and the subsequent broadcasts. 
 Despite this over-representation of Straw and other high-profile, elite political 
actors, Panorama: Blair’s War does devote some time and attention to those critical of the 
march to war. Some of these, such as former government minister, Ken Clarke MP, have a 
degree of authority and legitimacy. However, within the context or frame of this particular 
conflict phase broadcast, even these fierce critics of Blair, are able to be largely contained 
within the narrative orientation of the broadcast. That is to say: given the frame, the discourse 
and the characterisation granted to Blair in this dramatic representation, even those critics are 
usually left to criticise his mission(ary zeal) as opposed to the morality (or not) of an illegal 
invasion, or even, a war of aggression. When such legal questions are raised, we are 
reminded that the United Nations (UN) is ‘on board’. The exception to this, certainly from a 
legitimated high-profile source, is when Ken Clarke MP foregrounds the explicit nature of 
Blair’s legal approach: 
Ken Clark MP - Conservative Minister, 1979-97: I think Mr Blair's mission was to 
try to cloak all this with legality, with the old world order. So because of Blair in part, 
the Americans allowed the politics and the diplomacy to go round a loop line trying to 
get some support for this in United Nations whilst the build up of the American and 
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British armies and air force and navy continued, ready for the war to start in the 
spring. (P:BW) 
 
This is perhaps the most explicit criticism of, not only Blair but of the ‘fig-leaf’ nature of 
going to war under the banner of a United Nations resolution. Such overt criticisms are rare, 
and rarer still that they emerge from an extremely high-profile former government minister, 
and still sitting MP. Even in this, the most critical of the conflict-phase broadcasts though, 
Clarke remains a high-profile and legitimated anomaly. Importantly, as a member of official 
opposition, Clarke can perhaps be written-off through the narrative of ‘party-politics’. 
5.5 Representations of the ‘Anti-War’ Protesters 
Nevertheless, there are other occasions whereby there is some overt critique and criticism, 
here represented by the ‘anti-war’ protest movement. The ‘anti-war’ movement were the 
main voices critical of the march to war, they were the principal alternative(s). However, 
another caveat, in some ways screening this programme at this time was slightly obsolete 
insofar as, by the time of broadcast, 23 March 2003, coalition troops were already inside Iraqi 
territory. So screening alternatives to war, however represented, and framed, is compromised 
by the date of broadcast. This being the case, how large a role could these alternatives play in 
the build-up to conflict in Iraq, and in this broadcast? What space did they occupy and what 
shape did this take in Panorama: Blair’s War? Was an ‘anti-war’ position given prominence 
and credibility, were any of the anti-war voices afforded the position of ‘main strand of 
argument’, and if so was this position located within a specific hegemonic hierarchy?  
 Some answers to this hegemonic hierarchy can be found in the multi-modal 
representation combined with the functional honorifics granted to them. In Panorama: 
Blair’s War the protesters, certainly those granted any presence (if not legitimacy) at all, are 
first pictorially represented in moving image, but as their names are announced, the picture 
freezes, their picture then turns to ‘greyscale’ and the accompanying non-diegetic soundtrack 
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is that of the sound of a photograph being taken, as if taken in a police line-up. They are also 
introduced to the viewers with fairly explicit qualifiers, caveats or ‘health warnings’: 
White: The Chairman of Stop the War was Andrew Murray. He’s the Senior Press 
Officer at ASLEF the train drivers' union, a communist.   
 
Lindsey German: I thought it was a good turnout, and I thought actually the 
fundraisers meeting I thought wasn’t a bad turnout.  
 
White: Lindsey German, convener of the Stop the War Coalition, a long-serving 
member of the Socialists Workers Party. These traditional left-wingers had built a 
very untraditional political movement. (P:BW my emphasis) 
 
So the ‘anti-war protestors’ lacking both the proximity to ‘official’ authenticated, legitimate 
‘political’ discourse are also depicted as traditional left-wingers, in other words: ‘the usual 
suspects’. One might even posit – adhering to the dramatic narrative structure elements that 
thread throughout this research – that they are cast in archetypal roles. Whilst it might be 
problematic to suggest they are cast as ‘villains’, the above introduction to them certainly 
casts and multi-modally, Lexically represents them as potentially villainous. At least with the 
Over-Lexicalised ‘Communist’ ‘Socialist Workers Party’ appellation, they are hardly cast as 
those ‘we’ can trust. As opposed to the previous Panorama episodes thus far analysed 
(Chapter 4), in a broadcast that largely lacks any overt representation of Saddam, the ‘anti-
war’ protesters here fulfil the function of enemy (within). In the absence of ‘Saddam’ or 
various ‘Others’ from Iraq, the anti-war movement, because they are explicitly foregrounded 
as belonging to (apparently) long-discredited political orientations ‘socialist workers party’, 
‘communist’, are the opposite side of the Ideological Square. This rather sceptical appellation 
does not offer the same or even a similar functional honorific granted to legitimate sources or 
Primary Definers. The ‘anti-war’ spokespersons are thus immediately and consistently 
diminished in the narrative build-up to war in Iraq. They might believe what they say, but 
their representation in this broadcast does not grant them the same levels of authority and 
legitimacy granted to Blair (and Straw). Alongside this casting, the ‘anti-war’ voices that do 
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feature also tend to be framed in opposition to Blair, and through the prism of his individual 
culpability and future tenuous position and grip on power. What I mean by this is that even 
the anti-war position tends to be represented, in the broadcast at least, through their 
opposition to legitimated, authoritative, essentially human, and moral(ising) ‘Blair’. 
However, appear they do. As such, even while critically interrogating their narrative and 
characterisational casting in this Panorama broadcast, the fact is they do appear, they are 
given voice and some space with which to mount some critique (too late of course).  
The one possible counter-hegemonic alternative, which was not explored in detail, was the 
reference to the protesters not as merely ‘anti-war’ but as ‘peace movement’ campaigners.  
White: Led by experienced political activists the Stop the War Coalition had been 
organising a widespread public protest movement from its modest Union premises 
near London’s King’s Cross. Its organisers have long service records in the Peace 
Movement and in industrial disputes. The Chairman of Stop the War was Andrew 
Murray.  He's the Senior Press Officer at ASLEF the train drivers' union, a 
communist. (P:BW) 
 
This is an important addition that was, unfortunately, not explored.  
 To put it another way, other than this one example, one direct reference to the 
‘Peace Movement’ the campaigners were, from that moment, reduced to being represented 
for what they are against, as opposed to what they might be for. This might seem a small, 
overly critical, micro-linguistic point, but I believe it is indicative of the trends and practices 
of Current Affairs Television Journalism, of which Panorama remain emblematic. As 
previously discussed (above, p31; p92), the ‘peace-movement’ exists beyond the usual 
confines of what BBC Current Affairs constitutes as political. Therefore, the sources, the 
frames, are beyond the narrow discourse. Represented here, but as a small band of ‘the usual 
suspects’ (‘communist’) not affiliated to official politics or political expression, as such, 
Panorama cannot quite grant them the legitimacy afforded ‘official’ legitimated political 
actors and Primary Definers. Had Panorama somehow been able to devote an entire 
broadcast to the ‘Peace-movement’ campaign, their explicit ideological and philosophical 
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outlook; had it been broadcast prior to the conflict actually beginning, the peace-campaigners 
may well have had enough time, within the confines of a broadcast at least, and in the wider 
socio-political sphere, enough discursive space to perhaps reorient the discourse in interesting 
and counter-hegemonic ways. Located in this broadcast, the peace-campaigners, largely 
functionalised by the term ‘anti-war’, (the ‘what they do’ and ‘who they are’) merely fulfil 
the BBC obligations of ‘balance’ and ‘impartiality’. Cast here, ‘against the war’, in 
opposition to the legitimated social and political actors, the Primary Definers, they merely 
provide some necessary backdrop, some much required critique ‘reflecting a wide range of 
opinion across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe’ ensuring ‘that no 
significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected or under-represented’. (BBC 2006, 
Editorial Guidelines on Impartiality) but without (re)orienting the epistemology or discourse 
of Iraq per se. Additionally, in the context of war and conflict, the term and very meaning of 
the term ‘peace’ tends to be located in direct and diametrically opposed opposition to ‘war’.  
…any binary opposition establishes a hierarchy so that one term in the binary moves 
into a privileged position over the other. In the war/peace binary, war provides the 
dominant conceptual framework through which both terms come to be defined, 
conceptually subordinating peace to war. Peace therefore becomes the ‘absence of 
war’ (rather than a concept defined on its own terms), perpetuating a militaristic 
framework for thinking about peace. (Hodges 2013: 12, emphasis added) 
 
The binary oppositions outlined by Hodges are a clear indication of the establishing of a 
(militaristic) framework through which subsequent reporting takes place. This is manifest in 
the, already discussed (Chapter 3) taxonomy of the ‘war correspondent’. The journalistic 
position of ‘peace correspondent’ is of course absent, there are simply no ‘peace 
correspondents’. In some ways this is, at the level of journalistic practice at least, if not 
defensible as such, at least understandable, for as Wolfsfeld identifies: 
…there is an inherent contradiction between the logic of peace process[es] and the 
professional demands of journalists. A peace process is complicated; journalists 
demand simplicity. A peace process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists 
demand immediate results. Most of a peace process is marked by dull, tedious 
negotiations; journalists require drama. A successful peace process leads to a 
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reduction in tensions; journalists focus on conflict. Many of the significant 
developments within a peace process must take place behind closed doors; journalists 
demand information and action. (Wolfsfeld 1997: 67) 
 
Using Wolfsfeld’s approach, it is hardly surprising that no such ‘peace correspondents’ exist, 
there are simply too few quickly retrievable, easily represented, legible, operational and 
journalistic hooks on which to hang a developing story arc. It is therefore unsurprising, when 
using Wolfsfeld’s outline as a frame or analytical lens, to find in the dominant explanatory 
frameworks for discussions and broadcasts pertaining to Iraq, that the discourse of the early 
part of the twenty-first century are framed by war and conflict (and war’s role in ‘restoring 
order’) and as such are overly reductive. Peace campaigns remain, save for the one example 
above, unmentioned, certainly as an a priori position. With regards coverage of conflict, so 
far, all phases of Panorama conflict broadcasting seem to rely on an already established 
frame, one principally filtered through and oriented around the position and practice of the 
war correspondent. In fact, one could argue that built in to the very practices of journalism, 
its structures, the needs and demands of ‘News’, and concurrently, Current Affairs 
journalism, already pre-establish a very specific operational form and frame for reporting. A 
focus on action at the expense of detailed analysis of geo-political context of conflict is the 
‘sine qua non of war’ reporting. As Cottle has identified, geo-political context, tends to be 
erased, in part, because: 
…in times of crisis – War, etc – ‘the public’ becomes constituted in the exchange and 
contestation of different points of view as well as rhetorical appeals and emotion 
laden symbols. (Cottle in Allan and Zelizer 2002: 179) 
 
Given that the sample in the chapter is derived from the conflict-phase, we need to assess the 
extent to which there is (or is not) an ‘over-supply’ of ‘emotion laden symbols’? If so, is the 
focus and use of ‘emotion laden symbols’ inadequate to the task of providing context? Do 
these specific modes of representation fail to reveal the ‘social totality’? So far as Panorama: 
Blair’s War is concerned, the totality amounts to an examination of the Over-Lexicalised, 
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Over-Determined and positive(ly) Attribute(d) Blair’s ‘determination’ his ‘resilience’ and, 
through characterisation, he is represented as thoughtful, agonising, examining his 
conscience, but in the end, motivated by his desire to do ‘what I know to be right’ (P:BW) he 
is essentially cast in this narrative as an ethical and moral character. The Televisual 
performance of emotion(ity) plays an important role here. As Ellis states: 
Television enabled British citizens to see Prime Minister Tony Blair furrowing his 
brow and presenting his decision to join the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a struggle 
with his conscience. He explicitly appealed to the overwhelmingly skeptical British 
public to trust him. (Ellis, J. 2009. 113) 
 
Though difficult to imagine now – with the benefit of hindsight – Panorama, if we are to 
understand this form through dramatic elements and frames, casts Blair (and other Western 
allies) much closer to the role of the emotionally literate Hero, than they do the villain.  
 Ever the professional ‘performer’ Blair, in reasonably muted and subtle terms, 
reframes the impending conflict: 
Tony Blair: I know this course of action has produced deep divisions of opinion in 
our country.  But I know also the British people will now be united in sending our 
armed forces, our thoughts and prayers. (P:BW) 
 
In the above statement, Blair essentially provides the template for the conflict. By (largely) 
uncritically reproducing it, Panorama (and most News media) adopts that model. The 
approach from hereon in will be to represent the conflict as it is pursued. Once war begins, he 
‘knows’ that we, the ‘British people will be united in sending our armed forces our thoughts 
and prayers’. Once the war is underway, and as this broadcast went to air, the ‘British troops’ 
were inside Iraq, we are urged to get behind our troops. Taking their lead from the 
legitimated political actors, the Primary Definers, the following two broadcasts in the conflict 
phase largely adhere to this template.  
5.6 Panorama: The Race to Baghdad 
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Panorama tells the story behind the story of the war. The coalition plan for the 
invasion of Iraq was built on a campaign to remove Saddam Hussein and to be 
welcomed as liberators. 
John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in 
the heat of battle.  
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm) 
 
Adhering, at least in principle, to the expectations of Current Affairs broadcasting, 
Panorama: The Race to Baghdad promises to maintain the Hollandian spirit of ‘digging 
behind the headline’ (Holland 2006) in order to ‘tell the story behind the Iraq war’. Telling 
‘the story behind’ is an interesting and urgently required task, perhaps this conflict-phase 
broadcast might exceed expectations and provide some geo-political context. Explicit 
reference to the imagined and planned for expectation that ‘we’ would be ‘welcomed as 
liberators’ adds impetus to this expectation. Or perhaps, now that war is underway, that story 
will focus explicitly on the action as it is being undertaken. Indications that this might indeed 
be the case are revealed by the final sentence of the summary paragraph ‘John Ware 
investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in the heat of battle’. 
5.7 Panorama: The Race to Baghdad – ‘The Heat of Battle’ Not the Light of Analysis 
 
As in some of the examples cited in the previous chapter, the ‘lead-in’ to the programme 
itself is prefaced by the national news. In this instance, as previously, the lead-in statement is 
revealing.  
Next on BBC1, Panorama …and the gambles behind the American and British war-
plan. John Ware reports on ‘The Race to Baghdad’. (BBC News 6 April 2003)  
 
This reveals that, in a broadly similar manner to the previous example in the conflict phase 
(P:BW) in which the ‘political risks’ (P:BW) (for Blair) were foregrounded, the following 
programme is to be framed by and oriented around the ‘gamble’ template, the risks being 
taken. The frame is very directly oriented in the direction of this gamble having potential 
consequences for our political elites, our military and in a wider sense, the perceived ‘us’ of 
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the assumed Western imaginary that constitutes the Panorama audience. This frame, 
particularly the ways in which ‘we’ are being addressed, is very quickly confirmed by John 
Ware’s opening monologue.  
 Accompanying a series of still photographs, John Ware delivers the ‘headlines’, the 
narrative orientation of what is to follow over the next 49 minutes. The broadcast begins, the 
opening one minute, with a series of still photographs, these are exclusively (one assumes 
though it is not made clear) photos from the current conflict. They depict in some cases the 
pain and anguish of conflict, and in some notable cases actually semiotically, pictorially 
represent the pain, heartache and devastation of and on the local population. Here, one 
assumes, though it is not made explicit, that the image of devastation, injury and death are 
though not to be linked to or caused by the actions of coalition troops. As anticipated, there 
are elements of the WPM ‘Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audience for impending 
war’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005) from the pre-conflict phase ‘playbook’. The three images 
that conclude the opening address and montage are as follows: 
1. Two weary, tired, dirty and battered coalition soldiers carrying unspecified munitions 
– possibly landmines segueing into.  
2. A deceased woman lying stretched out, bloodied on a makeshift hospital bed – this 
particular image accompanies Ware’s ‘…and how, now….as the war has started’ and 
offers a compelling visual semiotic indicator of the brutality, cost and severity of 
conflict and war. That the image of the deceased woman is immediately cut against 
the previous image of coalition soldiers is also significant. ‘Our boys’ are involved in 
the dangerous activity of clearing away landmines, landmines laid by the (unspecified, 
un-represented) enemy. 
3. The final image is of another coalition soldier, in full battle kit holding his rifle across 
his chest. The camera slowly closes in on this final image accompanied by the sound 
of helicopter blades cutting through the air. This is the soundtrack to conflict. Fade to 
black. 
Accompanying the three images (above), Ware ends the opening credit sequence with the 
ominous: ‘This is the story of the enormous risks we and the Americans are taking…’ 
(P:TRTB my emphasis). Directly using the collective pronoun ‘we’ when referring to UK 
forces and political elites is problematic, but does reveal its orientation and the subject 
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position offered to the viewing audience. Using the collective ‘we’ effectively means the text 
seeks to address and interpellate the viewing audience as somehow in the current unfolding 
conflict, ‘We’ have ‘skin in the game’ as it were. Given that this is in the opening minute, the 
‘front page’, the interpellation is significant, it seeks to establish a sense of connection in the 
opening minute, rendering us as somehow interested subjects (on a particular side) in what 
follows. Also noteworthy is the present tense, ‘the risks we and the Americans are taking’, so 
despite this being Current Affairs, and not News, the broadcast has a present urgency. The 
‘risks’ while found on the streets of Iraq, are, for the most part, not represented as risks to the 
population of Iraq, but to ‘our boys’, and, as importantly, to the wider political context.  
Ware: Here in Basra the British forces are battling for the hearts and minds of 
ordinary Iraqis…attempt to convince them they are here as liberators. (P:TRTB) 
 
Further in to the broadcast, such ideas are developed:… 
 
Ware: Do you think the planners have underestimated the extent to which Iraqis, who 
may well loathe Saddam Hussein, but still feel a powerful loyalty to either Arab 
nationalism or their country? 
 
Maj Gen Patrick Cordingley, Commander, Desert Rats, 1991 Gulf War: I think 
undoubtedly that’s so. You see, don’t you, the fact that Americans are not seen as 
liberators. I don’t think they ever would have been seen as liberators. A much – I use 
the word ‘hated’ because I think that’s probably the right word - a much hated nation 
in that region, despite the fact that they’re trying to be helpful. That’s not how the 
Arabs actually see them, and I think that is a powerful factor in this. 
 
Ware: On this fire of Arab hatred for America, TV pictures like these, beamed across 
the Middle East, are the equivalent of high-octane fuel. This is how Islamic 
fundamentalists are exploiting the Iraq War. 
 
In other words, the focus is not, for the most part, on innocent lives lost, or on the legality (or 
not) of the Iraq war, but is instead concerned with the fact that the narrative of ‘Liberators’ 
will be compromised. If (once) compromised, then such narratives are able to be ‘exploited’ 
by ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ (linking to the ‘War on Terror’ frame) thus endangering us all. 
Note that a similarly sceptical motivation (that Bush and Blair might be ‘exploiting’ 9/11 as 
their own motivation for Iraq) is not forthcoming, only ‘fundamentalists’ exploit geo-
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political, historical conditions, not ‘our benign’ leaders. Also noteworthy is the phrase 
‘they’re trying to help’, a statement that one could, quite conceivably, subject to scepticism 
and critical interrogation is here used unproblematically and thus assumed to be fact, and 
functions as the de-facto legitimation.  
 As previously discussed (above and in previous chapter) according to this analysis, 
the pre-conflict phase broadcasts effectively established a frame whereby the possibility of 
war was rendered, if not exactly desirable, then at least necessary and inevitable. Given that 
the broadcasts analysed in this chapter are reflecting on and representing a war that is 
ongoing, the three broadcasts epistemologically and discursively adhere to this ‘logic’. Note 
that in Ware’s opening address the focus has shifted:  
Ware: …now that the war has started, the time taken to finish it is critical. (P:TRTB) 
 
What is significant, if not surprising, here is that the journalistic focus is on the procedural 
elements, the swiftness of ‘getting the job done’, not what the ‘job’ is, or the ethics and 
perhaps geo-political motivations and ramifications of doing so. The narrative is against the 
clock, a sort of early iteration of a kind of Jack Bauer figure of 24.  
 Immediately following the still photographs comes the opening credits: The Race to 
Baghdad, outlined against a black screen. Within the lettering are sepia video images of 
conflict, in this instance the image is taken from an aerial camera panning across a desert 
landscape. The broadcast proper then begins with extended and extensive use of aerial video 
footage (as above), the footage is taken at the end of the previous Gulf War (1991) with the 
voiceover of John Ware explaining how the last war concluded.  
 The archive footage depicts a barren landscape, one of desert, bombsites, decimated 
unspecified industrial and chemical facilities while Ware explains that the ‘Iraqi army was 
decimated’ and that the ‘US forces stopped’ at the Kuwait Iraq border. Use of this footage of 
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course is consistent with the WPM, and in fact adheres to some of the characteristics usually 
found in the pre-conflict broadcasts,  
Point 1) Reportage and visual reports of most recent war (or two). (Altheide and 
Grimes 2005) 
 
In this instance the use of archive has interesting functions. It acts as a means of legitimising 
News and Current Affairs discourse; it simultaneously locates this specific Panorama 
broadcast (with)in a tradition; it draws on its own archive material, and as such, advertises its 
own critical role in the journalistic and political landscape, and it prompts ‘Media memory’. 
Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, given that Panorama is an extended text, 
‘extended reportage’ (Corner) it is able, or arguably necessary, to use such material as a 
means of providing a more developed narrative, a developed and fuller context if you will. 
News broadcasts may use some archive footage but rarely of this length and detail. By 
contrast, Panorama is able to make use of more extensive and extended excerpts in order to 
tell the story of conflict. Still images overlaid with a non-diegetic score of machine gun fire 
and helicopter blades, providing an aural signifier (the soundtrack) of war and conflict, 
seamlessly referencing the current war with dramatic reference, imagery and memory with 
(Panorama’s own) archive material from Gulf War I (1991) locates, contextualises and 
multi-modally fixes the current conflict by way of reference to the previous Gulf War, a war 
that has largely escaped much critical comment and is thus assumed to be a ‘just war’.  
Again, this is consistent with points 1 and 3 of the WPM. The ways in which these semiotic 
and discursive resources are used to tell the story though is important. Which stories, which 
versions, featuring who? Is the narrative direction and development critically focused on and 
oriented around a narrow discursive frame?  
5.8 Historical Archive and the Critical Perspective 
On occasion, some overt criticism of the US is present. This particular broadcast does draw 
attention to some historical precedents and that the failure (by many Iraqi citizens) to see the 
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invasion as one of liberation might be linked to previous failures by the US to live up to their 
promises. In perhaps the most critical excerpt from the broadcast, and one that locates the 
history of Iraq in a wider context, the following excerpt reveals that Panorama can, on 
occasion, play a vital role as a highly critical broadcaster of record:  
Ware: One thing is certain, the Iraqis have a deep mistrust of what motivated the 
bombing of their country. The American led victory from the last Gulf War provides 
one important explanation. Then the objective was just to push Saddam back from 
Kuwait, not to topple him.  However, George Bush senior, the then President, did 
encourage the Iraqis to take matters into their own hands. He said they should rise up 
against Saddam.  
 
1st March 1991 
George Bush Senior: Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the 
resolution of all these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the 
acceptance of Iraq back into the family of peace loving nations. 
 
Ware: And so most Iraqis answered the President's call ‒ 14 out of 18 provinces rose 
up.  They expected the Americans to come across the Kuwaiti border to help them – 
but they didn't. 
 
 Archive footage from BBC News The Gulf War I BBC1,  
1996 Robert Gates US National Security Adviser 1991 Gulf War: That was the 
quagmire, therein laid Vietnam as far as we were concerned, because we would still 
be there. (P:TRTB) 
 
 
 Ware goes on to foreground, via archive and historical detail, the difficulties 
encountered in this conflict with the memories of the end of Gulf War I in which ‘Having 
encouraged the Iraqis to rise up, the Americans went home’ leading Saddam to ‘lay waste 
even to sacred Shia shrines at Najaf and Kabala’ in which ‘More than 300,000 Iraqis in the 
south in particular and some central cities were massacred’ (P:TRTB). In a series of 
broadcasts seemingly (mostly) devoted to airbrushing ‘our’ previous encounters from 
memory, this rare but crucial contextual detail is welcome. However, even here, before long, 
the final brutal act is narrated via (yet) another reference to Halabja: 
Ware: Directing operations here is one of Saddam’s key henchmen, Ali Hassan al 
Majid. Otherwise known as ‘Chemical Ali’ for arranging the poison gassing of 5,000 
Kurds in Halabja. According to British forces in this Gulf War, Chemical Ali and his 
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extensive network of thugs in the Fedayeen and the ruling Ba’athist party have been 
directing the fighting in most of Southern Iraq. Fear of the regime’s grip may help 
explain why the people of Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, have yet to greet British 
troops as liberators. (P:TRTB) 
 
Overlaying the above words from Ware, are the now all too familiar archive images of the 
devastation of Halabja.  
 Other criticism of the conflict emerges, too. However, in the example below, as 
opposed to framing the current conflict in terms the possible anti-imperialist, self-
determination, emancipatory potential of sovereign nation states, such resistance is instead 
discredited and written-off as ‘anti-American’:  
 
Colin Powell - US Secretary of State: There's a lot of anti-Americanism out there 
but it’s fuelled to a large extent by the Iraq situation and the Middle East peace 
process. When we fix Iraq and when we show progress with the Middle East peace 
programme, and people can see that this is a nation that is not against any religion, 
especially not the religion of Islam. (P:TRTB) 
 
The ability (not to mention the desire) to ‘fix Iraq’ requires more critical scrutiny than even 
the critical John Ware is able to manage.  
 As already briefly discussed, once the war is underway, even this slightly wider, or 
at least temporally longer, context is largely dislocated from global contexts or at the very 
least, side-lined, in favour of a more tightly defined, narrowly outlined and forensic focus on 
the local(ised) impact and effect the war is having (had) on the various central actors. 
Localised, in this context means local to a UK population, or perhaps phrased differently, 
how the ongoing conflict is able to be located within and speaking for/to ‘our interests’. The 
central actors and protagonists are, in the conflict phase, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, 
various individual military personnel and latterly, some of the local population. ‘The time 




 Though there are some criticisms of policy, these tend to be oriented around the 
ability of getting the job done with only ‘half the number of troops’ (P:TRTB) used in Gulf 
War I. As expected (demanded) of the title, The Race to Baghdad there is an explicit fixation 
on time, on the urgency with which the ‘job’ needs to be done. Repeatedly, the focus returns 
to speed, efficiency, urgency and time: 
Ware: How long in your view does this war have to go on for before you lose the 
peace, as it were.  You may win militarily but you lose the peace? (P:TRTB). 
 
Ware: This called for troops to be fast, flexible and light. (P:TRTB) 
 
 In the end, despite critical interrogation, this, at times forensic focus and critical 
questioning, and despite the historical references and the foregrounding of historical 
precedents, there remains very little to suggest that even John Ware is able to wholly discard 
the notion of benign intervention. The sense of surprise, that US and UK forces were 
surprised at the levels of resistance is the dominant frame. Largely adopting this frame, Ware 
effectively communicates and builds into it the need and demand for urgency lest ‘we’ ‘lose 
the peace’. Of course, we know who the ‘we’ is in this narrative, and ‘we’ are also seamlessly 
linked to ‘peace’, as if that is de facto ‘our’ aim. Given the discursive treatment the ‘peace-
campaigners’ received in the above discussed broadcast Panorama: Blair’s War, one does 
not have to be too sceptical to read this particular narrative as intensely problematic at best, 
and wholly hypocritical at worst. Herein lies one of the values of this particular 
methodological approach. Having the ability to track and trace examples from the same 
journalistic stable, across an extended timeframe (although with regards these two examples, 
temporality is hardly a problem given that the broadcasts were separated by weeks), means 
we can assess the extent to which, through Primary Definition, and dramatic means of 
storytelling, Panorama adopts a hypocritical perspective. However, one needs to 
acknowledge some caveats. Scepticism that peace was ‘ours’ to distribute in the first place 
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does arise, and is welcome, but despite being laced with some critique, the final words and 
frames, much like the first (top-and-tailing the broadcast) returns us to the dominant theme. 
That time, urgency, the need to ‘secure the peace’ (that might not be ‘ours’ to distribute) 
remains the explanatory format:    
Ware: These are just the opening shots in the new world order dominated by 
American supremacy with some help from their closest ally Tony Blair. Whatever this 
war takes, both leaders are going to finish it because both remain confident that its 
outcome will bring peace and security to the world.  
 
Bush: These are sacrifices in a high calling ‒ the defence of our nation and the peace 
of the world. We are applying the power of our country to ensure our security and to 
serve the cause of justice, and we will prevail.   [cheers and applause] 
 
Ware: And yet, apparently, to secure that peace, we may now have to engage in war 
over several decades. After Iraq other states deemed by America to be a threat to its 
security could be in the firing line. But first the face of the Middle East has to be 
changed according to a former CIA director close to the hawks in the Bush 
Administration.  
 
James Woolsey: Director, CIA, 1993-95: This Fourth World War I think will last 
considerably longer than either World Wars One or Two did for us, hopefully not the 
full four plus decades of Cold War. 
 
Ware: If this apocalyptic vision is right, the stakes for what George Bush and Tony 
Blair have embarked on could not be higher. 
 
Finishing with some scepticism but simultaneously a sense of urgency, with the overt 
reference to ‘high stakes’ we return to the gamble template. We can also see traces of the 
ways in which such scepticism is neutralised. By which I mean, with the above statement(s), 
Ware seems to be more concerned with the time this conflict might take to ‘secure the peace’, 
as opposed to examining (too much) the extent to which ‘we’ ought not to be there in the first 
place. Taking a gamble (with ‘our’ peace), foregrounding an ‘apocalyptic vision’ focusing 
intently on strategy in the heat of battle, is insufficient.  
John Ware investigates how the British and American war strategy has been tested in 
the heat of battle. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm) 
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Much of the action as it unfolded on screen was devoted to precisely examining ‘how the 
British and American war strategy has been tested’ and is perhaps the most revealing insight. 
Such ‘testing (of) the war strategy’ more clearly adheres to the WPM than almost any other 
signifier. The above description, the contents of the broadcast, and the analysis undertaken 
here are the clearest sign yet that Panorama: The Race to Baghdad is, in those moments at 
least, the paradigmatic example of conflict-phase broadcasting. The focus on strategy in 
action, at the expense of developed, geo-political context is emblematic of conflict phase 
broadcasting. Combining a plethora of archive footage, and of legitimated elite political 
actors (Primary Definers) the focus on strategy (of conflict), the procedures of war, and, what 
is more, that the focus will be on ‘the heat of battle’ demonstrates that this particular 
discursive approach generates much more ‘heat’ (of battle) than light (of analysis). This 
approach though, does lead neatly to the final broadcast in the conflict-phase. 
5.9 Panorama: The Battle for Basra 
As Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future, Panorama’s Jane Corbin reports from 
Basra on how the people of Iraq’s second city are beginning to shape the future of 
their shattered city and their broken lives. With exclusive access to the British troops 
in Basra, the programme also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi 
citizens and the military battle by British forces to take control of a city which the 
coalition never expected to have to have to fight for. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2950827.stm 
 
As the summary paragraph makes clear, ‘Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future’ the extent 
to which such uncertainty can be said to be in any way linked to ‘our’ invasion is debatable. 
However, hope for a different approach, one that places Iraqi subjects themselves at the 
centre of the narrative, and concomitantly at the centre and as the central actors of Iraq’s 
(currently) ‘uncertain future’ lies in Panorama’s promise that ‘Jane Corbin reports from 
Basra on how the people of Iraq’s second city are beginning to shape the future of their 
shattered city and their broken lives’. This may well (again) provide some evidence and hope 
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that the Panorama broadcasts of the conflict-phase take seriously the need to ‘to broaden the 
character and range of its representations in tune with new social and political times’ (Born 
2005: 376). Panorama, as ever, foreground their status as the broadcaster of note and of 
record, by reference to their ability to gain access to, and therefore offer voice to, Primary 
Definers ‘exclusive access to the British troops in Basra’. However, the claim that ‘the 
programme also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi citizens and the 
military battle by British forces to take control of a city’ must be critically interrogated. For 
the summary paragraph makes no claims to have access to said ‘Iraqi citizens’ but only to 
have ‘exclusive access to British troops’, therefore, the story of Basra, the story of The Battle 
for Basra, looks, from this reading to remain in the ‘exclusive’ hands (through the eyes) of 
‘our boys’. If the story is constrained and contained from within the purview of ‘British 
Troops in Basra’, then the ability to locate Iraqi citizens at the centre would seem to be 
curtailed by the standard, journalistic, narrative and televisual practices detailed and 
documented in this research. 
5.10 Panorama: The Battle for Basra – A Restoration of Order Tale 
Following the tradition outlined above for Panorama: The Race to Baghdad, the lead-in to 
the Panorama: The Battle for Basra contains some problematic though lexically interesting 
statements. The brief statement regarding the programme that is about to follow helps frame 
the broadcast. 
Coming up, Panorama looks at the uncertainties that lie ahead, as British troops try to 
restore order in post-war Iraq. (BBC News 27 April 2003) 
 
Immediately striking is the Lexically and Linguistically interesting and problematic couched 
notion of ‘uncertainties’ While acknowledging that war and conflict does indeed produce a 
degree of uncertainty, the extent to which ‘our troops’ might be the partial cause of said 
‘uncertainty’ remains, in this brief introduction, entirely Lexically Absented. This particular 
narrative is further augmented by the statement ‘as British troops try to restore order’. This 
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particular Lexical Choice is revealing. British military forces are deliberately characterised as 
having good intent. They are not there as an overt threat (to ‘order’ no matter how brutal or 
ambiguous such order might have been) or to Iraqi citizens, but, as Robin Nelson puts it when 
discussing the classic narrative structure of Propp’s schema, as heroes ‘restoring order’. ‘Our 
troops’ are forces intent on the restoration of order. By the use of the verb to ‘try’ they are 
designated the role of those making a laudable effort. What are they trying to achieve? The 
‘restoration of order’ To ‘restore’ is to renovate, to rebuild, revive, revitalise and improve. It 
is something laudable; the ‘order’ is similarly praiseworthy or desirable and also fits neatly 
the ‘law and order’ frame established in some of the pre-conflict broadcasts (see Chapter 4). 
So in this context, instead of an (arguably illegal) invasion of a sovereign nation, thus 
producing ‘uncertainty’ and disorder, ‘we’, ‘our’ troops are over-coded, given positive 
Attributes, Over-Lexicalised and engaged in a laudable endeavour that is oriented around the 
discourse of law and order, and by the motivation to restore, resuscitate, revivify and improve 
‘normal life’. The above analysis demonstrates the extent to which ‘our’ illegality, 
complicity, or causal link with the unfolding disaster(s) in Iraq is (largely) absented. 
Absented in favour of a representation of conflict told through (and represented by) ‘Our 
boys’. Lexically and discursively, an invasion of a sovereign nation by foreign armed forces, 
with the concomitant ‘uncertainties’ such an invasion produces; and subsequently framing the 
ongoing war, ‘our’ place and role within it, as somehow a ‘restoration of order’ is replete 
with problems. That no such ambiguity or problems are presumed or foregrounded in the 
representation(s) is indicative of the discursive frame. The phrase ‘…in a post-war Iraq’ is 
also significant. Given that the war was still ongoing (until 1 May 2003), this edition of 
Panorama (broadcast 27 April 2003) is already looking ahead to what is to follow. 
 But what (or who?) are the British soldiers fighting, and what for? Some clues, via a 
subtle ‘call-back’, arises in the excerpt below. Given the repeated associations with Hitler 
255 
 
from the pre-conflict phase sample, then, via Straw’s earlier evocation of Nazi Germany, via 
the references to ‘appeasers’ in Panorama: Blair’s War, a further Hitler frame, while (sadly, 
journalistically) not incongruous, is highly contentious and problematic. This 
characterisation, this narrative orientation is again referenced here in this Panorama 
broadcast from later in the conflict phase: 
Corbin: The imam of a local mosque however can’t run a city the size of Basra.  The 
Ba’ath Party dominated almost every aspect of life here as the Nazis once did in 
Germany.  It will prove almost impossible to root the Ba’ath out completely. 
(P:TBFB) 
 
Within a text that is, arguably, one of the most critically interrogative, or at least reasonably 
nuanced and ‘balanced’ within the sample, this reference to the Nazi’s, while brief, does go 
some way to reproducing the logic, the discourse the pre-conflict phase broadcasts 
established. Over-Lexicalising the previous ‘regime’ by way of reference to the Nazis, while 
over-Attributing positive characteristics to ‘our troops’ in the valid endeavour to ‘restore 
order’ assists in the Ideological Squaring. The visuals used in this section go some way to 
viscerally demonstrating the pressures the coalition troops are under. At this point in the 
broadcast the viewers have been alongside the soldiers, as such we have, vicariously at least, 
experienced the real dangers they face. Lest the visuals not be sufficient, evoking (again) the 
sceptre of Hitler or ‘the Nazis’ might just do the trick.  This short statement certainly fits the 
template developed over the pre-conflict sample, then repeated in the conflict phase (in 
P:BW) and as such, it contributes to the overall discourse, epistemology and characterisation.  
 As was detailed in Chapter 4, another significant and further contribution to the 
narrative developed over the course of the pre-conflict sample was the repeated references 
(across the sample) to Halabja. Halabja functions like journalistic, Lexical and multi-modal 
short-hand for Saddam’s brutality. The town, and what it evokes makes a small but telling 
return here: 
 Corbin: Otherwise known as 'Chemical Ali' for arranging the poison  
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 gassing of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. (P:TRTB) 
We then return to the streets of Basra with the troops. Post-battle when the troops with whom 
she is embedded have finished an encounter with a group of militias, Corbin sums up their 
motivations as follows:  
Corbin: It seems some of them will do anything to prevent Basra getting back to 
normal again. (P:TBFB ) 
 
The statement by Corbin is significant as much for what it conceals as for what it reveals. The 
mark against which ‘normal’ is measured is absent, what precisely is ‘normal’ for Basra? 
Given that the so-called ‘Mahdi Army’ represent the remnants of ‘Saddam’s militia’ one 
could make the argument that ‘normal’ is in fact a society and city dominated by the local 
militia. Here it is not my intention to ascribe positive values or less still, virtues to said 
militia, but to outline the extent to which the broadcast provides no reasonable measure 
against which the viewer can judge ‘normality’ or the ‘normal’ life of Basra’s citizens. Why 
this is important though is because this frame is one in which the British troops are 
(re)present(ed) as those fighting the good fight, for the restoration of ‘normal’ life.  
Corbin: The breakdown of law and order in Basra is likely to last some time.  It risks 
getting British troops bogged down in peacekeeping duties in the city. (P:TBFB ) 
 
The above statement addressed to the audience at home is revealing. Once again, the 
assumptions are that the objective is that of ‘law and order’ and once this is restored, perhaps 
for ‘peacekeeping’. I ought to (again) make it clear that I do not doubt that for those troops 
‘on the ground’ ‘in the line of fire’ such policy objectives might very well be the goal. I 
cannot know different, therefore, I, too, might assume this to be the case. However, should 
this be the assumption of the critical Current Affairs broadcast strand in the UK? As the 
frame, it does rather replicate or repeat government sound-bites or government statements as 
the objectives, with no recourse to more closely examine other possible motives and 
explanations. Of course framing the current conflict in such a way, ascribing such laudable 
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aims to the Iraq conflict is far easier to achieve when the ongoing conflict is depicted by 
repeated representations of coalition troops. In critical discourse and narrative structure terms, 
‘Our boys’ are represented heroically, they are Over-Lexicalised, and certainly afforded 
positive Attributes as ‘peacekeepers’ and as ‘restorers of order’. We are not in a position to 
critique the motivations of individual (or even collective) soldiers doing an almost 
impossible, and certainly terrifying ‘job’. The focus on action, and on sympathetically 
framed, recognisable characters as the narrators of conflict allows the Panorama broadcast(s) 
to elide wider critical interrogation of policy, to absent wider ideological contexts.  
 That the British soldiers are represented sympathetically is, to some extent 
problematic but I ought to foreground the fact that I do not doubt for a moment a) the real and 
present danger said British soldiers faced and were involved in and b) that the actual 
motivations of many of the individuals represented are in fact laudable, or certainly more 
innocent than the anti-war rhetoric of this thesis might presume. The point is not that their 
(soldiers) individual motivations, nor that Panorama journalists’ motivations are malign in 
intent, or anything less than ethical, within the context of conflict, but that there are 
assumptions that Western forces and political elites are always motivated by benign 
intentions. So here individual motivations are foregrounded but only through the discursive 
lens of them having benign intentions and positive impact. In this way then, the functional 
honorifics afforded the coalitions soldiers, the ethics of their mission, coded through 
individual performance, and the benign motivations here stand-in for, or might be said to be 
representative of the wider political context.  
 Representing the always more innocent, human(e), characterful and fully rendered 
troops as essentially ‘good’ here serves the wider political elites rather well. In fact, we can 
refer back to the first broadcast in the conflict phase sample, Panorama: Blair’s War. In 
Panorama: Blair’s War the protestors did actually find some limited discursive space. One 
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may (have) be(en) against the conflict, but look at these hardworking soldiers, trying their 
best in testing circumstances, their role in the ‘new Iraq’ is beyond critique. Within the 
context of this sample from the conflict phase, even the coalition politicians and more senior 
military personnel are framed positively. The structural conditions of geo-politics are 
overlooked, the structural, epistemological, discursive conditions of Panorama, the very 
practises of the discourse make it seemingly very difficult to frame and narrate the story in 
any other way. It is this that is intensely problematic and does not accurately represent the 
geo-political context; nor does it hold power to account, notionally, surely, one of the 
purported claims made for, of and by Panorama. 
On occasion there are some interesting Lexical Choices when describing coalition actions: 
Corbin: The war in Basra had pitted British troops against a regime prepared to hold 
its own people hostage in order to survive. The coalition targeted the regime's nerve 
centre, the Ba’ath Party, Saddam's henchmen and his loyalist militias. (P:TBFB) 
  
In the above statement from Jane Corbin the terms or frames of conflict are markedly 
different for the different national actors. Note that the ‘coalition targeted the regime’s nerve 
centre’. The explicit reference to ‘targeting’ is entirely consistent with discourse of Western 
Current Affairs broadcast journalism. Targeting is a text-book example of Nominalisation. It 
is even euphemistic and might be what one would describe as a fetishization, an Over-
Lexicalisation of technology. Coalition troops ‘target’ (with precision), the ‘henchmen and 
loyalist militias’ do no such thing. All such examples place distance between the agents 
undertaking action(s) and the actions themselves. The use of the term target appears 
repeatedly in Panorama: The Race to Baghdad, some examples are below: 
Corbin: Major Lindsay MacDuff showed me what lay beneath an anonymous looking 
block targeted by coalition bombers during the battle to take the city…  
 
Corbin: A British drone, a pilotless plane with a camera was called in to observe the 
target.  American planes armed with jadams – bunker busting munitions – were 
scrambled overhead.  
 





In these examples, even while ascribing agency to ‘us’, using the Transitive form, the actions 
are Nominalised and afforded noble, or at least well-intentioned motivations. If the WPM is 
applicable in this context, then one would expect to find a degree of nuance, of self-
reflection, examination and regret within the text of Panorama: The Battle for Basra. 
Reflections and anticipation are also factored in to the WPM ‘the international reaction, and 
anticipation of war’s aftermath’. In fact, as expected, there is some evidence that this 
broadcast does have some critical, reflective practice embedded in its narrative. As in the 
previous example from the conflict phase, the overwhelming discourse is of ‘a just-war’ or at 
the very least, the discourse that locates and characterises ‘our troops’ as demonstrably, 
inarguably the archetypal ‘good guys’, is present. However, there are notable moments in 
which these assumptions are, if not challenged or scrutinised as such, then at least some of 
the material effects of policy and actions are at least accounted for and fiercely critiqued. In 
the most moving section of the broadcast, despite the challenges the discursive, journalistic 
and televisual logic imposes on her, Jane Corbin demonstrates that she remains a critical and 
sensitive Current Affairs broadcast journalist: 
Abed Hassan Hamooudi: All the bricks though reinforced concrete fell on the family 
and a heap of dust was about 1 metre high. They were all there. What I did, I managed 
luckily to save the life of my daughter with her two sons, four years and 6 months.  
The third one was killed with his grandmum.  I managed to remove the bricks from 
them because I heard a noise ‘ba, ba, ba’ which means dad, dad. So I tried my…you 
know…my case at that time, at the time I was removing the bricks, another rocket fell 
there.  Luckily I escaped a disaster otherwise I should have been killed. 
Corbin: Ten members of the family from three generations of Hamooudis died that 
night.  Dina's infant son was killed, her mother and her sister and a beloved niece 
Zanab, on the threshold of a bright future.  
Dina:  Zanab 19 years old, she’s in pharmacy.  
 
Corbin: She was a pharmacy student?  
Dina: Yes, the first year. 
Corbin: And she was in the house that night? 
Dina: Yes, she was in the same room with me.  
Corbin: Yes, and your own young son was there. 




Dina: And my sister and her daughter … little daughter. 
Corbin: Mr Hamooudi's oldest son, a doctor, identified his mother, his brother, sister 
and four of his five children amongst the dead, the youngest, Zena, just 8 years old.   
The smell of death hung over the bomb site six days later. Coalition forces had yet to 
investigate the scene of a bombing they claimed was carefully targeted to avoid 
civilian casualties. (P:TBFB) 
 
 
The above section is perhaps the most moving example in the entire sample collated and 
analysed throughout the course of this research. The images and words spoken allow, even 
encourage empathic identification. Perhaps signifying their level of education, the characters 
represented here speak, through tears, in halting, though perfectly understandable English. 
Granted the televisual and discursive space, their words and the multi-modal representation 
speaks volumes. Notable is that in the context of a Panorama broadcast from the conflict 
phase, that has, up until this point, chiefly concerned itself with tactics, strategy, the 
procedural elements and the difficult conditions facing ‘our troops’, granting such authorial 
legitimacy, such subjectivity to those ‘killed’ by ‘our own’ troops is noteworthy and laudable. 
Disappointingly, perhaps it remains so noteworthy precisely because the presence of such a 
representation is itself a rarity. Nevertheless, and even though the above excerpt does not 
actually amount to a rigorous interrogation of the Western forces’ motivations, nor does it 
challenge the logic and discourse of benevolent intent, it does at least ably demonstrate that a 
more interesting and challenging contextual focus, a fully developed, more rounded sense of 
characterisation of, until now ‘Othered’, subjectivity is possible. 
 As befits the analytical model, and as importantly, as most academic scholarship on 
media coverage of conflict attests, there is an intense focus on the procedural; the actual 
micro-action. The following statement by Corbin is in that tradition. It refers back and returns 




Corbin: …the real battle for Basra, to ensure security and foster a Government that 
Iraqi’s trust is still being waged on the streets. (P:TBFB) 
 
While this is not surprising, it is nonetheless illuminating with regards the specific orientation 
of the narrative. In the context of Panorama: The Battle for Basra, locating the context as one 
of helping to create ‘a Government that Iraqi’s trust’ helps us understand, what in other, 
television drama context one would refer to as, the casting process.  That an invading force 
can help produce or sustain ‘a Government that Iraqi’s trust’ is indicative of the ways in 
which the coalition troops are cast, i.e. (echoing Cordingley’s ‘trying to be helpful’ P:TRTB) 
not as an invading force but as there to help. Once again, it is not the goal here to suggest that 
the individual troops on the ground, the individual subjects with their own motivations, 
desires and characteristics are motivated by malign intentions. More that the narrative and 
discourse in which Panorama: The Battle for Basra, by way of dramatically rendered 
repetition of archetypal character, narrative orientation and the institutional(ised), discursive 
practises, locates them, and their ‘Mission’ in specific ways and using specific terms. In the 
hands of Panorama: The Battle for Basra, the Iraq ‘mission’ simply becomes a story of 
valiant even heroic troops as they try to ‘restore the city’s functions’ (P:TBFB) transforming 
‘from a brutal regime to a democracy’ (P:TBFB). Again, this may well be the motivation of 
the troops, we could even (generously) posit that it may even be the motivation of the 
political elites that sent their troops into battle in the first instance. However, ascribing such 
values, un-problematically, to both political and military actors, without recourse to wider 
geo-political and discursive considerations is, contrary to the claims made by and for 
Panorama, not sufficient, not critical or interrogative. In fact, one could argue, to simply 
‘take it as read’ that the policy goals of the US and UK political elite narratives, simply are 
the goals, is not journalism but stenography. Such a position is tantamount to Western (neo-
imperialist) propaganda. It works by slow, gradual repetition of the form, of the narrative, of 
the characters drawn and cast within the series of broadcasts: ‘of course ‘Our Boys’ are the 
262 
 
good guys’. Despite the one notable exception above, and even here, the deaths of innocent 
civilians are Over-Lexicalised and simultaneously Lexically Absented, and framed as 
mistakes, or collateral damage from a ‘targeted’ military strike (P:TBFB) before swiftly 
moving on. Rarely is there any slippage from this central organising logic, rarely are there 
opportunities to voice, let alone challenge, the ‘logic’ of benign intervention, and Panorama 
rarely provides the journalistic, narrative, discursive space or resources with which to do so.  
5.11 Concluding Remarks 
Within the text of these, at times, critical broadcasts there are a number of interesting 
Nominalisations and Functional Honorifics. In particular, attention should be drawn to the 
extent to which, even here, with some overt acknowledgement that the US/UK coalition 
troops might not be seen as ‘liberators’, there is still an in-built assumption of moral 
certitude. The critical commentary is still coded as within the frames of benign intervention. 
Those casting doubt on that actual assumption are often framed as fanatics, or, at least, as 
misguided. Many of the ‘mistakes’ are here framed, coded and represented merely as a matter 
of lack of proper planning or ‘mistakes’. 
 Within the texts of the Panorama conflict-phase sample, and beyond, it is rare to 
find any critical commentary beyond the tactical. Certainly after Blair’s War, the focus turns 
to getting the job done. Or, in the words of John Ware: ‘now that the war has started, the time 
taken to finish it is critical’ (P:TRTB) and any critical comment that does arise or is present 
tends to be oriented around the tactical or practical difficulties encountered by the coalition 
troops. The focus is on the efficacy (or not) of particular military tactics as opposed the 
legitimacy of the war itself. This is reflected in (or perhaps, more accurately, Panorama 
reflects back) the wider political (Westminster) sphere. This is essentially, the Liberal 
Democrat (UK political party) position of being against the war…until it begins, after which 
support for ‘our brave boys’ takes precedent. 
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 Corbin: Unless they have security soon, people here may well turn on those who  
 came to liberate them. (P:TRTB) 
 
The above statement by Jane Corbin serves as the final word in Panorama: The Race to 
Baghdad, in many ways it is the most fitting conclusion imaginable, it certainly broadly 
captures the conflict phase discourse of the broadcast sample. Despite some, on occasion, 
overt critical excerpts, sequences, sections and comments that appear, that do indeed cast 
some critical eye over proceedings, the overall discourse is, again, that the intentions were, 
and remain ‘liberatory’. To use the phrasing favoured by Paul Bremer (see Chapter 6) the 
Iraq War is a ‘noble exercise’. 
 The dominant themes to emerge in this, the conflict-phase were: 
1) A focus on action at the expense of deliberation on policy objective or the rights and 
wrongs of the conflict. 
2) Deliberations that were present, tended to be narrated and framed through the 
dramatic rendering of character (and characterisation) of ‘our’ political elites, and/or 
soldiers. 
As has been stated by others, it is often the case that once war is underway, the explicit media 
focus does tend to be on the action. However, what marks this research out is the extent to 
which, using both a CDA frame, and by examining the dramatic television storytelling codes 
and conventions, the ‘war story’ is able to be safely contained within the rational, and 
human(e) deliberations (through archetype and character) on ‘our’ side, and on the continuing 
demonization (through one-dimensional caricature, Over-Lexicalisation) of the ‘Other’ 
(enemy) side. When assessed against one another, there is a clear Ideological Squaring 
deployed. 
 There is little to suggest that the conflict phase broadcasts contain much in the way 
of overt critical or ideological, counter-hegemonic critical interrogation. Not much that casts 
critical scrutiny on the motivations. The scrutiny that is present contents itself with a 
sometimes-fierce critical perspective on some of the tactics, the conflict strategy, latterly, 
regarding the planning for the post-conflict Iraq, and in one particular notable example, the 
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deaths of innocent Iraqi civilians. However, representation of said deaths, sensitively 
represented in Panorama: The Race to Baghdad is a rarity and, as discussed, does not 
necessarily puncture the assumptions of benevolent (if mistaken in this instance) intentions. 
 I would suggest that the reason(s) this sample of conflict phase broadcasts are able 
to appear critical lies in the fact that some considerable time, energy and resource is devoted 
to asking sometimes searching questions of some of the dramatically represented and cast 
high-profile elite military and political sources. These Primary Definers are subjected to 
critical scrutiny, to facing questions they might otherwise wish they did not have to answer. 
This is undoubtedly an urgently required, necessary task, and, in this guise, within narrow 
parameters, Panorama does indeed demonstrate its immense value as a public service 
broadcaster. Elements contained in this sample are indicative of some of the best examples of 
Current Affairs broadcasting, and it would be intellectually dishonest to claim otherwise. 
However, the extent to which Panorama (too) narrowly frames its critique is the focus of this 
research. The critique, scepticism and criticism that does appear is a) too often, only a small 
part of the overall discourse; b) as such, the wider critical interrogation is unable to be 
sustained; c) the criticism that emerges does so in very specific forms and through specific 
characters; d) the overall discourse is inarguably that the coalition troops, whom the conflict 
phase broadcasts tend to follow, or with whom the journalists are embedded, are, in the words 
of Patrick Cordingley ‘trying to be helpful’ (Cordingley P:TRTB).  When regret or, more 
likely, concerns are raised, these are narrated either by high-profile already legitimated, 
already cast as pensive and fundamentally ethical, Primary Definers. Or conversely, when not 
Primary Definers, i.e. when not represented by those Primarily Defining the conflict and its 
rationale, the concerns are represented through the characters having to deal with the 
consequences of those (unforeseen) circumstances. When such ‘characters’ are represented, 
in the spirit of the research undertaken here, they tend to be represented as archetypal ‘good 
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guys’ or heroes, and, what is more, in the classic realist narrative structure, undertaking a 
near-impossible task of ‘restoring order’. Of course one should not overlook the very real 
possibility that the viewer watching the events unfold, seeing the dangers faced by ‘our boys’ 
would not then turn their critical attention to those that sent them to war in the first place. 
However, a) we are repeatedly assured that the architects of the conflict are motivated by 
good intentions; b) even possible criticism of the ways in which the war is being pursued, 
does not amount to a critical interrogation of policy, of objectives. Most importantly for this 
research, such critique does not constitute a fundamental rejection (or even questioning) of 
the thesis of benign intervention.  
 Furthermore, some of the criticism that does emerge, and does, at times, take 
centre-stage, also partially fits the template of the WPM. The difference here is that, perhaps 
indicating the swiftness of the conflict (officially at least) the move to Point 4:  
Following the war, journalists’ reaction and reflection on various governmental 
restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented), 
 
and Point 6:  
  
Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively and 
often lead to the widespread conclusion that perhaps the war was unnecessary, other 
options were available, and that the price was too high. (Altheide and Grimes 2005) 
 
..are present much earlier than the WPM would ordinarily suggest. Perhaps the drama, the 
dramatic templates of the Iraq war means even media coverage demands a quicker narrative 
(and journalistic) closure.  
 The principle findings here are that the discourse is too narrowly set, framed, 
established and reproduced. Criticism is allowable but not so much that the fundamental 
motivations are called into question. It is the particular focus on drama, and forms ordinarily 
expected to be found within the forms and genres of fictionalised television texts that 
reproduces and solidifies this narrow frame. Panorama represents the conflict largely through 
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discourse of the realist narrative structure, deploys archetypes of ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’, and 
consistently engages in Over-Determining, Over-Lexicalising oppositional elements. Over-
emphasising ‘our’ goodness and simultaneously over-determining their ‘bad guy’ 
characterisation, in other words, by engaging in Ideological Squaring. By ascribing specific 
values and Attributes onto the characters featured in the sample, evil, barbarous, malign, 
uncontained, demonised for ‘them’; ethical, human, humane, selfless, and benign for ‘us’ that 
the story of Iraq is communicated. It is only through these explicitly televisual forms of over-
coding of character, of over-determined representation, narrative (and generic) coherence that 
the story of Iraq, and the story of conflict in Iraq is communicated to an audience, and 
communicates in such a way as to render critical interrogation of the fundamentals of benign 





Tying Up the Loose Ends 
 
6.1 The Post-conflict Phase 
As with Chapters 4 and 5, each of the three broadcasts in the post-conflict-phase will be 
analysed in chronological order. The discursive, thematic, journalistic, televisual and multi-
modal forms and tropes present in each of the three examples from the post-conflict phase 
sample will be subject to scrutiny and analysis in turn. It is only at the conclusion of the 
chapter, where the analysis is then really fully drawn together to assess the extent to which 
the post-conflict phase sample does amount to a discursive formation, and an epistemology of 
Iraq, and what this might be. 
 Again, the analysis will examine the extent to which consistent themes are present. 
However, consistent themes, certainly consistently represented themes, in this chapter, were 
not quite as obviously present, meaning the overall discourse here was, at first, more difficult 
to discern. Unlike in the previous chapters, and as was particularly the case in Chapter 4, the 
post-conflict phase sample, while having some generic and discursive similarities, also have 
some marked differences. As previously, the temporal separation ensures some thematic and 
analytical consistency, however, an additional rationale present in this chapter is based on the 
fact even though the Panorama episodes were broadcast after ‘Major combat operations in 
Iraq have ended’ (George Bush, Panorama: Saddam On the Run, P:SOTR) thus generically 
or discursively concerned with ‘post-conflict’ discourse, each broadcast has a quite different 
‘story to tell’. That each different broadcast has a different story to tell is related to both the 
wider social and political context; and to the journalistic and televisual contexts that shape 
their formation and dissemination. Though wider political, social and journalistic contexts 
(for instance, that Panorama continues to draw the majority of its source material from 
Primary Definer, legitimated sources) means all phases of the conflict are, to some extent, 
bound by these organisational principles, the different story angle is particularly pronounced 
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in the post-conflict phase. Interestingly, each programme was also concerned with 
completing the storyline(s) first encountered in the pre-conflict phase broadcasts. The 
examples are concerned with the details after conflict has officially ceased, therefore the 
focus of the Panorama texts cited here tend to take their lead from, and thus respond to, the 
official wider geo-political circumstances. The extent to which this is the case can be seen 
fairly explicitly in the summary paragraphs.  
6.2 Aspects of the War Programming Model  
As in previous chapters, some elements of the WPM are applicable. In the post-conflict 
phase, elements of Point 3:  
3.  Coverage of subsegments of current war, using the best visuals available to capture 
the basic scenes and themes involving the battle lines, the home front, the media 
coverage, the international reaction, and anticipation of war’s aftermath. 
 
are combined with the elements of those below: 
 
5. Following the war, journalists’ reaction and reflection on various governmental 
restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented). 
6 Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively and 
often lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other options 
were available, and that the price was too high. All of this will be useful for the 
coverage of the next war. 
7 For the next war, return to step 1. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622) 
 
The fact that elements of Point 3 are still present in this, the post-conflict-phase sample is 
indicative of the fact that, even here, in ‘post-conflict’ (sic) Iraq, the conflict continued for a 
number of years. The first broadcast in the post-conflict phase is, Panorama: The Price of 
Victory. 
6.3 Panorama: The Price of Victory 
Every week in Iraq coalition soldiers are being wounded and killed in a conflict which 
is crippling the reconstruction effort. For three long, hot and increasingly violent 
summer months, a Panorama team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad, day in 
day out recording scenes of a city still at war. This powerful documentary examines 
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the nature of the resistance in Iraq, gaining access to American troops as they hunt 
down paramilitaries. 
This is a story of men who came to rebuild a country but who found themselves 
sucked into an urban guerrilla war instead. This is a story also about Baghdad’s five 
million Iraqis whose gratitude over liberation is in danger of being squandered amidst 
a deepening unease over occupation. Throughout the programme Panorama 
scrutinises Iraq’s new ‘occupiers’, questioning whether the world’s most powerful 
nation is up to the task of rebuilding a country as effectively as it can defeat it in war. 
As the reconstruction process falters, Panorama is invited to quiz the key players at 
the heart of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer and the former 
New York cop and so-called ‘Baghdad Terminator’ Bernie Kerik. Kicking off the 
2003 autumn run in Panorama’s 50th year, this film also features the last television 
interview with UN Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, just 48 hours before his 
office was destroyed in a car bomb attack. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3097864.stm) 
As we can see from the summary paragraph, the first in the series, Panorama: The Price of 
Victory (P:TPOV) like those found in the conflict phase, tells the stories of battle; focusing on 
the conditions faced by the troops but with the ‘recently ended’ (sic) conflict still fresh in the 
memory. The Transitive verb is used when referring to deaths of coalition soldiers, troops are 
‘being killed’ (agency attached to the ‘enemy’) on a regular basis and this, we are told is 
‘crippling the reconstruction process’. Such a statement of course makes specific assumptions 
regarding ‘our’ troops, but, more urgently, frames the ongoing conflict in benign terms. That 
‘we’ are involved in a ‘reconstruction process’ is the stated policy objective of the political 
elites that took ‘us’ to war in the first place. Not subjecting such assumptions and assertions 
to critique is to effectively perform a vital Public Relations (PR) exercise on behalf of said 
political elites. Even when ‘gaining access to American troops’ and ‘invited to quiz the key 
players at the heart of the new regime’ to scrutinise ‘Iraq's new “occupiers”’, the assumption 
that the motivation is ‘rebuilding a country as effectively as it can defeat it in war’ remains in 
place, a taken for granted, common-sense assertion. In short, ‘our’ ‘reconstruction’ 
(paraphrased differently via the equally benign assumptions ‘This is a story of men who came 
to rebuild a country’) is framed here as the motivation. In such a context, particularly when ‘a 
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Panorama team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad’ alongside the ‘men who came to 
rebuild a country’ mounting a forceful (or even muted) critique of original policy objectives 
and motivations is difficult to sustain and represent.  
 Once again, Panorama makes much of its access to high-profile sources ‘invited to 
quiz the key players at the heart of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer 
and the former New York cop and so-called ‘Baghdad Terminator’ Bernie Kerik’ the extent 
to which said sources Primarily Define the frame, the narrative orientation, the context, and 
through which dramatic means is a key part of the analysis. Use of the term ‘quiz’ is also 
problematic insofar as the term is more neutered than one might hope for. Surely when 
successfully securing access to key Primary Definers and decision-makers, a more forceful 
and forensic term might be applicable. ‘Quiz’ connotes something more playful. The equally 
characterised soldiers (‘gaining access to American troops’) ensures that this ‘powerful 
documentary’ is designed to tell a dramatic and emotionally resonant story of ‘three long, hot 
and increasingly violent summer months’, alongside (or even as part of) coalition troops. 
That the Panorama team are proximate to the coalition troops is, in practical and safety 
terms, understandable. It echoes the analysis of Lewis and Brookes: 
The Pentagon’s embed (sic) strategy was ingenious because it increased rather than 
limited access to information. (Lewis and Brookes in Zelizer and Allan 2004: 299) 
 
However, also documented by Lewis and Brookes, this ‘embedded’ nature potentially 
compromises Panorama’s ability to provide a critical and impartial version of post-conflict 
Iraq.  
By giving broadcasters access to highly newsworthy action footage from the frontline, 
they were encouraging a focus on the actions of US and British troops, who would be 
seen fighting a short and successful war. The story was about winning and losing, 
rather than a consideration of context in which the war was fought. (Lewis and 




This frame means the post-conflict ‘reconstruction’ is the (only) goal and motivation, it is 
certainly the dominant frame on offer in this broadcast, and that the troops undertaking it 
simply are a benign force for good.  
6.4  Panorama: The Price of Victory - The Dramatic Resonance of the Soldiers’ 
Stories 
 
So Panorama: The Price of Victory is the story of conflict and of rebuilding in a post-conflict 
(sic) Iraq, it is essentially the ‘story’ of how coalition troops set about rebuilding, restoring 
order, or, in a phrase that really outlines Panorama’s approach, it is the story of how the US 
(and UK) forces attempt to ‘turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle East’ (Andy 
Davies P:TPOV). ‘Turning Iraq into a beacon of democracy’ is some claim. It is Over-
Lexicalised, the troops are afforded positive Attributes which is in-line with the stated policy 
goals of the political elites that sent the troops to war. Surely a critical Current Affairs 
broadcast ought to be in the business of forensically challenging said stated aims rather than 
reproducing them as ‘common-sense’ and unproblematic.  
 One of the principle weapons in the Panorama armoury is the use of dramatic 
characterisation. Telling the story of post-conflict Iraq is, at times, effectively ‘outsourced’ to 
those on the front-line. This particular trope is particularly acute in Panorama: The Price of 
Victory though other sporadic examples also appear in P:SOTR 
Andy Davies: It is now July and attacks on coalition troops are averaging over 80 a 
week.  A soldier is being killed almost every day, and this more than two months 
after President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. (P:TPOV)  
 
The above statement follows on from a full three minutes of explicit action. All the action is 
original film, shot for the purposes of this broadcast. Journalist Andy Davies, who has ‘been 
following a battalion of American troops’ (P:TPOV) and the Panorama crew capture 
previously unseen footage right in the centre of battle as it is ongoing. It is also a cross-over 
from the style of footage usually found in (Point 3 of) the conflict phase: ‘focus on action on 
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the frontline’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005). This type of footage does manage to viscerally 
communicate the danger and the unpredictability. That it is shot alongside (or as part of) the 
troops of the 437
th
 Battalion does give the viewers some insights into the battle(s) in Iraq. 
Having been on the same journey, placed inside the battle and having heard first-hand from a 
number of soldiers, including one solider directly addressing the camera as he explains the 
actions, feelings and emotions experienced, Davies’s statement regarding the death of 
soldiers is a clear and demonstrative example of the ‘risks’ ‘our troops’, those on ‘our side’, 
are taking.  
 Having witnessed the risks for ourselves, albeit only briefly over the previous three 
minutes, the phrase takes on a more emotionally resonant tone. The phrase ‘soldiers are 
killed’ while perfectly understandable, is also discursively and linguistically revealing. 
‘Killed’ of course ascribes agency, someone is responsible. As the statement is made the 
image is of a(n injured) US soldier being carried on a stretcher to a waiting helicopter. The 
use of the Transitive verb ‘killed’, though perhaps understandable and subtle, is important in 
this context.   
 This sort of Lexical Choice, to use the Transitive for ‘bad actions’ of the enemy 
combatants, the Over-Lexicalisation and Attributing good characteristics to ‘our’ troops, 
establishes the tone of Panorama: The Price of Victory. The images of injury and/or death, 
cut against the measured deliberations of the soldiers, is a multi-modal form of the 
Ideological Square. However, it is through the dramatized and highly emotional(ized) stories 
of character that the discourse of P:TPOV is most resonant and most obviously ideologically 
positioned.  By way of explanation, let us now examine one of the key characters to emerge 
in the text P:TPOV. Having already briefly seen him (in the opening few minutes) and heard 
reference to him, Reggie Harris is (re)introduced to the viewers at 19m… 
Davies: Are you any good at soccer? 
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Reggie Harris:  I’m pretty good, I’m average.  It’s a sport so I’m good at him.  
(laughs)  We’re going to head out now and get motivated.  Today we’re here to work 
on the football field and give these young kids like this a chance to play soccer.  
Okay?  That's what we’re here for, alright? 
Davies:  A lot of the reconstruction of Iraq has been painfully slow. Coalition 
attempts to revive the antiquated oil and electricity networks have been hindered by  
sabotage, and community projects like this are limited.  The soldiers know only too 
well that the longer they stay in any one place, the greater the risk of attack. 
Harris:  This is a project that was brought to my attention.  I'm kind of the sheriff, 
mayor, so to speak of this neighbourhood, me and my forces here.  So we decided to 
give something back to the community, and one project that we’re doing, we’ve 
called the Taskforce Neighbourhood Project, and what we’re calling it is ‘Completing 
a Kid's Dream’. We’re not only here to provide peace, security and civility, we’re also 
here to help rebuild Iraq. Will you present the first ball to the people.  
Soldier:  On behalf of the Iron Thunder Battalion and the Gators we hope the children 
can continue to be children and have fun. (P:TPOV) 
 
The above sequence is a moving account of Harris and his team as they attempt to rebuild 
this small part of Iraq and the means by which they are trying to do so. Through the universal 
language of sport, and ‘completing a kid’s dream’ it would be difficult to be overly critical or 
cynical about such a project. The project is presented (quite rightly) as a means to provide 
activity for children, to heal wounds, to assuage the local population and all through the 
universal language (activity) of sport and the always emotionally resonant signifier of ‘kids’. 
The point here is not necessarily to critique or criticise the actual idea or policy, which is of 
course beyond the remit and expertise of this research, but merely to assess the extent to 
which the sequence characterises Reggie Harris, in what way, and, as this research suggests, 
as a means to carry the story, orient the narrative arc in a particular direction. Harris is 
photogenic, frequently smiling and articulate. He is perhaps emblematic of all that the US 
imagines itself to be, in this respect, Reggie Harris is the perfect character onto which the US 
and UK (and Panorama) can project and inscribe their idea(l)s.   
 Harris appears throughout the episode, sometimes directly, other times more 
obliquely, by reference or seeing him ‘in shot’ in the background. Nevertheless, even when 
background, he remains a feature, a character in whom we are surely encouraged to identify, 
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and through which the story of Iraq in general, and The Price of Victory especially, is 
communicated. Towards the end of the broadcast, in perhaps one of the most emblematic 
examples of the emotionally resonant, characterisational and story-telling devices employed, 
Reggie Harris (re)appears directly. The sequence reintroduces him by way of his familial 
responsibility. We are informed:   
Davies: Reggie Harris and his men will be in Iraq until next year. Thousands of others 
who fought the war are still waiting to go home.  Today’s Pentagon favours a lean, 
high-tech military using the minimum number of troops.  But in Washington there are 
now those who are convinced that America came into Iraq with a force large enough 
to win the war but too small to secure the peace. A lot of these soldiers will be away 
from their families for at least a year. Reggie Harris is about to miss a milestone in the 
life of any first-time parent. 
Reggie Harris:  I miss em… you know… definitely, and I’m definitely going to miss 
his 6th birthday and I’m going to miss him going to school and getting first day… his 
first day at school now, and I told my wife if by some chance… you know… I don’t 
make it out of here, and I don’t make it back to him, you just keep telling him that 
daddy always told him to accomplish the mission, you know… and tell my soldiers 
that now. But I tell her to tell him that, and whatever he put his mind to, you know… 
he’ll accomplish it and he’ll do it regardless of what anybody else tell him, he’ll 
accomplish the mission (controlled voice – visible tears) you know… and I just… I 
just pray that I make it out and I can tell him that myself.  But he’s going to be alright. 
I know God is watching over him and he’s going to be alright.  He’s going to be fine. 
(P:TPOV) 
 
In some ways, the repeated representation of the emotionally literate Reggie Harris means he 
becomes the central character, the central military protagonist and, alongside Andy Davies, 
our guide through the narrative. The initial lengthy statement by Andy Davies (above) 
provides some critical comment. With the statement: ‘But in Washington there are now those 
who are convinced that America came into Iraq with a force large enough to win the war but 
too small to secure the peace’ (P:TPOV) certainly adopts a moderately sceptical or 
questioning position from which to mount some critique, and, what is more, some muted 
critique of policy, or at least of ‘planning’ for the post-conflict Iraq. Even within this muted 
critique though, the assumptions remain that the policy objective was to secure the peace. 
This is a very subtle difference, but it does reveal that within the journalistic discourse, while 
questions can be asked, on certain points, via positive Attributes inscribed onto ‘us, the 
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assumptions of benign intent remain irrevocable and established (‘common-sense’) facts. 
‘Securing the peace’, while perhaps not going well, is assumed to have always been the 
objective. The point here is not to suggest for a moment that securing the peace was not a key 
objective (certainly for those troops now inside Iraq), I cannot know, none of us can. 
However, the point is that a more critically interrogative, counter-hegemonic approach (that 
the Iraq war might be a war of imperialist ambition; for energy resource capture; or simply 
motivated out of a misguided sense of ‘post 9/11 revenge’ against the/any ‘Other’) is simply 
not present. So we are left with some muted critique of actions, of planning, of tactics, or of 
conflict and post-conflict strategy, but anything more ideological, more counter-hegemonic 
does not, indeed cannot, appear. 
 Towards the end of his commentary, the mood then shifts, Davies reintroduces us to 
the familiar, and now familial character of Reggie Harris. I would argue that there can be no 
other reason to include this section other than to help illustrate the story of conflict through 
the narrative and archetypal heroic characterisation of the fully rendered human subject. 
Something wholly denied official enemy combatants.  Enemy combatants are represented 
through Lexical and multi-modal Absence, or, more frequently, via an Over-Lexicalised 
demonized characterisation. ‘They’ tend to be ascribed negative Attributes, and afforded 
Transitive agency for their (mis)deeds. They are inescapably cast as the nefarious 
stereotypical villains of the piece. Reggie Harris is not just any US soldier, but one with 
whom we have become familiar, one named, a single tear rolling down his cheek clearly 
visible, Harris is afforded the luxury of characterisation, of character development, of 
narrative, and perhaps most importantly, he is given the narrative, discursive and televisual 
space in which to self-reflect. The questions he ponders and the stories he tells are powerful, 
familiar, familial and emotionally resonant ones, rich in dramatic, evocative human detail. 
This is, in many ways, equivalent to the middle-class subjects of reality television, afforded 
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time and space to discuss the ‘self-project’. The ways in which television provides them the 
space with which to reflect upon themselves, and become ‘subjects of value’ (Skeggs and 
Wood 2011) is significant. The telling of the self, the narrative allowances made for Western 
subjectivity is manifestly different to that made for the subjectivities of representationally 
designated ‘Others’. The dramatisation and performance of oneself is differently argued, 
textured and represented. Particularly when one takes account of the multi-modal forms of 
expression, the above scene from Panorama: The Price of Victory offers a stark and 
compelling reminder of the power of television to represent character in evocative and 
dramatic terms. In this example, Western subjects, represented by the charismatic, warm, 
emotionally literate, tearful and photogenic character, are afforded and given narrative and 
characterisational control, an emotional depth denied the excessive, immoral one-dimensional 
nature of the ‘Other’. Harris’s emotionally laden address is resonant of the different 
psychological depth, what Skeggs and Wood have termed ‘a subject of value with interiority 
and depth’ (Skeggs and Wood 2011). Western subjectivity is afforded this relative ‘luxury’ 
by representation in Panorama. To be a represented as a ‘subject of value’ is precious, it is 
conducive to and illustrative of the extent to which certain subjects are sympathetically 
framed, elevated to something recognisable, even ‘civilising’. In fact, coterminous with the 
overall discourse and epistemology, one could argue that the civilising function inscribed 
onto Reggie Harris here fits the geo-political narrative that ‘we’ are always a force for good, 
or that the soldiers are engaged in, what sociologist Norbert Elias would term a ‘civilising 
process’ (Elias 1976). Represented here by the charming and televisually appealing character 
of Reggie Harris, he thus stands-in for, and is emblematic of the civilising process of the Iraq 
conflict. The soldiers are a civilising force in the world. In the unfolding, dehumanising, 
brutal story of conflict, using the aesthetics and modes of dramatic television representation 
to humanise the subjects in the midst of an otherwise dehumanising environment, is a 
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resource upon which one can draw. In fact, it takes us back to McKee’s assertions regarding 
archetypes: ‘archetypal story unearths a universally human experience’ and that they can 
‘illuminate conflicts so true to humankind’ (McKee. 1999). In this example, Reggie Harris is 
the archetypal ‘good guy’. Such a resource though is not equally distributed and available to 
all, but only to those designated allies. In an act of now typical Ideological Squaring, the 
‘enemy’ is reduced to the ‘vivid but simple representation that reduces persons to sets of 
exaggerated, usually negative character traits’ (Hall 1997) of the stereotype. 
6.5 Dramatically Rendered Primary Definer(s) 
Signifying something of a middle-ground between the standard ‘Primary Definer’ and the 
more emotionally resonant central protagonist role that typifies the soldiers’ stories (see 
above), sits Bernard Kerik. At 6m through to 9m into Panorama: The Price of Victory, we 
are introduced to former New York City Police commissioner, Bernard ‘Bernie’ Kerik, now 
in his new role, described by Andy Davies as follows:  
Davies: ‘…nicknamed “The Baghdad Terminator” for his no-nonsense approach…(he 
is) effectively Iraq's temporary interior minister’ (P:TPOV) 
 
Kerik is stood overlooking and overseeing a cache of captured weapons and money. Stocky, 
balding, dressed in if not military fatigues, at least in the colours of said fatigues he looks 
every inch the solid and dependable strong man required for such tasks. Kerik explains that 
the cache is the result of operations and were;  
Kerik: …seized over the last day and a half from the same group of individuals.  This 
information was given to us, civilians came forward to talk about possible attacks on 
the coalition. (P:TPOV) 
 
The camera cuts from Kerik to a slow pan of various military hardware, mainly rifles, then 
back to Kerik stood alongside an Iraqi official. The camera then cuts back and lingers on the 
weapons cache. The diegesis then shifts, the sound is clearer, indicating a more formal 
recording while Kerik begins to explain the ‘mission’ as follows:  
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Kerik: The objective here is to create a free Iraq.  You don’t do that by cowering, you 
don’t do that by backing down. (P:TPOV) 
 
His own words, then, are casting him as the (necessarily) ‘Strong-man’ required for the task, 
underscoring the ‘Baghdad Terminator’ appellation. The shot then shifts to what one 
presumes is his (Kerik’s) office, or the offices of the temporary interior ministry, framed by a 
map of Iraq. Kerik, in mid-shot, now dominates the screen, and the diegesis:  
Kerik: We’re going to deal with the resistance in two ways, we’re going to either 
arrest them, or we’re going to kill them. (P:TPOV) 
 
Linguistically and discursively, the overt description of the actions, the Transitive ownership 
and agency of the mission ‘to kill’ is perhaps surprising. However, surprise should perhaps be 
tempered by the fact that Kerik has already been identified as the necessarily strong military 
man, and one necessary and up to the task of tackling (the thoroughly demonized) Saddam. 
The shot then shifts again to show Kerik inspecting photographic evidence, the diegesis is 
now another US official, perhaps army personnel, suggesting ‘it looks like he’s been tortured’ 
accompanied by a pensive looking Kerik. The clearly audible discussion of ‘torture’ (though 
of whom is not made clear) signals that ‘the enemy’ – multi-modally absent, but Over-
Lexicalised and assigned agency for ‘torture’ through something close to a Primary Definer – 
are engaged in torturous activities and that (part of) the mission here is to address, deal with 
and stop the torture conducted by ‘the insurgents’.
3
  
However, it is with what follows that attention ought to focus. What follows is a highly 
dramatically charged discursive and epistemological frame, and within the epistemology and 
discourse, Panorama provides a sort of discursive, journalistic and generic ‘call-back’ to the 
pre-conflict phase sample. The final change of shot in this sequence is a classic of the 
televisual form, the television drama aesthetic. Kerik, again in his office, now in mid-close-
                                                 
3
 Of course we now know that one of the methods employed to deal with the ‘torturing 
insurgents’ was the torture by US forces at the Abu Ghraib military facility. 
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up shot, the site of emotional expression (his face) now dominates the screen, while speaking 
the following words: 
Kerik: This job to me is very personal.  On September 11th 2001 I was the Police 
Commissioner of New York City.  I responded to the towers when they were hit.  I 
stood beneath tower one when tower two was struck by flight 175.  I watched over the 
next 24 hours as 23 members of my department were in fact missing inside those 
buildings.  They never came out.  I lost 23 people.  They were responding to defend 
the freedom of the United States.  This country was the threat to that freedom.  This 
country was a threat to the freedom of the UK.  We have now freed this country.  We 
have liberated Iraq and I think I owe it to the 23 people I lost. (P:TPOV) 
 
As we can see from the above statement, this section of the broadcast is devoted to Kerik, 
framing the ‘mission’. So even though there is a televisual and discursive ownership 
regarding coalition actions, the Transitive is deployed, even to actions that potentially locate 
‘our’ actions in a negative light (to ‘hunt’ and actions with deadly consequences, to ‘kill) the 
mission is explicitly framed as a reaction to the ‘events of 9/11’. Therefore, overt Lexical and 
discursive ownership is located within this narrative. This is assisted by Kerik’s willingness 
to take ownership, he references the personal pronoun with ‘I lost 23 people’. That the main 
semiotic focus is on Kerik’s face is significant, as is the contents of his testimony. Locating 
him at and as the dramatic, characterised, semiotic, narrative, emotional, discursive and 
journalistic centre is indicative of the narrative direction of Panorama: The Price of Victory. 
It of course draws on a now well-established discursive feature of the Panorama canon when 
dealing with Iraq (see Chapter 4) and helps provide some narrative orientation for the 
remaining post-conflict phase sample. Bearing in mind that this particular episode of 
Panorama is part of the post-conflict series of broadcasts, his testimony that ‘9/11’ is the 
motivation; that the operation is ‘personal’ and further, understood through the prism of ‘9/11 
is intensely problematic. However, it remains unchallenged. ‘9/11’ is in fact used as the 
journalistic and narrative hook onto which the dramatic story arc is pegged. The statement 
‘This country (Iraq) was the threat to that freedom’ demands more scrutiny and analysis than 
is provided by this Panorama broadcast. Iraq as both ‘threat to the US…and UK’ and that 
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‘Iraq was freed’ or ‘liberated’ remains unchallenged and undiscussed. The statements pass 
by, they simply are the justification and rationale for the Iraq ‘operations’, and within the 
discourse of this broadcast, take on a particularly resonant status. That 9/11 is the motivation, 
and moreover, that Iraq was a threat (‘to freedom’ no less) establishes itself as 
incontrovertible truth. 
Each society has its own ‘regime of truth’, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the 
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which 
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 
1977: 131) 
 
We can see from Kerik’s statements, that, in Foucault’s terms, Kerik is, by his ‘Primary 
Definer’ ‘status’ one of ‘those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ and the 
journalism of Panorama the conduit through which such ‘truths’ are communicated. Given 
that there was an ‘insurgency’ and that it was a growing and considerable threat to coalition 
forces, should give some indication, even if muted, that perhaps the coalition forces were not 
welcomed as the agents of ‘freedom’. However, to challenge such assumptions seemingly 
requires the desire and ability to imagine that ‘we’ ‘our forces’ are not always the agents of 
‘freedom and liberation’, that our motivations might not always be to ‘turn Iraq into a beacon 
of democracy for the Middle East’ (Andy Davies, BBC P:TPOV). It requires that those 
tasked with communicating, representing and mediating ‘our’ actions can step outside the 
‘regime of truth’, to see beyond and outside the discourse in which their own world view has 
been crafted. As this thesis has documented, such stepping beyond, discursively, 
theoretically, methodologically, representationally, televisually, and journalistically, proves 
rather difficult.  
 Kerik is permitted to frame the conflict in this way, unchallenged and while 
dominating the screen, his face initially a picture of stoic determination, then shifting to one 
of sad and pensive reflection (see above). His words partially shape the discourse and 
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narrative direction of Panorama: The Price of Victory. The final frame of Kerik in this 
segment is a lingering shot of him looking down, perhaps even gulping back tears as he 
struggles with the grief and loss of his colleagues. As part of a post-conflict series of 
broadcasts, the claims of Iraq as ‘threat’ less still, a threat to ‘freedom’ is, frankly, absurd and 
cannot (should not) be conceivable. Such a statement, post-conflict, is, one could feasibly 
argue, indefensible. The dramatic and emotional ‘pull’ of such journalistic representation 
though is indicative and representative of the approach Panorama seemed to adopt when 
representing the Iraq war. The discursive logic of the pre-conflict phase; the conflict phase; 
and now the post-conflict phase broadcasts are partly framed by 9/11, it is a post-9/11 world 
and as such, Panorama, through repetition of this dominant discourse, even while 
occasionally offering some muted criticism, effectively helps to sustain and represent a 
binary, ‘with us or against us’, worldview. Such a worldview is of course now established in 
the context and discourse of ‘The War on Terror’. 
 The lack of overt challenge, which, I would of course argue is required, can though 
seemingly be justified within the journalistic logic[s] of objectivity, or ‘impartiality’ As 
Wahl-Jorgensen insightfully theorises: 
…unavoidable subjective appraisals are carefully managed through a distinctive series 
of discursive strategies…there is a strategic ritual of emotionality in journalism which 
operates alongside the strategic ritual of objectivity, drawing on some of its practices 
and enabling what is often profoundly emotional story-telling to emerge through a 
form of ‘outsourcing’ of emotional labor to the subjects of the stories. (Wahl-
Jorgensen 2013: 130) 
 
In this (and other) instance(s), the ‘emotional labour’ of the story has been effectively 
‘outsourced’ to one of the principle subjects. And what a story, and what a ‘subject’. A man 
still suffering, still grieving the loss of colleagues, drawing together two disparate events in 
this way, narrating the still ongoing conflict in Iraq via, geo-politically, inarguably the most 
catastrophic rupture, the most dramatic and emotionally resonant ‘event’ of the early part of 
the twenty-first century. For clarity, this is not to diminish the loss, the undoubted heartbreak, 
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the grief, but merely to question the extent to which Panorama should uncritically locate him 
and it (9/11) as the central character and narrative device, as the frame. Such emotionally 
resonant and dramatic characterisation, the framing of the ongoing conflict in such terms, in 
such a way effectively cedes the ideological ground to those undertaking the conflict, and, 
one could argue, the political forces that engendered it. This returns us to Lewis’s thesis (in 
Chapter 2);  
those making the case for war with Iraq would juxtapose it – vaguely, intangibly, but 
repeatedly – with the war on terrorism. For a public with a limited knowledge of geo-
politics, these associations become the building blocks for making sense of the world. 
(Lewis 2004: 297)  
 
‘9/11’ is unquestionably emotive, highly dramatically charged. Such emotion, such unsubtle 
pathos as expressed by Kerik, and further, the allowances for self-reflection and character 
development mean the text can be read as a means of interpellating viewers in such a way as 
to be empathetic, to be emotionally involved with the principle subjects, those ‘with most to 
say’ (Van Dijk). In this instance, those with most to say are often emblematic of Western 
power, but framed and represented as thoughtful, reflective, humane and human, and, not 
coincidentally, always those sympathetic to the ‘cause’ [sic]. In the case of Bernard ‘Bernie’ 
Kerik, the resonance of his story, and that his story is allowed, unchallenged, to frame the 
ongoing post-war fall-out reveals the limitations of critique.  
 One final point: I ought to make it very clear that I do not doubt for a moment that 
the regime of Saddam Hussein was among the most brutal imaginable. It is simply not my 
intention in any way whatsoever to diminish the brutality, the cruelty and barbarism. The 
point remains, as I hope is obvious, that by adherence to journalistic, televisual, dramatic and 
aesthetic practises and templates, the Ideological Squaring discourse of Panorama 
systemically, in the end accentuates the very obvious brutality and flaws of officially 
designated ‘Others’ while, despite surely having the wherewithal and knowledge to do 
otherwise, simultaneously overlooks, side-lines, obscures, obfuscates and excises both ‘our’ 
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own blemished historical and contemporary global record, and the role ‘we’ played in 
sustaining Saddam Hussein for over 30 years. There were some notable moments, some 
examples whereby ‘our’ role was referenced, but this was not sustained, not examined, the 
references became merely additional contextual extras, that further strengthened the Over-
Lexicalised, Ideologically Squared, demonised characterisation. Even in the most critical of 
Panorama broadcasts, the critical contextual frame never began by even proposing to briefly 
examine our own deeply flawed, historical and neo-imperialist adventurism. What remains 
significant is that the necessarily critically interrogative frame cast on to Saddam Hussein is 
never cast in the direction of ‘our own’ high-profile, elite Primary Definers. Or, to be more 
clear, never cast on the systemic and structural global conditions that gave rise to, and 
sustained the regime of, Saddam Hussein. What is required is for critical Current Affairs 
broadcasting to join the contextual dots rather than separate out the archetypal and 
stereotyped villainous demons from the (sometimes flawed) archetypal heroes. On the 
evidence of this analysis, Panorama remains incapable or unable to undertake such a task. 
 On which note, it is only fair that this research does acknowledge the notable 
examples from Panorama: The Price of Victory where the coalition troops are represented 
less favourably. With what follows, another version of a ‘soldiers story’, the visual footage is 
demonstrably less favourable to the US troops. We are introduced to this more critical 
segment by Andy Davies: 
Andy Davies: In the torrid heat of an Iraqi summer and struggling to pacify, let alone 
understand, a people who’d been asking them for help, for some soldiers discipline 
becomes a casualty. (P:TPOV) 
 
The statement is certainly critical but one could argue that the criticism is muted or contained 
(again) within the benign motivation discourse. Their motivation is merely to (Over-
Lexicalised, positive Attributes) ‘pacify’ (an unruly mob), their ‘(in)discipline’ (Lexically 
Absenting potential brutality) merely a ‘casualty’, one that is apparently licensed by the 
284 
 
‘torrid heat of an Iraqi summer’ (even the weather in this place is as ‘brutal’ as its people, or 
at least as ‘brutal’ as Saddam). While some of the footage does viscerally contradict the 
assumption (to pacify) however, this is explained away by understandable pressures placed 
upon the individual soldiers the broadcast introduces us to. It is represented as a perhaps 
regrettable but all too human response to the ‘torrid heat’ and the pressures of the occupation. 
The episode continues with further footage from outside ‘Assassins Gate’. In this incident, 
two Iraqi’s were ‘killed’ by a US soldier firing into a crowd. This is explained by Andy 
Davies as follows:  
Andy Davies: But the protest became violent, rocks were thrown at an army convoy, 
and in response an American soldier shot into the crowd.  Two of the demonstrators, 
apparently unarmed, were killed. (P:TPOV) 
 
While it is significant and noted that the Transitive verb ‘killed’ is used, thus ascribing 
agency to the US forces, the act was not carried out by any of the individual characters we 
have met. The above statement had been preceded by some evidence of US army ‘force’ 
(though not ‘brutality’ which is the phrase used for designated enemies). The footage 
captures the US army ‘indiscipline’. However, that the protesters were ‘unarmed’ is heavily 
caveated by a) Davies tone; b) by the fact that those protesting are represented as fairly 
unruly, and that they were formerly (highly-trained) Iraqi soldiers; c) that the actions of US 
soldiers were a ‘response’ to ‘violence’. These facts, combined with the emotionally literate 
US soldiers (characters) we get to know does, rather viscerally, represent the ongoing 
situation in Iraq, but, for the most part, the coalition forces are represented as under-pressure 
and all too human. To be clear, the individuals are of course human, they are under pressure, 
the point is that this particular method of ‘story-telling’ elides wider critical contextual focus. 
It is simply assumed by the representation that, even if difficult and on occasion beset by 
‘indiscipline’, the US forces, according to Paul Bremer 
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…are learning about peacekeeping…and have a solemn obligation now to see this 
through and to see it through well and to put the time and resources behind it so we 
succeed. (P:TPOV)  
   
Or, in another excerpt, Iraq remains a perhaps misguided but nevertheless  
 Bremer ‘noble exercise’ (P:TPOV).  
The phrase is repeated at 56m in Panorama: The Price of Victory. That the above phrase, and 
the exact same footage is used to essentially ‘top and tail’ this broadcast is indisputably 
significant. The Over-Lexicalised ‘nobility’ and sacrifice of the ‘exercise’ of the ‘mission’ 
(Kerik) frames the first broadcast of the post-conflict era, whatever follows in the remaining 
broadcasts will be inextricably framed by such assumptions.  
 As we saw from the previous chapter, and the above discussed broadcast, there is a 
significant focus on action. However, given that action(s) are foregrounded by the very titles 
of the remaining two examples, are there similar active, action-based narratives and storylines 
in Panorama: Saddam on the Run and Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons? 
6.6 Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret and controversial work of the 
Iraq Survey Group as they hunt for Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. The 
failure so far to find the weapons the politicians insisted were there has been an 
embarrassment to Tony Blair and George Bush. Iraqi scientists and officials, once part 
of the regime, give Panorama their assessment of whether Saddam really posed a 
threat to the west and reveal details of one of Iraq’s illicit weapons programmes. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3261705.stm) 
 
In the second of the Panorama broadcasts, Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
(P:SCSW) the focus is on the (continued) search for weapons. Said weapons were of course 
the principle (stated) rationale for the conflict in the wider socio-political discourse, covered 
extensively in the pre-conflict phase sample (P:TCAS; P:SAWFH; P:CSW) and discussed in 
this research (Chapter 4). Therefore, given the importance of (the ongoing search for) 
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weapons (of mass destruction) the results of the search thus requires some partial narrative 
closure, which P:SCSW seeks to provide.  
 The summary paragraph revels (once again) in Panorama’s access to high-profile 
legitimated sources (Primary Definers) ‘Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret 
and controversial work of the Iraq Survey Group’. There remains an explicit assumption that 
Weapons of Mass Destruction were in Saddam’s possession in the phrase ‘hunt for Saddam’s 
weapons of mass destruction’. The ‘failure so far to find the weapons the politicians insisted 
were there’ is here, not an explicit and serious legal (and moral failing) but instead assumed 
to be nothing more than ‘an embarrassment to Tony Blair and George Bush’. The use of such 
phrasing is, at the very least, insufficient. For instance, one cannot imagine such a relatively 
harmless (though uncomfortable) adjective being applied to a designated enemy. Here 
though, the failure to ‘so far find the’ elusive ‘weapons’, while perhaps relatively 
compromising the perilous career(s) of the politicians involved (in a call-back to Panorama: 
Blair’s War), is here coded as little more than a trying inconvenience. The final sentence 
‘Iraqi scientists and officials, once part of the regime, give Panorama their assessment of 
whether Saddam really posed a threat to the west and reveal details of one of Iraq's illicit 
weapons programmes’ locates this example firmly in the realm of Point 6 of the WPM: 
…lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other options 
were available, and that the price was too high. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622) 
 
6.7 Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons – The Return of the ‘Primary 
Definers’ 
 
Even within the most critical broadcast in the post-conflict phase, Panorama: Still Chasing 
Saddam’s Weapons the critique is muted or downgraded in very interesting and problematic 
ways. The use of the ‘Primary Definers’ and Panorama’s use of its own archive to 
demonstrate the ‘intelligence failures’ is a significant and not to be overlooked facet of this 
broadcast. That such things are foregrounded is noteworthy. However, what is equally 
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noteworthy is the extent of the journalistic oversights, or the timely forgetfulness of those 
producing the programme(s). The example below is particularly striking:  
Richard Perle:  I don’t know what sort of evidence… a mushroom cloud would be a 
powerful statement, but do you want to wait for that? (P:SCSW 2003. Archive footage 
from P:TCAS) 
 
In the example above, Richard Perle is clearly represented as an authoritative source’ but 
within this narrative, the representation is designed so as to demonstrate the failings of 
individual high-profile elite sources (but not the wider structural conditions or motivations). 
The footage inserted into the relatively critical narrative of P:SCSW is precisely that used in 
the pre-conflict P:TCAS.  Further examples are used in much the same way, again, with the 
apocalyptic ‘Mushroom Cloud’ as the signifier: 
Corbin: A year ago the message coming from Washington and London was that 
Saddam's Hussein’s regime posed a current and serious threat. In the US the President 
and his officials raised the ultimate spectre of modern warfare, the nuclear bomb.   
 
7th October 2002 
Bush:  They've seen clear evidence of peril.  We cannot wait for the final proof, the 
smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.  
 
8th September 2002 
Condoleeza Rice: There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can 
acquire nuclear weapons, but we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom 
cloud. 
 
23rd September 2002   
Richard Perle: I don’t know what sort of evidence… a mushroom cloud would be a 
powerful statement, but do you want to wait for that? 
 
 
So not only does Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons make use of the very same 
sources, it uses the same footage. In the pre-conflict phase, those same sources, and this exact 
footage, not only passed by without critique, but, more importantly, it was deployed in such a 
way that, as I argued in Chapter 4, materially assisted in the perpetuation of an ‘immediate 
threat’ narrative, and of Saddam as uniquely dangerous. Now, in the more reflective and 
288 
 
critical broadcast, the same footage, the same sources, are here wheeled out and deployed for 
a different narrative purpose. Because the storyline demands are manifestly different, the 
archive from only 14 months previous, is stripped of its original uncritical context. While 
there might be nothing inherently wrong with referring to previously ‘reliable’ sources (sic), 
and, furthermore, clearly revealing their flaws and shortcomings, what is more problematic is 
that the Panorama production (producers and journalists) see no reason to assess and 
critically interrogate its own practices, its own relationship to its sources and that they 
appear(ed) to (have previously) grant(ed) them uncritical legitimacy. Panorama’s own 
archive footage of Perle, Kay, Bush and Rice is deployed merely to adopt a critical pose but 
without the requisite critical self-reflection regarding the part Panorama’s own previous 
broadcasts might have played in hyping the ‘threat’ of Saddam, the ‘immediate danger’ he 
posed to the world if he remained in place. The Over-Lexicalised ‘mushroom cloud’ together 
with occasional semiotics of (library footage of) said cloud certainly continues to Attribute 
negative connotations (to say the least) to – the already thoroughly demonized – Saddam. 
 Another example of this lack of self-reflexivity regarding Panorama’s own role in 
the build-up to the Iraq war, appears later in the same broadcast. Using the same source 
previously used in P:TCAS on this occasion, David Kay is, too late of course, subjected to 
critical scrutiny: 
Corbin: Though Saddam was still interested in nuclear weapons, the UN had 
dismantled his nuclear infrastructure and placed his raw stocks of uranium under 
guard in 1991.  Sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate 
his nuclear programme.  So where did that leave Mr Kay’s certainty about the tubes?  
 
Kay: Well the problem we have with the tubes is the tubes a year ago…two years ago 
when we weren’t in the country we were just looking at the tubes themselves, and the 
tubes looked like they were suitable for centrifuge, and in fact I still think, if I were 
only looking at the tubes, they were suitable for the centrifuge. Now we’ve got a great 
advantage now, we're inside the country, so we don’t have to grasp at straws of 
evidence.   
 
Corbin: Straws of evidence, Dr Kay’s description of some of the intelligence that 




Corbin is correct to forensically focus on alleged intelligence failures (though ‘intelligence 
failures’ themselves quickly became the get of jail free card deployed by the elite political 
actors who had themselves seemingly been angling for conflict (see Chilcot Inquiry 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/)). In the above statement, Corbin even goes so far 
as to explain that ‘the UN had dismantled Saddam’s nuclear infrastructure’ and that 
‘sanctions appear to have made it impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear 
programme’. In the context of this sample, by which I mean the entire discursive sample 
collated and analysed in all three analysis chapters of this research, such an admission is 
startling. It is simply beyond credibility that the same Panorama team that produced and 
researched both this episode, and Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons would, fourteen 
months previously, have been unaware that ‘sanctions appear to have made it impossible for 
Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme’. They are startling precisely because such 
definitive and overt claims regarding the UN dismantling are absent from the pre-conflict 
phase sample, when arguably, their presence could well have provided some vitally necessary 
critique. That the same source was legitimated and used uncritically in the pre-conflict phase 
demonstrates that the discourse of Panorama was largely uncritical, or at least that the 
journalists involved were all too willing to accept explanations and the logic(s) of its Primary 
Definer sources. Again, perhaps because the storyline demanded a different narrative 
orientation, these same previously legitimated and authoritative sources are questioned and 
scrutinised more fully during this more critical broadcast (now too late of course). However, 
critique of legitimate(d) and ‘authoritative’ (sic) sources and Primary Definers now fit the 
wider social and political narrative of ‘intelligence failures’. So even Panorama’s (muted) 
critique is able to be contained within an elite discursive frame. What is absent is the 
necessary self-critical assessments and examinations of Panorama’s own role in legitimating 
conflict prior to it beginning. This is perhaps related to their journalistic practices of sourcing 
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and the high-profile access Panorama continues to enjoy. Gaining access to such high-
profile, legitimate(d) Primary Definers is significant and provides Panorama with its own 
legitimacy and authority in the wider television journalism landscape. However, in 
continuing to operate in this way, by refusing to critically interrogate said sources prior to the 
conflict, only doing so once it is too late, and by discounting or discarding more critical 
sources (Scott Ritter for instance) Panorama might have an officially designated legitimacy, 
but is manifestly not the necessarily critically interrogative, counter-hegemonic broadcast that 
we urgently require. As a reminder and in order to compare, this is (just one example of) how 
David Kay was represented in the pre-conflict phase: 
Kay:  I’ve seen one of them.  The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design 
which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and 
developed therefore enriched uranium, that is taking natural uranium up to the level  
that makes it useful for a weapon. 
 
Corbin:  What does it tell you, the fact that they’re trying to get several of these? 
There have been several shipments. 
 
Kay:  Well it tells me that they’re going for a large scale programme over a thousand 
centrifuges which in fact is what they were going for before the Gulf War intervened. 
(P:TCAS) 
 
In this example from the pre-conflict sample, Corbin essentially believes him, no critical 
scrutiny, a soft question (a gentle ‘quizzing’ perhaps – see p267) that merely confirms, 
cements and reproduces the narrative orientation of the pre-conflict phase sample.  
 Furthermore, even though some of the (same) sources and Primary Definers are 
subject to critical interrogation and scrutiny in the latter broadcasts, there is little to suggest 
that similar strategies of granting legitimacy to high-profile sources would be questioned in 
future. Sure, the examples cited are questioned and scrutinised, they are examined for their 
failures, the individual political and social actors might be discarded as unreliable witnesses, 
but what evidence exists that Panorama would, in future be sceptical of similarly high-profile 
(but personally different) Primary Definers? Of course the WPM, rather adroitly, has already 
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accounted for this in Point 7: ‘For the next war, return to step 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005). 
I would add my own addendum to Step 7: ‘Nothing significant is learned’. 
 I would argue herein lies the value of a critical discourse analytical approach as 
used in this research. This research has tracked and traced examples across different phases, 
across a temporal sample in order to assess the ways in which material – both original and 
archive – is used and reused in order to tell the story (stories) of Iraq. In so doing, it has 
revealed the extent to which, encumbered by source-relations, televisual and discursive codes 
and conventions, Panorama is seemingly incapable of stepping beyond the narrow 
representational, discursive, epistemological, and hegemonic limits.  
 Related to the above, we can assess the frame in a little more detail by examining 
some of the discursive Lexical Choices made and then used by the journalists involved. 
Within the opening scenes of Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons, Jane Corbin 
continues to use the established frame for the post-conflict sample: 
Corbin: The stakes are high. The reputations of a Prime Minister and a President are 
on the line. (P:SCSW) 
 
Note that the discourse here is on reputation and not legality, not the ethical or moral issues 
of destroying a country (in order to ‘rebuild’ it). Reputations are on the line, though what 
remains notable is that reputations of journalists that uncritically reflected or reproduced the 
logic of benign intervention are not ‘on the line’. Additionally, that individual ‘reputations 
are on the line’ is manifestly different to the structural conditions and ‘reputations’ of either 
‘the West’, or its (our) media systems, practices and discourse, in general, or Panorama in 
particular. 
 Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons remains the most critical of the post-
conflict phase broadcasts in this sample, but even here, the critique is muted and firmly 
contained within a certain discursive logic. At seven minutes into the broadcast we hear 
(again) from chief operations director of the ISG (Iraq Survey Group) Dr David Kay. With 
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the narrative set by Corbin, Kay begins to lay out his own critical reflections regarding the 
hunt for weapons, and that their presence (or absence) is of paramount importance for the 
‘credibility’ of the entire mission. Herein we find one of the few examples whereby some 
muted criticism and questions regarding ‘the necessity of waging war’ and that ‘perhaps war 
was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the price was too high’ (Altheide and 
Grimes 2005: 616). Notable though is that this critique is both muted and refers to political 
and intelligence gathering, not, you will note, critical of the media coverage of the build up to 
and prosecution of the Iraq war. Nor are the reflections overtly critical of the motivation(s), 
the necessarily benign nature of the intervention continues to be apparently self-evident, it 
remains an issue of ‘common-sense’. Then follows a series of archive clips, sourced from US 
news, in which Dr Kay repeatedly, across four different broadcast examples explains that 
‘regime change’ is the only solution.  
 The final clip, that sees Kay explaining that ‘finding them (weapons) is the new 
priority’ (P:SCSW), is instructive. Finding weapons as the new priority is surely the political-
military version of arranging the evidence around an already existing policy decision, or 
policy-based evidence making. In partial defence of Panorama, that these clips are present in 
the narrative of Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons does at least indicate some 
willingness to critique the very policy on which the (rush to) war was based. However, a) the 
critique is not overt, it is not explicitly mentioned or discussed again, the clip, the evidence, is 
simply left hanging; b) the motivations of benign intent are not examined or critically 
interrogated; c) such critique that does appear, and these clips feature in a sequence in which 
the policies are demonstrably examined, not in detail, but at least foregrounded, is again, as 
expected, filtered through the characterisation of individuals. Point 6 of the WPM suggests 
that, post-conflict, there are often reflections and assessments that suggest ‘widespread 
conclusion that perhaps the war was unnecessary, other options were available, and that the 
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price was too high; all of this will be useful for the coverage of the next war’ (Altheide and 
Grimes 2005: 616). However, the research conducted here would suggest that any 
‘widespread conclusions’ and reflections are cast in the direction of individuals, small groups 
of policy formers, or, in the case of Iraq, ‘intelligence experts’ (and their failures).  In the 
above example, it is ‘Dr Kay’s reputation on the line’ and not the lives of ordinary Iraqi’s, 
and certainly not the narrative or characterisation of the fundamentally benevolent Western 
intervention. Dr Kay, and others’ when mentioned, and the ‘intelligence failures’ are simply 
the bad apples in an otherwise benign barrel. Panorama itself, its televisual, dramatic and 
journalistic methods are of course, not subject to critical self-examination, interrogation or 
scrutiny. As discussed above, the critique that does emerge remains rigidly within the 
confines, the context, logic and discourse of stage seven of the WPM ‘For the next war, 
return to step 1’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616). 
6.8 Panorama: Saddam on the Run 
In the final broadcast of the sample, Panorama: Saddam on the Run (P:SOTR) the multi-
modal and journalistic focus is centred on the hunt for the previously excessively demonised 
Saddam. Given Saddam’s ‘over-representation’ in the pre-conflict phase sample (P:TCAS; 
P:SAWFH; P:CSW), it makes narrative and journalistic sense that this theme is returned to.  
Panorama: Saddam on the Run 
In April 2003, as Saddam’s statue was being toppled in Baghdad, US Marines were 
locked in a deadly gun battle with Saddam Hussein and his supporters just across the 
city. Yet their Ace of Spades escaped. The next time the world would see him was at 
his capture, eight months later. For all this time ‒ through handwritten letters, tape 
recordings, personal messages ‒ Saddam stayed in touch with his fellow Ba’athists, 
helping to direct those fighting the Coalition.  
Sheltered by a handful of people, appearing secretly in public, he still thought he 
could win a guerrilla war against the Coalition. Yet all this time, a team of US soldiers 
and Special Forces was methodically closing in on him. How did Saddam Hussein 
evade capture for so long? Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family 
member betrayed Saddam’s sons, killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally 
betrayed Saddam to the Americans? 
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Panorama speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked 
and caught Saddam; to the bodyguards who once protected the dictator; to the Iraqi 
minister who confronted Saddam in his prison cell; and to the families of those 
accused of betraying Saddam Hussein and all he believed in. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3546081.stm) 
 
As the summary paragraph makes clear, the focus here is explicitly on the ways in which the 
coalition troops, characterised here as ‘a team of US soldiers and Special Forces’ 
‘methodically closed in on’… ‘their Ace of Spades’. The broadcast also reveals that while the 
world waited, not knowing where he was, ‘Sheltered by a handful of people’ the ‘Special 
Forces’ firstly ‘locked in a deadly gun battle’ in the end ‘tracked and caught Saddam’. This is 
therefore dramatic, action oriented, and simultaneously procedural. The broadcast also seems 
to set up a series of questions that will be answered: ‘How did Saddam Hussein evade capture 
for so long? Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family member betrayed 
Saddam’s sons, killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally betrayed Saddam to the 
Americans?’ Panorama again reference their access to high-profile sources: ‘Panorama 
speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked and caught Saddam’ 
and, they also speak to the designated (perhaps former) enemy: ‘to the bodyguards who once 
protected the dictator; to the Iraqi minister who confronted Saddam in his prison cell’. To 
continue the characterisation of brutal demon, which while no-doubt deserved, does, in the 
context of a post-conflict broadcast, finally cement the demonized characterisation and, 
further underscore that the effort was worth it, Panorama also speaks to ‘the families of those 
accused of betraying Saddam Hussein and all he believed in’.  
6.9 Panorama: Saddam on the Run - The Return of the Stereotypical Demon 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the active verb of the title, Panorama: Saddam on the Run is less 
concerned with action. What emerges in the discourse and throughout the narrative of 
Panorama: Saddam on the Run is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a return to representing Saddam as 
the archetypal demon. By now though, so used are we to this representation, ‘He’ has simply 
295 
 
morphed into ‘a fixed, reductionary image’ who when ‘reflected out to reality… serve(s) a 
stereotypical role’ (Gray. 2008)  However, given that we already know Saddam is captured, 
by the time and date of broadcast (28th March 2004) the event of his capture was known the 
world-over, and given the fact of his rather pathetic demeanour when captured, in order to 
sustain the characterisation that Saddam was worth the effort, resources and time, Panorama: 
Saddam on the Run still needs to represent him and his associates in a way that cements the 
demonised characterisation. So here in the post-conflict sample, in which he obviously poses 
less of a threat, the more overt representations of menace we saw in the pre-conflict sample 
(particularly in S:AWFH and P:TCAS) are largely (though not wholly) absent. Instead the 
representational focus of this broadcast is oriented around a) the perhaps more prosaic 
procedural elements usually found in a detective caper, perhaps in the style and genre of 
Columbo. From the outset, the narrative cuts to the chase, the conclusion (Saddam’s capture) 
is revealed. Much of this episode of Panorama is simply devoted to dramatically representing 
the actions and decisions that led to his capture; and b) there is more focus in this broadcast 
on Saddam’s wider network and family. 
 In order to continue and reinforce the demonised archetype/stereotype, the early 
sequences in Panorama: Saddam on the Run refer back to his past, and uses some previously 
unseen footage. At 11m we are reminded of his brutality by way of some original footage 
shot for this broadcast. The image that follows is one of the few occasions whereby Iraqi 
citizens themselves are represented in human terms. The shot, over 10 seconds in length, 
features an elderly Iraqi woman, dressed in a black hijab, faced with a mound of body bags, 
she drops to her knees and weeps uncontrollable tears. As she does so, Jane Corbin provides 
the following commentary: 
Corbin: The lie being exposed by now was Saddam, his denial of his regimes crimes 
against humanity. Mass graves are being uncovered all over Iraq, evidence of the 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Iraqis on the orders of Saddam and his 
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henchman.  In May investigators began identifying the victims and preparing 
evidence.  But there was still no former president to put on trial. (P:SOTR)  
 
 The above commentary serves multiple functions. Firstly, it reminds us, both visually and 
Lexically that the perhaps now pathetic figure was once a brutal presence who committed 
‘crimes against humanity’. As the phrase ‘Mass graves’ is spoken, an Iraqi man emerges from 
the mass grave clutching a long-deceased body. The evidence is placed before us on screen. 
The ‘slaughter of 100’s of 1000’s of ordinary Iraqi’s’ is accompanied by shots of hundreds of 
bodies which then pans up to reveal hundreds of Iraqi citizens at the graveside to no doubt 
begin the task of identifying their loved ones. This deliberately filmed original footage and 
excerpt provides some useful perspective. Saddam’s armed forces are characterised and 
functionalised by what they do ‘henchman’. 
The screen then fades to black before a change of scene.  
Corbin: Hunted by the coalition last spring Saddam headed for his hometown of 
Tikrit in the so-called Sunni triangle in central Iraq.  We travelled the same route to 
find those who’d helped Saddam in this Ba’athist heartland and those who’d tracked 
him. (P:SOTR) 
 
The opening shot to accompany Jane Corbin’s continued commentary is a computer-
generated map of Iraq. The map transforms into a 3D image and the viewer is placed ‘inside’ 
the map. A moving red line indicates the journey from Bahgdad to Tikrit. Accompanied by 
the non-diegetic musical score ‘Drum Ensemble: Various Artists’ the soundtrack has an 
otherworldly haunting urgency to it. We are then reminded of the mission, or the Over-
Determined ‘noble exercise’, Saddam is to be ‘hunted down’. Corbin legitimates her own 
position by reminding us that she, too, will ‘travel the same route’ in the ‘Ba’athist 
heartlands’ (P:SOTR) and the accompanying visuals demonstrate that point. Shot from the 
car, Iraqi countryside passing quickly by. The next shot is of Jane Corbin herself, in the car, 
on the journey. Panorama viewers are on the same journey, we will accompany Corbin and 
also accompany ‘those who’d tracked him’ (P:SOTR). The monster will be hunted, Corbin 
297 
 
and the viewers will go on the same dramatically represented journey. As a means of 
positioning the viewers, this is potentially quite effective. Reminded, even in his absence, of 
his brutality, Iraqi subjects are (finally, rarely, though briefly) represented humanely. What 
hardly needs saying is that ‘our’ (covert) role in supporting Saddam whilst these brutal crimes 
were undertaken is completely multi-modally, Lexically Absent(ed) and ignored.  
 The broadcast then devotes attention to documenting the steps the US and UK 
coalition took in order to capture Saddam. One such step allows for Panorama: Saddam on 
the Run to continue with the dramatized narratives. Outlined thus: 
Corbin: The Americans came up with their own BIG incentive. 
Ambassador Paul Bremer - Head of Coalition Provisions Authority: I am today 
announcing a twenty-five million dollar reward for information leading to the capture 
of Saddam Hussein, and a fifteen million dollar reward for information leading to the 
capture of either of his sons. (P:SOTR) 
  
The $25million reward announced by Paul Bremer and used in Panorama: Saddam on the 
Run is used here as an interesting story-telling device. That it is allowed to stand without the 
necessary critique or reference to the US essentially functioning beyond any pretence at 
International Law is instructive. Ostensibly, the war in Iraq was in defence of international 
law, however, the Coalition Provisions Authority in Iraq is here permitted, uncritically, to 
essentially function as the world police force. In this broadcast, Iraq stands in for the ‘Wild 
West’, a ‘Wild West’ in which the US plays the role of sheriff to Saddam’s villainy. The use 
of non-diegetic score is also instructive. When discussing ‘the huge sums Saddam had 
squirreled away’ (P:SOTR), shots of said millions are cut against US military and political 
spokespersons, but the transition from shot-to-shot is accompanied by the sound of a bank 
vault opening. Perhaps the explanation for non-diegetic aural stimulus is to multi-modally 
represent Saddam as Heist mastermind. 
 With clearly represented access to high-profile Primary Definers, legitimated 
sources and figures, we are introduced to General David Petraeus. Interestingly, and in a 
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similar fashion to that which is granted to Bernie Kerik and, in a different way to Reggie 
Harris, Petraeus is afforded the time and televisual space with which to fulminate. He is 
afforded a functional honorific, his title; nominated by use of his name, and the semiotic 
space he is afforded; and functionalised by what he does. Discursively, this is a fairly 
comprehensive representation.  
 Having begun the journey and then the investigation with reference to, and 
interviews with high-profile sources, the next sequence appears perhaps a little incongruous. 
The imagery is archive footage and again, by referring back to the pre-conflict phase 
examples of demonization designed to remind us of Saddam’s villainy. The sequence is 
archive of Saddam’s family which serves to represent him (via association with his sons) as 
akin to mafia figures. In order to achieve this characterisation, this previously unseen footage 
of Saddam Hussein’s family at a party.  
Corbin: On family home movies Uday and Qusay lived up to their image in Iraq ‒ 
gangster sons of a mafia don, hated and feared.   
 
The party theme, we are told, is ‘Capone’ and the attendees are all dressed as gangsters. This 
allows the narrative of Panorama: Saddam on the Run to segue neatly from the images of the 
‘squirreled away’ cash and jewellery seamlessly back to descriptions of the family as 
‘gangster sons of a mafia Don’ (Jane Corbin P:SOTR). This is narratively and 
characterisationally vital. Perhaps the Hussein family were as seduced by the same signifiers 
of Hollywood imagery and popular culture as the imagined audience. However, in this 
representation (perhaps rightly) such ideas are precluded so that the demonised figure can be 
augmented, they can thus be represented as archetypal villains in the drama. This latest 
representation serves to fix the image in the mind of the audience, a dramatized rendering of 
the gangster Saddam, ‘on the run’. The archive footage, particularly that sourced from the 
Saddam Hussein personal family archive, does undoubtedly add something, some 
authenticity and legitimacy. However, as they appear in these broadcasts, they are stripped of 
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context. Instead they are free-floating signifiers, abandoned textual threads weaved into the 
fabric of (whatever) the narrative orientation requires. And what Panorama: Saddam on the 
Run requires is to reanimate the characterisation of Saddam the archetypal demon.  
 Having re-established the demon and fixed him in the narrative, the remainder of 
the broadcast then again returns to devoting attention to documenting the steps the US and 
UK coalition took in order to capture Saddam. Having devoted significant time and attention 
to demonization (across the sample), the next sequence of the narrative thread signals a return 
to the Primary Definer of David Petraeus. Corbin offers Petraeus what one might describe as 
something of a soft or feeder question: 
Corbin: How important was it for what you were trying to do – out there ‒ with 
‘hearts and minds’ that you find the family, the father and the sons? (P:SOTR) 
  
There is no discussion of the international legal obligations, the extent to which it is (or is 
not) within the terms of the ‘mission’, within the remit, within international law to hunt down 
these men? An explicit, but disavowed and assumed correct, ‘common sense’ even, 
acknowledgement of the battle for ‘hearts and minds’, or in other words, explicit propaganda. 
Petraeus, in mid-shot, dominating the screen, talking in calm and measured tones (always 
marked against the more uncontrolled and chaotic representation of Saddam et al, thus 
contributing to the Ideological Square) in his answers actually references the ‘psychological 
impact’ the capture of Saddam’s sons might have on Iraqi’s, but devotes most of his answer 
to the ‘substantive’ points: 
Patreus: …on the substantive side, people like Uday and Qussai (Saddam’s sons) 
have enormous amounts of money… 
Corbin: And what are they doing with this money? 
Patreus: ‘They were hiring others’ to take shots at our soliders, to take shots at those 
who are trying to play a role in the new Iraq’ (my emphasis) (P:SOTR) 
 
The final words from Petraeus, while perhaps not unexpected, he is, after all the general and 
is therefore expected to believe in the mission, are interesting in themselves. However, 
equally interesting is Corbin’s response to this statement. There was no response, the shot 
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then shifts to a crowded Mosul street. This is important because his statement passes without 
comment, without critique, without question. Is there not some demand that the ethics, the 
legality, the human cost of this mission are questioned or foregrounded? Some discussion or 
critical interrogation of the role, what that might be, might involve, might suppress? What is 
this ‘new Iraq’? On whose terms will the ‘New Iraq’ be established? What are political, 
military, bureaucratic and social mechanisms by which the new Iraq will be organised? 
‘Trying to play a (positive) role in the new Iraq’, the positive Attributes, is simply a given, 
that the role, and the new Iraq itself, will, by dint of its architects and authors, automatically 
be a positive one. It is this interview which most clearly reveals the orientation of the 
narrative and the limits of critique. That the ‘new Iraq’ will be a place of ‘freedom and 
democracy’ is simply a given, uncritiqued and further demonstrates, against mounting 
evidence, that the benign intervention thesis is firmly established, entrenched and actually 
functions as the sine qua non, the organising logic, the common sense of the ‘operation’ in 
general and the post-conflict Panorama broadcasts explicitly. Is this the expected and 
necessary role demanded and required of the flagship Current Affairs broadcast strand, to 
simply act as uncritical cheerleader for ‘benign Western intervention’?  
 One of the most important things to note about Panorama: Saddam on the Run is 
quite how muted any discussion of the actual conflict is. Despite it only officially ending a 
matter of months previously (and of course it continued unofficially via guerrilla warfare for 
years) it is almost completely Absented and ignored. This is one of the clearest 
demonstrations of the extent to which the sample of broadcasts referred to in this chapter are 
concerned with each telling a different (though related) story. That the actual conflict, either 
recently ended or the continuing ‘insurgency’, is almost completely ignored (in two of the 
three broadcasts) is indicative of a) the disparate threads the post-conflict sample is 
attempting to weave together; b) that the post-conflict discourse is concerned with providing 
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narrative closure; c) it indicates the extent to which the media caravan swiftly and decisively 
‘moves on’. Panorama: Saddam on the Run, perhaps unsurprisingly given its title, is chiefly 
concerned only with the ‘Manhunt’ aspect, as such all political, ideological, geo-political 
considerations are entirely side-lined and overlooked in favour of the ‘procedural elements’ 
of the hunt and capture. What historical references do feature are only ever concerned with 
the brutality of Saddam and his ‘henchmen’. 
 There are some occasions whereby the actions of the coalition forces are 
foregrounded and are the central focus. However, in the overall narrative and discourse of 
this broadcast, the example serves chiefly to demonstrate the difficulty of the mission, the 
continuing ‘battle for Iraq’. 
Corbin: At dawn the next morning, they launched an assault against Saddam 
loyalists, many Iraqi’s and one US soldier were to die. (P:SOTR) 
 
Jane Corbin’s description of events here is an act of Nominalisation, the agency recedes. The 
term ‘assault’ is, in the circumstances, rather euphemistic. ‘Many’, how many? An example 
of the discursive tool of ‘Aggregation’, reducing individuals to a mass, not even statistics as 
there are no numbers provided, merely a lumpen mass. That it is then followed by the 
passive, or Intransitive verb ‘to die’ is an act of Nominalisation or exnomination. So even 
though, in this instance, there is some agency attached, within the same sentence, ‘we’ do 
know who is responsible, the US troops are distanced by omission (not named, merely 
referred to as ‘they’) and the passivity attached to the verb ‘die’ is markedly different to the 
verb used (by Andy Davies, above: ‘kill(ed)’.  Even if disavowed, accidental, logically 
(journalistically) coherent, just the way things are done, the ascribing of blame, fault, outright 
mendacity or cold-bloodedness to the ‘Other’ while simultaneously distancing bloody 
‘effects’ from ‘our troops’, though subtle, and only visible after extensive analysis, is 
illustrative of the discourse of the Panorama canon when dealing with conflict in Iraq. 
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 One of the final scenes in Panorama: Saddam on the Run provides the narrative 
closure, that this particular episode in Iraq’s history is now at a close:  
Dr Adnan Pachachi - Iraqi Governing Council 
As soon as Ambassador Bremer said: ‘We've got him’ there were cheers all over the 
place and people were crying.  It was a very emotional period.  I mean a lot of people 
have lost so many relatives of their own, so many friends, so many… really Iraq 
passed through a terrible, terrible time. (P:SOTR) 
 
Televisually, journalistically and discursively, this returns us to the tropes and forms found in 
the pre-conflict phase sample, particularly P:TCAS; P:SAWFH and P:CSW found in Chapter 
4. The use of archive material, some of it never previously seen, serves as a reminder for the 
viewers as to why ‘we’ are pursuing him in the first instance. This is interesting on a number 
of levels. On the most basic level, having been reminded of his brutality, the manhunt 
discourse entirely shifts the narrative away from any internationally legally binding 
agreements. The above scene complimented by tearful and cheering crowds, witness 
statements and relief, serves as the ultimate denouement. Despite the efforts, despite the 
bloodshed (though this is mostly disavowed) the hunt was worth it:  
…the pro-war camp were able to build on a well-established discourse about the 
depravity of the regime, and to stress the moral obligation to liberate the Iraqi people 
from such an oppressive dictatorship. While this did not provide the legal basis for 
intervention, it became increasingly important as a de facto justification for war. 
(Lewis 2004: 299) 
 
Panorama clearly represents the story that, despite the illegal, destabilizing and unwanted 
nature of the war, even without the presence of WMDs, getting rid of the evil that was 
Saddam was worth it anyway. No further analysis is required when ‘We’ve got him’, the 
ultimate villain has been captured. The capturing of ‘Saddam on the run’ of course also 
obscures or simply ignores the structural conditions of neoliberal and neo-imperialist 
adventurism. 
6.10 Concluding Remarks 
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All three post-conflict phase examples cited in this chapter build on the various narrative(s) 
developed over the timeframe and present in the discourse of this sample. Discussed in the 
previous two chapters, all three broadcasts encompass elements from the previous two 
phases. However, in addition, the examples cited in this chapter are combined with (an)other 
key facet. This facet is one of the key dramatic tropes that is television’s speciality, chiefly: a 
sense of denouement which is typically found in fictionalised drama(tic) texts. Though all 
three have different narrative and characterisational focus (different stories to tell), there is 
demonstrably a sense that the episodes of Panorama are engaged in a sort of tying up of the 
loose ends. 
 All three post-conflict broadcasts are clearly, demonstrably and discursively linked 
to other, previous examples in the sample. Panorama: The Price of Victory has as its 
narrative focus the action of battle, told principally through military personnel, discursively, 
narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically linked to and building on, similar 
frames and discourses utilised in the conflict-phase (particularly, P:TBFB and P:TRTB). 
 Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons returns us most forcefully and overtly 
to the search for Saddam Hussein’s (always illusive or illusory) ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’, discursively, narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically drawing 
on and linked to elements contained within the pre-conflict sample. Panorama: Still Chasing 
Saddam’s Weapons has some elements of the police procedural or cop show genre. This 
broadcast also makes most direct reference to, uses footage from, another, already discussed 
and analysed example from the pre-conflict phase sample. In fact, even the title is instructive, 
making an overt reference to Panorama’s own historical example from Chapter 4, 
Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons. As such, we can begin to see the discursive and 
journalistic, televisual trends this research has sought to identify and analyse. 
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 Panorama: Saddam on the Run charts and traces the ‘hunt for Saddam’, 
discursively, narratively, aesthetically, televisually and journalistically linked to, and building 
on (referencing back) to the already demonised representations clearly evident in the pre-
conflict phase sample (P:SAWFH; P:TCAS). This broadcast, too, combines moments of 
action with elements of a detective caper.  
 In some regards the dramatic is obviously present even in the very titles of the 
broadcasts in the sample. Admittedly, ‘Price’ is not, on its own, particularly dramatic, 
however, the contents of this broadcast certainly are, and the sense of drama through 
character is certainly forcefully present within the text. The remaining two broadcast both 
reference action by way of the verbs contained in the titles. ‘Chasing’ and ‘Running’ are both 
indicative of some (descriptions of) action and within the texts themselves, this urgency is at 
times accentuated. What remains more acute and urgent though in these broadcasts, in the 
latter two in particular, is the denouement elements. The sense of narrative closure each 
broadcast attempts to bring.  
 One of the reasons to focus on character, and in this chapter I would apply that term 
to include the soldiers (stories), the journalists and the Primary Definers is because, as 
outlined by both Altheide and Grimes (2005), and this research, post-conflict broadcasts tend 
to focus more explicitly on reflection, on what went wrong:  
Following the war, journalists’ reaction and reflection on various governmental 
restrictions, and suggestions for the future (which are seldom implemented)… 
Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast quite negatively 
and often lead to widespread conclusion that perhaps war was unnecessary, other 
options were available, and that the price was too high. All of this will be useful 
for the coverage of the next war. (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 616) 
 
As such, the mistakes, the problems, the issues, many of them complex, are more easily 
communicated when attached to, or told through individuals. The extent to which such 
reflections are present has been subject to analysis. However, crucially, such reflections and 
examinations that were present, were, when ‘our side’ were represented, typically filtered 
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through the self-reflexive, contemplative and thoughtful musings of individuals. On occasion, 
even the moments and examples of critical reflection are undertaken by the very same people 
involved in the original ‘mistakes’. Those already ‘cast’ as ethical, thoughtful, contemplative 
and human(e). Very little outside agency is permitted, nothing or no one from beyond the 
confines of the political elites, the military elites, or the journalistic elites. Simply invited to 
(self) reflect, afforded time and televisual space with which to do so. There are some muted 
acknowledgements of ‘mistakes’ made, or at least that the task was larger and more difficult 
than anticipated ‘the US forces large enough to win the war but too small to secure the peace’ 
(P:TPOV) but these are confined within a narrow discursive regime, no critical interrogation 
of the wider geo-political, ideological or ethical implications. No critical reflection (or 
rejection of) the benign Western intervention thesis. The focus on character (in a dramatic 
text) has been dominant. 
 Whether the characters are military personnel, elected officials or assorted other 
political actors, the text(s) tend to narrate the war/conflict as having impact on individuals, on 
their future career, or on their relations with their families, etc. When the focus has been on 
one of the military coalition troops, by way of empathy, and recognition, particularly 
recognition of the(ir) human failings or their familial qualities, the texts represented those on 
screen as (potentially) sympathetic characters. The texts leave us in little doubt that those 
represented are human, innately flawed yes, but human and motivated with the best of 
intentions. The discursive and epistemological effect this has on them, and potentially on our 
vision of them, and, by implication, even perhaps our vision of ‘ourselves’ as Western 
subjects, is significant. Through representational apparatus, the discourse, the casting of 
character as thoughtful, contemplative humans, through shear repetition, viewers might be 
unable to so easily dismiss the motivations of those represented in quite the same way we are 
interpellated to dismiss or even be hostile to officially designated enemies. 
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 Throughout the post-conflict phase broadcasts, and as a means of demarcating them 
from the conflict broadcasts, the focus slowly shifted. There was a gradual refocusing, and re-
energising with regards continuing the ‘search’ for or ‘chasing’ down ‘his’ ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ and latterly the ‘hunt for Saddam’. These search templates, searching for Saddam 
and his weapons, take on a significant role. Despite the fact that these particular policy 
objectives are related to the wider political context, ‘his weapons’ and ‘his brutality’ 
functioned as de facto justifications for the conflict, the search discourse orients the narrative 
away from wider structural accounts and considerations to a more procedural, a more 
dramatic narrative arc.  
 What has been present most consistently, or at least is most clearly observable is 
that the, perhaps expected, more critical and more reflective discourses of the post-conflict 
sample, while to some extent, present, are not necessarily oriented around either a) 
journalistic self-reflection, nor b) critical reflection or interrogation of actual policy.   
 Firstly, that a major critique that does emerge is oriented around the hunt for 
Saddam ensures that, to some extent, the texts can (re)play the visual reminders of Saddam’s 
brutality. This of course continues (cements) the narrative developed in the pre-conflict phase 
sample (including archive visuals of, and reference to Halabja in Panorama: Still Chasing 
Saddam’s Weapons). The dominant mode of critique that is operationalised by the sample 
texts tend to be framed by ‘our’ continuing hunt for the demon. Once caught, as he is in 
Panorama: Saddam on the Run, there is a sense of narrative closure, the type of narrative 
closure typically found in dramatic narratives. In the genre(s) of News and Current Affairs, 
this literal closing of the circle is then followed by the actual departure of the ‘news media 
caravan’. 
 Secondly, a major discursive, narrative and characterisational orientation is the 
focus on the ‘soldiers’ stories’. This approach is particularly acute within the confines of the 
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text Panorama: The Price of Victory. The limited critique that is (re)present(ed) tends to 
focus on the fact that ‘they’ (the coalition troops) might not be as prepared as necessary; that 
the soldiers are not provided with the tools necessary to ‘do the job’ required; or when on 
those rare occasions the troops are represented less-favourably, such actions are licensed by 
their human frailty, the pressures of the job in the ‘torrid heat of an Iraqi summer’ (P:TPOV) 
and perhaps indicative of a few bad apples. In this narrative, the ‘shortcomings’ or any 
discussions ‘that perhaps war was unnecessary’ (Altheide and Grimes 2005) while present, 
and at times, foregrounded and argued, are contained within an overall discourse or template 
that demands a degree of sympathy for those on screen while simultaneously disregarding or 
overlooking the rationale, the ethics, the potentially neo-imperialist and (capture of) energy 
resources that might have been (one of) the objectives. In other words, critical reflections that 
are present and observable are represented as tactical or procedural. The coalition soldiers are 
caught in the middle of perhaps ill-prepared or hapless planners. This is manifestly not an 
ideological critique or critical reflection on the policies of neoliberal or neo-imperialist geo-
politics. By framing the post-war discourse in this way, the critique that does emerge is coded 
and safely contained within very narrow parameters. These parameters are consistent with the 
WPM, and are particularly acute for the Public Service Broadcaster of record, with all its 
attendant focus on ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’. It would appear that the discourse and idea(l)s 
applied once the ‘conflict is underway’ continues to be a motivating factor here in the post-
conflict sample. There is of course also an additional focus on achieving those objectives, not 
questioning or casting critical scrutiny on what they are:  
…the media are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of balance and 
objectivity when a conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing the 
ability of government to achieve the goals it has set. (McQueen 2010: 64) 
  
 Furthermore, and as consistent with the critique developed over the course of this 
research, the focus on individuals, authoritative sources (Primary Definers), soldiers, and 
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their familial familiarity essentially casts them as sympathetic, even empathetic characters. 
None of the above is to suggest that the individual ‘characters’, particularly those characters 
featured in the soldiers’ stories arc, are not worthy of such identification. The point is that in 
focusing on such characters, the narrative orientation, the discourse is established such that it 
dislocates the micro-narrative(s) from their wider (macro-narrative) ideological contours.  
 Thirdly, there is some focus (again) on the ‘Primary Definers’. These sources, with 
all the institutional authority that comes with such positions reproduces legitimacy for 
specific policy objectives. These sources and primary definers are principally drawn from 
senior diplomatic core, senior military command, and senior elite politicians. So if and when 
opinions, ‘facts’ and arguments against the war do emerge and find a place in the post-
conflict phase Panorama sample, the critique, from these sources and institutions, never 
examines motivations, but is coded, contained and restricted to the difficulty of getting the 
job done, not what that job is. When they themselves are subject to critique, they can be 
written-off as ‘mistakes’ and further, Panorama itself does not see the need to subject itself to 
(even) similar levels of (muted) critique.  
 Interestingly, I would not cast the soldiers in this instance as ‘primary definers’. I 
would characterise them as central actors, or protagnists, their voice and presence in the 
narrative is entirely (dramatically at least) necessary, but they do not wholly shape the 
discourse or narrative orientation. Instead I would argue that they provide the personal, 
dramatic resonance, the characterisational depth demanded by the narrative orientation. Said 
narrative orientation is defined by the more senior, more legitimated authority figures, the 
soldiers merely add the character, the dramatic depth (though not breadth). 
 What remains important throughout the analysis, and in fact is a consistent feature 
of all phases, pre-conflict; conflict; post-conflict is the representations of different central 
actors: elite, military and civilian, when marked against one another. The sheer weight, the 
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number of sympathetically framed representations of ‘our’ side when cast and cut against 
those of the ‘Other’ has a semiotic cumulative, epistemological, Ideologically Squaring, 
discursive effect. So even when snapshots, little moments of either sympathetic 
representation of ‘Others’, or conversely less than sympathetic representations of ‘our’ side 
do appear, they do not necessarily puncture the over representations that have accumulated.  
 Within the narratives of the final broadcasts, the questioning by the Panorama 
journalists is at times fairly forensic but the focus is on mistakes or things overlooked that 
should not have been. ‘That’s what tyrants do’; ‘why were our troops badly briefed’; ‘Why 
are our troops (Brave boys) not given the resources they need?’, as opposed to why the war is 
being prosecuted in the first place. The wider geopolitical context and rationale for conflict, 
and equally importantly, to what (ideological, geo-political and hegemonic) end[s] is largely 
absented or erased?  
 The drama of the post-conflict phase broadcasts, through ideological expediency, 
and through a combination of the aforementioned factors, does not provide the necessary 
texture or nuance(d) representation. Perhaps through the more banal practicalities of lacking 
available footage, we are often denied the fully developed context and/or background 
character. Concomitantly, it might be said that in so doing, Panorama through either 
invisibility or more likely caricature, renders Iraq as subaltern, ‘Other’, backwards, dangerous 
and fundamentally unknowable in terms ‘we’ might understand and empathise with. 
Panorama, by detaching persons from the set of relations that make up their experience in the 
world, tends to objectify or ‘Other’ subaltern characters. They are ‘not like us’. This is of 
course visually, discursively and multi-modally marked against the representation of ‘our 
boys’ where the persons are inextricably attached to the set of relations (quite literally when 
Reggie Harris discusses missing family, or Bernie Kerik sheds tears over lost colleagues) that 
make up their experience(s) in the world. 
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 Despite the fact that each broadcast from the sample tells a different story, there are 
two significant, and clearly present consistent discursive features of the post-conflict phase 
sample. The first consistent theme that unites the post-conflict sample is that the broadcasts 
seem to attempt to communicate a sense of narrative closure. Building on the narratives, 
characters, frames and discourses found in the pre-conflict and conflict phase(s), using the 
televisual and discursive features of denouement typically found in fictionalised dramatic 
texts, the post-conflict sample seems to be designed as a means of bringing events to a 
(partial) close. 
 The second consistent discursive element is that, and as the WPM suggests, a more 
critical approach is notionally present. There are certainly sections and comments from 
sources and from journalists that critically examine the situation in ‘post-war Iraq’. Indeed, 
there are elements of a sort of ‘lessons learned’ discourse. In this way Panorama: The Price 
of Victory; Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons and Panorama: Saddam on the Run 
adhere to the WPM. However, it is because the post-conflict sample returns to and is oriented 
around already previously established (in the previous pre-conflict and conflict phases), now 
entrenched, narratives, that the critique is limited or diminished.  
 Perhaps the best way to summarise this, is by way of quoting from a Primary 
Definer contained within one of the post-conflict phase broadcasts. Concluding in the same 
way that Panorama: The Price of Victory begins and (almost) ends, American source, Paul 
Bremer sums up the limits of Panorama’s critique: 
Paul Bremer:  The American people have undertaken with the British and our 
other coalition allies here a noble exercise and we will see it through. (P:TPOV)  
 
This particular statement posits that despite some problems, the UK and US are engaged in 
(and thus motivated by) a(n) Over-Lexicalised, positively Attributed ‘noble exercise’. 
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Similarly, and as our lead-in to Bremer, seconds prior to that statement, Panorama journalist 
Andy Davies utters the following statement:  
Andy Davies: The vision, to turn Iraq into a beacon of democracy for the Middle-
East. (P:TPOV) 
 
For a journalist on notionally and reputationally the most critical broadcast strand on British 
television to uncritically Over-Lexicalise and positively Attribute ‘us’ in such a way is 
problematic. That the apparent motivations of coalition forces and the political elites that sent 
them to war are essentially benevolent, is surely naïve (at best). Such a statement is a literal, 
journalistic, televisual narrative based entirely on the rationalisations and justifications of the 
UK and US Government sources. However, it, and the related ‘nobility’ referenced by 
Bremer becomes the main frame through which the post-conflict phase broadcasts are 
organised and narrated. Even when examples of moderate criticism are (re)present(ed), they 
are able to be safely constrained by the dramatically rendered emotional signifiers and 
practices, and simultaneously safely contained within an epistemology of what this research 

















Throughout the course of this research, it has been my contention that the public service 
broadcast Current Affairs strand, Panorama, while remaining broadly within its public 
service obligations, has systematically, journalistically, epistemologically and discursively 
misinformed, or at least, only partially informed ‘the public’ with regards the (still) ongoing 
situation in Iraq. It is also my contention that this partial informing was/is not done through 
any particular journalistic malfeasance, or even easily identifiable deliberate inadequacies. In 
this way then, the ‘inadequacies’ (such as they can be referred to as such) are not a matter of 
either bias, which we can summarise as a deliberate attempt to mislead or persuade, or of 
misinformation, but that there is something else is at work here. Something else embedded 
within the very practises of the Current Affairs television journalistic form. Perhaps the 
partial vision and version of events that Panorama presents us with might instead be a 
product of the very practises and discourses of the long-form broadcast (televisual) 
journalistic ‘form’.  
 With regards television specifically, complaints regarding it (television) are of 
course longstanding: 
This warning against the ‘contamination’ of the journalistic enterprise from the high-
principled field of documentary, as opposed to populist frivolity, nevertheless 
contains the familiar suspicion of the contaminating power of the medium itself. It 
implies that the visual nature of television may hinder the verbal attempt to explain, 
and that an emotional concentration on ‘societies sores’ always discourages a cool 
attempt to account for those sores (Holland 2006: 92) 
 
 Despite much critique and interrogation of the form and medium in this research, it was not 
my intention to repeat and rehearse the exact same reductive complaints regarding its 
(television specifically) shortcomings. There are of course echoes here that may hint at this 
view, but my critique is not (wholly) focussed on the limitations of the visual(s) but on the 
hybridized form of Current Affairs as it is currently imagined. Post-Birt revolution, while 
News and Current Affairs, and Panorama in particular, were afforded more resources as a 
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means to undertake ‘the mission to explain’, the mixing of forms, journalism, news and the 
more entertainment centred tropes found increasingly present in ‘reality’ formats, means that 
Panorama never really satisfactorily produces a fully-formed rigorous method that 
journalistically informs the audience of the (full) story (of conflict). The analysis contained 
herein outlines that relying on the practices and forms of the classic narrative structure, often 
reverting to archetypes and stereotypes, largely dependent on Primary Definers to shape the 
narrative arc and define the discourse, Panorama instead seeks to tell the, often emotional 
and dramatic, story (or stories) in visually arresting form(s), while simultaneously being 
incapable of examining the wider ideological and geo-political context(s) of stories and News 
events. In this specific case, the news event was the conflict in Iraq.  
 There is of course a danger that the above prognosis has echoes of the long 
established and much debated ‘dumbing-down’ thesis. Some have argued forcefully against 
the perhaps lazy assumptions that such journalistic tropes and approaches necessarily lead to 
a ‘dumbing-down’. Among these, McNair (2009), Harrison (2006), de Burgh (2005) and Bird 
(2010), in fact posit the theory that there are many positives to be found in the attempt to 
engage viewers/readers of News with personal stories and narratives as a means of 
understanding complex events. In the editions of Panorama subjected to critical discourse 
analysis in the course of this thesis, such representations are present, and, I would argue, 
forcefully so. The characters tend to be over-determined. In television studies theory, the 
dramatic ‘pull’ of character can act as a point of entry for viewers. Cushion (2012a) 
paraphrasing Temple (2006) argues: 
‘Dumbing-down’ is good ... scholars should look beyond a Habermasian model of 
constructing audiences as rational and critical actors since many people engage with 
news that is trivial or emotionally driven. The ‘dumbing-down’ thesis, in this context, 
is caught up in intellectual snobbery, informed by an elitist and highbrow sense of 
what news and current affairs should be as opposed to an accessible form of 




According to this critique then, perhaps the dramatic and ‘emotionally driven’ (Cushion 
2012) story-lines of (some of) the Panorama episodes are designed to be accessible, 
understandable and as such to possibly encourage understanding and engagement. 
 As the research developed, and to my own surprise, it became clear(er) that in fact 
the dramatic and emotional elements present in much of the sample, do not, in themselves, act 
as impediments to Public Service Broadcast, Public Sphere oriented, public interest 
journalism. It need not be the case that broadcast Current Affairs (or News) journalism be 
compromised by dramatic and emotional engagement, it need not be a ‘binary’ choice. 
According to Pantti’s ethnographic research with journalists in Finland and the Netherlands: 
Within all newsrooms, traditional views of journalism, based on the reason/emotion 
and information/entertainment binaries, were present. Importantly, however, the 
journalists did not simplistically distinguish ‘good’ journalism from ‘bad’ journalism 
on the grounds that the latter is concerned with emotion; instead, they highlighted the 
different ways and motivations for using emotions. (Pantti. 2010. 180) 
 
As the above quote, paraphrasing broadcast journalists demonstrates, the binary might be a 
false choice. Furthermore, emotional and dramatic moments are considered a vital and valid 
part of the journalistic storytelling repertoire, and what is more, that such elements can 
enhance audience understanding and social knowledge: 
Presenting and interpreting ‘relevant’ individual and collective emotions were seen as 
a part of journalism’s aim to reveal reality, as ‘facts’, without which the whole truth is 
not told; on the other hand, the main objective of emotional storytelling was to 
enhance the political and social knowledge of the audience, to facilitate the 
understanding of news. (Pantti. 2010. 179) 
 
Perhaps then, it is not so much that drama, character and emotive representation are present, 
but who are the ‘subjects of value’ (Skeggs and Wood 2011) afforded time, space, depth, 
interiority, character and that have some impact on the direction (even partial) of the 
unfolding narrative. So perhaps part of the limitation can be identified as deriving not merely 
from the Television aesthetic, but in the journalism itself. What I mean by this is that the 
shear unavailability of alternative or ‘enemy’ sources, and the simultaneous proximity to/with 
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‘Primary Definers’ represented as ‘subjects of value’ might be accounted for by the relative 
geographical distance the subjects have from the journalists attempting to represent them. It 
might be that a physical, intellectual, social, cultural and emotional distance; the lack of local 
proximity and subsequent knowledge and investment, affects the ways in which the central 
social, political, diplomatic and military actors are represented. These various and varying 
journalistic impediments and difficulties of basic access perhaps combine with the television 
aesthetics, the semiotics of production and dissemination; the needs and demands for 
dramatic and emotional ‘story-lines’ into which character[s] can be rendered and made 
knowable. An explicitly related impediment that precludes more in-depth, critical contextual 
understanding is the location of Panorama in the context of journalism, or as a piece of 
journalistic reportage. By which I mean, Panorama is so firmly and clearly demarcated as 
part of the BBC News output, and that having discarded the ‘more chaotic forms of … the 
documentary tradition’ (Barnett 2011: 117) is thus ‘reduced’ to a form of televisual 
storytelling too narrowly contained in and constrained by the discourse(s) of journalism and 
News. It could be then that the combination of factors ensures that journalists revert to the 
story-telling template, a template which foregrounds and privileges recognisable, knowable 
‘characters’ of Western imaginary and thus precluding the possibility of a fully developed 
overview of geo-politics.  
 Might it then be perfectly acceptable and understandable to make use of dramatic 
codes and conventions, narratives and characters? If so, should the focus then not be on the 
fact that such modes are present and dominant, but with whom, within the texts, the 
audiences are encouraged to identify. Who, in the narrative is represented as the more-
rounded, nuanced and sympathetic human subject(s). As important, what might the dramatic 
strategies (for identification/dis-identification) be? This research posits that the television 
journalism strategies tend to be the Over-Coding, Over-Lexicalised, positive Attributes of 
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‘our’ recognisable ‘characters’, represented as archetypal ‘good guys’. Even if such a positive 
representation is not always possible, at the very least, when such a representation is 
compromised or hedged, ‘we’ tend still to be represented as thoughtful and self-reflective, 
more fully-rendered human subjects, sometimes in archetypal form, but nevertheless, a more 
fully-rounded and ‘universal’ human. Contrastingly, officially designated enemies are ‘flat 
and cartoon like’ (BBC), often a more ‘fixed, reductionary image of a particular type of 
person’ (Gray. 2008) with little room for character or narrative development, a stereotype 
against whom, the more rounded character(s) of ‘us’ are marked. Such representations, 
particularly via visual and Lexical cues and edits, and through repetition, accumulate 
representational power and solidify a picture of the world. The contrasting is a form of 
Ideological Squaring. The important additional question posed is: what might the wider 
socio-political ramifications of this be?  
 This developed critique is not arguing that television journalism, the visual, 
necessarily contaminates the best intentions, or the ‘verbal attempt(s) to explain’ (Holland 
2006: 92) but that television journalism as it is currently practised tends to have an over-
reliance on specific discourses, narratives, characters and visuals. There is an over-reliance on 
deliberately chosen and particular dramatic examples. The deliberately chosen examples can 
no doubt be rationalised journalistically, but the detailed critical discourse analysis present in 
this research, indicates that the examples chosen are most often those that fit (and therefore 
significantly contribute to) the developing, soon to be dominant, ‘Saddam as uniquely 
threatening’; ‘Benign Western intervention’ narrative(s). In part because of their source-
relations, the journalists end up reproducing hegemonic discourse. This eventually dominant 
discourse is mobilised, imagined and represented via a detailed focus on specific character(s), 
sometimes through archetypal representation(s), and sometimes through the more clumsy 
stereotyped representation(s). When the focus is on ‘our side’ most often, though not 
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exclusively, the ‘characters’ are recognisable elite political actors, imbued with legitimacy in 
part through shear repetition of representation, in part through the hierarchical social location, 
or, emotionally literate soldiers or other individuals with whom ‘we’ can relate. Whether 
political officials, advisors, military experts, they, over time, through repetition take on the 
authority of Primary Definers. In the case of ‘our’ combat troops, in place of Primary 
Definers’ (as we would ordinarily understand the term) they become the central dramatic and 
characterisational actors, called upon to burnish or support the discourse established by the 
primary definers/elite sources. The combination of this repetitious presence and, especially 
with regards the combat troops ‘on the front-line’, the dramatic and emotionally resonant 
story-arcs and characterisation tropes, play a significant, often overlooked, role in sustaining 
the ‘muscular liberalism’ or what this thesis has defined as the ‘benign intervention’ of 
Western power. The dramatically resonant representations sustain this (disavowed as) 
ideological imperative with little or no criticism of its foundations or of its merits. It is the 
over-representation (of the above) that produces a narrow vision and version of the event(s). 
Even ‘benign intervention’ might in fact be too anaemic a term. Perhaps a better, more 
accurate term might be ‘benevolent intervention’. This is not the time or space in which to 
develop this argument, however, it is worth bearing in mind the polling that consistently 
demonstrates that the British population, think – overwhelmingly – that the British Empire 
was a ‘good thing’ (https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/07/26/britain-proud-its-empire/). Such a 
response is hardly surprising given the research undertaken and documented here. It should of 
course go without saying that I do not propose Panorama is solely responsible for this state 
affairs, more that it is merely a small, but significant (and legitimated) piece of the jigsaw. 
Further analysis of these dramatic, storytelling, journalistic and televisual signifying 
practices, and the ways in which they might contribute to the benign intervention thesis, 
offers possibilities for future research. 
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 Returning to the ‘narrow vision’, specifically regarding television, this is a part of a 
general trend. Or, as John Ellis, echoing Susan Douglas, puts it: 
…television can be used either as a telescope, opening up world vistas as in its early 
years; or, as now, as a microscope, investigating ever more constrained topics in an 
ever more detailed way. Is it true, then, that television is deeply implicated in a flight 
away from political engagement towards the ‘navel-gazing’ of reality TV? (Ellis 2016 
http://cstonline.tv/politics-tv) 
 
 It is therefore a combination of factors: the medium, the form, the journalistically 
narrow discourse(s) and the accumulated ‘weight’ of representations, of Primary definers, of 
characters, and narratives, and the all too readily available narrative structure template which 
precludes fully developed contextually rich explanation(s) of vitally important events and 
issues.    
 In all three historical, textual genres and phases (pre-conflict phase; conflict phase; 
post-conflict phase) the identification of the villain is clearly represented. As discussed in 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5, Panorama devotes significant representational effort in casting 
and characterising Saddam Hussein as the primary ‘deviant’ agent. While this trope does 
rather reduce the ‘Whodunnit’ element (much like in Columbo), we are left in little doubt as 
to who the villain is. Nevertheless, a villain is present and known. Saddam (single name 
depicting his villainy) becomes the object and subject, the central narrative and characterised 
concern. In Chapter 5 ‘he’ recedes a little into the background as the focus turns to the action. 
In Chapter 6, given that there is a sense of denouement, of seeking some narrative closure, 
once the ‘hunt’ for him is ‘on’, the narrative arc of Panorama takes on the characteristics of 
the cop show. This is even indicated by the title(s), Panorama: Saddam on the Run, and to a 
lesser extent, Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons. The villain, on the run is pursued 
by the archetypal heroic figures of coalition troops and associated Primary Definers.  
 In the Panorama broadcasts analysed here, the pre-conflict phase is the disruption, 
we, the audience are aware of some disruption to the normal ‘harmonious’ way of life, the 
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representation of Saddam in the broadcasts analysed in Chapter 4 set up the disruption, and 
the villain, that said disruption is the fault of a ‘deviant’ agent. Chapter 5 is the procedural 
element, we are invited to witness the procedure(s) of war and conflict. There are also 
additional ‘cop show’ individual(ised) story-lines and characters. The pursuit of the deviant 
agency and an attempt to bring him to justice. Chapter 6 is the denouement, the (partial) 
narrative closure, elements of the procedural, the practises of the chase are combined with the 
‘resolution’, when the disruptive element is apprehended, the ‘neutralisation of the threat he 
poses’ (MacMurraugh-Kavanagh in Carson and Llewellyn-Jones. 2000) is achieved and, in 
the Panorama post-conflict phase broadcast examples, the task of ‘the restoration of order’ is 
undertaken, resolved and partially ‘achieved’. Perhaps it is not the mission that matters, but 
the pleasure one takes from experiencing the act of the hunt, and the safe resolution brought 
about by the capture. It is also the case that each broadcast has, in and of itself, a certain 
Proppian narrative structure, including ‘disruption’, identification of deviant agent, 
identification of hero, pursuit of deviant agent, and (partial) narrative resolution. 
 Even if the above ‘police procedural’ and ‘copshow’ analogies and analysis are not 
wholly sustainable, the point remains that many of the signifiers, such as archetypes, 
stereotypes, and the classic narrative structure elements contained within dramatic television 
genres, become the principle storytelling devices used in the Panorama broadcasts 
(pertaining to conflict).  
 Through an adherence to rigorous discourse and critical discourse analysis, the 
research has sought to identify particular characteristics, styles, epistemologies and 
discourses that feature prominently in Panorama broadcasts pertaining to Iraq. The ways in 
which such discursive practice(s) produce a set of frames through which the event(s) in 
question can be read and understood, has been of paramount importance. The principle 
findings suggest that, particularly in the case of the flagship Current Affairs series Panorama, 
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and additionally when dealing with war and conflict, a focus and concentration on dramatic 
elements of the story are employed. Whilst understanding and appreciating the need to 
communicate (some of) the salient points to an audience in a form that both captivates and 
informs, it would appear that such dramatic mechanisms and forms tend, via a combination of 
Over-Lexicalisation, Lexical Absences, Nominalisation, Transitivity/Instransitivity, 
Attributes and Ideological Squaring to overstate the relative menace of officially designated 
enemies, whilst simultaneously overstating the benign ‘nature’ of ‘our own’ political and 
military motivations and interventions. Or, if you prefer: understating and underplaying the 
less than benign motivations and characteristics ‘our own’ political and military elite actors 
might have. It is hard to over-state the sheer weight of number of these examples, there were 
too many to analyse, thus, as an adherence to a detailed CDA methodological approach 
would suggest, this over-abundance of representations should be seen as indicative of wider 
and more sustained trends. Crucially, it is their repetition that frames the debate(s) in very 
specific, pro-Western (elite), neo-imperialist, neoliberal, directions.  
 The selection of The BBC, and specifically, Panorama, is based on the fact that the 
institution itself, and the flagship nature of Panorama means that they are together, and 
separately, particularly powerful media actors. Through high-level access, historical 
institutional weight, accumulated social and cultural capital, economic journalistic resources 
and historical reputation, Panorama has the power to establish dominant discourses and 
epistemologies regarding vital geo-political issues of the moment. The question here is the 
extent to which Panorama (re)produce(d) a reductive, largely pro-Western discourse or frame 
through which the war in Iraq is/was refracted. Does the cumulative repetition of particular 
characters and narratives have a serious and deleterious effect on public understanding of 
vitally important events and issues? 
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 With regards public understanding, nor has it been my intention here to make any 
claims regarding the extent to which audiences uncritically accept the frames offered. Whilst 
having a very different textual, discursive and ‘event’ sample and example, Boyce-Kay and 
Salter (2014) perhaps summarise it adroitly:  
By situating the … BBC texts in their institutional, historical, political and discursive 
contexts, we hope to demonstrate how qualitative analysis of these texts can provide 
insights into the processes by which the hegemony of neoliberalism is discursively 
sustained. It is neither the remit nor the intention…to determine the extent to which 
audiences uncritically accepted the dominant frames in these features; rather, our 
interest is in how a powerful institution such as the BBC – which is ostensibly 
protected from market forces – delineates the boundaries for ‘legitimate’ political 
debate. (Boyce-Kay and Salter 2014: 2) 
 
 Perhaps we can begin to summarise that it is not necessarily that character, 
characterisation, archetypes, stereotypes, casting, the classic narrative structure, non-diegetic 
score, and stories (that they are all significant elements and signifiers of the ‘dramatic’) are 
themselves overtly problematic, after all, events need to make sense, but who in said stories is 
afforded characterisation[al] depth, space, voice and general presence. Representational 
presence, voice and characterisation establishes, at least in part, through story and 
characterisation, how certain events, make sense. ‘Our own’ recognisable, public, political 
and military actors take ‘centre-stage’ in the ongoing drama of the events. So much so that it 
is sometimes the case that the events are in fact filtered almost entirely through the narrative 
and characterisation of individual protagonists and Primary Definers (Panorama: Blair’s War 
– March 2003, for instance). These figures are knowable and able to resonate depth of 
character and perhaps draw in an audience. This is particularly the case when said characters 
are afforded the relative luxury of self-reflection and self-examination. We are invited to 
‘see’ for ourselves the apparent agonising over decisions, and the ways in which such 
agonising has emotional and material effect on them, as human beings. Such ‘casting’ within 
the dramatic narrative means that even if we might disagree with their actions, such rendering 
of human character might make it more difficult to question their (human(e)) motivations. If 
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‘our’ political and military elites are always represented as fundamentally motivated by 
benign intent(ions), and what is more, said elites, cast within the confines of Current Affairs 
narratives, and representationally marked against the demonised, unknown, unknowable, 
darker forces of the ‘Other’, then this representational practise and form has the potential to 
have a quite profound effect on the ways in which geo-politics is understood. In this context, 
and throughout this research, by restricting which opinions, policy proposals, voices and 
visions of the world are deemed ‘credible’ we can see that the BBC and Panorama function 
as a means to ‘manage’ public opinion: ‘human wellbeing is understood as the wellbeing of 
the capitalist economy, and democracy is understood as the management of the public’. 
(Boyce-Kay and Salter 2014) 
 Conversely, those only partially or notionally represented, afforded no, or very 
little, and marginalised, space, time, character and presence, often when represented at all, are 
represented perhaps clumsily, through caricature, stereotype and as importantly, in opposition 
to the ideologically, politically, emotionally and humanly rounded characters (‘our boys’; our 
elected officials) effectively means that the story established is a somewhat lopsided one. 
What chance of developed and nuanced representation of a complex geo-political situation, 
when the representation of character is a) deemed so necessary; b) so firmly embedded in, 
and based on binary opposition? c) Said binaries are so demonstrably marked…the ‘Other’ is 
marked against the fully-rounded benign and human(e) characters of Western hegemony? 
‘Blair’ (for instance) is afforded a pensive, reflective human quality through both direct and 
indirect representation. However, no such luxury is afforded ‘Saddam’, or (m)any Iraqi’s 
involved in the conflict. Moreover, as above, when such character, caricature, archetypes, 
stereotypes and narrative structure are the organising logic and principle through which the 
event(s) are refracted and represented, the character(s) deemed officially as the (would-be) 
enemy tend(s) to be overly reductive and demonised. Such demonization (in these examples) 
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are occasionally the filter through which the entirety of the broadcasts are narrated and 
organised: Panorama: The Case Against Saddam – September 2002; Panorama: Saddam: A 
Warning from History – November 2002; Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons – 
February 2003; Panorama: Saddam on the Run – March 2004.  
 As the analysis chapters have demonstrated, even while notionally examining the 
‘case’ against Saddam, the broadcasts, and other related programmes, establish ‘him’ as the 
dramatically rendered, central caricature(d) and stereotyped figure. The broadcasts thereafter 
simply present that he has a case to answer, whereas no such overt accusations are 
forthcoming when dealing with ‘our own’ western political elites. In fact, in the one example 
in which one of ‘our own’ political actors does feature as the central protagonist (perhaps, 
with a ‘case to answer’) Panorama: Blair’s War, Blair is afforded more space, more time, 
and certainly, vicariously through the character of Jack Straw, Blair is represented as critical, 
‘resilient’, ‘thriving on the heat’ (P:BW) thoughtful, pensive, emotionally tortured and 
motivated by benign intent(ions), doing ‘what’ he ‘believes to be right’ (P:BW). So even 
when Blair is the central figure around whom the broadcast is organised, it is his thoughtful 
ruminations, faithfully reported by Panorama, that establish and set the judgemental frame 
through which the case will be made, and answered. 
 We see this, somewhat muted, but at least still present critique of ‘Western leaders’ 
most readily perhaps in the Panorama broadcasts notionally critiquing the ‘decision to go to 
war’. In such broadcasts, there is certainly an element of critique, a striking element whereby 
the ‘anti-war’ protestors are afforded presence and a degree of developed character. To some 
extent this is understandable, and of course entirely defensible and necessary given the levels 
of disquiet at the time the programme was made and broadcast. However, within the context 
of both this individual broadcast, and, moreover, the collection or overall discourse of 
Panorama episodes of the time, such criticism is marked against elite source Primary 
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Definers, and what is more, the ways in which such elite sources have been, and continue to 
be represented as (perhaps) flawed but always motivated by benign intentions. They, the 
characters with ‘benign’ motivations, continue to be the driving narrative force.  
 Of course as befits the WPM (Altheide and Grimes 2005) as analytical framework 
and model, there is a significant proportion of the broadcasts under scrutiny, particularly the 
pre-conflict phase, and some elements of the post-conflict phase broadcasts, in which a 
healthy dose of scepticism and critical interrogation (of Western elite assumptions and 
rationales) is present. Equally, as befits the (CDA) methodology and approach, such 
‘moments’ must be included, they must feature in the analysis and the ways in which their 
characteristics, narrative and critical positions challenge the (by now dominant) assumptions 
of this thesis. Even though there is a great deal of scepticism, or at least significant moments 
of sceptical and critical inquiry, certainly in two of the four broadcasts of the pre-conflict 
phase sample (Panorama: Case against Saddam; Panorama: The Case Against War) these 
can certainly be permissible within the frame of the WPM. What is more, even within the 
narrative of the aforementioned texts, the overall discourse remains one oriented around 
Saddam having a case to answer. Even when ‘our’ political and military elites are scrutinised, 
the frame established still represents them as fundamentally good and as benign (if 
misguided) human subjects. In fact, it is largely the very political actors that ought to be 
under intense scrutiny who actually set the terms, and establish the frame. Scepticism about 
the impending war is oriented around a narrative in which the case is perhaps not yet made as 
fully as required. Not, that the case (for war) itself is problematic, unethical, and/or illegal. 
The case is certainly never made that the motivations of our political elites might be 
propelled by other less than benign geo-political, energy-resource issues or less still, neo-
imperialist ambition(s).  
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 The main difficulty in giving too much credence to Panorama’s apparent critical 
position during the pre-conflict phase broadcasts lies in the fact that the chief narrative and 
characterisation device of the WPM in the pre-war broadcasts remains that of ‘demonization 
of individuals’. Therefore, any critical comments, excerpts, moments, characters, discourses 
and narrative developments need to be contextualised, located within and measured against 
the overall schema (overt demonization of Saddam). As we have seen, even within these 
more critical broadcasts, most of the narrative, most of the time is devoted to precisely that, 
demonising Saddam. This is certainly the case here. Even when some minor focus on ‘our’ 
mistakes or earlier refusal to intervene or stop selling munitions, the focus quickly and 
irretrievably returns to what ‘He’ will do with them (weapons) if he could. Set in this context, 
in this epistemology of benign western intervention, and when such discourses are the 
organising logic of the 10 broadcasts in this sample, and over the course of 19 months, 
mounting a forceful critical position that challenges this logic is rather difficult to sustain, and 
thus, does not appear, certainly not in any sustained manner.  
 Using a series of related ‘public service’ Current Affairs broadcast journalism 
examples, this thesis has sought to critically interrogate Panorama’s discursive role in the 
shaping of public understanding (the epistemology) of politics, power, and ‘conflict’ with 
specific focus on Iraq. This research concludes by suggesting that by focussing attention on 
narrow, reductive, personalised stories, characters and narratives, combined with an absence 
or displacement of wider social political and ideological concerns, it is the case that in place 
of critical interrogation of wider geo-political and structural issues and inequalities, 
Panorama, as it is currently imagined, reduces the complexity of geo-political concerns to a 
narrow, personal(ised) and reductive focus. The Western hegemonic, even neoliberal, 
‘consensus’ is left unremarked upon in favour of a narrative of demonization, exclusion and 
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fear. Panorama constrains representations, closes down alternative readings, cements and 
reproduces the hegemony of ‘benign’ (or even benevolent) Western intervention. 
 In relation to these themes and to outline: a) that our political elites continue to 
engage in rhetoric that locates ‘western intervention’ in positive terms; b) that they are 
explicitly permitted to do so precisely because News media and Current Affairs merely 
reproduces the rhetoric of the Primary Definers without the necessary critical interrogation, it 
might be useful, albeit very briefly, to provide an example from the contemporary debates 
about Syria.  
 Having won the Parliamentary vote that permitted UK forces to intervene in Syria, 
the (at the time) Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne suggested that this means 
‘Britain’s Got its Mojo Back’ (http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/conversation-george-
osborne/p37302). Such statements move beyond a mere callous lack of concern for human 
life, and perhaps revealingly, move beyond the benign intervention thesis, to instead perform 
a sort of western imperialist machismo. According to his logic, Britain is revitalised, 
becoming strong again, recovered its swagger on the ‘world stage’. In this version of events, 
George Osborne is treating the bombing of Syria as if the act(ion) itself functions as Viagra 
for imperialists. Such statements are a mythologizing of (empire and) violence. The news 
media response was at best uncritical, and at worst, silent. There is more than an echo here of 
Altheide and Grimes War Programming Model point 7 ‘For the next war, return to step 1’ 
(Altheide and Grimes 2005: 622), with of course my own addendum to Step 7 ‘Nothing 
significant is learned’ providing the additional punctuation mark in the overall discourse. 
 This thesis has attempted to outline that, in part because of the visual ‘story-telling’ 
features contained within the televisual form; in part because the journalistic ‘sources’ are 
elite-policy-makers, advisors or military officers, ‘Primary Definers’; in part because of the 
dramatic ‘nature’ of war and conflict, and that such dramatic events fit seamlessly and easily 
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with the requirements of Current Affairs broadcasting and further, the requirements of 
Journalism and television; in part because of the division of the BBC Current Affairs output 
into distinct units, or discursive silos, Panorama, despite its claims, is only able to provide a 
very narrow perspective (an epistemology or discourse). By dividing the thesis into clearly 
identified sections; the historical and BBC/Panorama specific context; the wider academic 
field; the methodological, followed by the three analysis chapters (pre-conflict phase; conflict 
phase; post-conflict phase broadcasts) over a specific period over nearly two years (19 
months), the particular discourse analysis methodology presented here has been able to 
‘track’ these practices across time, so that one can identify the extent to which these are the 
consistent features, tropes, journalistic and visual practices, consistent story-telling 
‘templates’ and discourses used tell the story of Iraq. In part because Panorama is the 
flagship, these practises become the ‘common-sense’ way to ‘do’ Current Affairs conflict 
journalism. It is hoped that this research has thus demonstrated that the Panorama broadcasts 
were essentially a pro-Western apologia or, at least provided a discourse legitimising Western 
imperial ambitions, and that such ‘imperialist adventurism’ was, continues to be, concealed 
beneath a discourse of ‘noble’ rescue and benign western intervention. 
 While not exhaustive (there are of course textual absences within, even this 
extensive, research sample) the claims made are not necessarily that BBC Panorama wholly 
failed to provide a rigorous, nuanced or balanced representation of Gulf War II, but that in 
adhering to specific journalistic and televisual templates, Panorama produces and sustains a 
narrowly defined discourse and epistemology of Iraq. The point is not that Panorama is 
solely responsible for the public understanding of Iraq. However, given Panorama’s profile, 
its much vaunted and celebrated position as marker of journalistic quality; that it sets the 
mark, and continues to establish the formal characteristics of the genre, combined with the 
BBC’s role and position as authoritative, legitimated journalistic and cultural leader, means 
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critical scholarship ought to scrutinise its journalistic and televisual methods, approaches and 
output in order to assess the extent to which, in setting a benchmark, it cements a journalistic, 
televisual, methodological and ideological template and discourse.   
 The main argument is that: encumbered by its seeming faith in drama and the 
employment of dramatic templates as the most efficient and effective means to communicate 
social and (geo)political activity (and ‘reality’), and storylines, Panorama in particular, but 
perhaps Current Affairs in general, ends up focusing attention on those actors to whom they 
have access, granting legitimacy to them. Concomitantly, the broadcasts effectively 
disenfranchise, characterise or cast often negative and stereotypical characteristics to those 
‘Other(s)’ represented in the discourse. These journalistic and televisual decisions are 
dependent on, established practises. However, in so doing, they then shape the discourse 
depending on the demands of the storyline(s). 
To return to the central proposal of this thesis. Namely, that the complexity of detailed 
‘investigative’ Current Affairs broadcasting seemingly necessitates the adoption of a dramatic 
template in order to tell the stories. Panorama largely deploys and depends upon a Classic 
Narrative Structure, relies on casting and characterisation – through archetypes and 
stereotypes – and makes explicit use of apparently unproblematic, self-evidently legitimate 
sources (Primary Definers). Though the focus has been on conflict coverage, I would argue 
that the same – or at least broadly similar – method(s) of storytelling are deployed when 
detailing, investigating and broadcasting other News and Current Affairs events. Applying 
the same (or similar) analytical, multi-modal, CDA forms of analysis across a range of 
different story types, reveals that long-form, extended reportage, complex journalism seems 
to require (overly) simplified dramatic devices. 
One of the contributions this thesis makes is: the theoretical overview and 
methodological approach developed here, when applied over different News event(s) 
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sample(s), can be used to undertake critical analysis, assess and draw conclusions as to how 
dramatic codes and conventions are deployed in order to communicate salient issues and 
storylines. Furthermore, that such televisual, journalistic codes, conventions, and storytelling 
devices have tended to favour elite, hegemonic discourse and epistemology.  In short, the 
methodological approach is designed to be applicable when examining Current Affairs 
coverage of different (non-conflict based) storylines. 
What this research, and methodological approach demonstrates is that the specific 
CDA lexical, linguistic and multi-modal methods and tools of analysis identified are 
particularly acute with regards analysing storytelling on television. If storytelling on 
television demands a certain dramatic engagement, then by applying a rigorous CDA 
methodology and approach, one which incorporates Over-Lexicalisation, Lexical Choices, 
Lexical Absences, Ideological Squaring, Attributes, Transitivity/Instransitivity, one can 
undertake rigorous analysis which can reveal the ways in which hegemonic discourse is 
reproduced. If journalism in general, and journalism on television continues to be about 
stories, and if – as appears to be the case – stories are best told through individuals 
(characters, archetypes, stereotypes), then the dramatic elements and the methodological 
approach identified in this research, can provide a discursive and analytical template to be 
applied over many different News and Current Affairs events, storylines and broadcasts.  
 As an example, perhaps we can refer back to my earlier example of the Panorama 
Special Report - Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle (2013). As discussed (see p38-41), this 
particular broadcast focused on the cost to the ‘public purse’ when a range of people were 
‘caught’ claiming various benefits to which they were either wholly not entitled, or that said 
featured protagonists were found to be claiming more benefits than they were entitled to. 
Being the respected and institutionally recognised Current Affairs brand, Panorama: Britain 
on the Fiddle made use of its access to Primary Definers who proceeded to Primarily Define 
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the narrative orientation. The entire frame was provided by these elite-level sources, it clearly 
framed, contextualised and provided the basis for the programme. In short, that some 
(stereotyped feckless individuals) had a ‘case to answer’ was the starting (and end) point of 
the broadcast, and, one assumes the research. The Primary Definer sources were Over-
Lexicalised and positively Attributed, assisted by their location in a social and discursive 
hierarchy. Contrastingly, setting an Ideological Square, the claimants were often Over-
Lexicalised with negative Attributes, framed as deviant agents, threatening the fragility of the 
post-2008 financial crisis political economy. Cast and marked against the legitimated Primary 
Definers, there were even moments of dramatic confrontation, denouement and partial 
narrative closure when the deviant subjects are confronted and then subsequently 
apprehended.   
However, equally – to repeat – if journalism in general, and journalism on television 
continues to be about stories, and if – as it appears to be the case – stories are best told 
through individuals (characters, archetypes, stereotypes), then how could an alternative story 
be told? 
Using the above example: Panorama: Britain on the Fiddle, an alternative means of 
telling the story, would, admittedly require a different frame, a completely different start-
point. However, one could quite easily still deploy the (seemingly favoured) dramatic codes 
and conventions, the classic narrative structure and cast of characters (archetypes at least) and 
still produce a well-sourced, public service oriented, public interest focused piece of 
television Current Affairs broadcasting. Characters and sources would need to be drawn from, 
and located in, wider social contexts, those framed as ‘deviant’ agents could be reframed in a 
wider social, political and economic context (precarious labour, under-employment, rampant 
asset and house-price inflation, and how such structural issues effectively disenfranchise the 
protagonists in late capitalism) but an at least partially sympathetic frame could be drawn 
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around the central protagonists. The already poor and suffering could Primarily Define the 
discourse and epistemology of late capitalism in 21
st
 century Britain. Panorama could, while 
still adhering to the storytelling, classic narrative structure template, tell the story while 
remaining within the confines of ‘impartiality and balance’. That it does not do so, raises 
vitally important questions that this research has sought to examine and interrogate. 
 The principle findings of this research indicate that, increasingly, Current Affairs 
broadcast journalism, of which Panorama remains paradigmatic, is seemingly unable to 
provide the necessary nuance or context. In his 2009 seminal study of the media industry Flat 
Earth News, Nick Davies of The Guardian put it as follows:  
The failure to provide context has multiplied and divided into a preference for human 
interest over issue; for the concrete over the abstract; for the event rather than the 
process; for the current over the historic; for simplicity rather than complexity; for 
certainty rather than doubt. This applies in both print and broadcast, generating 
patterns of distortion so consistent as to amount to a bias against truth. (Davies 2009: 
139) 
 
 In his book, Davies devotes particular attention to general news trends, and his main 
sample(s) are newsprint-based, however the above statement serves here as a rather neat 
summary (echoing Wolfsfeld) of the discourse of Panorama.  
So what might the alternatives be? In truth, the discourse and form(s) are so well 
established that to even attempt an alternative approach is replete with problems. Were any 
alternative, subaltern, counter-hegemonic, critical discursive means employed to tell the 
stories, so well-established, entrenched and ‘common-sensical’ are the standard forms of 
television journalism, that to explain the rationale for the different semiotic, lexical, and 
discursive choices might necessitate an entire series of broadcasts.  
However, I maintain that the standardised (and standard bearer) forms of broadcast 
journalistic practice must be radically shifted in favour of forms that locate contemporary 
issues in their wider ideological, (geo)political, discursive, social and historical context. In 
short, in order to fully ‘tell the story’ (of, in this case, conflict) and inform ‘the public’, 
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Current Affairs in general, and Panorama in particular could (perhaps should) shift away 
from the overly and overtly dramatic and instead (re)turn to an approach that (re)locates 
issues and events in their wider social, historical, ideological and geo-political context. 
Perhaps such a form is possible, but it might need to be a form distanced from journalism as 
it is currently imagined and practiced, and one more readily embedded within and associated 
with documentary practice.  
Either that, or alternatively, if, as contemporary trends suggest, the latest iteration of 
(television) journalism increasingly does focus on the personal, utilising dramatic frames in 
order to tell stories, and if Panorama continues to remain within the genre, the form, and 
utilising the practices and discourses of journalism, adhering to the ‘news values’, with all its 
contemporary attendance to ‘the personal’ and ‘the dramatic’, then it will need to cast its net 
wider. In fact, as the political fallout of 2016 and 2017 continues, as the collapse in the 
political ‘centre ground’ produces a swing away from this notional ‘centre ground’ towards 
both left and right, as the distrust in ‘liberal democracy, and, by extension a media that 
reports on, and is part of ‘liberal democracy continues, then it might be germane to ask a) 
how media deals with and represents this swing away; b) how emergent and disparate 
political formations might deal with a media seemingly incapable of political and ideological 
nuance.  To repeat my own words from above (p313), perhaps then, it is not so much that 
drama, character and emotive representation are present, but who are the ‘subjects of value’ 
(Skeggs and Wood 2011) afforded time, space, depth, interiority, character and that have 
some impact on the direction (even partial) of the unfolding narrative. One of the things that 
the continuing defeats of the left might teach us, is that facts, challenges, fact-checking, 
statistics and data, while important (even vital) do not – on their own – necessarily win 
political victories. In fact, if defeat(s) teach(es) us anything, then it is that character, narrative, 
and stories ‘win hearts and minds’. It is journalistic and Televisual storylines and narratives 
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that shape the political and ideological terrain. In which case, in order to provide the 
necessary wider contextual detail, the Current Affairs journalistic form will need to feature a 
much wider and greater plurality of voices. As documented by Georgina Born, if the BBC are 
serious about plurality and multiplicity, then a radical transformation as to whom ‘primary 
definers’ are will be necessary. If, even in News and Current Affairs broadcasting, we are to 
learn about the world through increasingly dramatised frames, then those featured 
‘characters’ must be drawn from a much more diverse social, political, cultural and economic 
field. A more diverse reservoir of voices and characters must be used. In short, a wider 
coalition of social, political, ideological, cultural and counter-hegemonic identity forms must 
be sought out and represented, and their subsequent place in the discourse(s) (or storylines) 
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Panorama: Summary Paragraphs 
Pre-Conflict Phase: 
Panorama: The Case Against Saddam 
The war of rhetoric between the Bush administration and Saddam Hussein threatens to spill 
over into a bloody confrontation that may change the regime in Baghdad but in the process 
spark a conflagration throughout the Middle East. Amidst this rhetoric, what is the real truth - 
the real case against Saddam? Panorama investigates the evidence against the Iraqi dictator - 
his ambition to create weapons of mass destruction, the instability of a leader described as a 
psychopath and the corruption of his cronies that has let the Iraqi people suffer while 
militarisation continues in secret. 
Discovering the truth 
Using testimony from top scientists in the west, and from defectors who have fled the regime 
carrying its secrets, Panorama examines Saddam's history of developing nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons and reveals just what he still has in his arsenal and where it is hidden. 
In New York we visit the UN Agency charged with finding and destroying his weapons of 
mass destruction and talk to the weapons inspectors involved with assessing his capability. 
Just how close did the Iraqis get to firing missiles with anthrax warheads during the Gulf 
War? And how real now are the claims that Iraq will soon have enough uranium for four 
nuclear bombs? Panorama speaks to the politicians who will be making the case for war - the 
Republican Hawks who are busily plotting the next stage in the War on Terrorism. And we 
speak to the players in the last war to see whether they stand by their action then and whether 
they support a new war. 
"The cult of Saddam" 
We examine the real motivation of Bush and his inner circle and explore the fears of would-
be allies in Britain and Europe, afraid of the price both their own troops and the Iraqi people 
will pay. We also investigate the cult of Saddam himself and his cronies to assess how he 
would react with his back to the wall and what that means for Israel and the Middle East. It 
may be unfinished business for America but what will a war amidst the oilfields in countries 
where Islamic extremists wait in the wings mean for the rest of the world?  
Jane Corbin, the award winning Panorama reporter, has made a number of films about 
Saddam's secret weapons programmes and first brought the public's attention to the threat 
posed by his nuclear, chemical and biological projects. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2264844.stm 
Panorama: Saddam A Warning from History 
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As the USA plots to remove the world's most durable dictator, Panorama investigates 
Saddam's past in a search for clues to his future actions. BBC World Affairs editor John 
Simpson speaks to witnesses who have watched first hand the Iraqi leader's ruthless rise to 
power - and the methods he has employed to hold onto office - to reveal new insights into 
Saddam's volatile personality. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2371697.stm 
Panorama: The Case Against War 
Worried about war with Saddam? Panorama reveals your doubts are shared by many you'd 
expect to back invading Iraq. In the last programme of Panorama's widely-acclaimed year, 
Steve Bradshaw examines the arguments of critics on both sides of the Atlantic, including 
some whose lives could be at risk. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2535973.stm 
Panorama: Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
Panorama goes to Iraq in search of the "smoking gun" that could lead to war. The attention of 
the world has been focused on the UN Weapons Inspectors' search for weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq. During this time, Panorama has gained access to both sides in the game of 
hide and seek that stands between Saddam's Iraq and war.Panorama's Jane Corbin reports 
from Baghdad as it braces itself for conflict. She visits the weapons sites where inspectors 
have been concentrating their efforts, and interviews the Iraqi officials and scientists who run 
them. 
Panorama has followed the inspectors for three months, in Iraq, New York and Vienna, 
during a period which has taken them from early planning, to the battle for more time, as they 
come under increasing pressure from Washington. As one of the few documentary crews that 
has managed to get into Iraq, Panorama visits the sites at the centre of the dossiers compiled 
by the British and US Governments and provides a unique insight into a nation on the brink 
of conflict and invasion. We assess what has happened to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 




Panorama: Blair’s War 
Could Tony Blair lose his job over the Iraq crisis? For two months Panorama has been 
following the opposition to him, in the anti-war movement, in the Labour Party, and in 
Parliament. This is the real-life political drama of a Prime Minister, accused in the past of 
being guided by focus groups, yet apparently now determined to override a million 




Panorama: The Battle for Basra 
As Iraq looks forward to an uncertain future, Panorama's Jane Corbin reports from Basra on 
how the people of Iraq's second city are beginning to shape the future of their shattered city 
and their broken lives. With exclusive access to the British troops in Basra, the programme 
also tells, for the first time, the story of the struggle of Iraqi citizens and the military battle by 
British forces to take control of a city which the coalition never expected to have to have to 
fight for. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2903799.stm 
Panorama: The Race to Baghdad 
Panorama tells the story behind the story of the war. The coalition plan for the invasion of 
Iraq was built on a campaign to remove Saddam Hussein and to be welcomed as liberators. 




Panorama: The Price of Victory 
Every week in Iraq coalition soldiers are being wounded and killed in a conflict which is 
crippling the reconstruction effort. For three long, hot and increasingly violent summer 
months, a Panorama team has been filming on the streets of Baghdad, day in day out 
recording scenes of a city still at war. This powerful documentary examines the nature of the 
resistance in Iraq, gaining access to American troops as they hunt down paramilitaries. 
This is a story of men who came to rebuild a country but who found themselves sucked into 
an urban guerrilla war instead. This is a story also about Baghdad's five million Iraqis whose 
gratitude over liberation is in danger of being squandered amidst a deepening unease over 
occupation. Throughout the programme Panorama scrutinises Iraq's new "occupiers", 
questioning whether the world's most powerful nation is up to the task of rebuilding a country 
as effectively as it can defeat it in war. 
As the reconstruction process falters, Panorama is invited to quiz the key players at the heart 
of the new regime, including Coalition chief Paul Bremer and the former New York cop and 
so-called "Baghdad Terminator" Bernie Kerik. Kicking off the 2003 autumn run in 
Panorama's 50th year, this film also features the last television interview with UN Special 
Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, just 48 hours before his office was destroyed in a car bomb 
attack. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3097864.stm 
Panorama: Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons 
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Panorama has secured exclusive access to the secret and controversial work of the Iraq 
Survey Group as they hunt for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. The failure so far to 
find the weapons the politicians insisted were there has been an embarrassment to Tony Blair 
and George Bush. Iraqi scientists and officials, once part of the regime, give Panorama their 
assessment of whether Saddam really posed a threat to the west and reveal details of one of 
Iraq's illicit weapons programmes. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3261705.stm 
Panorama: Saddam on the Run 
In April 2003, as Saddam's statue was being toppled in Baghdad, US Marines were locked in 
a deadly gun battle with Saddam Hussein and his supporters just across the city. Yet their 
Ace of Spades escaped. The next time the world would see him was at his capture, eight 
months later. For all this time - through handwritten letters, tape recordings, personal 
messages - Saddam stayed in touch with his fellow Ba'athists, helping to direct those fighting 
the Coalition.  
Sheltered by a handful of people, appearing secretly in public, he still thought he could win a 
guerrilla war against the Coalition. Yet all this time, a team of US soldiers and Special Forces 
was methodically closing in on him. How did Saddam Hussein evade capture for so long? 
Where did he hide out? Who protected him? Which family member betrayed Saddam's sons, 
killed in a fierce shoot-out? And who finally betrayed Saddam to the Americans? 
Panorama speaks to the American army generals and ordinary soldiers who tracked and 
caught Saddam; to the bodyguards who once protected the dictator; to the Iraqi minister who 
confronted Saddam in his prison cell; and to the families of those accused of betraying 




























Panorama broadcast Transcripts 




THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM 




JANE CORBIN:  The talk is of war. 
 
BUSH:  Saddam Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger, to suggest 
otherwise is to hope against the evidence.  
 
BLAIR:  Doing nothing in those circumstances is not an option. 
 
CORBIN:  The regime of Saddam Hussein is in the firing line and Britain waits to hear the 
evidence to be put before Parliament tomorrow.  Will it make the case for confronting a man 
who has menaced his people and his region for a quarter of a century?  Over nearly two 
decades Panorama has revealed how Saddam Hussein  
caught, stole, smuggled and copied western technology in a bid to develop weapons of mass 
destruction.   
 
JANE CORBIN 
We’ve put together the hard evidence of what he’s actually got today and what he stands a 
good chance of getting in the not too distant future.  Tonight we ask what is the real case 
against Saddam Hussein and is it strong enough to justify going to war?   
 
Paris, 1975, a visitor with a secret ambition arrived on a costly shopping spree.  He was 
welcomed by the then Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, eager to secure a multi 
billion dollar contract.  The VIP was none other than Saddam Hussein.  He’d come to buy a 
nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes he said, to develop a nuclear power plant.  But back in 
Baghdad Saddam was soon summoning his top atomic energy officials.  He left them in no 
doubt of what he really wanted.  Dr Hussain Shahristani, then the head of Iraq’s civilian 
atomic programme and a man opposed to nuclear weapons was at the meeting with Saddam.   
 
DR SHAHRISTANI:  It was clear to me and to everybody else at the meeting that he meant 
that he wanted the scientists at the Atomic Energy to devote all their time to develop a 
nuclear bomb for him.  I chose at that time basically to remind him very innocently if you 
like, that Iraq had signed the non-proliferation treaty with the  
International Atomic Energy Agency, and then he just looked at me and he said Dr Hussain, 





CORBIN:  Dr Shahristani refused to participate in Saddam Hussein’s new venture.  The 
President tried brutal persuasion. 
 
DR SHAHRISTANI:  In the torture chambers they start by hanging a person till their arms 
are usually paralysed and then they give them electric shocks on their sensitive parts of their 
body, their private parts and so on.  They will keep on at it, day in, day out, not allowing a 
person to sleep.  That went on for 22 days in my case.  
 
CORBIN:   For 11 years Saddam Hussein kept Dr Shahristani in prison.  The dictator still 
needed a more compliant scientist to develop his bomb programme.  Dr Jaffar Jaffa, a 
brilliant London University trained physicist was the man for the job.  He too needed some 
persuading at first. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL- SHAHRISTANI 
Former Senior Scientific Advisor 
Atomic Energy Organisation of Iraq 
Dr Jaffa himself for example was the key figure, the single person that was really responsible 
for all the technology and development.  I know that he has been brought to prison and they 
brought other  people and tortured them to death in front of him. Till he cracked down and he 
just couldn't take it anymore and he said you  
know..  I’m not going to be a cause for all these people to be tortured like this till they die, 
and he decided to go back to work. 
 
CORBIN:  By 1981 the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was about to go on line.  But spies 
were watching closely and in July Israel sent warplanes to scupper Saddam’s plans.  They 
took out Osirak before Iraq could divert the plutonium it would produce to build the bomb.  
Saddam Hussein was undeterred.  In 1990 Panorama revealed how a British company sold 
machine tools to Iraq.  They helped create a new clandestine nuclear programme to replace 
what Israel had destroyed.  Saddam still harboured nuclear ambitions. Using Iraq’s huge oil 
revenues he scoured the world for nuclear technology.  He couldn't resist gloating publicly 
but despite western embargoes he could still smuggle forbidden parts into Iraq to build 
atomic weapons. 
 
He looks pretty determined in those pictures.  What do you think, seeing him there holding 
that piece of nuclear technology? 
 
SHAHRISTANI:  Absolutely, I mean he has been very determined to get this programme 
going.  He sent his stepbrother who was in charge of the Iraqi intelligence at that time, 
Barazan al Tikriti, and he told me: “We need the atomic bomb because that will give us a 
long arm to reshape the map of the Middle East.” 
 
CORBIN:  A hawkish member of the American administration in the 80s, Richard Perle, is 
again a key advisor in the Pentagon today.  He’s speaking in his personal capacity he says, on 
the subject of Saddam Hussein. 
 
RICHARD PERLE:  He believes that nuclear weapons will transform Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein into a world power of such a character that we will be unable to oppose his 




CORBIN:  Saddam Hussein’s ambition was made clear in August 1990.  He invaded his 
neighbour Kuwait to grab it’s enormous oil well.  Iraq had already developed chemical and 




General Sir PETER DE LA BILLIERE 
Commander, UK Forces, Gulf War 
The Iraqis had chemical weapons, we knew that.  They had biological weapons, we knew 
that.  They had used them, we knew that.  And they were going to be fighting what Saddam 




Brig. General JOHN LEIDE 
Director of Coalition Intelligence, Gulf War 
I would wake up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat just thinking about would they use 
them. 
 
CORBIN:  But Saddam’s hands were tied.  He’d invaded Kuwait before he developed his 
atomic warheads.  He was afraid to use his chemical weapons for fear of what that might 
bring. 
 
General COLIN POWELL  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 
And of course there was always the implicit threat of nuclear weapons.  I don’t think we ever 
would have used them, but nevertheless the Iraqis didn’t know that and we could have if 





Iraqi Foreign Minister, 1991 
We didn’t think that it was wise to use them.  That’s all what I can say, that it was not wise to 
use such kind of weapons in such kind of a war with such an enemy. 
 
CORBIN:   Panorama was there when the superior military might of the west forced Saddam 
out of Kuwait.  His retreating army was devastated along the road of death that led back 
towards Iraq.  Kuwait was liberated but Saddam did not withdraw gracefully.  His parting 
vindictive order was to fire the Kuwaiti oil wells. It was a defiant sign he would not easily 
abandon his quest to control the region. The world decided it must contain the dangerous 
ambitions of the Iraqi dictator. And so the United Nations sent weapons inspectors to route 
out and destroy forever Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction.  They discovered that the 
scope of his ambition was greater and better hidden than they had thought.    The leader of the 
team of UN nuclear inspectors in Iraq was David Kay.  He discovered four extensive separate 
programmes to develop nuclear weapons alone.   
 
DAVID KAY:  You have to remember that we ultimately found over 24 large facilities that 
employed somewhere between 20 and 30 thousand Iraqis and cost 10 billion dollars.  The 




CORBIN:  For 7 years Saddam Hussein and the UN inspectors played an elaborate game of 
cat and mouse.  The inspectors chased and Iraqi officials tried to hide forbidden technology 
before they pounced. 
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92 
They managed to conceal physical facilities from some of the best technical intelligence in 
the world and they managed even while we carried out the inspections to learn how to 
conceal things to defeat ways we were actively using against us and in fact to carry their own 
programme on while we continued inspections. 
 
CORBIN:  The difficulties were evident, when David Kaye arrived unexpectedly at (Faluja?).  
Forbidden to enter a secure industrial area he persuaded military guards to let him climb a 
watchtower to get a better view.  The inspectors saw massive metal disks being driven 
hurriedly away, calutrons machines used to process  
nuclear material. 
 
UN INSPECTOR:  ?? movement on this site at this point puts you in clear violation of the 
Security Council Resolution, the Commander is in serious violation of an agreement that your 
own government has signed. 
 
CORBIN:  It was a lucky break for the UN inspectors but not for the unfortunate Iraqi guards.  
They paid the price for not protecting Saddam’s most valuable asset. 
 
KAY:  We do know that several Iraqis that we came across, I’m thinking particularly at 
Faluja of the base commander who made the mistake of allowing me to place men on a water 
tower overseeing the facility while he waited for permission to let us in, and consequently we 
observed them moving around the calutrons.  We know fairly certainly that he was executed 
the next week by a firing squad for his mistake. 
 
CORBIN:  The calutrons were disabled and left in the desert where they could be monitored.  
The UN couldn't trust the Iraqis not to salvage material and start up their nuclear quest again.  
There was continual confrontation with the Iraqi officials. The Deputy Head of the UN 
Mission, Bob Galucci, recalls one of the occasions when he caught out an Iraqi official.  
Galucci revealed he had a list of nuclear equipment imported from abroad.  Despite official 
denials that Iraq had any of it. 
 
BOB GALUCCI:  The Iraqi who led his side consulted with his colleagues and said he would 
take us the next day to show us these components and that they were destroying them.  I 
noted that he had a moment ago said there were none, and that now he was telling me 
something entirely different.  He said yes.  There was nothing about this that embarrassed 
him, nothing about having lied that seemed to trouble him.  When I indicated that we could 
save a lot of time if they gave us truthful responses to our questions, he told me that this was 
really not a cooperative endeavour. 
 
CORBIN:  When the United Nations inspectors uncovered Iraq’s extensive nuclear 
programme it was being led by the London educated Dr Jaffa.  Dr Jaffa tried to stop the 
weapons inspectors from getting their hands on lists of those who worked in the nuclear 




Dr ROBERT GALLUCCI 
Deputy Executive Chairman 
UNSCOM.  1991-92 
That large establishment was manned by nuclear physicists and engineers, experts of all 
kinds.  To the best of our knowledge, most of these, if not virtually all of these people are still 
in Iraq, so the significance of that kind of expertise ready to be engaged cannot be overstated.  
It is extremely important if one is trying to assess how far away Iraq is from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. 
 
KAY:  We got the documents but even we knew we didn’t get the original and only copy of 
any of those documents.  In this digital age and Xerox age that’s not possible.  So the Iraqis 
actually were left with copies of those documents that we removed.  I did not know, nor did 
any of us know, how you remove technology knowledge from the minds of people who have 
already learned the secrets of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
CORBIN:  So what do we now know about where Saddam has got to in his ambition to 
acquire atomic weapons?  His scientists ran an extensive network of research facilities and 
they still have the design for the device to trigger a nuclear weapon.  Saddam has the raw 
material for the bomb.  Natural uranium mined and  
processed inside Iraq.  But it needs to be enriched to reach weapons grade.  Now there’s new 
information that Saddam is seeking centrifuges, machines to enrich uranium, just as he did 
before.  In the last 14 months several shipments, a total of 1000 aluminium centrifuge tubes 
have been intercepted by intelligence agencies before they actually reached Iraq.   
 
KAY:  I’ve seen one of them.  The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design which is 
German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed therefore 
enriched uranium, that is taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a 
weapon. 
 
CORBIN:  What does it tell you, the fact that they’re trying to get several of these?  There 
have been several shipments. 
 
KAY:  Well it tells me that they’re going for a large scale programme over a thousand 
centrifuges which in fact is what they were going for before the Gulf War intervened. 
 
CORBIN:  But there’s another, quicker way Iraq could get the essential fissile material, 
enriched uranium or plutonium on the black market.  As Panorama reported in 1993, the 
former Soviet state of Kazakhstan was just one place where poorly guarded enriched uranium 
was secretly sought by Middle Eastern countries.  If he could buy such material, Saddam 
would be much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than if he had to laboriously enrich 
uranium in his own centrifuges.  The British government’s dossier will reveal tomorrow that 
Saddam has tried several times to smuggle fissile material from countries in the former Soviet 
Union and Africa.  Criminal elements are helping the Iraqis but so far the dossier says they 
have not succeeded. 
 
KAY:  They could be as close as right now if Saddam manages to obtain fissile material from 
example the former Soviet Union where corruption and insecurity unfortunately still reigns.  
If he in fact has to produce his own material himself the best guess is somewhere in the three 
to six year period but that’s a soft number.  I  
362 
 
don’t know exactly when that period began.  It could have begun a year ago or two years ago 
even. 
 
CORBIN:  But the real answer is we just don’t know.  It is not necessarily imminent. 
 
KAY:  It’s not necessarily imminent but it’s not necessarily far off.  Just don’t know means 
just don’t know. 
 
RICHARD PERLE 
Chairman, Defense Policy Board 
Department of Defence 
It’s a race against time, it’s a race against his crossing that threshold before you have 
restrained him.  So I don’t know what sort of evidence a mushroom cloud would be a 
powerful statement but do you want to wait for that? 
 
CORBIN:  The Chief Civil Servant at the MoD during the Gulf War was Sir Michael 
Quinlan, the man who developed Britain’s nuclear deterrence policy.  But he’s sceptical 
about the urgency of dealing with Saddam. 
 
SIR MICHAL QUINLAN:  I find the desire to push this forward in great haste disquieting.  
No one claims that Saddam has nuclear weapons now.  I’ve seen no compelling evidence that 
he is very close to getting nuclear weapons and that stands quite aside from the question of 
even if he has them.  Even if one day he gets them, why will not deterrence work as it has in 
so many other contexts and as it did with Saddam. 
 
CORBIN:  But things have changed.  Doomsday scenarios have haunted the Bush 
administration ever since the day a year ago when the President learnt America was under 
direct attack. The nations greatest city devastated by a small group of terrorists.  A threat 
which few in America had taken seriously until the unthinkable  
happened.   
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-92 
9/11 is a prism through which American political leaders are examining everything that 
occurred since 9/11 and every threat. 
 
PERLE:  What September 11 did was bring home in a way that no amount of abstract debate 
could have, the dangers of waiting until it’s too late.   
 
KAY:  They’ve realised they can’t.. cannot count on intelligence to provide them with the 
warning of when he truly becomes dangerous and consequently they have to deal with him in 
the hear and now as opposed to try to interrupt him after an attack has begun.  
 
CORBIN:  After September 11th hawks in the American administration, who’d long been 
pressing for Saddam’s removal, suddenly had the ear of the President and the American 
people. 
 
Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN 
Permanent Under-Secretary  
Ministry of Defence, 1988-92 
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I understand very well that the appalling thing that was done to America on 9/11 has changed 
psychology.  I don’t myself believe, though, that it directly affects the Saddam situation.  
Saddam was not behind it.  We still have to assess the Iraq problem in terms which are 
directly relevant to Iraq.  It doesn’t create some special  
new legitimacy that didn’t exist before.   
 
CORBIN:  It’s not just Iraq’s nuclear threat that’s being viewed differently through the prism 
of 9/11.  In 1986 Panorama revealed the pesticide plant at Samara. Saddam was developing 
chemical weapons.  He used them first against Iranian soldiers in the long and bitter war with 
his neighbours in which a million men were sacrificed.  And then in 1988 he turned them 
against his own people.  A cloud of poison gasses enveloped the town of Halabja.  Five 
thousand people died, most of them women and children.  Chemical weapons were outlawed 
by every international convention, but Saddam was then the ally of the west against the 
mullahs in Iran.  Nothing was done.   
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Former Senior Scientific Advisor 
Atomic Energy Organisation of Iraq 
The west even allowed him to use his weapons of mass destruction against his own people 
and they covered it up for him, so they’ve not only allowed him and helped him to produce 
weapons of mass destruction, they even allowed him to use them against his own people 
during the Iran Iraq war.  I mean this is well known and this  
is something that they don’t even deny, but as one of them have said, you know..we have 
always known that Saddam was son of a bitch but he was our son of a bitch.  Now he’s 
different.  So when Saddam was basically serving their purposes, they were very happy to let 
him do whatever he wanted to do. 
 
PERLE:  We were wrong in 1988 not to take him on then.  We mustn’t repeat that mistake.  
And the fact that we failed in 1988 is hardly an argument for failing in 2002. 
 
CORBIN:  Halabja was just one example of Saddam’s willingness to slaughter and torture his 
own people.  As Panorama found out 20 years ago in the first ever western interview with the 
Iraqi President, he makes no apology for using violence to crush his opponents at home and 
abroad. 
 
SADDAM HUSSEIN:  (translator)   The opposition in our country, it was no longer a local 
opposition, but an international opposition. Q:  Should it be subject to torture and executions? 
 
HUSSEIN:  Yes.  It calls for it to be subject to execution and to torture. 
 
CORBIN:  Yet despite all this the west went on selling Saddam technology.  There were fat 




ALAN CLARK MP 
Minister of State 
Ministry of Defence, 1989-92 
I think our attitude on this is very much coloured now by the fact that we did actually 
subsequently go to war with Iraq and it is a risk that is always present when you're selling to 
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dictatorships. You just have to weigh up the probabilities and weigh that probability against 
the economic advantages of the trade. 
 
CORBIN:  When the inspectors uncovered Saddam’s chemical weapons programme after the 
Gulf War they found nearly half a million litres of chemical warfare agents and the 
precursors, the material to make them.  Iraq finally admitted they had made nearly 4 tons of 
the nerve agent VX, one microscopic droplet can kill.  The inspectors also found and 
destroyed 38,000 munitions.  They were filled with mustard gas and deadly sarin.   Colonel 
Terry Taylor worked for the UN in Iraq for 4 years, using his expertise in chemical and 
biological weapons.   
 
TAYLOR:  They finally admitted to production of VX but we don’t know how much there is. 
We know they had problems in its manufacture and particularly the stability of this particular 
agent, but they had continued to work on this and this would probably be the most valuable 
weapon in their chemical arsenal which we’re  
convinced is still progressing. 
 
CORBIN:  So where has Saddam got to in rebuilding his chemical weapons capability today?  
He still has enough material to manufacture 200 tons of VX gas in just a few weeks. And he’s 
got several hundred tons of mustard gas, the choking agent he’s used before, plus several 
thousand munitions to deliver it on the  
battlefield.  This summer a chemical plant at Faluja showed signs of being rebuilt after an 
earlier pounding from British and US warplanes.  Satellite pictures revealed new chemical 
storage tanks, buildings and piping systems.  The CIA believes Saddam is up to his old tricks, 
producing chlorine here, but far more than Iraq actually needs.  Chlorine is an ingredient in 
some chemical weapons.  It is, however, impossible to tell from the air just what’s in these 
tanks and pipes, even harder to detect and contain is Iraq’s other existing weapons of mass 
destruction  
programme, its biological or germ warfare plan.  It took the UN years to begin to uncover it.  
The Iraqis blocked them at every turn.  But the inspectors unpicked a trail of documents 
showing Iraq had imported 40 tons of growth medium on which to culture bacteria. It was 20 
times what the country’s hospitals actually needed. 
 
Colonel TERRY TAYLOR 
Chief Inspector, UNSCOM, 1993-97 
It was the quantities that made us suspicious.  They had all sorts of extraordinary stories 
about where this material might have been used and so on, and eventually they were forced to 
admit that they were lying and the documents were forged.   
 
CORBIN:  The Iraqis did their best to keep their key bio weapons researches hidden.  At a 
laboratory supposedly for civilian purposes, a scientist tried to slip past Terry Taylor. 
 
TAYLOR:  I said I’m Terry Taylor and he immediately introduced himself, so I knew he was 
the right man, and asked him if he would give me the documents which he did. 
 
CORBIN:  And what did they reveal? 
 
TAYLOR:  Well after getting past his wife’s driving license application which was on the top 
and at the back, they revealed.. there was a report on his work with a team on research and 
development to see if ricin would be  viable biological warfare agent.  He was looking at 
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delivering it in aerosol form, a very fine powder or dust or this dry aerosol form, and a very, 
very tiny quantity of that, if inhaled, would kill a human being quite quickly. 
 
CORBIN:  It was only when this man, a son-in-law of Saddam’s fled Baghdad 4 years after 
the Gulf War that the inspectors gained a real insight into Iraq’s bio-weapons programme. 
Hussein Kamal was the head of Saddam’s special weapons projects.  He brought with him 
Iraq’s most closely guarded germ warfare secrets.  A  
homesick Kamal was however persuaded by the President to return, assured of a warm 
welcome.  Instead he was executed on Saddam’s orders with 40 members of his family.  
Armed with Kamal’s information the UN inspectors set off for Al-Hakam, an agricultural 
complex.  They found thousands of litres of anthrax,  
botulinium, an aflatoxin which causes liver cancer.  Iraqi officials insisted they never planned 
to actually deploy the killer spores and toxins in weapons.  But when the river next to the 
factory was dredged, warhead were found, weapons modified to take biological agents.  The 
inspectors were convinced that Iraq kept thousands  
of litres of other biological stocks and substantial amounts of the growth medium on which to 
culture germs.  Al-Hakam had been unmasked but not Iraq’s entire bio-weapons programme.  
Despite destroying 14 major weapons facilities the UN believed that others are still 
undiscovered.  With no independent observers on the  
ground in Iraq since 1998 it’s almost impossible to tell how true the rumours are.  Which are 
emerging from intelligence agencies around the world.   
 
This summer German intelligence hinted that the biological toxin ricin was again being 
produced at Faluja, the huge Iraqi chemical complex.  New warehouses had appeared in one 
part of the site amongst the bomb destruction.  One man decided to investigate.  Hans von 
Sponeck was a former under secretary who had supervised the UN’s humanitarian projects in 
Baghdad.  He’d resigned in protest of the UN’s sanctions policy against Iraq.  In mid July this 
year Mr von Sponeck returned to Baghdad with the blessing of the regime, a film crew in 
tow.  He wanted to investigate his tip off that ricin was being extracted from the waste at a 
castor oil  
plant at Faluja.  The Iraqis had notice that he was coming.  There were only derelict or 
abandoned buildings in the one area he had asked to see.   
 
HANS VON SPONECK 
UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq 
1998-2000 
There was nothing.  There were empty halls but the key of this facility that I was interested in 
was the castor oil facility that was specifically singled out by intelligence organs to argue that 
it was functioning and producing chemical agents.  And that facility again I could verify as a 
non-specialist that it was disabled, that there was nothing and there hadn’t been anything. It 
was rusting away with pipe connections being severed and absolutely in a state where it could 
do.. could produce nothing. 
 
CORBIN:  A month later western reporters were taken to Faluja.  The Iraqis insisted that 
barrels stored in the new warehouses were pesticides for agricultural use.   
 
IRAQI SPOKESPERSON:  As you see, those barrels are not sealed.  If they were chemical or 




CORBIN:  The reporters only saw one small part of the vast complex and not being experts 
could only report what they Iraqis told them.  But he’s known to have hidden his chemical 
weapons production facilities all over  
the place.  There are many sites duel use, it’s hard to really know what’s going on in Iraq. 
 
SPONTECK:  I would agree that it is not easy to know what’s happening in Iraq but the 
important point to remember is that we have in different areas, in the humanitarian field as 
well as in the disarmament field, we have examples where information is given to the public, 
information is given to political decision makers  
which is wrong.  That was what worries me because you don’t want to end up involving 
Europe and the US in a war based on conjecture and disinformation. 
 
CORBIN:  With all the uncertainty what do we actually know about the state of Saddam’s 
biological programme today.  The exact locations are still shrouded in secrecy.  But Iraq is 
known to have retained several tons of growth medium to culture bacteria and the UN and 
most experts believe there are still stocks of anthrax viable today, and most importantly Iraq 
still possesses the industrial capability and the know-how to produce new bio-weapons 
quickly and in quantity. 
 
Have you any doubt that Iraq continues to stockpile some biological agents and to have the 
ability to produce more in fairly short order. 
 
TAYLOR:  I have absolutely no doubt whatsoever.  Some of these stocks will obviously 
become less effective over time, but they have the capability to carry out production at times 
when and where they wish to do so. 
 
CORBIN:  There are no inspectors now inside Iraq to verify what Saddam is up to. But there 
is the testimony of recent defectors who brought out new information about his weapons 
programme.  Some are unreliable but we’ve spoken to two who we understand are believed to 
be credible in what they say about the Iraqi regime. 
 
Abandoning his prosperous engineering company Adnan Saeed Al-Haideri fled Iraq 9 
months ago before disappearing into protective custody he gave this exclusive television 
interview. 
 
HAIDERI:  I am engineer.. civil engineer but I am advised in clinical construction. 
 
CORBIN:  Haideri has details of 20 secret facilities where he went to fit out 
specialised buildings.  He believes they were sites for developing chemical, 




ADNAN SAEED AL-HAIDERI 
Iraq civil engineer 
This is a mixture of.. ammonia mixture, as I said.  Inside of these buildings, I did 
the finishing that they needed for clean area antibacterial, resistance to bacteria and 
this just for four chemicals.  This place is not normal place, not for normal 




CORBIN:  So the new weapons and technology have been hidden away in heavily 
populated areas, even under a hospital in Baghdad according to Haideri.  Beneath 
Saddam’s many presidential palaces too, and weapons are constantly on the move 
to outwit the vigilant spy planes. 
 
HAIDERI:  The important thing is.. the important, very secretive thing, this didn’t 
fixed in one place, always it’s mobile, movable in any place. He produced here and 
after a month or 20 days go to other place, and change of place again. 
 
CORBIN:  Haideri’s most harrowing account comes from people forced to work 
inside the secret weapons programme.  They’ve told him Saddam’s ordered the 
testing of chemical weapons on prisoners. 
 
HAIDERI:  He said they test chemicals on them.  They take ten people, they put 
masks on five of them and five without mask, and testing chemical weapons on 
them, and they waiting when this with masks died and without masks when he died. 
So there is very.. for them is very cheap to kill these people. 
 
CORBIN:  Another defector has described how Saddam has siphoned off billions 
through illegal oil exports. Shadowy front companies fund the smuggling of 
forbidden technology from the black market in Russia and other countries.  Once a 
top aid to Saddam’s son, Abbas Al Janabi was imprisoned but managed to flee 
Baghdad four years ago. 
 
AL JANABI:  I worked now 15 years, I am very close to all the inner circle, 
anybody in this circle we know each other. 
 
CORBIN:  Al Janabi reveals how Saddam has constructed a web of deceit and 
corruption in which the President himself sits and at the very centre. 
 
ABBAS AL JANABI 
Personal Assistant to Uday Hussein 
1983-98 
People inside this inner circle, even those people divided into this group 
responsible for the smuggling, this group responsible for hiding the weapons or 
hiding.. you know..  the machines, the equipment and a group hiding all the 
documents. So each one doesn’t know, but those who control the operation – 
maybe 5 or 6. 
 
CORBIN:  And they know everything. 
 
AL JANABI:  They know everything, they have.. you know..  each line comes to a 
point and this point is controlled by Saddam Hussein. 
 
CORBIN:  So could the man at the centre of the secrets weapons programme 
threaten the west directly?  As Panorama reported in 1989 Saddam was already 
seeking long range missiles.  They would be the most essential element in his 
weapons of mass destruction arsenal enabling him to hit his neighbours in the 
region.  Saddam had used his scuds, conventional warheads, to strike at Israel and 
the inspectors destroyed almost all the hundreds of missiles which remained.  The 
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UN found Iraq had secret ambitions to build intercontinental rockets which would 
go even further. They were confident they had stopped Saddam.  But there will be 
new evidence tomorrow in the British government’s dossier, evidence that Saddam 
is rebuilding mobile platforms to launch his missiles from. 
 
AL-JANABI:  They managed to rebuild them completely and these are five 
platforms, I know about them. 
 
CORBIN:  Mr Al-Janabi says he saw the platforms during a Baghdad arms parade, 
not on public display but at a special showing for the inner circle. 
 
AL-JANABI:  We filmed the people working on these platforms to repair with 
spare parts from outside Iraq, mainly from Russia.  I am not saying that they bought 
it directly from Russia, you know..  the black market is very huge and I am quite 
sure the operation was done by the black market, and they managed to rebuild five 
platforms. 
 
CORBIN:  So how far has Saddam got in developing his missiles today?  Experts 
believe he has at most 24 scuds which could hit neighbouring countries.  They can 
be fitted with biological or chemical warheads but they’re unreliable.  And though 
Iraq still wants to develop rockets, with a range of 1500 kilometres, the country’s 
missile project is still best described as modest. 
 
Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN 
Permanent Under-Secretary 
Minister of Defence, 1988-92 
It would take him years to get to the point where he could directly threaten the 
United States, and even if he did, there’s still the point about deterrence.  Why 
would he dare, unless we ourselves force his back right against the wall. 
 
CORBIN:  You mean unless we put him in a position where he has to lash out. 
 
QUINLAN:  Where he has nothing left to lose.  At the moment, what he has to lose 
is his survival in power which is I think what he prizes above everything else, and it 
would be strange to say the least if we now rush to take the one step that might 
provoke him into using these weapons. 
 
CORBIN:  But Western intelligence has detected another system by which Saddam 
could deliver chemical and biological agents. 
 
US MILITARY OFICER:  We attacked the L29 unmanned aerial vehicle 
programme which he developed for the delivery of biological and chemical 
weapons. 
 
CORBIN:  Four years ago when British planes bombed an Iraqi airfield they 
exposed a hangar full of trainer aircraft which were being reconfigured as 
unmanned drones to carry Saddam’s weapons. 
 
Colonel TERRY TAYLOR 
Chief Inspector, UNSCOM, 1993-97 
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They’re continuing work on this and this remotely piloted vehicle can carry spray 
tanks which could deliver not just biological weapons but also chemical spray as 
well, and that could go out to about 600 kilometres, so about the same range as a 
missile could.  So they will have a small number of those unmanned aerial vehicles 
as we call them. 
 
CORBIN:  So what’s our final assessment of Saddam Hussein’s secret weapons 
programmes?  What we know now isn’t radically different from what we’ve known 
for a number of years.  He still has chemical and biological weapons or the means 
to make them quickly.  And his nuclear ambition remains the same, although it’s 
clear he’s some years away from building the bomb.  Unless he can save time by 
smuggling in the necessary enriched uranium, it’s clear that Saddam Hussein has no 
missiles with which to hit New York or London.  But following September 11th a 
new method of delivering WMD, weapons of mass destruction has become 
President Bush’s nightmare.  The suicide terrorist carries a biological or chemical 
weapon to an American city in a suitcase. There is no direct evidence to link 
Saddam to Al-Qaeda, although the Bush administration has tried hard to find some. 
But Saddam Hussein has had links to other terror groups in the past. 
 
RICHARD PERLE 
Chairman, Defense Policy Board 
Department of Defense 
The terrorist links add another dimension which is.. it raises the question of 
whether he might not choose to disseminate these terrible weapons through suicidal 
maniacs who are terrorists in other organisations.  I mean we’ve seen people.. 
 
CORBIN:  But he’s likely to do that if you push his back to the wall.  He’ll give a 
weapon to a terrorist, you're creating the problem possibly by making this push 
against him. 
 
PERLE:  Well the same logic would have said alright we throw up our hands and 
leave Hitler forever, he can do what he likes.  We can’t oppose him because if we 
oppose him he will do the thing we’re trying to stop.  It only gets worse with the 
passage of time. 
 
QUINLAN:  Certainly like a number of other countries in the region he has been 
sympathetic to terrorists, he has given them a degree of support and succour but the 
idea that he has been the main driver of terrorism seems to me, to put it politely, to 
lack evidence.  And the idea that he would put WMD in the hands of terrorists out 
of his own control and that he might be found out later and have to take the 
consequences seems to me deeply implausible. 
 
CORBIN:  Four years ago the Secretary General tried in vain to persuade Saddam 
Hussein to keep the UN in Iraq to contain his weapons of mass destruction.  But the 
inspectors were thrown out and a divided UN Security Council let Saddam get 
away with it.  Now, his future hanging in the balance, Saddam has offered to have 
the inspectors back again. 
 
TAYLOR:   In my view, and perhaps I’m an optimist, but it’s worth giving another 
chance the inspectors, unfettered, unconstrained, no links to any other issue, and 
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perhaps say to Iraq by a certain date, take the inspectors back.  We’re not 
negotiating over conditions that might surround it.  The obligation is on you, Iraq, 
and I think that’s the way inspections should work, and it’s worth another shot. 
 
CORBIN:  Shouldn't the weapons inspectors, though, be given a chance to find 
these things before we resort to war? 
 
PERLE:  Well I can only give you a personal view which is if you know that the 
mission is going to fail, why bother?  Why give Saddam the additional time that’s 
involved in demonstrating that the inspections will fail and how do you know what 
you're accomplishing with inspections? 
 
CORBIN:  There will be no smoking gun to warrant immediate action when the 
British government lays out its evidence against Saddam tomorrow, just more 
details of his efforts to procure forbidden technology.  But for those on both sides 
of the Atlantic who’ve made up their minds to get rid of him, the decision is based 
on the nature of Saddam’s regime.  They want to act pre-emptively before he 
reaches his goal of nuclear weapons. 
 
If Mr Blair fails to convince the British public and Parliament that the case against 
Saddam has been made, will you deal with Saddam anyway, America? 
 
RICHARD PERLE 
Chairman, Defense Policy Board 
Department of Defense 
No President, no country, can allow it’s security to be dependent on the views of 
others.  I don’t see how the President can do anything other than the best job he can 
arrange at protecting the American people and he is convinced that if Saddam is left 
in place he will ultimately do terrible damage to the United States. 
 
Sir MICHAEL QUINLAN 
Permanent Under-Secretary 
Minister of Defence, 1988-92 
I think we have to think very carefully about war. It’s always a very grave thing to 
do and we can’t be sure how it will go.  Do you remember what Churchill said? 
“Never, never, never assume that any war will be smooth and easy.”  Even if it goes 
easily, this hypothetical invasion, a huge amount of damage will be done.  It may go 
less than easily and whatever way the military operation goes, there is still the 
enormous problem, the enormous uncertainties about the future of Iraq and the 
future of the region. 
 
CORBIN:  The dilemma is that if politicians do not act, Saddam will continue 
down the nuclear path.  But if he’s attacked, then he may use his chemical or 
biological agents.  The hawks are clear where America’s interests lie. 
 
Well if containment has failed with Saddam Hussein, what message does that send 
to other states seeking weapons of mass destruction about the attitude America will 
take towards them? 
 
PERLE:  Well I hope it sends the message that if you pursue weapons of mass 
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destruction and if you are a threat to the United States, we will not stand by and 
allow you to achieve your objectives. 
 
CORBIN:  The Bush administration has put Saddam and the rest of the world on 
































A Warning From History 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 3:11:02 
....................................................... 
................. 
“Conflict: Desert Storm” 
SIMPSON:  A brand new game has hit America’s computer screens as Saddam  
Hussein lurks in his bunker the forces of freedom and democracy close in for the  
kill.  It treats Saddam as just another cartoon villain.  In Iraq he seems equally two  
dimensional.  Every single night state television broadcasts a different music video  
starring him.  But which of Saddam’s many faces is the real one?  And as the final  
showdown comes, what lessons can we draw from the past about what he will do  
now? 
 
SIMPSON:  For years Saddam Hussein has been fooling everyone.  A German  
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forensic scientist Dieter Buhmann, armed with the latest computer technology, has  
analysed thousands of hours of video footage and made an extraordinary discovery. 
 
BUHMANN:  On the left side is the real Mr Saddam Hussein, on the right side is  
Mr Hussein in the year 94. 
 
SIMPSON:  He takes careful measurements of the images of the genuine Saddam.   
He knows there is one double but he is surprised at what he finds. 
 
BUHMANN:  I found the left one is the real Saddam Hussein in the year 1990, the  
second is a double and that is the other doubles. 
 
SIMPSON:  Are you absolutely certain that those are four different men that we are  
looking at there? 
 
BUHMANN:  I am absolutely sure. 
 
SIMPSON:  It’s part survival technique, part a useful convenience.  Saddam can’t  
be bothered to meet the less important foreign visitors.  The Austrian far right  
leader Joerg Heider for instance.  He thought he was meeting the real Saddam.  
Dieter Buhmann shows he merely met a fake. 
 
BUHMANN:  This is a picture of the double, you see a lot of differences in the  
anatomical areas.  The corner of the left eyelid is in the wrong place.  The top of the  
nose has another form and the ear is different and altogether you can be sure that  
they are two different persons. 
 
SIMPSON:  It’s Saddam’s birthday and the people of Baghdad are celebrating  
compulsorily.  Privately almost everyone would be glad to get him off their backs  
but it is suicidal to say so.  The images are everywhere but the man himself is  
nowhere to be seen.  His elusiveness has helped to keep him in power for 23 years.   
But now, as the American pressure on him builds up, those who have watched him  
are certain that he will come out and fight. 
 
Sir STEPHEN EGERTON 
British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82 
I don’t think bullies die in bunkers.  He will always try and get out somehow. 
 
General BRENT SCOWCROFT 
US National Security Advisor, 1989-93 
I think he is an absolutely dangerous man.  Because he is relentless.  He simply  
doesn’t quit. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Former Chief Scientist 
Iraq’s civil nuclear programme  
He was on record on Iraqi television, when he first came to power, saying that we  
have come to stay.  If we have to go, everybody else will be going with us. 
 
SIMPSON:  Saddam’s violent, proud, defiant character was formed by a dreadful  
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childhood, deprived and brutalised 12 miles from the town of Tikrit.  He was born  
here 65 years ago.  This is the first time his closest childhood friend has spoken  
publicly about him. 
 
IBRAHIM ZOBEDI 
Childhood friend of Saddam 
He feels that he is lonely, nobody likes him, especially his uncle always, you know,  
laugh at him and treated him as a dummy.  He doesn’t like to go to school, he is  
always alone, walked alone, stay alone, and he has very, very few friends. 
 
SIMPSON:  He was routinely beaten by his step-father. 
 
HASSAN AL-ALAWI 
Former friend of Saddam 
He used to carry an iron bar to protect himself from stray dogs or other people.   
Society neglected Saddam when he was a child.  Saddam grew up believing that the  
only thing he could trust was that iron bar. 
 
SIMPSON:  The child with the iron bar turned into a violent youth but he was soon  
to find an outlet for all this violence.  In 1950’s Baghdad the young Saddam was  
drawn into nationalist politics.  Iraq has had a long tradition of political murder.  At  
22 the opposition Ba’ath party recruited him to assassinate the Iraqi president in his  
car.  Saddam loved the whole business.  He wasn’t ashamed of what he had done,  
on the contrary, he would one day hire a Hollywood director to make a film about  
it.   
 
“The Long Days” 
 
SIMPSON:  You have to watch quite carefully to realise that the attack actually  




That was the first time anybody heard about somebody called Saddam Hussein and  
that is the way he rose to power.  It wasn’t through any of the institutions or  
organisations of the State, it was through being a tough thug - really - for the party. 
 
SIMPSON:  Even by Iraq’s bloody standards, Saddam’s Ba’athists were ferocious,  
yet when they seized power in 1968 they had the backing of the CIA which thought  
their nationalism was better than the old government’s communism.  Saddam was  
the new president’s deputy and the party’s enforcer. 
 
JERROLD POST 
Former senior political psychologist for CIA 
Analysed Saddam for US Government  
This is not a mad man but he does have the most dangerous personality that we  
know - what I call malignant narcissism. 
 




POST:  On the one hand he is so caught up with his own vanity - his own   
messianic dreams that there is no room for the pain or suffering of others, that  
doesn’t count at all.  He has got conscience whatsoever and making it all the worse,  
will use whatever violence is necessary to carry out his ambitions and violence has  
been the hallmark of his very success. 
 
SIMPSON:  Soviet Communism never attracted Saddam and yet he became fixated  
on Joseph Stalin, his hero. 
 
ABURISH:  People who knew him when he was a young man told me stories about  
him wondering around saying “Wait until I take over, I’m going to run this country  
the way Stalin ran Russia”.  And of course they laughed him off.  Little did they  
know.  I mean he has studied and read every single book about Stalin and he most  
definitely models himself after him. 
 
AL-ALAWI:  He was different from other tyrants like Hitler or Stalin; they were  
rulers who became criminals, he was a criminal who became a ruler. 
 
SIMPSON:  In 1979 he made another film but this time the violence was genuine.   
 
Ba’ath Party video 
July 1979 
 
SIMPSON:  Having taken over as leader he put his Stalinism to work.  He called a  
meeting of the party leadership which was carefully filmed.  Exactly as in Stalin’s  
show trials, a senior figure was persuaded through torture, to reveal details of a  
supposed conspiracy.  “The conspirators had many dreams”, he says, stubbing out  
his cigar.  “But be assured that I will pick up my gun and fight to the end.”  People  
who have been named in the audience try to protest, it doesn’t do any good.  One by  
one, dozens of Saddam’s former supporters are led out to be shot.  Saddam ordered  
a copy of the video to be sent to every party member. 
 
HASSAN AL-ALAWI 
Saddam’s former spin doctor 
It was unbelievable.  Saddam didn’t make the video in order to show that there was  
a conspiracy against him, he wanted to send out the message that these people were  
innocent but I still executed them.  The aim was to terrorise people. 
 
SIMPSON:  Two years later Panorama asked him if it was right to treat political  




SADDAM:  Yes, it calls for it to be subject to execution and to torture in  
accordance with the law we say he who collaborates with a foreign party is  
sentenced to death. 
 
SIMPSON:  When the British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Stephen Egerton, met  




Sir STEPHEN EGERTON 
British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82 
We went through a series of rooms, huge rooms, each colder than the last and the  
one he was in was the coldest of all, which was of course matched by his  
demeanour.  He was very cold towards me and it sticks in my memory because all  
the people around him were sweating and I realised afterwards they were afraid. 
 
SIMPSON:  The fiercest punishment awaited anyone who failed to conform.   
Dissent was treasonable.  You and your whole family could be wiped out for it.   
Even members of his inner circle like the head of military intelligence had to be  
careful with him. 
 
Gen WAFIC SAMARAI 
Former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence 
We didn’t have to look at the ground while we talked to him, however, no one  
would dare to raise his voice in the presence of Saddam Hussein.  And if someone  
banged their fist on the table they would certainly be executed. 
 
JERROLD POST 
Former CIA political psychologist 
This is a deeply brutal man indeed who, however, rationalises his brutality as  
necessary for the cause in which he believes, the advancement of Iraq and in his  
mind there is no separation between Saddam and Iraq and what is good for Saddam  
is good for Iraq and that means staying in power. 
 
SIMPSON:  Saddam’s power base has always been his family, his clan.  The men  
from Tikrit and its surrounding villages.  They were the only people he could  
entirely trust.  As a young man he married his cousin and by all accounts was a  
loving father.  His son, Uday, would later become one of the most powerful men in  
Iraq, violent, uncontrollable and a serial rapist.  No wonder he needed a double too.   
Latif Yahia was an old school friend of Uday.  He was imprisoned and forced to  
have plastic surgery. 
 
LATIF YAHIA 
Uday Hussein’s double, 1987-91 
He has stolen my personality.  It has taken me a long, long time to get over it.  They  
train me, show me videos of how he walked, how he talked, how he do  
conferences, how he drives, how he smoked, how he drinks, and every movement  
of Uday.  And after that they started to make me stronger they started showing me  
how they torture people, how they kill people, how they hung people, how they  
kept the fingers, the nails and ears and nose and... 
 
SIMPSON:  Uday has so many enemies the life of his double is an unenviable one. 
 
YAHIA:  Eleven times some people tried to kill me and I have got 9 bullets in my  
body. 
 
SIMPSON:  Eleven attempts to kill you? 
 
YAHIA:  Yes, and twice just they missed me.  Nine times I got shot, the bullets are  
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in my body. 
 
SIMPSON:  The presidential family was quite extraordinary.  On Saddam’s orders  
Uday, standing in the middle at the back here, later took part in the killing of his  
two brothers in law standing on the left of this family photo.  Their wives have  
never been seen in public since. 
 
YAHIA:  The word was ‘mafia’.  There is a mafia.  Because every son, every  
grandson, every doctor, every bodyguard, he has his own business.  If you do  
something with this government you must pay the price.  Just don’t try to play a  
game with him and send him money.  If you don’t send it your head will be cut off. 
 
SIMPSON:  Literally? 
 
MALE:  Yes, you and your family. 
 
SIMPSON:  Like Stalin Saddam made himself the embodiment of the country, the  
central figure of its history and culture.  Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin who was also  
from Tikrit, and now the greatest Iraqi of them all.  He rebuilt ancient Babylon with  
little regard for archaeological correctness, stamping his name on the bricks for  
later generations to admire.  It all hinted strongly at his future ambitions. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Former Chief Scientist 
Iraq’s civil nuclear programme  
The regime started to invest a lot of money in infrastructure but mostly to enhance  
the military might of the country.  Saddam has always been very clear saying that  
he is there to unite the Arab world under his leadership. 
 
SIMPSON:  But in fact he made the Arab world nervous.  Thanks to his ferocity,  
his immense oil revenues and the weapons he was buying.  Still, the Americans  
decided he was the man to sort out his turbulent neighbour.  Iran was undergoing its  
violent and bloody Islamic revolution. 
 
Iraqi propaganda video 
 
From the start of it Iraq had been broadcasting hostile propaganda, now the  
American’s encouraged him to invade Iran, and Saddam, sensing its weakness,  
decided to do it.  The invasion came within 18 months of his becoming president.   
Once again life was cheap for him  The war was to last 8 years and cost a million  
lives.  Like many of the big moves he has made it was a serious mistake.  Soon he  
assumed direct control of the war himself but he made a poor general.  In 1986 I  
saw for myself how his enemy, Iran, scored a stunning victory invading Iraqi  
territory at the far peninsular. 
 
JOHN SIMPSON 
BBC News 1986 
There is no questioning the extent of the Iranian victory in recapturing all this land  
and they seem to be repelling the Iraqi counter-attacks pretty well.  What is in  




SIMPSON:  The American’s were now seriously worried.  If Saddam lost Iran’s  
fiery Islamic fundamentalism might sweep through the entire region.  The  





CIA Director, 1993-95 
We gave him, for example, satellite photos which indicated movements of Iranian  
forces.  That would have been extremely useful to him even though it was relatively  
easy for us to do.  So to know where your enemy is deployed and where his  
reserves are and that sort of thing could have been extremely important to him. 
 
SIMPSON:  It could have saved him. 
 
WOOLSEY:  Possibly. 
 
SIMPSON:  Yet the American’s were double crossing Saddam by channelling arms  
to the Iranians at the same time as part of a deal to get American hostages released.   
Saddam never forgave them. 
 
General WAFIC SAMARAI 
Former Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence 
Each piece of information we received from the Americans and all the meetings we  
had with them were referred to Saddam personally.  He studied every detail, he  
used to tell us to be cautious and he said this very clearly “The American’s are  
conspirators”. 
 
SIMPSON:  The war had reached stalemate.  Iraq was haemorrhaging men and  
money.  Now he was backed into a corner Saddam showed how far he would go to  
save his regime.  Again using western technology, Saddam deployed a weapon  
scarcely seen since the first world war - poison gas.  It was horribly effective  
against the closely packed Iranian forces. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Iraq’s former chief atomic scientist 
Even in the military communiqués that were read on the Iraqi television they said  
“We have killed Iranian soldiers like flies being sprayed”.  And that is what he  
considered his nerve gasses to be - killing soldiers like flies. 
 
SIMPSON:  Halabja provided another warning.  A small Kurdish town in Northern  
Iraq which had gone over to the enemy.  When I went there a few days afterwards I  




The bodies which litter this town were those of people who ran out of their houses  
to try to escape the gas and then were killed out in the open either by more gas or  




SIMPSON:  Now Saddam knew how easy it was, what he had done once he could  
do again. 
 
Sir STEPHEN EGERTON 
British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82 
He has actually used them, he has used them against his own people and that is  
quite frightening but I don’t think that they would be for wider use - not unless his  
back was absolutely up to the wall, against the wall, and he was being invaded. 
 
SIMPSON:  In 1988 the war with Iran was at last over.  Saddam claimed it as a  
victory, even though it wasn’t.  He celebrated by putting up vast monuments.  But  
he couldn’t rest, an even bigger crisis was brewing.  Saddam was broke and so he  
met the immensely rich Emir of Kuwait to demand his help.  “After all” he said “I  
saved the rest of the Arab world from Iran”.  The Emir refused and Saddam was  
deeply insulted.  From that moment the invasion of Kuwait was inevitable. 
 
HASSAN AL-ALAWI 
Former friend of Saddam 
We must remember his words “This is my price”.  He meant Kuwait was his price  
for fighting Iran.  He was saying “I fought Iran on your behalf and I lost thousands  
of soldiers but you haven’t given me my reward and my reward is Kuwait”. 
 
SIMPSON:  There was world-wide shock and revulsion.  But the invasion was  
another colossal miscalculation.  By now it had become habitual for Saddam to  
shift the blame for almost everything onto the west. 
 
SADDAM HUSSEIN:  Any aggressive act is not characteristic of us.  But it is  
characteristic to repel aggression. 
 
JERROLD POST 
Former CIA political psychologist  
This is a man who has unbounded ambition.  For years he suffered believing that he  
had gotten no recognition as being one of the world’s great socialist leaders, that he  
was destined to be ranked with Tito, Mao Tse Tung, Castro, but the world had not  
seen him as being in this league.  After the invasion of Kuwait, finally he had the  
world by its throat and he was now recognised as an important world leader. 
 
SIMPSON:  But while President Bush was assembling a force to evict him from  
Kuwait, Saddam made yet another serious blunder.  Mr Bush and his advisors knew  
that if Saddam staged a partial withdrawal their plans would collapse.  Saddam  
might even be able to keep Kuwait’s oil fields. 
 
General BRENT SCOWCROFT 
US National Security Advisor, 1989-93 
We had half a million troops there, we couldn’t keep them there, we couldn’t  
sustain them there over a long period of time.  But he never took advantage of that  
and that was my greatest fear that he would be skilful and do something which  




SIMPSON:  Saddam’s greatest problem is his isolation.  It is the price he pays for  
terrorising the people around him. 
 
SCOWCROFT:  I am convinced that nobody tells him the truth about what is going  
on.  People are afraid to tell him to give him bad news because it may cost them  
their lives.  So he lives in this cocoon, in a way, of people telling him things that  
they think wont get them in trouble and that has to affect his view of the world. 
 
BBC News 
15 January 1991 
SIMPSON:  All the firing that’s going on, and there is a great deal of it, is just  
pretty wildly up in the air and it doesn’t seem to be aimed at anything.  It looks as  
though they’re just getting ready for the big attack. 
 
The big attack didn’t bring the terrible loss of life that Saddam had expected, but it  




General WAFIC SAMARAI 
Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, Gulf War 
Saddam Hussein might think that we were conspiring and had no intention of  
keeping Kuwait, secondly he’d probably think that we were accusing the leadership  
of failing to take the right decisions.  
 
SIMPSON:  Although we were shown occasional pictures of Saddam in his bunker,  
he actually spent much of his time outside Baghdad, driving round in a red  
Volkswagen Passat with only a single bodyguard, that way he was almost  
impossible to target.  The Islamic world had always distrusted Saddam.  He was  
seen as anti-Muslim and headed an aggressively secular state.  But in the Gulf War  
he showed how clever he was at manipulating opinion.  A few days before the war  





‘I have become a Muslim’.  He takes a great deal of responsibility on the average  
Muslim in the Middle East.  What are you going to do now?  ‘I am fighting those  
people as a Muslim, not as an Iraqi, not as an Arab, but in a much larger context.  If  
you are part of the Islamic nation then you must support it’. 
 
SIMPSON:  Arab Government didn’t but ordinary people did.  It revealed the path  
which Saddam has been able to follow ever since.  Even more important for Arab  
opinion, he decided to target Israel.  Israelis expected an attack with chemical  
weapons, and there was near panic and some absurdity.   
 
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU 
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, 1991 
I must say that this is darnedest way to conduct an interview.  Of course what it  





SIMPSON:  As Saddam launched his scud missiles at Israel pro-Iraqi  
demonstrations erupted right across the Middle East.  Saddam was hugely popular.   
It made him realise that he can play to public opinion, encouraging him to hang on,  
hoping his enemies will crumble.   
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
The Arab masses felt at least there is somebody now with the capability to  
challenge Israel, so the effect in general was positive, at least he had succeeded to  
convince the Arab masses that he is their hero, their champion who can really stand  
up for their rights. 
 
SIMPSON:  But in the next war Saddam probably wont be able to attack Israel like  
this.  He’s only got around 18 long range missiles now.  His former chief nuclear  
scientist: 
 
AL-SHAHRISTANI:  If he does have a few missiles left and he manages to use  
them against Israel, I don’t think it will be different from what we saw in 1991.   
They will be just empty, hardly causing any damage.  The object of the exercise is  
basically to stir up the Arab masses to come on the street and demand stop of the  
war against Saddam, and that’s what he wants. 
 
SIMPSON:  As it turned out, Saddam’s army put up scarcely any fight at all.  It was  
all just hype about being the world’s fourth biggest army, willing to fight to the  
death.  Soldiers, like the Iraqi civilians, weren’t interested in laying down their lives  
for Saddam.  But in retreat he showed what he was capable of when his back is  
against the wall.  Blowing up oil wells is something he could do again, next time,  
unless they’re properly defended against him that is.  The coalition forces advanced  
and then stopped at the Iraqi border.  The Americans had privately promised the  
Egyptians and the Saudis they wouldn't invade Iraq.  They didn’t.  
 
General BRENT SCOWCROFT 
US National Security Advisor, 1989-93 
 The mission was to drive his forces out of Kuwait.  And while almost everyone  
thought that he would be topped as a result of being defeated, but there was no talk  
before the war that the mission had to be getting rid of Saddam Hussein. 
 
SIMPSON:  At the surrender ceremony the Americans failed to insist that Saddam  
should be there in person.  If he had been shown up to be that weak, his generals  
would probably have overthrown him.  Instead President Bush appealed to  




BUSH:  Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the resolution of  
all these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq  
back into the family of peace loving nations. 
 
SIMPSON:  The Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the North took the appeal  
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seriously.  They believed the Americans really wanted Saddam overthrown and  
would help them.  Saddam’s authority began to crumble.  But President Bush left  
the rebels to their fate. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Rebel leader, 1991 uprising 
I felt betrayed by the Americans.  The Americans were hoping that there could be a  
palace coup where another general can take over and be friendly or controllable by  
them, and they decided basically to allow Saddam and indirectly to help him to  
crush the uprising and that has caused the Iraqi people 300,000 lives. 
 
SIMPSON:  Once again Saddam wanted people to see it for themselves.  Iraqi  
television showed pictures of Saddam’s cabinet members beating up and killing  
prisoners after the uprising.  It was the old method of conspicuous punishment.   
Slowly he was regaining his dominance.  The rebellion was crushed. 
 
JAMES WOOLSEY 
CIA Director, 1993-95 
I think the decision not to support that was one of the worst American decisions of  
the 20th century frankly.  I think they had a bit of a blind spot on not wanting bad  
states to break up because they didn’t know exactly what was going to follow.   
 
SIMPSON:  Thousands more died after a second uprising four years later.   
 
[Film footage of brutalities] 
OFFICER:  Slit their throats and divide their hearts in two. 
 
General WAFIC SAMARAI 
Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, 1995 
He cured Iraqis of trying to overthrow Saddam for themselves.  As for his army, the  
one institution that might challenge him, he purged its senior officers regularly and  
thoroughly.   
 
He executed the Head of the General Security, he executed the Head of  
Intelligence.  He poisoned and killed another head of intelligence.  He poisoned and  
killed another Head of General Security.  I was convinced that if I hadn’t left Iraq I  
wouldn't have been alive by now. 
 
SIMPSON:  So in spite of all his disastrous mistakes, Saddam was firmly back in  
charge.  Now he planned to turn Iraq into a regional superpower again by  
developing more weapons of mass destruction.  
 
JERROLD POST 
Former CIA political psychologist 
How can they be at the very peak of world leadership without having these  
weapons that are associated with significant world leaders.  This is very important  
to him, not only to be a weapon of leverage and threat, but also in terms of his own  
personal view of his own stature. 
 
SIMPSON:  After the Gulf War, United Nations weapons inspectors had tried to  
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destroy Iraq’s massive programme for making nuclear chemical and biological  
weapons, but it was an immensely difficult job.  The inspectors were frustrated at  
every turn, partly by the Iraqi’s skill at hiding their weapons but also because of the  
fear Saddam created in his own people. 
 
CHARLES DUELFER 
Dep chief UN weapons inspector, 1993-2000 
It was not a pleasant experience because we would identify a low level person and  
ask him to describe what he was doing, and he would do this under the eye of Iraqis  
observing this, and he would know perhaps even his life was at risk, depending  
upon how he behaved in this interview.  But when you see these individuals, they’d  
be quivering sometimes because they were afraid that they would say something or  
reveal something that was not part of the party line. 
 
SIMPSON:  In 1998 the inspectors had to leave.  But it was pretty clear that Iraq  
had kept part of its arsenal in tact.  The inspectors may go back soon but the  
problem is Iraq has now had 4 years in which to hide its weapons well.   
 
SAMARAI:  Iraq has built its policy on weapons of mass destruction in accordance  
with the strategic balance in the region.  I don’t believe that Saddam will ever give  
up his policy in the future. 
 
SIMPSON:  By the end of the 90s Saddam, or it may be his double of course,  
seemed indestructible.  
 
LATIF YAHIA 
Uday Hussein’s double, 1987-91 
Where is John Major?  Where is George Bush?  Where is Mitterand?  Where is..  
you know..  Gorbachev?  Everything is gone.  Who stay?  Still Saddam in the  
power.  Everyone is gone but he stay.   
 
SIMPSON:  Saddam has outlasted and outwitted all his enemies and there seemed  
no sign that he was ready to capitulate.  The Americans seemed prepared to tolerate  
him, merely keeping him in his place by the imposition of UN sanctions.  They  
were indeed a savage punishment but they chiefly hurt the ordinary people of the  
country.  Saddam made sure they suffered even more than they had to.  The  
situation could have gone on indefinitely and then everything changed.  The hawks  
in the Pentagon insisted that Al-Qaeda was linked with Saddam Hussein even  
though the CIA were certain it wasn’t.  No matter, Saddam was public enemy  
number one again.  Now Afghanistan had been dealt with, Iraq was next. 
 
September 2002 
BUSH:  We can’t let the world’s worst leaders blackmail, threaten, hold freedom  
loving nations hostage with the world’s worst weapons. 
 
SIMPSON:  In the recent referendum Saddam says he got 100% of the vote.  Well,  
perhaps.  There was no one else to vote for.  But the turnout wasn’t very high.  A  
kind of lethargy has come over Iraq, as it did before the war 12 years ago.  They’re  




SADDAM:  [Speech]  The evil of the evil doers will never end until they are  
defeated.  And their defeat is coming in the near future, God willing.   [applause] 
 
SIMPSON:  Whether the British will send troops to join the Americans may depend  
on whether President Bush gets UN support or not.  It will be a hard decision for  
Tony Blair.  It now looks as though an attack will come in February, even March.   
As for Saddam, we can be sure he wont go quietly. 
 
Sir STEPHEN EGERTON 
British Ambassador to Iraq, 1980-82 
In the normal course of events, when things are going quite well, he’s pretty  
predictable.  But with the back to the wall, you know..  any person, any human  




If Saddam believed that he is going to go, that the campaign against him.. any  
campaign against him was succeeding, and that they’re after him personally, I think  
he’d use the weapons of mass destruction.  What has he got to lose? 
 
IBRAHIM ZOBEDI 
Childhood friend of Saddam 
He is in the corner.  He will not give up. He will not leave the country.  He will not  
resign.  He will not go to another country at all.  He will stay to the last minute. 
 
SIMPSON:  But when the moment comes, will Saddam bring everything crashing  
down about him?  He’ll certainly try but it won’t necessarily be easy.  His  
weaponry is limited.  His soldiers don’t want to fight and his generals must be  
looking for a way out.  Still we cannot write him off, especially now he’s cornered. 
 
Dr HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Former Chief Scientist 
Iraq’s civil nuclear programme  
I think he’ll fight to the last man.  He will go down as the world’s biggest suicide  
bomber, making sure that he takes as many lives with him when he goes. 
 
SIMPSON:  Still, forget the gung-ho simplicities of the computer games, it’s likely  
to be the Americans who hunt him down than the Iraqi army.  As so many dictators  






































RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 8:12:02 
....................................................... 
STEVE BRADSHAW:  We’ve examined the case against Saddam.  Tonight we  
assess the case against going to war with Saddam. 
 
PATRICK CORDINGLEY:  My troops led the armoured attack into Iraq.  At the  
moment I don’t believe the case has been made for another war against Iraq. 
 
HAIFA ZANAGAN:  Even though I was imprisoned by the regime, I was tortured  
by the regime.  I would love to see this regime changed, but still I am against the  
war. 
 
BISHOP HARRIES:  I’ve supported every war that this county has been engaged in  
over the last 20 years, but on the evidence at present available to us I can’t support  
a military action against Iraq. 
 
BRADSHAW:  The inspectors are still searching Iraq for weapons of mass  
destruction.  The west is pouring over the dossier Saddam has handed to the UN as  
America prepares for war.  It could be the last chance to consider the arguments for  
peace.  Tonight the case against war through the stories of  seven people you might  
not expect to hear making it.  If there’s one man who might be surprised to hear  
himself making the case against war it’s the man who led British Armour into Iraq  







Major General Patrick Cordingley is on his way to Westminster Abbey for  
Remembrance Sunday.  For the General who retired two years ago it’s time to  
contemplate the cost of war, including another war against Iraq. 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91 
My reservations are all to do with the numbers of Iraqis that might be killed, you  
could argue, unnecessarily. 
 
Saudi Arabia, 1991 
 
CORDINGLEY:  [addressing the troops]  I’m absolutely certain that his morale is  
taking a hammering… 
 
BRADSHAW:  The general knows all too easily how combat can turn to slaughter.   
Eleven years ago he led Britain’s Seventh Armoured Brigade, “The Desert Rats”  
against Saddam’s conscript packed army.   
 
CORDINGLEY:  [addressing the troops]  …and there’s good evidence to show that  
even the Republican Guard is not that happy, and if that’s the case, that’s very good  
news for us. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Less than 200 British and American soldiers died in combat in the  
last Gulf War.  The Iraqis lost tens of thousands.  Eleven years on the Americans  
estimate Iraq’s land forces, weakened by sanctions, are at half strength, while the  
allies have even more sophisticated weapons than those which so hideously  
devastated the Iraqi forces.   
 
CORDINGLEY:  People don’t understand what it means to send a modern British  
division to war today.  How much fire power is available to it and how massive that  
will be, and the effects on the enemy will be remarkable.  I do think that there is an  
inevitability about this.  The Americans have geared themselves up now, or are  
gearing themselves up now.  I think that they think the only way of resolving this  
problem is by going in on the ground and finishing the matter off. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Like any prime minister, moved by the Remembrance service,  
Tony Blair would be offended by suggestions he’d lead us into a war of  
unnecessary slaughter.  He says the reasons for fighting would be disarming  
Saddam, not getting rid of his tyrannical regime. 
 
8th November 2002 
 
TONY BLAIR:  I may find this regime abhorrent, any normal person would.  But  
the survival of it is in his hands.  Conflict is not inevitable but disarmament is. 
 
BRADSHAW:  It’s a day to think of the ordinary soldier.  Before General  
Cordingley would see any more go to Iraq he’d want another Security Council  
resolution explicitly calling for military action against Iraq, not just serious  
consequences like the last resolution.  Otherwise the general would be seriously  
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concerned about what the troops would think, a concern he knows to be shared by  
some top serving commanders. 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91 
If we go – and this is critical – if we go into this war unilaterally with America and  
some other allies without the United Nations resolution, I think there would be  
doubt in the minds of the British soldiers the justness of this cause, and I think it is  
a great shame if you get a situation where they’re being used in a way that the  
British public are not easy with. 
 
BRADSHAW:  You say: “A great shame” I mean.. tough some people might say. 
 
CORDINGLEY:  Yes, but I mean I’m not going to dispute that and they will do  
their job and get on with it. But I, if I was a commander out there, would feel sad  
that we were being used in a way that.. and uneasy too, being used in a way that did  




BRADSHAW:  On the wall in her London home, the fading memory of another  
city.  She is one of many exiles with a personal reason to hate Saddam’s regime.   
When she was 25 Haifa was arrested by Saddam’s secret police at her old home in  








I was too frightened to speak even.  I was frozen totally.  They thought I was  
courageous at that time so they started bunching and kicking.  I lost conscious.  I  
was naked. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Three friends arrested with her, also involved with the anti- 
Moscow wing of the communist party were executed.   
 
HAIFA:  They moved me to a room next to the torture room and I had to spend  
about three weeks there listening to the screams of people while they’re being  
tortured.  It was a howling, not screams.  It wasn’t human voices at all.  They were  
begging, asking, and in many languages, Arabic, Kurdish… 
 
BRADSHAW:  After all that, don’t you want a war to get rid of Saddam? 
 
HAIFA:  I want to get rid of Saddam but not by war.  I don’t want the war.  I was  
imprisoned, I was tortured, I witnessed the suffering of many Iraqi people.  I know  
the suffering of Iraqi people in exile yet I don’t want Iraq to be led to another war. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Haifa watched the bombardment of Baghdad at the start of the Gulf  
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War in 1991 from exile in London. 
 
HAIFA:  The night of that bombardment I was listening to one commentator saying  
this is like Christmas tree, and was crying because it’s not a Christmas tree – it’s  
Baghdad, my city, burning until the morning.  I felt angry, I felt dead worried about  




BRADSHAW:  Back in ’91 it seemed bombing military targets in Baghdad by so- 
called ‘smart bombs’ could be a relatively casualty free exercise, until the  
destruction of the al-Ameryah shelter showed the reality of the carnage on and  
under the ground.  Some estimates suggest the total civilian death toll in Baghdad  
was between one and two thousand.  If American and British troops try to occupy  
the city the death toll could be much worse. 
 
HAIFA:  I worry about my family and the rest of the population.  People are  
frightened.  They have kids, they have old people. 
 
BRADSHAW:  But you say some people in Britain will say look, this guy is a  
menace to world peace, to his neighbours.  You’ve tried but you haven’t got rid of  




I don’t think he’s a threat to the world peace, he’s not a threat to the world.  He’s  
definitely not a threat to America or Britain.  The real threat was, and still is, to his  




BRADSHAW:  Britain’s armed forces first marched into Baghdad in the First  
World War, and didn’t leave.  In the 20s the British installed a client king and  




The number 55 Bomber Squadron stationed at Hinaida, near Baghdad, exercising  
with an armoured car section over 250 miles from any civilised habitation. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Aerial bombardment, regime change imposed by the west, to Iraqis  
it’s nothing new, and to Iraqis the reason for our continuing interest has been clear  
from the start. 
 
[News footage] 
There was oil seepage to the surface, more than a hint of what lay beneath.  So the  






BRADSHAW:  Although more and more regions outside the Middle East are  
meeting the west’s demand for oil, the Iraqis know the strategic value of their  
reserves. 
 
HAIFA:  Iraq could be the largest reserve oil country in the world after Saudi  
Arabia and Britain is fighting to gain access to that, to have a share in the spoil of  
the war.  The British involvement at the moment in Iraq, or trying to involve in this  
war, is definitely will be looked upon by the Iraqis as another colonisation of Iraq,  
something which they fought very hard during the whole last century to get rid of. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Now Iraqis fear their natural resources are being coveted by a new  
imperial power.  As the US builds up its forces in the Gulf, Haifa fears the world’s  
solo superpower is starting to behave like Britain before it with the arrogance of  
empire.   
 
HAIFA:  Iraq is only the beginning I think.  There was Afghanistan of course, I  
mean this is Iraq here, and probably Iran or Syria next.  What else?  I mean is there  
an end to it?  This is real expansion of power.  There is one power in the world  
nowadays and it is the US, and the US wants that area. 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91 
Isn’t it a throwback to days of empire, back to the last century when armed force  
was used whenever we wanted to around the world for particular foreign policy  
aims.  Surely we’ve moved on from that now. 
 
US Embassy, London 
[Peace Marchers] 
 
WOMAN:  The Americans who are behind all this evil warmongering and I am  
against it. 
 
MAN:  Bush uses the term “The war on terrorism” but for me that’s just a smoke  
screen.  It’s just a smoke screen to give the Americans the right to invade any  
country and any regime they don’t want. 
 
BRADSHAW:  As an agent for the CIA, America’s central intelligence agency, he  





Robert Baer was a top CIA agent, then the FBI investigated him for allegedly trying  
to kill Saddam.  That would have defied a presidential order on assassinations and  
been a potential crime under ‘murder for hire’ laws. 
 
ROBERT BAER 
CIA Agent, 1976-97 
I was detained, and my team, by the FBI.  Had we been guilty and tried, we could  




BRADSHAW:  In the United States? 
 
BAER:  In the United States, so it’s stupidity but… 
 
BRADSHAW:  For trying to murder Saddam? 
 
BAER:  Murdering Saddam Hussein. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Baer hadn’t tried to kill Saddam and hadn’t broken any US laws.   
But he had become involved in a plot by Iraqi dissidents to unseat Saddam.  He’d  
done so on the Clinton administration’s orders, until a nervous Washington pulled  
the plug. 
 
Given that you were there and you were the man on the ground trying to get rid of  
Saddam, you must presumably be pleased that President Bush is now going to try  
and do it for real? 
 
BAER:  No, because what we’re inviting is World War Three in the Middle East.   
It’s too late to invade Iraq a second time. 
 
BRADSHAW:  In 1991 the allies have the support of Arab nations like Saudi  
Arabia for invading Iraq.  After all, Saddam had just invaded another Arab country  
– Kuwait.  Try to invade now though, Baer argues, there’d be no such support for  
war.  Any government helping the west would fear a fundamentalist backlash. 
 
BAER:  I talked to people in the CIA and they’re worried about the stability of the  
region. 
 
BRADSHAW:  And privately people in the CIA say to you.. 
 
BAER:  War is a bad idea, it’s going to cause my terrorism.  Cooperation, local  
governance is going to end. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Baer believes war with Saddam is being sold to President Bush by  
right-wing hawks, so-called neo-conservatives who started promoting war against  
Iraq long before the 11th September last year.  Four years ago a group calling  
themselves Project for the New American Century wrote to President Clinton  
urging the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Using military action to disarm  
him and to protect our vital interests in the Gulf, including oil.  Most of those who  
signed it now serve the Bush Administration including defence Secretary, Donald  
Rumsfeld. 
 
BAER:  Today they have the chance to do something about it and they want to  
prove themselves right.  They say we were right in the 90s and we’re going to show  
you today.  Just watch.   
 
BRADSHAW:  Watch while we…. ? 
 




BRADSHAW:  Alarmist?  Maybe not.  These are the kind of images that make  
some of Washington’s neoconservatives hope war against Saddam will destabilise  
much of the Middle East.  What such American hardliners hope is Saddam’s fall  
will be followed by the collapse of what they call other terrorist states, countries  
like Iran and Syria which they say are backing terrorists.  One neoconservative even  
advocated turning the Middle East into a cauldron.  In Washington President Bush  
has distanced himself from the more extreme neoconservatives.  But they do have  
old allies in the Pentagon where the Department of Defence has rebuilt its offices  
and is now strengthening its Washington powerbase. 
 
Pentagon 
13th September 2001 
 
When I came around that corner, you could see pieces, way up there at the far end  
of the airplane.. 
 
BRADSHAW:  What critics like Baer allege is the Pentagon has been trying to  




CIA Agent, 1976-97 
Well I think all power in Washington has sort of gravitated toward the Pentagon  
which has set up its own intelligence units which is reinterpreting intelligence to  
ensure the outcome they want. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Some top democrats in Congress shared Baer’s fears about this so- 
called politicisation of intelligence.  The old CIA hands accusations are strongly  
denied in the Pentagon, but Baer believes many neoconservatives are set on war. 
 
BAER:  Today a land war or massive air war against an Arab country is going to  
cause several governments in the Middle East to fall, among them Saudi Arabia,  
Jordan, possibly Egypt.  
 
BRADSHAW:  Some on the right would say that’s a good thing. 
 
BAER:  I think people in Washington are so hurt, so damaged by the attacks on  
September 11th that they want to take revenge, and Saddam happens to be the  
vehicle. 
 
BRADSHAW:  It’s not revenge, surely it’s a precaution. 
 
BAER:  Well, I mean how do you fight a billion people.  I’m not sure.  Is this  








BRADSHAW:  You might at least think all the men who helped shape Tony Blair’s  
Middle East policy would back the war.  But meet our old Ambassador in Saudi  







BRADSHAW:  When the three British hostages were freed in Beirut after five  
years of captivity, Sir Andrew Green welcomed them back into the world. 
 
GREEN:  I shall never forget it.  I was the Ambassador in Syria when they were  
released and they were released to me.  John McCarthy bounced into the room,  
shook us all by the hand and I sat him down, briefed him.  But it was a huge relief,  
so that was quite a moment. 
 
BRADSHAW:  For 35 years Sir Andrew Green advised British governments,  
including Tony Blair’s.  Now he’s in no doubt the Prime Minister is making a big  
mistake. 
 
Sir ANDREW GREEN 
Ambassador to Syria, 1991-94 
And Saudi Arabia, 1996-2000 
I think this talk about Saddam being a threat to the west frankly is largely  
manufactured.  I think the policy is misguided and misconceived.  I think any attack  
on Iraq will be a huge bonus to Osama bin Laden, it will destabilise the Gulf and  
we’ll have consequences that cannot be foreseen or indeed predicted. 
 
BRADSHAW:  You’re putting it very strongly. 
 
GREEN:  Yes, I think we’ve gone off the rails. I think American policy has  
changed.  Indeed it clearly has changed in this determination to achieve what they  
call regime change, and I think that the British government have effectively fallen  
into line and I think that’s a serious mistake. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Back in 1996 a group of American neoconservatives helped write a  
report called: “A Clean Break”.  It was published by a think tank based in Israel.   
They hoped their ideas might be taken up by incoming Prime Minister Binyamin  
Netanyahu  They included removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq which  
they called an important Israeli strategic objective.  The paper never became official  
policy but was widely read. 
 
GREEN:  I think it’s very interesting.  I think there has always been a group in  
Israel that has wanted to knock out Iraq – Iraq being the main remaining strategic  
threat to Israel.  Now if that has the effect of creating chaos in the Middle East and  
hostility towards America, why should they worry?  It’s we who should worry.  If  
we’re going to march to war to an Israeli drum, then that would be a very foolish  




BRADSHAW:  And eight strong group behind the paper was chaired by Richard  
Perle, now the Pentagon’s top civilian advisor.  Two other members of the group  
[Douglas Feith – David Wurmser]  now have official posts in President Bush’s  
administration. 
 
GREEN:  There’s certainly a group of people at the top of the American  
administration who have a great deal of sympathy with Israeli aims in the region. 
 
BRADSHAW:  And who therefore..? 
 
GREEN:  And who, therefore, are open to suggestions that removing Saddam  
Hussein is a good thing to do. 
 
BRADSHAW:  The policy of disarming and maybe removing Saddam, the US  
administration says, is most certainly not the result of pro-Israeli pressure.  After  
all, the American President didn’t campaign on action against Saddam.  He only  
decided to act after 9/11.  He could be taking a huge political gamble. 
 
Surely he simply wants to do it because he doesn’t want another 9/11. 
 
GREEN:  Well there’s no connection between Saddam and 9/11 so removing  
Saddam is not going to prevent another 9/11. 
 
BRADSHAW:  And this isn’t an Arabist in the Foreign Office’s conspiracy theory  
or paranoid or…? 
 
GREEN:  Well of course they would say that, wouldn't they.  But perhaps someone  





US Anti-War Coalition 
If Bush goes into Iraq again, invades it, slaughters people, as if they hadn’t done  
enough already over the past ten years, occupies it, you know what that’s going to  
do.  That’s going to create thousands of people who are willing to martyr  
themselves, fly a plane into a building or drop something….. (applause) 
 
BRADSHAW:  Few people have tried so hard to warn about weapons of mass  






In the 90s Jessica Stern was an advisor to President Clinton.  She once warned that  
terrorists could nuke the Empire State building and to alert people for the dangers  
of so-called hyper-terrorism she helped make the Hollywood movie: “The  
Peacemaker” she was the model for the Nicole Kidman character who saves New  
York from a nuclear suitcase bomb.  The former presidential adviser now lectures  
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on public policy and religious terrorism at Harvard University. 
 
JESSICA STERN 
National Security Council, 1994-95 
There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq.  Saddam poses a threat to  
the entire world.  However, we need to consider whether the risks of going to war  
exceed the benefit and I believe they do. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Last October the CIA made public part of its secret intelligence  
assessment on Iraq. It said the probability of Saddam initiating an attack without  
provocation on the United States in the foreseeable future was low. 
 
STERN:  I think there would be a far more compelling argument for going to Iraq if  
we had intelligence that Saddam was about to strike the UK or the United States.  I  
don’t believe that any intelligence has been uncovered. 
 
BRADSHAW:  But the CIA argued that if Saddam was attacked, the chances  
would then become pretty high that he’d respond with biological or chemical  
weapons. 
 
GREEN:  There were rumours that he had been threatening to use chemical agents  
in perfume bottles several years ago.  That’s always a risk.  The question is, if we  
go to war, are we increasing that risk or are we decreasing that risk.  There is no  
question in my mind that we are increasing the risk, that those weapons, chemical  
or biological agents will be used, possibly in our cities, deployed with relative ease  
in our cities. 
 
BRADSHAW:  President Bush believes that’s all the more reason to act now  
before the threat from Saddam gets even more serious.  If we don’t, he says, we  
may have to face still worse horrors. 
 
7th October 2002 
 
PRESIDENT BUSH:  Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or  
chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.  Alliance with  
terrorists could allow the Iraq regime to attack America without leaving any  
fingerprints. 
 
BRADSHAW:  And the Hawks say there’s an even bigger risk waiting for Saddam  
to team up with the religious terrorists of Al-Qaeda.  The CIA has warned it has  
solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, but despite the  
odd appearance of piety there’s no evidence Saddam’s planned terrorist attacks  
with Al-Qaeda. 
 
STERN:  At the moment Al-Qaeda and Saddam are mortal enemies.  Saddam is a  
secular ruler.  He is an infidel from the perspective of Al-Qaeda. However, if we go  
to war against Saddam, it seems to me that is the most likely way that those two  
entities, now enemies, would join forces against a bigger enemy which is the west. 
 
BRADSHAW:  But isn’t getting tough showing there is a downside to terrorism,  
394 
 
the only way of really guaranteeing our security? 
 
STERN:  I don’t think it is.  I think that the United States has bee very slow to  
recognise that we are really despised around the world.  We are despised because  





There is no deep understanding of what is going on.  There is no understanding of  
the anger of the people.  Go and see any Arab and the ordinary Arab in the street. 
 
BRADSHAW:  There is already growing anger against American policy in the  
Middle East in Muslim countries across the world.  The fear is anger could turn into  
support for terrorism if America bombs Iraq.  Here in Iran they’re still chanting  
‘death to America’.  But for George Bush, war against terror is both the war against  
extremists who turn to violence and against states who back them. 
 
JESSICA STERN 
National Security Council, 1994-95 
We are in the middle of a war on terrorism, this is the most important war we have  
to fight.  Right now terrorists pose a far more significant threat to international  
security than states do.  I think that attacking Saddam will increase the appeal, will  
help the terrorists mobilise disgruntled youth.  We, in fact, will be doing Al- 
Qaeda’s work if we attack Saddam. 
 
Cardiff 
[Stop the war protesters] 
MAN:  I am actually opposing the war because I believe there are so many innocent  
people would be killed, and thus I think it’s not justified. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Back in the 60s he fought in the Vietnam War.  Now he’s worried  





Chuck Hagel is not only a Vietnam vet, he’s also a senior and pretty right wing US  
senator.  He’s one of two senators who led the US fight against the Kyoto Global  
Warming Treaty, and he’s in favour of at least preparing for war with Saddam.  But  
even the Senator from Nebraska is having doubts whether the risks of war have  
really been thought through. 
 
Senator CHUCK HAGEL 
Republican 
Foreign Relations Committee 
There’s always risk in action, and there is always risk in war, and we should ask  
some of the same questions that we did not ask about Vietnam, we should ask those  






BRADSHAW:  Chuck Hagel won two purple hearts for his courage in Vietnam.   
The US was sucked into war in South East Asia without real honest debate, and the  
Senator wants to be sure that wont happen again. 
 
HAGEL:  What is the objective?  Who are we doing this with?  Have we thought  
through the consequences?  What kind of government do we want?  How long are  
we going to be there?  Have we thought through the cost?  Those are things we  
didn’t ask ourselves in Vietnam and we got into a lot of trouble, and you always get  
into trouble when you don’t ask yourself the tough questions. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Etched on Washington’s Vietnam war memorial are over 58,000  
names, including some of the Senator’s friends.  So of the current administrations,  
Hawks and Neoconservatives though, have never seen combat and some escaped  
the draft.  
 
HAGEL:  I think it is interesting that many of those who have been advocating the  
world the last few months, actually the last few years, are individuals who have  
never experienced war.  That certainly does not disqualify them from their  
opinions, because they have other experiences.  But I tend to first of all listen to  




When there’s nothing but horror and suffering and people being killed, a lot of  
innocent people being killed and our own people being killed, and the other people  
being killed, then you balance your perspective.   
 
BRADSHAW:  As America builds up its forces, the Senator is also worried by the  
economic cost of war.  The President’s former economic advisor has estimated the  
overall cost could be as much as 1-200 billion dollars.  In Britain estimates also run  
into billions of pounds.  The Chancellor has already put aside one million pounds  
for extra military spending alone. 
 
HAGEL:  Certainly it will be costly if we go to war.  Certainly the unknowns of  
what if those oil fields in Iraq go down?  What if we have other surrounding oil  
producing countries in the Middle East are affected?  What if terrorism strikes at  
some of those countries, some of their oil capacity goes down?  That would have a  
disastrous effect on the world economy. 
 
BRADSHAW:  But war could mean recession. 
 
HAGEL:  War could mean a recession, sure.  I mean again it’s the unintended  
consequences, the unknowns, we don’t know. 
 
BRADSHAW:  With a clear United Nations resolution for military action the  
senator might be a back wall, but he’d be reluctant to support a decision to go it  





HAGEL:  We don’t want to be there alone.  We don’t want to isolate ourselves like  
we did in Vietnam. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Coming from the same party as the President, the Senator normally  
sees eye to eye with George Bush.  In principle he has no quarrel with the  
President’s new defence policy which permits pre-emptive strikes against perceived  
enemies that haven’t yet attacked.  But the Senator is worried how the new policy  
could be interpreted. 
 
Senator CHUCK HAGEL 
Republican 
Foreign Relations Committee 
We’re fighting against a shadowy dark insidious evil called terrorism, so it is  
tougher.  But at the same time we have to be careful here and be responsible as a  
great power that we don’t overplay that or unintentionally give the world a  
perception that we are now going to be the bullies of the world and we’ll take it  
upon ourselves to attack anyone that we believe could harm us. 
 
ROBERT BAER 
CIA Agent, 1976-97 
We’re talking about pre-emptive war and that’s very dangerous because once you  
set those standards for pre-emptive war you have wars all across the world. 
 
Westminster, London 
[Stop the War demonstration] 
 
BRADSHAW:  Mr Benn, BBC Panorama, we’re making a film about the case  
against war.  I’d just like to ask you why you're here. 
 
TONY BENN 
Former Labour Cabinet Minister 
Well I’m here because if the war begins, President Bush and the Prime Minister  
will be taking decisions to kill women and children and thousands and thousands of  
innocent Iraqis and it would be wrong.  This is a question of right and wrong. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Donning his robes for a sermon on weapons of mass destruction, he  






He is the son of a brigadier and he was educated at the top officers college  
Sandhurst only to leave the army and join the church.  The Bishop of Oxford has  
had a controversial record – not for opposing war but for backing it. 
 
Rt Rev RICHARD HARRIES 
Bishop of Oxford 
I’m not a pacifist and with much moral fear and spiritual trembling I even  
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supported a policy of nuclear deterrence at the height of the Cold War.  I supported  
the action to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, I supported the military action in  
Afghanistan.  I do believe that force does have to be used on occasions in order to  
maintain international stability, order and justice, but on this occasion I can’t  
support military action on the evidence at present available to us because I simply  
don’t think the traditional ‘just war’ criteria have been met. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Just war, the age old Christian tradition, it allows believers to fight  
with a clear conscience.  The Bishop has made a special study of ‘just war’.  He  
says it must be fought for a good reason, and the evil it prevents must outweigh the  
evil it causes.  Not every Christian would agree with the Bishop how that applies to  
Iraq, Tony Blair for one.  But the Bishop believes that as things stand, war with Iraq  
would not be just. 
 
HARRIES:  In order for a war to count as just, there must be a just cause, and it  
would be a just cause if the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was immediate and  
serious, but the threat is not immediate and serious.  He is a long-term worry, but  
the policy of containment and deterrence has worked for the last ten years, nothing  
new has come on the scene to force us to cross this terrible threshold of a war. 
 
BRADSHAW:  The Bishop may believe in containment but President Bush says  
that’s not led to compliance.  Iraq is still developing weapons of mass destruction.   
The Bishop though, points out that most mainstream Christian churches in the US  
and UK back his view. 
 
HARRIES:  We have the extraordinary situation that at the moment the national  
church, the established church, the Church of England, is predominantly opposed to  
military action, so is the Roman Catholic Church, so are the other churches, and in  
the United States there’s this unusual coalition of all of us believe that this war is  
both mistaken and immoral, and that has not happened in my lifetime.  
 
BRADSHAW:  What the Bishop fears is suffering in Iraq and unrest in Britain.   
He’s concerned about reaction in other faith communities in Britain, other religions  
including Islam, the religion of most people in Iraq. 
 
HARRIES:  I’m certainly concerned about the possibility of communal strike in  
cities where there are significant Moslem communities, but my concern is also that  
there could be a much broader division in this country. 
 
[News footage] 
Cairo 1954.  Egyptians hear Colonel Nasser speaking of a future Arab Empire. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Back in the 50s the British faced another Arab leader, Colonel  
Nasser who nationalised the western owned Suez Canal.   
 
Suez Canal, 1956 
 
Britain was divided over plans to recover the canal.  Opinion poll showed only a  
minority, about a third, supported military action.  Today less than half support war  
with Saddam.  In Egypt the troops went in anyway but the mission ended in failure  
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and national humiliation. 
 
Rt Rev RICHARD HARRIES 
Bishop of Oxford 
It was bad enough over Suez all those years ago.  I think that if there was military  
action now the country would be even more divided and I think the cabinet would  
be divided, Parliament would be divided, the churches would certainly be opposed  
to it, and I think it would be a very, very serious situation in this country.   
 
Edinburgh 
[Stop the War marchers] 
 
BRADSHAW:  168,000 square miles of Iraq to search for deadly weapons labs that  
could be hidden in a truck.  The inspectors showing they can even check Saddam’s  
cupboards.  If these sometimes quixotic seeming inspections fail, or if Saddam’s  
weapons dossier proves flawed, we could be on the edge of war, and if we are, well  
it wont be the inspectors who are in a fix but the politicians.  The opposition to a  
war to disarm Saddam is not just coming from the usual suspects. 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
This is not appeasement.  What I’m saying very clearly is that if we go to war a lot  
of Iraqi soldiers and civilians will probably die.  We’ve got to make absolutely  
certain that it is necessary to do that, that some material breach of the resolution has  
taken place and there is no other option. 
 
JESSICA STERN 
National Security Council, 1994-95 
It’s very important in thinking about whether to go to war to consider the cost and  














“CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS” 




JANE CORBIN:  Vienna Airport last November, the start of a journey into  
unknown territory.  Physicist Jacques Baute headed a team of nuclear experts from  
the International Atomic Energy Agency travelling to Baghdad.  I was with them.   
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The UN Inspectors had agreed to let Panorama follow them over the coming weeks.   
There was an air of anticipation but also a big question mark hanging over their  
mission.  Would they be able to prevent a war, or would they just delay it?  On  
board with Jacques Baute was Demetrius Perricos who would lead the UN search  
for missiles and biological and chemical weapons.  The inspectors were already  
feeling the political pressure.  They knew they wouldn't be given much time. 
 
CORBIN:  How are you feeling about it? 
 
TOM:  Excited but also nervous, but enthusiastic for the mission.  I think it's a very  
important mission.  I think that if we can go the places that we need to go to, to do  
the things we need to do, that we can help maybe prevent a war. 
 
CORBIN:  It's going to be tough on the team. 
 
JACQUES BAUTE:  It will be tough on the team.  It will be tough for probably at  
least 6 months.  In other words, we are not going to have many days of leave or  
things like that. 
 
CORBIN:  And you think you're going to be there for six months?  You don’t think  
that American pressure in the interim will actually take us towards war? 
 
BAUTE:  You know, the political decision of.. you know.. going to military action  
or letting inspections go on is not ours.   
 
CORBIN:  This is the inside story of the last three months chasing Saddam's  
weapons.  Iraqis traditionally welcome foreign guests with a meal of fish from the  
Tigris River.  The day after my arrival in Baghdad I was summoned to meet two of  
the most important officials in the Iraqi regime - General Amer el Saadi, a British  
trained engineer once headed the country's chemical weapons programme.  Now  
he's an adviser to President Saddam Hussein.  General Hussein Mohammed Amin  
heads the team responsible for proving that Iraq no longer has forbidden weapons  
programmes.  These officials had promised me I could visit suspect sites and talk to  
scientists.  They wanted to convince me Iraq no longer had weapons of mass  
destruction. 
 
The West still doesn't seem to believe Iraq, there's still this feeling you're hiding  
something, that you're not really laying out your cards on the table. 
 
General AMER AL-SAADI 
Presidential Advisor 
Well how else can they justify their military build up?  They must portray things as  
not being satisfactory, that Iraq is holding back, Iraq is hiding things.  How else can  
they justify their actions to their public?  If we have something we would produce  
it.  We'll be happy to produce it to get rid of it and get done – but we don't.   We  
don’t.  What do we do? 
 
CORBIN:  For years I had heard about Iraq's notorious weapon sites, researched  
and reported on what had gone on there.  Now I was arriving at a remote spot in the  
desert outside Baghdad, once the centre of Saddam Hussein's germ warfare  
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programme.  I was escorted by my minder, the official from the Ministry of  
Information who must accompany ever film crew at all times, and another Iraqi  
who turned out to be personally acquainted with this place. 
 
So, this is…. 
 
MINDER:   This was El Hakam site. 
 
CORBIN:  This was El Hakam. 
 
MINDER:  Yes, because you have seen there is no El Hakam site here. 
 
CORBIN:  Were you working here? 
 
MINDER:  Yes, I was responsible for the production of anthrax. 
 
CORBIN:  You were responsible? 
 
MINDER:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:   Ah, well I didn't realise that. 
 
MINDER:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  So this was Iraq's main biological weapons site. 
 
MINDER:  Yes, that's right. 
 
CORBIN:  And what was produced here? 
 
MINDER:  It was used for the production of Biological agents which included  
bacillus anthracis spores.   
 
CORBIN:  Anthrax. 
 
MINDER:  Yes, anthrax.  Clostridium botulinum toxin. 
 
CORBIN:  Botulinum toxin, yes. 
 
MINDER:  perfringen spores.  That's it. 
 
CORBIN:  So a big variety of weapons here. 
 
MINDER:  Just the three, no more. 
 
CORBIN:  That's enough. 
 
MINDER:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  After the Gulf War in 1991 the UN forced Iraq to disarm and accept  
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inspection teams.  They visited Al Hakam repeatedly.  For four years the Iraqis lied,  
denying they had a germ warfare programme.  They dumped the evidence, the  
bombs, in a nearby river, and they hid documents, records of what they'd produced.   
It took a defector to reveal where to look.  Thousands of tons of toxins which  
suffocate their victims and cause liver cancer were eventually found and destroyed.   
The inspectors made sure Al Hakam could never again be used to produce  
biological weapons.  Today Al Hakam lies abandoned.  But the Iraqis have still not  
explained what happened to over 8,000 litres of anthrax, tons of growth medium to  
culture bacteria, and many thousands of munitions filled with biological agents.   
There was one Iraqi scientist who masterminded the bio warfare programme at Al  
Hakam and the cover-up.  I wanted to meet the woman the inspectors nicknamed  
'Dr Germ'.  Dr Rihab Taha has never spoken publicly before.  She met me  
accompanied by several officials at the ministry responsible for proving Iraq has  
destroyed its forbidden weapons.  Dr Taha learnt her scientific skills in a British  
university. 
 
Can I ask you a little bit about your history.  Where did you train and what do you  
remember of those days? 
 
Dr RIHAB TAHA 
Well I did my PhD in England, in the University of East Anglia in Norwich City,  
and that was from 1980 to 1984. 
 
CORBIN:  And what did you study? 
 
TAHA:  I studied bacterial toxin, phytopathogenic toxin. 
 
CORBIN:  That's toxins in plants is it? 
 
TAHA:  Infected plants.. infected plants, yes. 
 
CORBIN:  Dr Taha's British education was put to use testing lethal toxins on  
animals and, some suspect, on people.  She became head of the germ warfare  
programme. 
 
Are you ashamed of what you did in those years when you were working on the  
biological weapons programme for Iraq? 
 
TAHA:  No, not at all.  No, because you know we are under a threat of different  
sides and different enemy so I think it is our right to be able to defend ourselves and  
to have something as a deterrent. 
 
CORBIN:  So even though you were producing toxins and bacteria that could kill  
hundreds of thousands of people… 
 
TAHA:  Well we never have this intension to use it.  We never want to cause harm  
or damage to anybody. 
 





TAHA:  No.  Now my work is just from the administrative point of view.    
 
CORBIN:  Saddam Hussein developed his weapons of mass destruction to give him  
power in his region, and as he showed in 1988 he was prepared to unleash poison  
gas against his own people to crush internal dissent and ensure his regime's  
survival.  It raised the question would Saddam ever reveal what had happened to his  
forbidden weapons.  Would he not gamble everything and try and keep them?   
 
November 12, 2002. 
United Nations, New York 
 
CORBIN:  I arrived in New York to meet the Weapons Inspectors just a few days  
after they'd received their orders to return to Iraq.  Their predecessors had spent  
seven years uncovering and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  Their  
mission had ended before they completed their task.  Now, under the leadership of a  
quiet Swedish diplomat, Dr Hans Blix, they were going back. 
 
Can you do this?  Can you get to the bottom of what Iraq is up to? 
 
Dr HANS BLIX 
Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC 
Well we've been preparing ourselves since the early year 2000, so we have a lot of  
trained people, we have also analysed a lot of the things from the past.  So if we are  
not prepared now, I think we will never be prepared.  
 
CORBIN:  America was threatening war against Iraq, but the UN passed a  
unanimous resolution.  Dr Blix and Mohamed El Baradei of the IAEA was set the  




Secretary General of the United Nations 
Resolution 1441 was extremely important, not only was it passed by the council but  
every member of the council voted for it and sent a unanimous message to Saddam  
Hussein that he must disarm. 
 
CORBIN:  The French-led UN opposition to America's plans for regime change in  
Iraq.  The Bush administration, at Britain's urging, reluctantly backed the resolution  




Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board 
He was not our first choice, that's well known.  He was the first choice of the  
French.  I have never thought that Dr Blix was sufficiently aggressive in getting at  
the truth.  I think he's much too concerned about Saddam Hussein's sensitivities.   
Saddam is not a sensitive man. 
 
CORBIN:  You must be aware that there are mutterings amongst some elements in  
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the American administration, what you might call the hawks, saying are you tough  
enough for the job, are you up to it, are you the man for the moment? 
 
BLIX:  Well the proof of every pudding is in the eating so I think they will have to  
see what I do, or else they will eat me (laughs). 
 
CORBIN:  The Weapons Inspectors of UNMOVIC had few people and limited  
resources.  They knew they'd have to depend on friendly governments with their  
much vaunted intelligence dossiers to have a real chance of finding Saddam's  
weapons.   
 
The British government seems pretty sure that Saddam Hussein still has chemical  
and biological weapons, has produced more recently and is trying to get a nuclear  
bomb. 
 
BLIX:  Well we are asked to provide facts to the Security Council and the best way  
of doing that is through inspections, what we see.  I read this as totally as I read the  
intelligence reports but frequently they simply state that intelligence tells us this, or  
intelligence shows that etc.  Fine, it may all be true.  I mean I meet some of these  
people and I have the greatest respect for them.  I know they do a necessary job.   
But simply saying that "intelligence shows.." is not evidence.   
 
CORBIN:  The UN inspectors opened up their old headquarters in the Canal Hotel  
in Baghdad.  The inspectors were there to verify that weapons programmes banned  
since the Gulf War had not restarted, and that former UN sites were empty.  But the  
resolution made it clear it was up to Iraq to come clean if they were hiding weapons  
of mass destruction. 
 
TARIQ AZIZ 
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq 
When you listen to Bush and Blair they tell Iraq has weapons of mass destruction;  
Iraq has to declare weapons of mass destruction; the Onus is on Iraq – and this is  
not fair.  This is not logical.  The onus is not on Iraq.  The onus is on the accuser.   
Who is accusing Iraq, he has to prove his case. 
 
CORBIN:  The hunt began on November 27th.  The Inspectors' plan was to begin by  
checking hundreds of sites, factories, laboratories and military areas, places which  
they had been to before, and which had been involved in suspicious activity in the  
past. 
 
BAUTE:  The first day was absolutely crazy.  We were three cars of ours, six or  
seven on the Iraqi side, and probably thirty of forty cars trying to compete who  
would get photo of us, that was an interesting challenge. 
 
CORBIN:  What did you actually do?  How did you organise these expeditions so  
the Iraqis wouldn't be forewarned that you were coming? 
 
JACQUES BAUTE 
Chief Weapons Inspector 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
404 
 
As the Chief Inspector I was the only one having in mind where we were going.  I  
would inform the team members the evening before, by signs, not speaking,  
because we always take care… 
 
CORBIN:  In case you're bugged. 
 
BAUTE:  Exactly.  We don’t know the status of the rooms. 
 
CORBIN:  Each morning as the Inspectors set out in convoys Iraqi officials,  
equipped with communications kit, were hard on their heels.  They were trying to  
work out where the Inspectors were going and give the sites advance warning. 
 
DEMETRIUS PERRICOS 
Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC 
In the cars that follow us they had people who were constantly on the telephone or  
the radio, and they are saying okay, we passed this particular mile, so the sites  
which are let's say five miles back, it's fine, they can be released.  For the sites that  
are in front, they're all on high alert, that there is still a very good probability that  
the inspectors are going to visit it.  They already have in all the sites that they know. 
 
CORBIN:  On the 6th day, however, the Inspectors seem to have flustered the Iraqis  
when they arrived unexpectedly from two different directions at one of Saddam's  
palaces in Baghdad.  In the past the inspectors lacked the powers to enter these so- 
called presidential sites.  For Demetrius Perricos and Jacques Baute it was a test of  
their powers to go anywhere, any time.  After a brief wait the gates were opened  
and the inspectors descended on the Palace. 
 
PERRICOS:  They were surprised.  They were surprised because they didn't think  
that we would go so early to one of those presidential sites. 
 
CORBIN:  What happened? 
 
PERRICOS:  Well we went in of course and we split the work and we started going  
through.  One team went over to the side buildings, another team went over to the  
main building. 
 
CORBIN:  Demetrius Perricos, a veteran of past inspections, knew from defectors  
that important documents and computer records had been hidden in Saddam's huge  
palaces before. 
 
PERRICOS:  We've tried to see whether you can find the computer which, strange  
enough there was no computer there.  But when we were down in the kitchens and  
we started looking at the refrigerators, which we did, we found the marmalades. 
 
CORBIN:  Jars of marmalade, jam, sweetmeats.   
 
PERRICOS:  Jars of marmalades, everything that you can imagine. 
 
CORBIN:  But didn't you feel a bit foolish that you'd gone looking for biological  




PERRICOS:  Not really, because part of the job is you look if you want to find. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam Hussein was publicly welcoming the Inspectors to Iraq, urging  
his officials to assist them in their work.  But his propaganda machine was busy, the  
state-controlled media calling them the "Un spies".   I took a stroll in a Baghdad  
market to see what people really thought.  Perhaps, surprisingly, a former director  
of Iraqi Airways who'd lived in London was suddenly on hand to give me his views  
of how the inspections were going. 
 
EX DIRECTOR, IRAQI AIRWAYS:  Up to now there is nothing serious up to  
now. 
 
CORBIN:  But do you think, though, that that will avoid war even if they find  
nothing, or what do you think will happen? 
 
EX DIRECTOR:  This depends the policy of America.  They want.. seeking for a  
reason.  
 
CORBIN:  You think they're looking for a reason for war? 
 
EX DIRECTOR:  Yes, yes. 
 
CORBIN:  What do people think about the UN coming here and going everywhere,  
looking for weapons of mass destruction? 
 
The stall holder was more suspicious? 
 
STALL HOLDER:  [translated]  It's a violation.  We consider it to be spying.   
They're leading the spying activity in this country.  They did their inspections  
before and left so what are they doing back here?  They are inspecting areas which  
have no weapons. 
 
CORBIN:  The Inspectors were telling me, as they worked through all the old  
familiar sites around Iraq, that they had little hope of finding anything, without, that  
is, some help from the real spying experts.  The CIA had produced reports claiming  
they knew from secret sources Iraq was hiding forbidden weapons.  And last  
autumn the British government had produced its own intelligence dossier.    
 
I'm on my way to Al Dara, it's a vaccine laboratory which British intelligence in  
their dossier have called "a facility of concern".  They suspect it of being involved  
in Iraq's research and biological warfare programme.  The spook suspicions had  
been aroused by a recent Iraqi application for a license to restart vaccine production  
at Al Dara.  Could it be a cover for a new and secret programme to make other  
deadly bugs?  Al Dara was disabled six years ago by the previous UN inspectors.  I  
found it shut and empty.  There was, of course, another helpful Iraqi official, Al  
Dara's former director waiting to take me on a tour.   
 
So is this laboratory as it was left by the United Nations before or have you been  




OFFICIAL:  No, no.  No rebuilding.  This remain like this after they destroy all the  
equipment.  So we leave it without any repairing. 
 
CORBIN:  And is there any production here at all? 
 
OFFICIAL:  No, no, no, no.  No productions at all now.  It is from the 96 until now  
we don’t produce anything here, it's as you see it. 
 
CORBIN:  Have the Weapons Inspectors been back here to Al Dara in recent weeks  
to inspect it, and did they… 
 
OFFICIAL:  At the second day when they are here they visit this place. 
 
CORBIN:  And what did they find? 
 
OFFICIAL:  Nothing, and I said there is nothing here.   
 
CORBIN:  The inspectors knew that this ruined laboratory wasn't likely to be in use  
again.  They were more interested in whether specialised equipment had  




Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board 
I think the weapons inspections are going in a predictable way.  That is to say they  
are not finding anything because the inspectors don’t know where to look and Iraq  
is a big country, and until there is a clear declaration from Saddam and a full and  
truthful accounting, there is really little that the Inspectors can do. 
 
CORBIN:  To the untrained eye at least Al Dara was clearly non operational.  But  
what about the testimony from Iraqi defectors that germ labs  were now hidden in  
the back of lorries? 
 
The suspicion of the British and the Americans is that it doesn't matter if this  
laboratory isn't being used because Iraq now has mobile laboratories.  You've taken  
the things you had here and you move them around the country all the time so it's  
impossible to find them. 
 
OFFICIAL:  Everything they are here, everything from this place they are here, still  
here, so what they destroy they destroy, and when they're remaining they are  
remaining here.   
 
CORBIN:  So nothing from here moved. 
 
OFFICIAL:  Nothing.  No. 
 
CORBIN:  As the weeks wore on the inspectors were becoming increasingly  
frustrated.  While American critics complained they were ineffective the US and  




Dr HANS BLIX 
Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC 
We want to have intelligence about sites to visit.  It's alright and it's interesting and  
important to be informed that they draw conclusions that Iraqis have done this or  
that, but we are inspectors and they have to be in the geography somewhere.  They  
have to go some places.  So we'd like to know are there some places you'd suggest  
us to go for good reasons? 
 
CORBIN:  And they haven't told you those places? 
 
BLIX:  No, no, I think that will come, I hope so, if they have them.  I hope they  
have them. 
 
CORBIN:  At the beginning of December came the first test of Saddam Hussein's  
intentions.  Under the UN resolution Iraq was required to submit it's declaration.  A  
full and final account of what had happened to it's weapons of mass destruction.   
There had been debate in Saddam's highest council about how open they should be.   
The 12,000 page document arrived at the Canal Hotel two days early in piles of  
boxes.  But would the Inspectors, waiting in New York and Vienna, find Iraq had  




Chief Weapons Inspector 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
The first reaction was simply to try to get in the first 30 seconds a feeling of what it  
was.  What matters could be a small paragraph added here or there, so that's why  
we cannot draw any conclusion before we have every single word. 
 
CORBIN:  So it will take a few days, perhaps even weeks, to really get a measure  
of it. 
 
BAUTE:  We're working I can almost say days and night, and when I say 'we' it  
includes the translators for instance, so that we get a good flavour of what to say..  
what to tell the council next week. 
 
CORBIN:  In New York at the United Nations UNMOVIC's Inspectors, specialists  
in missiles and chemical and biological weapons laboured for a week through  
stacks of paper.  Dr Blix was telling me he still had many questions about missing  
anthrax and VX, a deadly nerve gas – a drop can kill.  The head of UNMOVIC had  
warned the Iraqis to answer truthfully and told them they didn't have much time to  
do so.  But Dr Blix's people searched in vain for hard information in the Iraqi  
declaration.  One told me the huge document was no more than a pile of garbage  
recycled from past documents they produced many years ago. 
 
BLIX:  What Iraq needs to do is to show evidence that they have finished their  
weapons programme, that they actually destroyed weapons, and until they do that  
there will not be the confidence arising in them.  They are a well organised country  
and if you produce scud missiles or you produce anthrax, you keep track of it and  
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you have records of that, you will have reports given to it, you have individuals  
who have dealt with it.  And therefore, it seems to me, that it would not be  
impossible for them to do so, and of course the suspicion arises that if they don’t do  
that, they have actually kept something. 
 
CORBIN:  The Inspectors knew that Saddam Hussein's regime had failed a crucial  
test.  Their chances of uncovering what had happened to the missing items were  
diminishing.  Iraq was now on notice as far as the American Government and its  
British ally at the UN were concerned.   
 
Sir JEREMY GREENSTOCK 
UK Ambassador to the United Nations 
The silences are eloquent.  They have not wanted to explain what we have fairly  
strong evidence they are still holding and the onus is on Iraq to explain those  
silences under the resolutions and it's a huge disappointment to the UK which  
wants to resolve this whole thing without the use of force that the declaration has  
not been used as an opportunity to do that. 
 
CORBIN:  There had been debate amongst the top figures in the American  
administration about what should constitute a breach of Iraq's obligations serious  
enough to trigger war.  The US decided to warn Iraq that snubbing the Inspectors  
with a less than truthful declaration was in itself a cause for military action.   
 
COLIN POWELL:  Iraq's response is a catalogue of recycled information and  
flagrant omissions.  It should be obvious that the pattern of systematic holes and  
gaps in Iraq's declaration is not the result of accidents or editing oversights or  
technical mistakes.  These are material omissions that in our view constitute  
another material breach. 
 
General AMER AL-SAADI 
Presidential advisor 
That's absolute nonsense.  The declarations were truthful and complete.   
Allegations to the contrary are the same as the allegations about the Blair document  
and the CIA report in which it was said that Iraq had resumed.. prescribed activities  
and harbouring weapons of mass destruction.  None of this is true.  Also the  
reference to gaps in the declaration is just not true.  There are no gaps. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam Hussein was courting war while America was very publicly  
building up its forces on his doorstep.  And Britain too announced it was sending  
troops and aircraft to the Gulf.   
 
GREENSTOCK:  This is actually for real, but it's being done in a way which can be  
switched off if Saddam Hussein decides to comply 100% and hand all his stuff in.   
So he's got his hand on the switch actually, and if he declines to use it, then the  
military machine will roll onward as it's being prepared now.  But he's got to come  
forward credibly with all those explanations - with the materials behind them that  
are gaps in the declaration - now. 
 
CORBIN:  The military build up in late December increased the uncertainty of the  
UN mission.  The Chief Inspectors admitted it underlined the vulnerability of their  
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people in the field. 
 
BAUTE:  The last thing we want to happen is to have them caught in dramatic  
events.  
 
CORBIN:  Caught when the bombs start falling? 
 
BAUTE:  Caught when the bombs start, caught with a possible and predictable  
reaction. 
 
CORBIN:  You mean held as human shields or something by the Iraqis. 
 
BAUTE:  Maybe, you know history shows UN staff are usually well protected.   
However, in some instances they've been used as human shields and when you have  
your own people there it's definitely something that crosses your mind.  
 
CORBIN:  In January the pressure was mounting on the UN inspectors to produce a  
smoking gun.  I'm on my way to Al Tuwaitha.  It was the site of Iraq's secret nuclear  
weapons programme before the Gulf War.  Since November the UN Inspectors  
have been back to Al Tuwaitha repeatedly, trying to find out if Iraq has restarted it's  
bomb programme.   US intelligence agencies had accused Saddam Hussein of  
continuing work to build a nuclear bomb, and the British insisted he was trying to  
procure enriched uranium to do it.  These accusations, if proved, were most likely  
to trigger a war to topple his regime before it acquired these strategic weapons.   
Previous inspectors had discovered industrious scientists developing all stages of  
the bomb and the raw material to the warhead design at Al Tuwaitha – the Los  
Alamos of Iraq. 
 
Tuwaitha is like a small city.  There seem to be buildings, administrative  
headquarters, looks like a self-contained town.  Vast earthworks surround the  
massive site, much of it in ruins today.  Once more there was a welcoming  
committee and another guided tour in prospect. 
 
OFFICIAL:  The site was the nuclear research site.. the main nuclear research site  
in Iraq. 
 
CORBIN:   And today, what activities go on here? 
 
OFFICIAL:  General activities concerning research on material, agriculture and  
biology. 
 
CORBIN:  So for peaceful purposes only. 
 
OFFICIAL:  For sure. 
 
CORBIN:  And how many times have the UN inspectors been to Tuwaitha this  
time? 
 




CORBIN:  Eleven times? 
 
OFFICIAL:  Yes nine since 27 of November.  
 
CORBIN:  So in not even two months they've been here eleven times. 
 
OFFICIAL:  Yes, you are right. 
 
CORBIN:  Al Tuwaitha bears the scars of the world's determination to halt  
Saddam's nuclear ambitions.  The Israel's bombed the first reactor here 22 years  
ago.  And American planes crippled the second reactor in 1991.  The Inspectors are  
aware that new activities not only nuclear but perhaps biological too could emerge  
from the ashes of Al Tuwaitha.    The Iraqis were very anxious to show me round a  
brand new building, an experience that hovered on the brink of farce.   
 
OFFICIAL:  The farm is nearby, nearby the building, and now they are cleaning it  
and… it's a small, small farm related to the agricultural directorate here in IAEC. 
 
CORBIN:  But the problem is that last time Iraq denied that it had any of these  
weapons of mass destruction.  You made all sorts of excuses, and then after the war  
it was discovered that you did have all these programmes.  So this time people feel  
there's still a lack of credibility. 
 
OFFICIAL:  This is good credibility, it's in front of you, you can see it.  You can  
see it.  Do you think that this is a mass of destruction weapons? 
 
CORBIN:  No, it looks like mushrooms now, but how do we know what's been  
happening here before? 
 
OFFICIAL:  You can test it.   
 
CORBIN:  It's easy to… 
 
OFFICIAL:  No, no, the inspection teams they used the latest technology they have  
and even it's clear it's a mushroom and you can test it.  If you don’t believe go and  
test it. 
 
CORBIN:   So why did the inspectors come and look at the mushrooms then if  
nothing's going on here?  They had their suspicions. 
 
OFFICIAL:  Yes, and even they looked everywhere.  For example they went to  
universities, to college. 
 
CORBIN:  Yes, but why did they look at the mushrooms?  Why did they come to  
this building? 
 
OFFICIAL:  You should ask them why they are so interested this building.  They  
have visited this building twice since they returned back. 
 
CORBIN:  The UN weapons inspectors know full well that laboratories can be used  
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to culture other things than mushrooms.  And Iraq has used what it claimed were  
food production facilities before to secretly develop biological weapons.   
 
The problem for Iraq is that in the past you've said you didn't have weapons of mass  
destruction and hen they were discovered.  You lack credibility.  You yourself even  
said you didn't have them in the past.  So the world says well why should we  
believe you this time? 
 
TARIQ AZIZ 
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq 
No, when the inspectors came, madam, when the inspectors came in 1991 we didn't  
say that we don’t have weapons of mass destruction.  Chemical we did have, long  
range missiles we did have.  We did have a nuclear programme.  We didn't have  
nuclear weapons, but we did have a nuclear programme, we confessed that to  
UNSCOM and to the IAEA.  As regards the biological area, we revealed all the  
facts to UNSCOM after 1995. 
 
CORBIN:  But it took years. 
 
AZIZ:  It took years because why, why?   
 
CORBIN:  Because you didn't put it all on the table to begin with. 
 
AZIZ:  Who is to blame for that?  Who is to blame for that? 
 
CORBIN:  Mr Aziz had conveniently forgotten that after the Gulf War Iraq never  
revealed any significant weapons until the Inspectors found them.  The UN  
inspectors told me in January they would change their strategy and make surprise  
visits to places they'd never been before.  The Chief Inspector had brought new  
information back from his Christmas break.  Nervous security officials kept the  
press outside another presidential compound in Baghdad.  The Inspectors were  
inside looking for documents.  The arrival of Demetrius Perricos in Baghdad has  
signalled a new phase in the weapons inspections and will target a more direct  
approach.  Intelligence has been handed over by the United Kingdom and I've been  
told that the Weapons Inspectors are hoping for a breakthrough in the search for  
weapons of mass destruction.  The Inspectors knew this was the headquarters of  
Saddam's special security force, believed by western intelligence to be responsible  
for concealing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  They found only an armoury of  
guns, but Iraqi unease was a signal the leadership was feeling the pressure. 
 
Does the President Saddam Hussein feel the pressure on the country, on himself? 
 
AZIZ:  Of course.  He is the leader of Iraq.  When there is a pressure on his country  
he is the first person to feel the pressure. But President Saddam Hussein is a very  
strong and courageous person.  He will not bow to pressure. 
 
CORBIN:  That evening I went to the Canal Hotel to talk to Demetrius Perricos  





Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC 
They are afraid that something may be found, maybe new style of doing  
inspections.  No longer at only declared sites, and they don’t know to which site we  
will go.  They don’t know what information we will have.  They don’t know what  
sort of buildings or people we are going to try to speak or to try to enter.   
 
CORBIN:  A quiet Baghdad suburb became the next target in the Inspectors' search  
for evidence.  British intelligence had tipped the inspectors off that documents  
relating to the nuclear programme would be hidden here in a private home.  When I  
visited Dr Faleh Hassan Hamza I found him still smarting at the Inspectors' visit. 
 
Dr FALEH HASSAN HAMZA 
They search the house room by room.  They went to the bedroom of my wife.  She  
was sleeping in the bed and they are searching in her private things. 
 
CORBIN:  Then Dr Hamza was asked to open a locked junk room upstairs.  There  
was something else there.   
 
Dr KAY MERRISH 
Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC 
It was a manmade wooden box.  When I opened it.. it was as high as this table,  
probably as big as this table.  The box was that big. 
 
CORBIN:   And what's in it? 
 
MERRISH:  It's full of documents.  I said right away, I said Dr Hamza, this is what  
I am looking for. 
 
HAMZA:  So, if it is important paper it wouldn't be in order in this way. 
 
CORBIN:  Yes, but the inspectors would say this is just the place you would hide  
documents you didn't want anybody to see, in a rubbish, in a…. 
 
HAMZA:  It's rubbish things, you know.. this is rubbish.  This is one of the  
report… 
 
CORBIN:  The papers that were found.. 
 
HAMZA:  Most of them, 95%, it's old paper, it's nothing to do, it's unreality.   
 
CORBIN:  But what about the rest of them? 
 
HAMZA:  The rest of them they are private documents.  
 
CORBIN:  Did you know immediately that these were scientific papers of a very  
special kind.. 
 
MERRISH:  Oh yes.  Oh absolutely.   
 




MERRISH:  Oh yes, I could read it, and when it said classified documents…  
 
CORBIN:   And it said classified documents? 
 
MERRISH:  Yes, secret.  They are bound by the government, it's a government  
document, and they have a number because they are classified documents.   
 
CORBIN:  The papers turned out to be about using lasers to enrich uranium for a  
nuclear bomb, part of Iraq's past weapons programme.  Dr Hamza's papers should  
have been given the inspectors years ago, but the documents have never been  
disclosed, and neither had they been part of the supposedly full and final  
declaration given to the UN five weeks before.  This inspection gave credence to  
the claim that Iraqi scientists were keeping sensitive documents at home.  The only  
chance of getting at the truth was to interview scientists either abroad or in private  
at the Canal Hotel, but everyone the inspectors asked had a standard answer, only in  
a government ministry with a minder by their side. 
 
PERRICOS:  It's a certainty they don’t come because they're afraid.  And because  
they had been told.. they are not afraid because they are afraid just by themselves,  
but they have been told:  "You will answer that you are not accepting any  
interviews except in our own territory. 
 
CORBIN:  History teaches everyone a lesson.  Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in- 
law, the keeper of the special weapons, defected in 1995 and spilled the secrets of  
the germ warfare programme.  But homesick, Kamal returned to Iraq.  He and  
dozens of members of his family were murdered on Saddam's orders.  I wondered if  
the scientists I'd met would talk to the UN in private or go abroad. 
 
Would you go? 
 
HAMZA:  No, certainly not. 
 
CORBIN:  Why? 
 
HAMZA:  Because I don’t trust UNMOVIC to start with. 
 
CORBIN:  You don’t trust UNMOVIC, the UN. 
 
HAMZA:  The UN… because I have very bad experience with them.  Second thing  
is I don’t feel secure abroad to be honest with you, and I am only feel secure at my  
country.  I don’t like to leave my country.  I feel secure whether President Saddam  
is here more than anybody else.   
 
CORBIN:  Would you go to speak to them privately? 
 
Dr RIHAB TAHA 
No, I don’t trust the previous inspector and I think it is better for me and for them,  
and for everybody to have witnesses because I think it is our right and it is a human  
right that if you don’t want to speak to anybody, no any one obliged you or force  
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you to do that.   
 
CORBIN:  During my interview with Dr Taha we had several witnesses.  Her every  
word was recorded by two Iraqi officials. 
 
AZIZ:  Why should they take Iraqi experts outside Iraq? What's the objective  
behind it. 
 
CORBIN:  Because they feel they wont talke freely inside Iraq. 
 
AZIZ:   Free outside their own country?  They are a free inside their country.  They  
are free men. 
 
CORBIN:  As the 12th anniversary of the first Gulf War dawned, Iraqi's gathered in  
Baghdad's tea shops to hear their leader's televised address.  Saddam Hussein's  
defiance continued.  He said his people should again prepared themselves for battle.   
They would defeat the American aggressor.  The bullish speech reinforced the stand  
Saddam Hussein had taken.  The inspectors knew that his intentions to tough it out  
meant it was unlikely Iraq would ever put it's cards on the table.  By now they'd  
made discoveries which heightened their suspicions, rocket engines which haven't  
been declared.  Chemical shells had turned up in an arsenal empty and unused the  
Iraqis insisted they'd been overlooked by accident.  The aluminium tubes which the  
US and British intelligence had made so much of were harder to fathom.  The Iraqis  
said they were for conventional rockets.  The inspectors agreed it was plausible.   




Chief Weapons Inspector 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
We need more time. We're in the middle of the river, we've made major progress  
but we're not yet at the stage to draw any conclusion regarding the absence of a  
nuclear programme in Iraq. 
 
January 27, 2003-02-10 
United Nations, New York 
 
CORBIN:  At the end of January the UN gathered to hear the results of the first 60  
days of inspections in Iraq.  Dr Blix had no smoking gun to report to the Security  
Council but the mild mannered Swede was harder on the Iraqis than his critics,  
even the Americans, had expected, and he made it clear Iraq had not yet revealed  
what had happened to all the anthrax and the nerve gas. 
 
BLIX:  Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of  
the disarmament which was demanded of it, and which it needs to carry out to win  
the confidence of the world. 
 
CORBIN:  There were deep divisions in the United Nations and public opinion in  
many countries was increasingly opposed to a war.  Influential voices were raised in  
the council.  They argued that giving the inspectors longer for tough 'no holds  
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barred' inspections could contain Saddam Hussein's ambitions to develop weapons  




Secretary General of the United Nations 
The Security Council has indicated, depending on the evidence that is brought to it,  
it can declare Iraq in material breach, and following that, they will decide what  
grave consequences should be taken.  I would prefer that we have other means to  
disarm Iraq than war, and it is quite clear the Inspectors destroyed more weapons of  
mass destruction than all the bombings that has taken place in Iraq since 1991.  
 
CORBIN:  America wasn't interested in giving the UN time.  The Inspectors would  
never contain Saddam's weapons, they said, because they'd never find them.  The  
US declared it would present secret intelligence to prove Iraq's guilt.   
 
There's real frustration here at the UN.  If the Americans have substantive evidence,  
then why haven't they given it to the Inspectors before.  Amongst the Inspectors  
there's real scepticism that these new revelations will amount to anything at all. 
 
Dr HANS BLIX 
Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC 
Much of this evidence I think and understand will be circumstantial or will be by  
inference and it will be personal judgment how convinced are you by it.  We will  
see on Wednesday what Colin Powell has to say. 
 
POWELL:  This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on  
the Inspectors t find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long.   
Inspectors are inspectors, they are not detectives.  
 
CORBIN:  The American Secretary of State laid out what he said was evidence  
before the Council.  He claimed Iraq was again playing the old game of hide and  
seek with the inspectors.  Mr Powell produced secret intercepts.   
 
POWELL:  Listen: 
 
(recording of exchange of dialogue in Arabic – translated) 
 
COL:  Hello. 
 
CAPT:  Hello. 
 
COL:  Hello. 
 
CAPT:  May I help you, Sir? 
 
COL:  Who is this?  Captain Ibrahim? 
 




COL:  Remove. 
 
CAPT:  Remove.. [repeats instructions] 
 
COL:  The expression. 
 
CAPT:  The expression. 
 
COL:  "Nerve agents." 
 
CAPT:  "Nerve agents." 
 
COL:  Wherever it comes up. 
 
CAPT:  Wherever it comes up. 
 
 
CORBIN:  There were spy satellite photos which he said showed sites had been  
sanitised ready to receive Dr Blix's teams.  Mr Powell made it clear he thought  
inspections were pointless now.  US patience with Iraq was almost exhausted.   
 
POWELL:  We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance.  Iraq is not so far taking  
that one last chance. 
 
CORBIN:  The Inspectors had already got the message.  A weary Dr Blix had told  
me the week before, he couldn't spin out the inspections any longer. 
 
BLIX:  Take note of the fact that we had inspection in Iraq for eight years, and  
thereafter four years we had no inspection at all.  Since then we started have had  
two months.  Well that's a rather short time to call it a day, and therefore, if more  
time were given, yes, I will welcome it.  But I cannot in good conscience plead for  
it. 
 
CORBIN:  Is that because you feel perhaps even however much time you have, the  
fact you're not getting the answers from the Iraqis it's futile really. 
 
BLIX:  That's right. Yes, if you do not have that change of attitude, then it could  
drag out. 
 
CORBIN:  This weekend the heads of the UN Inspection Teams went to Baghdad  
once more to hear the Iraqis promise new cooperation.  Scientists had suddenly  
come forward for private interviews and new documents were handed over. 
 
BLIX:  I perceived a beginning, more serious attitude and cooperation of substance  
and I welcome that.  Breakthrough is a bit too strong word for what we are seeing,  
but we are seeing some… 
 
CORBIN:  There was a hint of even more Iraqi concessions to come just before Dr  
Blix next briefs the Security Council in five days time.  But Iraq's brinkmanship  






Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq 
It will be a bloody war. Yes, they can inflict a lot of losses in the civilian area.  But  
if they decide to invade Iraq, then they will pay a very heavy price. 
 
CORBIN:  Dr Blix, if your inspectors have to leave Iraq, if war becomes inevitable,  
wont it show, in effect, that the UN has failed in its mission to peacefully disarm? 
 
BLIX:  Yes, it's a failure and I certainly would want to have disarmament through  
the peaceful route of using in sections.  But there is only so much you can do. 
 
CORBIN:  Three months ago when I started out, the Inspectors hoped they could  
avert a war, but Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets.   
The Inspectors may soon be just a footnote in history as America warns Saddam  
has thrown away his last chance. 
 
Next week on Panorama, "Promises Promises" the first in a series of the state of  
Britain's public services.  John Ware investigates whether Tony Blair's government  
is living up to its promises on Transport.  If you want to comment on tonight's  





















RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 23:03:03 
........................................................................ 
 
JACK STRAW:  This man, Blair, has taken really very significant risks with his own future 
as a Prime  





TAM DALYELL:  I suppose, if it was a short, sharp, victorious war, that he would bathe in 
glory – heaven  
help us. 
 
JOHN LLOYD:  There is no present and clear danger to British interests.  He's doing it in a 
sense out of a  
missionary duty to the world, to rid the world of evil people.  
 
KEN CLARKE:  I listen to a man who preaches at me with deep, deep conviction and I'm 
afraid I sit in the  
congregation and think, and I don’t really think we should be there and  I don’t really think 
your allies on  
the other side of the Atlantic see it quite like that. 
 
VIVIEN WHITE:  This is the story of the road to war for Tony Blair, of his personal 
conviction, of the risk  
that he's taken.  And this is inside story of the long and intense campaign fought by hundreds 
of thousands  
in this country to try and prevent the war from happening. 
 
TONY BLAIR:  I know this course of action has produced deep divisions of opinion in our 
country.  But I  
know also the British people will now be united in sending our armed forces, our thoughts 
and prayers. 
 
WHITE:  Blair's war and the political risk he's taken was forged in the USA by the bond 
between Bush and  
Blair, the remarkable political and personal alliance between a Labour Prime Minister and a 
Conservative  
rightwing Republican President. 
 
6th April 2002 
 
GEORGE BUSH:  Laura and I are very honoured to have our friends, Tony and Cherie Blair 
and their  
family, visit us here in Crawford.  We appreciate the rain that the Prime Minister brought 
with him, and so  
do the other farmers and ranchers in the area.  Mr Prime Minister thanks for brining it. 
 
TONY BLAIR:  My pleasure George. 
 
 
Sir CHRISTOPHER MEYER 
British Ambassador to US 
1997-2003 
The first meeting was over lunch.  The President said to Blair: "Welcome Tony.  Can I call 
you Tony?"   
And of course Blair said:  "Yes".  And Blair said:  "Well it's great to be here George.  Can I 
call you  
419 
 
George?"  And the President said:  "Yes, of course you can."   And then… "Well what shall 
we talk about?"   
"Middle East."   "Middle East."  And off they went. 
 
WHITE:  But after the attack on the World Trade Centre America fundamentally changed its 
foreign policy  
and asserted its right to take action wherever it saw itself as potentially threatened. 
 
CHAIR:  The President of the United States.    [cheers and applause] 
 
29th January, 2002 
 
WHITE:  The doctrine of "pre-emption" was born.  The countries which the President saw as 
a threat were  
named.  The list of perspective targets for a pre-emptive first strike, and Iraq was top of the 
list. 
 
GEORGE BUSH:  States like these and their terrorist allies constitute and axis of evil arming 
to threaten  
the peace of the world.  I will not wait on events while dangers gather.  I will not stand by as 
peril draws  
closer and closer.  The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous 
regimes to  
threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. 
 
CHRIS SMITH MP 
Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001 
This is a completely new doctrine that overturns all the normal rules of international 
engagement.  We  
should, as a government, have been much clearer at the time about the scale of the change 
which that  
doctrine of pre-emption identified, and we should have been actively saying: Hang on a 
moment, this is not  
the way in which you deal sensibly with international relations. 
 
WHITE:  But Tony Blair wasn't carried along against his will by this new policy.  A 
longstanding friend of  
his says pre-emption coincided with his own view of international morality. 
 
JOHN LLOYD 
Former Editor, "New Statesman" 
Friend of Tony Blair 
It's clear I think that after 9/11 he took the position that states like America and its allies must 
at times use  
military force to depose evil people or to go into failed states where there is a danger.  He'd 
accepted that..  
in some ways he'd accepted that before George Bush, and it puts him rather on a par with 
these so called  
hawkish advisers of George Bush who also say you should go into states, depose evil men 
and bring in  
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democracy if you can.  So in a sense he is in conventional terms to the right of the Republican 
Party. 
 
WHITE:  Blair's agreement with Bush's new policy was quite unacceptable to many within 
the Labour  
Party.  The gulf between the Prime Minister and some of his own MPs was dramatically 
displayed when in  
the Commons he was challenged by a left-winger about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. 
 
29th January 2003 
 
DR LYNNE JONES:  Can my right honourable friend explain why he represents a greater 
threat today than  
he did in 1997, 1998, 1999 and all the time that my right honourable friend was Prime 
Minster up until  
President Bush's "axis of evil" speech when apparently the situation changed? 
 
BLAIR:  The fact is, way before President Bush's speech, at the very first meeting I had with 
President Bush  
back in February 2001 I said that weapons of mass destruction is an issue and we have to 
confront them.  In  
this House on the 14th September I said this was the issue that after the 11th September was 
even more  
important to deal with.  And I simply say this to her, the UN having taken its stand, if we do 
not deal with  
Iraq now, the UN having taken its stand, my honourable friends says? "Who's next?"  Well 
after we deal  
with Iraq we then do… yes, through the United Nations, again have to confront North Korea 
about its  
weapons programme. 
 
HOUSE MEMBERS:  Whoooooo 
 
JONES:  There was this extraordinary "Whoooo".  I can't even make the sound of it. 
 
WHITE:  And what did that tell you was going on inside your Party? 
 
LYNNE JONES MP 
Labour 
Well there's deep unease but also it was almost jeering at the Prime Minister which was very, 
very unusual  
because obviously for many years he's been held in enormous respect.  He's seen as the leader 
that did the  
impossible and led Labour into a second victory. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  Sign the anti-war petition here today.  Grab some leaflets for your 
neighbourhood.   
Say to Bush and Blair that we don’t your slaughter in the Middle East.  We don’t want your 




WHITE:  Beyond Parliament there was growing opposition to the war.  But at first it was 
discounted by the  
government.  The activists were on the left which Mr Blair was used to defeating.  But the 
public were  
becoming politicised.  Iraq had made street politics genuinely popular. 
 
MAN [member of public]:  What will you do?  What's your suggestion as to alleviate that 
pain. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  Right, okay.  First of all, will this war solve… 
 
MAN:  No, no, never mind the war. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  No, you just asked me what the position is. 
 
MAN:  Never mind the war.  Never mind the war because you said you don’t want war.  
So…. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  No, hang on, what do  
 
MAN:  Right, okay.  First of all, will this war solve… 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  No, no, ?? in the war. 
 
MAN:  No, you just asked me what the position is. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:  Never mind the war.  Never mind the war because you said you don’t 
want war.   
So…. 
 
MAN:  No, hang on, what do you want.  What do you  want to happen. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR: Every time I open my mouth you jump in.  So let me finish… 
 
MAN:  Your friend here is not ??.  He's actually suggested an alternative because there is no 
alternative. 
 
WHITE:  But the anti-war movement thought they could win the argument.  They'd become a 
professionally  




Stop the War.  How can I help you? 
 
Go on GMT tomorrow morning… 
 
We're not starting till Andrew gets here, are we? 
 




WHITE:  Led by experienced political activists the Stop the War Coalition had been 
organising a  
widespread public protest movement from its modest Union premises near London's King's 
Cross.  It's  
organisers have long service records in the Peace Movement and in industrial disputes.  The 
Chairman of  
Stop the War was Andrew Murray.  He's the Senior Press Officer at ASLEF the train drivers' 
union, a  
communist.   
 
LINDSEY GERMAN:  I thought it was a good turnout, and I thought actually the fundraisers 
meeting I  
thought wasn't a bad turnout.  
 
WHITE:  Lindsey German, convener of the Stop the War Coalition, a long-serving member 
of the Socialists  
Workers Party.  These traditional left-wingers had built a very untraditional political 
movement.  
 
MAN:  I mean I was talking to Tariq and to Colin Redgrave and whatnot about…. 
 
ANDREW MURRAY 
Chairman, Stop the War Coalition 
We started off with the issue of the war in Afghanistan which a lot of people opposed, I 
wouldn't say a  
majority.  But since then it's been an almost insane drive for war coming from Washington, 
and Tony  
Blair's decision to support it throughout that has driven ever wider sections of the population 
into the anti- 
war movement and the Stop the War Coalition has been there to coordinate and express that. 
 
WHITE:  The Coalition made grandiose claims.  They said there was a movement large 
enough to threaten  
the Blair government.  
 
MAN:  It's going to have to pay a massive political price for this in the future. 
 
2ND MAN:  The government should listen to the people that fought to get it elected. 
 
3RD MAN:  Unless Blair changes course, Blair will fall on this. 
 
WHITE:  To make an impact, the Coalition had to be more than a Leftwing movement.  It 
had to reach the  
Prime Minister's heartland.  Blending the ancient arts of politics and the new, the movement 
set out to play  






WHITE:  Sophie Churchill, director of a Birmingham think tank.  She's a politics graduate 
who'd voted  
Labour and never thought that street protests worked.  Lots of teenage children, far from 
being uninterested  
in politics became very involved over Iraq.  In Sophie Churchill's home in Birmingham and 
many others,  
getting ready for the national march on February 15th became a family affair.   
 
SOPHIE CHURCHILL 
I think one of my main actions to this is to wake up to how much of the Presidential style of 
leadership we  
have been moving to, and one of my big concerns has been what's been happening to 
Parliamentary  
democracy through this.  I'm somebody who has never thought that there was anything wrong 
with taking to  
the streets and demonstrating, but I've always thought there are other ways which are a little 
bit more  
effective.   
 
It think it's really effective because it's so simple really, isn't it. 
 
One reason I'm going tomorrow is that I feel we've got to the point where actually just being 
visible is as  
effective as going through our own democratic processes. 
 




WHITE:  Deep in Middle England the very voters who enthusiastically elected Mr Blair were 
now  
preparing to march against his policy on Iraq instead.  For writer Minette Walters, opposing 
the war now  
inevitably meant opposing him.  She's the best selling author of nine crime thrillers.  Five of 
them already  




I have a real problem about invading another country, particularly as I'm afraid I have not 
seen any evidence  
to show me that it's justified.  But Tony's got himself into such a terrible position.  How does 






Retired Major, British Army 
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They don’t trust him.  I thin this is the frightening thing.  There's been so much spin, there's 
been so much  
misinformation coming out, and even if he put out something which was absolutely accurate 
people  
wouldn't believe it. 
 
WHITE:  You wouldn't? 
 
MILLS:  I wouldn't, know. 
 
WHITE:  Bernard Mills, a former major in the British Army who served in the SAS, a 
Middle East  
specialist, another recruit for the anti-war march. 
 
On February 15th there was a political demonstration against the war unlike anything ever 
seen here before. 
 
TONY BENN 
We cannot take a nation to war against its will.  Eden tried it.  Do you remember what 
happened to him?   
He lost his job. 
 
EMILY CHURCHILL 
There's no evidence that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, and if he does, 
they're going to  
have been given to him by the US and the UK which is a fact that a lot of people are ignoring. 
 
MAN:  Well I'm marching on behalf of the Iraqi people who I think have suffered enough in 
the last 30  
years. 
 
WHITE:  Hundreds of thousands of people who'd never taken part in any political event 
before filled the  
capital's streets.  Tony Blair wasn't impressed. 
 
Glasgow 
15th February 2003 
 
BLAIR:  If there are 500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose 
deaths  
Saddam has been responsible for. 
 
SOPHIE CHURCHILL:  When you actually get here and you just feel that you suddenly 
belong to a whole  
lot of other people, and in a democracy you just don’t feel that very often. 
 
BLAIR:  If there are one million, that is still less than the number of people that died in the 









WHITE:  Bernard Mills, the former army officer, was marching for peace though he knew 
serving officers  
in the Gulf waiting to fight. 
 
MILLS:  When you join the army, you join to defend your country and I think I'm defending 
my country as  
much by coming on this march as if I was out now with a lot of young friends of mine in 
Kuwait. 
 
WHITE:  Downing Street got a special jeer from the protesters as they passed by.  The 
decision on peace or  




I think Tony does have to take notice of this but whether he will I'm not perhaps that 
optimistic.  But I think  
a million people, if a million people turn out, I think that's a very, very loud voice speaking 
against war. 
 
BLAIR:  The moral case against war has a moral answer.  It is the moral case for removing 
Saddam. 
 
SOPHIE CHURCHILL:  I think this sends a message to Tony Blair that if he feels isolated in 
his Cabinet  
and in the Government, he should feel… he should feel isolated.  This is quite a personalised 
message that  
going, a lot of the banners are about Blair and about Bush and they're talking about regime 
change here as  
well. 
 
WHITE:  British Muslims were on the march in large numbers, making their voice heard.  A 
Muslim  
organisation was part of the Stop the War coalition.   
 
SELMA YAQOOB 
Birmingham Stop the War Coalition 
If today only the Centralists had turned up, they would have said:  It's just the Loony Left.  If 
today only  
CND had turned up, they would have said: It's just a bleeding heart Liberal.   If today only 
the Muslims had  
turned up, they would have said:  it's the Fundamentalists.  Well Tony Blair, you can not 






The United States is a monster out of control.  Unless we challenge it with absolute 
determination,  
American barbarism will destroy the world.  It is a country run by a bunch of criminal 
lunatics with Tony  




TONY BLAIR:  I simply ask the marchers to understand this.  I do not seek unpopularity as a 
badge of  
honour.  But sometimes it is the price of leadership and it is the cost of conviction. 
 
CHRIS SMITH MP 
Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001 
I'm sure one of the things that he sees as being a test of leadership is being able to be strong, 
to be  
forthright, to be convinced of what you're doing.  So a little bit the same way that Mrs 
Thatcher had, that  
you could disagree passionately with what she was doing and what she stood for, I think he's 
adopted the  
same mantle himself.  But sometimes, if they're going down the wrong track, you also need to 
have a Prime  




There have been other leaders of ours who have been profoundly unpopular and in the 1930s 
– and I'm not  
suggesting there are exact parallels, there never are – but in the 1930s it's worth remembering 
that there  
were huge marches in favour of what was… came to be called pejoratively 'appeasement'.  I 
understand,  
indeed sympathise with the stand they took, although history later told us that they were 
wrong. 
 
BLAIR:  Right, Jack, why don’t you start us off with current diplomatic situation. 
 
STRAW:  Right, well the Security Council resolution went through….. 
 
WHITE:  Blair and Straw thought they had an Iraq strategy which would satisfy many of the 
protesters.   
Blair had persuaded President Bush to go down the UN route.  Last November the United 
Nations past  
Resolution 1441.  Sponsored by the US and the UK it sent the inspectors back into Iraq and 
threatened  
serious consequences if Saddam did not disarm.  But it didn't say there will be war. 
 
8th November 2002 
BLAIR:  In the event of Saddam refusing to cooperate, or being in breach, there will be a 
further UN  
427 
 
discussion as we always said there would be.  To those who fear this resolution is just an 
automatic trigger  
point without any further discussion, paragraph 12 of the resolution makes it clear this is not 
the case. 
 
31st January 2003 
 
Ladies and gentlemen – the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom. 
 
WHITE:  Blair publicly committed himself to seeking the so-called second UN resolution 
which would be  
an explicit trigger for war.  It was politically critical for him, but it wasn't for Bush.  He 
would go to war  
without UN backing if he judged it necessary. 
 
BUSH:  I appreciate my friend's commitment to peace and security.  I appreciate his vision.  I 
appreciate his  
willingness to lead.  Most importantly I appreciate his understanding that after September 
11th 2001 the  
world changed. 
 
Sir CHRISTOPHER MEYER 
British Ambassador to US 
1997-2003 
Blair made a very forceful case to the President for using the United Nations, for going 
through the United  
Nations, a moral case, a realpolitik case, and we made it to the US Administration at various 
levels.  Now  
there are others inside the Administration also making the case.  And in the end, as we know, 
that is what  
the President chose to do. 
 
KEN CLARKE MP 
Conservative Minister, 1979-97 
I think Mr Blair's mission was to try to cloak all this with legality, with the old world order.  
So because of  
Blair in part, the Americans allowed the politics and the diplomacy to go round a loop line 
trying to get  
some support for this in United Nations whilst the build up of the American and British 
armies and air force  
and navy continued, ready for the war to start in the spring.   
 
WHITE:  But for many inside the Foreign Secretary's own Blackburn constituency Labour 
Party, a second  
UN resolution wasn't just desirable but the absolute minimum price for their support.  They 
debated a  
motion insisting on a second resolution. 
 




MAN:  We at Shadworth are very concerned about the brinkmanship that's happening in the 
Middle East  
just now.  There should be no war without a second resolution, and there should be no second 
resolution  
without substantial proof.   
 
2nd MAN:  What we are saying is, Labour Party members, members from my world, that's 
why I've come up  
here, they are telling me to go and tell Labour Party in Blackburn that what Jack is doing is 
wrong.   
 
3rd MAN:  If we follow America without any thinking, without any philosophy, then we 
are… it's blind  
leading the blind. 
 
PHIL RILEY:  I think a number of you are doing the government a disservice.  My belief 
would be – and  
this might be naïve – but my belief would be that if the British Government had not taken the 
stand that it  
has done, then the chances of the American government particularly under Bush taking any 
sort of steps  
through the United Nations would be very, very slight. 
 
WHITE:  The government's policy was being challenged in constituency Labour Parties up 
and down the  
country.  In Blackburn the question was: Would they only support the war with a second UN 
resolution? 
 
WOMAN:  All those in favour of the resolution.  Against.  That's clearly carried. 
 
WHITE:  If there should be a was without a second UN resolution, how do you think your 
local MP, the  
Foreign Secretary, be placed, and how will you be placed? 
 
PETER DAWSON 
Blackburn Labour Party 
 It's a very big question and I'm sure Jack Straw is aware of the difficult decision that he's got.  
First of all  
he's got to do what he believes is the right thing for the country in respect of all the other 
interests and also  
demonstrate to his constituency and England in general, that we are a pacifist party, so it does 
put him very,  
very starkly between a rock and a hard place. 
 
WHITE:  The Chamber of the Commons now became the chief theatre of opposition to the 
war. The  
protesters had spoken, so had local Labour Parties.  Now it was the turn of over 100 Labour 
MPs to tell the  




26th February 2003 
 
STRAW [speaking in the House]:  We are now close to the crunch point.  Saddam must 
either embark  
immediately on voluntary and full disarmament or the Security Council has to face up to its 
responsibility to  
see that he is disarmed by force.  That's the truth.  That's the reality.  I give way to my humble 
friend. 
 
WHITE:  A former Cabinet Minister, normally a strong political supporter of Mr Blair, was 
leading the  
rebels. 
 
SMITH:  It grieves me, madam deputy speaker, that I'm seeking to amend a resolution tabled 
by my  
government, a government that I applaud and support.  But these are serious times and this 
House must  
make a serious judgment.  We must say here today in this chamber, that now is  not the time, 
that the case  
has yet to be fully made, and that war with all its consequences cannot be the present answer. 
 
HOUSE MEMBERS:   (Cheers and applause):   
 
WHITE:  That night 122 Labour MPs defied the government whip.  It was the biggest party 
rebellion for a  
hundred years.  The threat to Tony Blair was now there for all to see, even though the 
Conservative  
opposition voted along with the government. 
 
AMERICAN DEMONSTRATOR:  Use your head, not your guns.   Oh boy! 
 
CHRIS SMITH MP 
Labour Cabinet Minister, 1997-2001 
And this was not about rebelling for the sake of rebelling.  It wasn't about playing politics.  
This was about  
a serious issue of whether we go to war or not.  And I think actually the House of Commons 
dealt with it in  
that sort of serious frame of mind. 
 
WHITE:  If there is a war without a second UN resolution, a war involving British troops, 
what do you now  
think is going to happen at Westminster? 
 
LYNNE JONES MP 
Labour 
I think that there will be an enormous vote against war and part of the parliamentary Labour 
Party and Blair  
will only get a majority if he gets the Tories voting with him, and I just don’t think that is 
acceptable for a  
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Labour Prime Minister, and then there will be growing talk about whether it is appropriate for 
him to  
continue to lead the Labour Party in such circumstances. 
 
WHITE:  Do you think Mr Blair is gambling his premiership? 
 




WHITE:  And do you think it's…. 
 
DALYELL:  Yes, yes, yes. 
 
JACK STRAW MP 
Foreign Secretary 
Well you get used to these things in politics and if you… as Truman famously said:  "If you 
don’t like the  
heat, get out of the kitchen."   I think the Prime Minister thrives on the heat. 
 
WHITE:  He thrives on the heat? 
 
STRAW:  Yes, he thrives on the pressure.  I mean the interesting thing about taking on a job 
like mine, a  
job like his still more, is that amongst many things you find out about yourself and what 
happens when you  
are subjected to very considerable pressure.  As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, he is 
very resilient,  




WHITE:  The day after the Commons vote Blair had to go to a summit in Madrid and attend 
the  
enthronement of the Archbishop of Canterbury on the way.  Then, obviously exhausted, he 
gave his  
response to the rebellion. 
 
28th February 2003 
 
BLAIR:  I don’t ignore the voices of people who are opposed to the course that we are taking.  
I understand  
why they take that view and I respect that view.  But in the end, I have got to say as Prime 
Minister to the  
country on an issue such as this, what I believe and why I believe it.  And I believe genuinely, 
passionately,  
that international terrorism and unstable repressive states developing chemical, biological, 
nuclear weapons  




STRAW:  Six years of this intensity as Prime Minister and nine years as Leader, he's bound 
to show in a  
way.. I mean he's remarkably energetic, hugely resilient, one of the reasons why he was 
looking tired over a  
particular period, was because he was having to take diplomatic calls from heads of state of 
government  
into the small hours of the morning and then start again in the early hours of the next day, and 
for all of us,  




WHITE:  And with the Blair Government under intense political pressure the Foreign 
Secretary, Jack  
Straw, arrived in his constituency for a series of engagements that weren't all about the war. 
 
The Foreign Secretary is potentially as politically vulnerable in his Blackburn constituency as 
any other  
Labour MP, in some ways more so. 
 
Jack Straw, isn't your government's policy on Iraq now dangerously out of line with public 
opinion here in  
your constituency in Blackburn, in Parliament and in the country at large? 
 
STRAW:  I don’t think so.  I mean of course the issue is one of great anxiety for people.  It's 
one of great  
anxiety for those of us right at the centre of it.  What I think the opinion polls over all show is 
real  
understanding about the problem of Iraq and the need to disarm it, great support for the 
United Nations, big  
hesitation if action were taken without a second resolution, and that's essentially I think the 
mood of the  
House of Commons.  But also, it has polarised opinion in a way that we've not seen for many 
years. 
 
WHITE:  And Blackburn had particularly strong opposition to the war because it has a large 
Muslim  
minority, and many saw the threatened conflict as a war against their fellow Muslims.  The 
local area on the  
latest census is nearly 20% Muslim, and in the town itself the proportion is considerably 
higher.  The  
prospect of the war added to existing tensions.  The Muslim Asians are a power in the Labour 
Party and the  
Iraqi conflict presented some of them with a difficult choice between their religion and their 
politics. 
 
You're a Labour councillor but you're a Labour Asian councillor, a Muslim yourself.  On this 
issue, do you  




Cllr YUSUF JAN VIRMANI 
Blackburn Labour Party 
My loyalties again, yes, Labour Party, yes, but my conscience and my religion comes in as 
well,  




Secretary, Blackburn Labour Party 
We've almost got two parallel communities in the town but in the broadest of terms there 
are… this is  
biculturalism rather than multiculturalism. 
 
WHITE:  And is your concern then that Muslims, even Muslims in this constituency Labour 
Party may  
judge the Iraq issue on Muslim perspective, on what's happening to Muslims in another 
country? 
 
RILEY:  It feels like that to me as an outsider.  The danger is, is that we will end up 
discovering how  
different we are rather than how much we have in common. 
 
WHITE:  Iraq is a Muslim issue here.  The faithful who attended one of Blackburn's many 
mosques for  
Friday prayers were urged directly by the Imam to oppose the war and the policy of their 
Labour Mp. 
 
IMAM:  At 5 o'clock at the community centre the Foreign Minister Jack Straw is coming.  
We all need to  
be there to make our voices heard.  We voted Jack Straw into Parliament. 
 
WHITE:  And the Imam then led the congregation in chanting prayers seeking Allah's help 
for repressed  
Muslims the world over, including those of Iraq. 
 
God, show mercy on the Muslim world.  Glory to the Muslim world.  Give independence to 
the Muslims of  
Kashmir.  May the Muslims of Palestine be freed from cruelty and oppression.  May the 
Muslims of Iraq  
gain salvation at this time when the world of infidel has united against the Muslim world.   
 
WHITE:  That afternoon outside the community centre where Jack Straw was due to hold his 
next surgery  
the demonstrators gathered, the Imam amongst them, awaiting the Foreign Secretary.  
 
Do you really believe that Tony Blair the Prime Minister, and you for that matter, can survive 
politically the  




STRAW:  Well we have endorsement in the House of Commons, yes I do, and we have got 
the first  
resolution from the Security Council.  We're working very hard to get the second resolution, 
and as I've  
repeated, we could only take military action if that decision was itself endorsed by our 
democratic  
representative body which is called the House of Commons. 
 
10th March 2003 
 
WHITE:  But in the Elysée Palace the Blair Government strategy of getting a second UN 
resolution was  
wrecked by the French.  In public, on prime time TV President Chirac exercised his veto and 
said he would  
vote 'Non' whatever happened.  And in Downing Street, the failure of Mr Blair's diplomatic 
strategy was  
there for all to see. 
 
BLAIR:   Right.  Good morning everyone.  First of all can I say…   France or any other 
country is simply  
going to say we will veto, no matter what.  That's obviously a very difficult position. 
 
WHITE:  You can't possibly claim that politically that situation was prepared for either in 
terms of public  
opinion or the Party or Parliament. 
 
STRAW:  Well all three were clearly prepared for, and if you look at what I've been saying in 
Parliament  
ever since… well I think probably before 1441 was finally agreed but certainly from the 
moment that 1441  
was agreed, I've been continually asked about what about second resolution and I've said 
words to the effect  
that we would prefer to have a second resolution but we don’t regard it as necessary. 
 
WHITE:  But getting that second resolution had been the agreed position of the Cabinet.  It 
was make or  
break point.  One Cabinet minister, Clair Short, invited herself onto a radio programme, 
threatened to resign  
and condemned the Prime Minister. 
 
SHORT:  Reckless with our government, reckless with his own future position and place in 
history.  It's  
extraordinarily reckless. 
 




WHITE:  The Leader of the House, Robin Cook, did resign because there was no second UN 
resolution.   
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Though Clair Short did not.  He was rewarded with a standing ovation.  Parliament now had 
to decide and  
vote for war or no war.  Outside, the protesters made their voices heard.  It was their last 




Retired Major, British Army 
I think what we have done is follow a very, very rightwing American Government and I think 
our Prime  
Minister has been, dare I say, tricked into following that lead. 
 
WHITE:  Tony Blair had faced a million protesters and a record rebellion in the Commons.  
Now he went  
into the Chamber and put his premiership on the line. 
 
Has he blinked? 
 
STRAW:  Well he's never blinked in the sense of his commitment to the strategy of 
disarming Iraq.  I mean  
there have of course been many moments when we've had the most intensive discussions 
about the steps  
you take the next day or the next day the next week, of course.  But in terms of the overall 
strategy is there a  




Former Editor, "New Statesman" 
Friend of Tony Blair 
The reason why he hasn't blinked is that he's always sustained by this view that this is the 
right way, and in  
some ways, as many people who were in that position, the very fact of the opposition, and 
indeed the  
growth of the opposition, itself underscores the rightness. 
 
HOUSE:  (voices in support) 
 
BLAIR:  This is not the time to falter.  This is the time for this House, not just this 
Government or indeed  
this Prime Minister, but for this House to give a lead, to show that we will stand up for what 
we know to be  
right, to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our 
way of life at  
risk. 
 
18th March 2003 
 




BLAIR:  To show, at the moment of decision, that we have the courage to do the right thing.  
I beg to move  
the motion. 
 
HOUSE:  (cheers) 
 
WHITE:  Mr Blair secured a clear parliamentary majority for war against Iraq.  Outside 
Parliament the  
protesters stopped the rush hour traffic.  Inside, 139 Labour MPs and 78 MPs of other parties 
had voted  
against military action.   
 
MARTIN LINTON MP 
Labour 
Certainly we were in the position, and Tony Blair would be the first person to describe it as 
far from ideal,  
where we were under a great deal of pressure from the Americans to go along with them and 
equally the  
French were looking for delay.  But at the end of the day we had to make a decision and I 
think the right  
decision has been made. 
 
WHITE:  And you've backed the government. 
 
LINTON:  I have indeed. 
 
LYNNE JONES MP 
Labour 
I hope that those who think that this is the right way to go will be proved right.  I hope I… 
you know.. the  
sick feeling that I have, that somehow or other we are laying down a path for conflict for 
several decades to  
come.  I hope that I'm going to be proved wrong. 
 
WHITE:  George Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was rejected.  Tony Blair was armed 
with the  
democratic assent of British MPs.  The war began.   
 
LLOYD:   He is gambling his premiership.  I think he's gambled his premiership in his mind 
for some time.   
I think soon after 9/11 he realised his premiership would be on the line.  Indeed he was 
saying so to people  
close to him that he would see himself at risk politically for the role that he was going to have 
to play with  
America.  And now that gamble is being made, well clear to everyone that the dice are being 
played, the  
cards have been dealt, and that dependent upon the outcome of this war will depend his 
political outcome. 
 




WOMAN:  We have no confidence in this government who doesn't listen to us.  Doesn't that 
show you  
about the MP that you voted for? 
 
WHITE:  On the night war broke out there were demonstrations all over the country, 
including Blackburn,  
Jack Straw's constituency. 
 
MAN:  And if they don’t resign, then in the coming elections we wont vote for them.  In the 
next general  
election and local elections we will give a clear no to Jack Straw. 
 
WHITE:  Inside the town hall that night the constituency Labour Party had been meeting just 
as the  
invasion of Iraq began. 
 
PETER DAWSON 
Blackburn Labour Party 
I'm, as many other Labour Party members are, will be thinking about our positions, but 
there's got to be  
something ?? ?? there's no… I don’t feel any bitter hatred for the Labour Party, I just feel that 
there's issues  
that need to be.. to instigate serious discussion at the moment. 
 
WHITE:  This is exactly the war that you voted against. 
 
DAWSON:  Absolutely, yes. 
 
WHITE:  You told us before that if this happened, people might resign from the Labour 
Party.  Are there  




Secretary, Blackburn Labour Party 
I mean, the answer is no in fact at the moment, and that's not to say that there wont be but in 
fairness, at this  
current minute, there is no indication that anybody is going to resign? 
 
Cllr MAUREEN BATESON 
Chairman, Blackburn Labour Party 
Dependent on how people see the handling of that war will I think colour their decisions 
about their  
position within the Labour Party.  At present I would hope that everybody within the party at 
this difficult  
time will support whatever action is being taken.   
 
WHITE:  The war has caused a reassessment of Tony Blair.  Some of his former supporters 
are alarmed by  
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I actually am now agreeing with what people always said about him before which is that he 
was arrogant  
and he didn't listen to people.  I never thought it before.  I thought he was a very 
conscientious man and I  
actually thought he believed in what he was doing.  I still do and I mean it's… well in a way 
I'm frightened  
by this.  I think he does believe in good and evil and that he's on the side of good and that 
Iraq is on the side  
of evil.  That terrifies the living daylights out of me. 
 
WHITE:  Yesterday there were antiwar protests across the country.  Five weeks ago a million 
people had  
marched in London to try to stop the war.  The police estimate that yesterday 200,000 turned 
out there again  
to demonstrate against the conflict now underway.   
 
SOPHIE CHURCHILL 
We have failed in our main intention which was to stop the war, and today's demonstration 
feels a little bit  
more angry, a little bit sadder perhaps.  But some things are worth doing whether you win or 
not. 
 
WHITE:  Last month Tony Blair told a million marchers that they were wrong.  Now some 
public opinion  
polls report increasing support for him and for the war. 
 
ANDREW MURRAY 
Chairman, Stop the war Coalition 
He has decided to ignore the British people which is a profoundly undemocratic thing in 
addition to the  
issue of war and peace which is our main concern, and we will keep the pressure up on him.  
I mean if you  
give voice to the people's views and you're ignored, all you can do is shout louder. 
 
DEMONSTRATOR:   You are a Blair faced liar.         [cheers from demonstrators] 
 
STRAW:  Yes it has been a bumpy ride and it's not over yet, but I believe that we will come 
through it and I  
believe that the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, will come out of a strengthened 
individual in terms of  
his public position, not weakened or undermined. 
 
WHITE:  Do you? 
 




WHITE:  A bumpy ride that strengthens Tony Blair. 
 
STRAW:  Not the purpose of it but it happens to be the experience. 
 
WHITE:  British and American troops are now advancing deep into Iraq.  Tony Blair has 
taken an awesome  
political risk.  He is convinced of the justness of the cause.  But the war has, in his own 
words, produced  




























THE RACE TO BAGHDAD 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 6:04:03 
........................................................................ 
 
JOHN WARE:  Every night on television we are witness to a huge gamble, what some 
American insiders  
say are just the opening shots of a Fourth World War, a series of perpetual wars against states 
that threaten  
our security.  President Bush and Tony Blair have promised the Iraq War will make the world 
safer.  But  
what we see from within the Arab world is incomprehension and seething hatred.  This is the 
story of the  
enormous risks we and the Americans are taking, and how now that the war has started, the 
time taken to  
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finish it is critical. 
 
Gulf War 1991 
 
In the First Gulf War we saw the American doctrine of overwhelming force drive Saddam 
Hussein's  
invading army from Kuwait.  First the battle field was 'prepared', as the military men say, 
with five weeks of  
aerial bombardment.  Then half a million ground troops, led by the Americans, went in.  
Saddam Hussein's  
army was decimated as it retreated back across the border which is where the Americans 
stopped. 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, Desert Rats 
1991 Gulf War 
Last time round we used a hell of a lot of shock.  I mean we killed 20, 30, 40 thousand Iraqi 
soldiers – I  
know not how many and I don’t think we'll ever know.    
 
WARE:  This, the second war in Iraq, is very different.  The war objectives are much more 
ambitious, and  
yet the Americans and British have set out with half the number of troops.  Baghdad was also 
spared weeks  
of aerial bombardment before the troops moved in.   
 
REPORTER:  It was a nerve wracking flight.  On board we felt vulnerable to antiaircraft and 
artillery fire,  
flying low beneath Iraqi radar made us easy targets for anyone with a decent rifle.  The 20 
minute journey  
felt like a lifetime. 
 
WARE:  This time the soldiers are going all the way to Baghdad to unseat Saddam.  This war 
is like no  
other.  More than ever what matters is not just winning but how the war is won.  The new 
American war  
plan was inspired by the hawkish Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.  This called for 
troops to be fast,  






Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW 
US Military Planner 
1991 Gulf War 




and expertise allows us to go with sufficient force provided you've got your assumptions right 
and that  
psychological operations and special operations and all those things makes it unnecessary to 
use  
overwhelming force or even lots of force to accomplish your objectives. 
 
WARE:  The American gamble was to race north about 300 miles to Baghdad.  In purely 
military terms this  
seemed risky.  Just 80,000 fighting men and women to take a country the size of France. 
 
Is it not a bit of a risk, though, to go with light forces? 
 
KILLEBREW:  There is a risk and it's exaggerated by the lack of enough force to recover 
from failure if  
your assumptions are wrong.  So you've got to be pretty sure that your planning assumptions 
are right before  
you go into it. 
 
WARE:  One hawk, close to the Bush administration said this Iraq war would be a cake walk. 
 
REPORTER:  Then a long line of Abram Shanks and Bradley fighting vehicles began driving 
for what  
turned out to be a 12 hour drive.   
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  Never has a mechanised force moved so fast and so far.   
 
WARE:  But while the Bush administration said the Iraq regime was history, their invasion of 
a Muslim  
country rekindled the embers of Arab antipathy.  Demonstrations spread like bushfire across 
the most  
unstable region in the world. 
 
Cairo, Egypt 2003 
 
ARAB:  I am from Arab world.  I have message for Mr Bush and Mr Tony Blair.  You are 
liars.  You are  
gangs. 
 
ARAB:  I hate Americans.  I hate what's happening in the world.  And we will all reject 




US Secretary of State 
There's a lot of anti-Americanism out there but it's fuelled to a large extent by the Iraq 
situation and the  
Middle East peace process.  When we fix Iraq and when we show progress with the Middle 
East peace  
programme, and people can see that this is a nation that is not against any religion, especially 
not the  
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religion of Islam. 
 
Cairo, Egypt 1991 
 
WARE:  The First Gulf War saw demonstrations even though most Arab governments had 
sent troops.   
This time the stakes are much, much higher.  Most Arab governments are against this war and 
the street  
demonstrations are much bigger.   
 
How long in your view does this war have to go on for before you lose the peace, as it were.  
You may win  
militarily but you lose the peace? 
 
General Sir MICHAEL ROSE 
Commander, UN Protection Force 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994-95 
We all thought that we needed a quick decisive victory, and that's obviously what the 
strategists planned  
for.  If we're still fighting in Baghdad, Basra, Kabala and Nasiriyah after six weeks, I think 
we're in serious  
danger of rising a tide of opposition not only within Iraq but also in the neighbouring Arab 
states, and  
indeed in the 1.4 billion Muslims around the world which would then start to question the 
way… the  
original strategy. 
 
WARE:  The Americans expected to be able to sweep past towns on the way to Baghdad, and 
that the Iraqi  
army would stay in its barracks.  Many Iraqi units didn't engage them but equally many did.  
On the road to  
Baghdad the Americans met stiff resistance.  For one division almost every mile to the capital 
was  
contested.   
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  There is a little bit more resistance than we've expected, and there 
are also some  
fanatics who will remove their uniforms and become… masquerade as civilians and still 
shoot at us. 
 
WARE:  Above the din of battle can also be heard the clash of cultures.  Incomprehension 
from American  
soldiers about why a Middle Eastern nation should resist their offer of freedom. 
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  Most of them are either running or lying to us, trying to deceive us 
when we're  
just here to help them. 
 
Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW 
US Military Planner 
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1991 Gulf War 
I'm reminded of a saying by Winston Churchill that when making war plans, you sometimes 
have to take  
the enemy into account.   I think we focused a lot on our own theories and we didn't give 
Saddam Hussein  
the credit for adapting his style of warfare to our style of warfare over the past ten years or so. 
 
WARE:  Again and again the message coming back from correspondents in the field was of 
commanders  
saying the level of resistance was not what they'd been led to expect.   
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  [over walkie-talkie] We've got a critical case that needs to get out 
of here. 
 
REPORTER:  They are encountering these pockets of resistance where Iraqis are fighting 
fiercely, far more  
fiercely than they imagined. 
 
WARE:  Coalition soldiers have suffered some of their worst casualties away from the TV 
cameras. 
 
Lance Corporal JOSHUA MENARD 
We were told when we were going through Nasiriyah that we should see little to no 
resistance.  And then  
when we got in, it was a whole different ball game.   We received a lot of resistance and we 
were more  
prepared for what happened in the Gulf War where they turned over and surrendered most of 
the time.  We  
saw a lot of surrendering but they weren't rolling over like we thought they would.  
 
WARE:  Some of the fiercest resistance has come from a bloodthirsty group of Saddam 
loyalists.  They are  
called the Fedayeen, martyrs for Saddam.  Iraqi TV portrays them as patriotic and noble 
savages, ready to  
fight and die for their president.  In fact many are criminals freed from gaol.   
 
Dr HUSSEIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Chief Scientific Adviser, 1970-79 
Iraqi Atomic energy Commission 
These are people who really owe everything they have to the regime, and have committed so 
many  
atrocities against the Iraqi people where they cannot go back even to their own families.  I 
mean members  
of the Fedayeen have been known in the community to go and arrest their own mothers and 
sisters and hand  
them to the security to rape them. 
 
WARE:  According to the Iraqi opposition Saddam had been preparing the Fedayeen for 
guerrilla warfare  
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for many months.  They've often mounted their hit and run raids from converted farm trucks.  
That this was  
to be Saddam's war strategy appears to have been an open secret.  
 
Dr SALAH SHAIKHLY 
Opposition Spokesman 
Iraqi National Accord 
Recently he had imported 1,400 trucks from South East Asia.  This was on the oil for food 
programme, and  
the idea was that he is importing these for farm use.  As soon as these trucks arrived in Iraq, 
he armoured  
them and he mounted machine guns and now they are with their thousands of them being 
used for the  
Fedayeen. 
 
WARE:  Does that level of resistance from the so-called Fedayeen and Ba'athist militia, that 
didn't surprise  
you? 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
It didn't surprise us.  What shocked us were the lengths to which they were prepared to go in 
threatening  
both regular members of the armed forces, and obviously the civilian population in the way 
that we know  
they have done, threatening. 
 
WARE:  Why should that have shocked you?  They were loyal to a tyrant.  It's entirely 
predictable that they  
should have done that. 
 
HOON:  They were loyal to a tyrant but equally they have gone to lengths.. extremes that… 
 
WARE:  That's what tyrants do.  That's what tyrants do.  It was all entirely predictable, 
surely. 
 
HOON:  Well, as I say, we anticipated that they would resist, that they would fight, that has 
happened, they  




Brig General VINCENT BROOKS 
US Military Spokesman 
I don’t think that we have necessarily underestimated, and I am certain that we accounted for 
enemy action.   
The specifics of the action, no one can ever predict exactly how a battle will unfold. 
 
WARE:  After the first week of fighting cheerful optimism had given way to some glummer 
faces.  One  
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American general conceded:  "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we 
war-gamed  
against.  This had been no cakewalk as some advocates of the war had so breezily predicted.  
In fact it was  
beginning to look as if it might become a quagmire.  Back in Washington a discreet blame 
game opened up  
between the Bush administration and the generals in the Pentagon, especially those directing 
the war out in  
the Gulf.  The overall commander there is General Tommy Franks.  His hawkish boss, the 
Secretary of  
Defence Donald Rumsfeld.   
 
Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW 
US Military Planner 
1991 Gulf War 
It's unusual in our system for a Secretary of Defence though, to get personally involved in 
battle plans and  
impose his own philosophy of war.  The last time that happened was Secretary of Defence 
McNamara  
during the Vietnam era.  So part of the friction on this is a Secretary imposing a different 
style of warfare  
over one that existed when he came in and took office.  
 
DONALD RUMSFELD 
US Defence Secretary  
The war plan is Tom Frank's war plan.  It was carefully prepared over many months.  It was 
washed through  
the tank with the chiefs on at least four or five occasions. 
 
KILLEBREW:  There's certainly an atmosphere in the Pentagon of strain between Secretary 
Rumsfeld and  
his top military planners. 
 
WARE:  And Rumsfeld is a tough guy. 
 
KILLEBREW:  He's a very tough guy. 
 
WARE:  The gamble in the Rumsfeld doctrine of 21st century warfare being fast, flexible and 
light, became  
apparent as long snaking supply lines were exposed to attack. 
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  They hopped out and began to open fire with AK47s and they fired 
one RPG also  
at our convoy.  
 
WARE:  Saddam was making good his promise to hit 'the snake' as he described the 
armoured columns  
now strung out so thinly. 
 




WARE:  And how long is that going to be? 
 
AMERICAN SOLDIER:  Well we don’t know.  Hopefully soon. 
 
General Sir MICHAEL ROSE 
Commander, UN Protection Force 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1994-95 
Modern technology in the battlefield consumes a vast amount of power, a vast amount of 
fuel, vast amount  
of ammunition and even a vast amount of battery power.  They've got a very vulnerable and 
extended line  
of communication.  Conventional military terms they should have had at least a cavalry 
regiment - or in our  
terms, probably a brigade - looking after that line of communication. 
 
WARE:  You don’t think you took a gamble with ground troops being on the light side, 
because that's what  
a lot of American generals have complained about. 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
Well there is obviously a debate in free societies about how governments go about what they 
do, and that  
includes the debate about the use of military force.  But I repeat, this is a remarkably 
successful military  
campaign that has achieved its objectives much more quickly than anyone could have 
anticipated. 
 
WARE:  Another key assumption of the American war light strategy was that ordinary Iraqis 
would  
welcome them and the British and then rise up against Saddam.  The Vice President 
emphasised this just  
four days before the war started. 
 
US Vice-President DICK CHENEY 
The read we get on the people of Iraq is there's no question but what they want to get rid of 
Saddam  
Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that. 
 
WARE:  A senior member of the Bush administration predicted an explosion of joy would 
eventually greet  
the soldiers.  First though there would have to be what the Americans called "shock and awe" 
from  
thousands of precision guided munitions.   So far the prevailing sound from the Iraqi people 
has been grief  
and pain.  Iraqis put the civilian death toll at over 1,250.  More independent reports put the 
figure lower but  




Just as a matter of fact, do you have an approximate figure for the number of civilian 
casualties to date? 
 
HOON:  No we don’t.  
 
WARE:  Do you have any idea at all?  You've not been keeping a tally? 
 
HOON:  It's impossible for us to keep an accurate assessment. 
 
WARE:  Sure, but some kind of assessment? 
 
HOON:  No.  Our assessment is that we have been very successful in minimising the number 
of civilian  
casualties. 
 
WARE:  Well then you must have a figure, roughly, in your head.  That's why I asked you 
how many  
roughly – roughly.  Is it in the hundreds, has it gone past the thousand mark?  If that is your 
pre-eminent  
aim and concern you must have an idea of what the collateral damage is to date. 
 
HOON:  Well I don’t have a figure in my head because, as I've indicated, it can only be 
speculation.  But  
what I do know is that careful efforts that have been to target regime targets in Baghdad have 
been  
successful.  The careful aim to minimise civilian casualties has been successful. 
 
WARE:  The Americans have called this war "Operation Iraqi Freedom" though no one asked 
the Iraqi  
people if bombing was the price they were prepared to pay for liberation from Saddam.  It's 
hard to know  
exactly what the Iraqi people are thinking.  But so far as one can tell, the prevailing mood 
looks to be more  
muted than joyful.   
 
New York, 1991 
 
WARE:  One thing is certain, the Iraqis have a deep mistrust of what motivated the bombing 
of their  
country.  The American led victory from the last Gulf war provides one important 
explanation.  Then the  
objective was just to push Saddam back from Kuwait, not to topple him.  However, George 
Bush senior, the  
then President, did encourage the Iraqis to take matters into their own hands.  He said they 
should rise up  
against Saddam. 
 




GEORGE BUSH SENIOR:  Iraqi people should put him aside and that would facilitate the 
resolution of all  
these problems that exist, and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the 
family of peace  
loving nations. 
 
WARE:  And so most Iraqis answered the President's call - 14 out of 18 provinces rose up.  
They expected  
the Americans to come across the Kuwaiti border to help them – but they didn't. 
 




US National Security Adviser 
1991 Gulf War 
That was the quagmire, therein laid Vietnam as far as we were concerned, because we would 
still be there. 
 
WARE:  Having encouraged the Iraqis to rise up, the Americans went home. 
 




Director, CIA, 1993-95 
I think the decision not to support that was one of the worst American decisions of the 20th 
century frankly.   
I think they had a bit of a blind spot on not wanting bad states to break up because they didn't 
know exactly  
what was going to follow. 
 
WARE:  When Saddam realised he would have a clear run, he sent in his helicopter gun ships 
and laid  
waste even to sacred Shia shrines at Najaf and Kabala. 
 
Dr HUSSEIN AL-SHAHRISTANI 
Chief Scientific Adviser, 1970-79 
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission 
More than 300,000 Iraqis in the south in particular and some central cities were massacred.  
The Iraqis have  
not been able to overcome, as I've said, the bitterness of that betrayal.  It strengthened our 
conviction that  
the Americans are not there to help the Iraqi people.  They are not there for liberty and 
freedoms for other  
people, and that conviction, I think is carried by the majority of Iraqis even today. 
 




TONY BLAIR:  They've been let down before, when they thought coalition forces were 
going to remove  




IRAQI OFFICER:  [addressing troops]  Slit their throats and divide their hearts in two. 
 
WARE:  But, if the Americans underestimated their legacy of mistrust from the First Gulf 
War, Saddam  
had certainly learned some lessons of his own.  These pictures on state run Iraqi TV after the 
uprising were  
designed to send a clear message to Iraqis contemplating a second one.  Directing operations 
here is one of  
Saddam's key henchmen, Ali Hassan al Majid.  Otherwise known as 'Chemical Ali' for 
arranging the poison  
gassing of 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. According to British forces in this Gulf war, Chemical Ali 
and his  
extensive network of thugs in the Fedayeen and the ruling Ba'athist party have been directing 
the fighting in  
most of Southern Iraq.  Fear of the regime's grip may help explain why the people of Basra, 
Iraq's second  
largest city, have yet to greet British troops as liberators. 
 
BRITISH SOLDIER:  Tango two one bravo, we are receiving harassing occasional fire from 
the north west. 
 
WARE:  According to the British, some of the gunmen who fired at them are doing so 
because their  
families have themselves been threatened with death by Ba'athist militia unless they fight.  
When these  
Iraqis left Basra to collect water, chemical Ali's death squads thought they were fleeing and 
fired on them. 
 
BBC News 
30th March 2003 
REPORTER:  From inside the city the sound of distant gunfire, the final humiliation for a 
desperate people,  
attacked by their fellow countrymen.   
 
WARE:  Here in Basra the British forces are battling for the hearts and minds of ordinary 
Iraqis.  In their  
attempt to convince them they are here as liberators committed to destroying Saddam's 
network, the Royal  
Marines have arrested leading Ba'athists. 
 
BRITISH SOLDIER:  The aim of this operation was to try and take out the leadership.  And 
so if the brain  




WARE:  The Marines have also stormed the palatial home of Chemical Ali.  Inside they 
found a sandpit  
with toy tanks.  If this is how he war-gamed the defence of Basra, it doesn't seem to have 
been much help.   
Today real British tanks reached the town centre.   A precision guided missile also destroyed 
this Ba'ath  
Party building in Basra – 200 Ba'athists were said to be inside.  In their quest to be seen as 
liberators the  
Americans have dropped leaflets and transmitted freedom messages.  Saddam, by contrast, 
depicts the  
Americans and the British as conquerors.  A message which readily finds its mark in the Arab 
world with  
its long memories of Christian crusades.  All Saddam needs is a TV station to address the 
nation and rail  
against the invaders.  In this appeal to Iraqi patriotism the state run TV makes much of the 
smallest of  
victories.  Small arms fire from Fedayeen guerrillas downed this Apache Long Bow 
helicopter.  Iraqi TV  
said it was done single-handedly with an old gun fired by this patriotic farmer.  To Iraqis, this 
is David  
fighting Goliath.  The patriotic calls around which many ordinary Iraqis with no love for 
Saddam seem to  
have rallied.  
 
Do you think it's been a mistake to keep the TV station to keep broadcasting in Iraq? 
 
 
Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW 
US Military Planner 
1991 Gulf War 
I think it's a catastrophic mistake.  I think that is… early in the war we tried real hard not to 
draw  
conclusions about specific things because we know that history has a way of giving us a 
different view.  But  
I'm willing to say right now our key error in this war so far has been to allow Iraqi television 
and Iraqi radio  
to go on.  That should have been destroyed the first day, and Saddam Hussein should be right 
now a  
voiceless fugitive somewhere in Baghdad. 
 
WARE:  The Americans have bombed the information ministry.  Yet, although its signal has 
sometimes  
been shaky, Iraqi TV is still on the air. 
 
Do you think it was a mistake not to have taken Iraqi TV off the air straight away? 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
What we were trying to achieve in this campaign was both military success but also to leave 
as much of the  
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infrastructure of the country in place as possible.  
 
WARE:  But the TV is a central part of the Saddam regime, isn't it. 
 
HOON:  Certainly it has been used for propaganda reasons.  It's been used to support the 
military resistance.   
It is part of the regime, and certainly I have consistently complained about the way in which 
Saddam's  
propaganda has been rebroadcast not least in the Arab world but even in the western world. 
 
Amman, Jordan  
 
WARE:  But it would be unreal to suppose that in the wider Arab world beyond Iraq's 
borders those who  
want to take up arms against the Americans and the British are all dupes of Saddam's 
propaganda machine.   
Since the war began there's been a steady stream of Iraqis returning from Jordan saying they 
want to fight  
for their country. 
 
IRAQI MAN:  Why would the coalition want to liberate Iraq?  Iraq is not occupied.  Iraq 
should be  
protected by its own people, it's own men will defend it, and if someone crosses that line, we 
will stamp on  
their head. 
 
2ND IRAQI MAN:  They're coming here out of greed, for oil, and to occupy the whole of 
Iraq.  We will not  
accept this.  Even if the last one of us is martyred, we will still defend Iraq. 
 
ALI MUHSEN HAMID 
Arab League Ambassador to UK 
They are resisting because they believe that they have been invaded by outside forces, 
without any reason,  
without any mandate by the UN, without any legal reason, without doing anything or harming 
the British or  
the Americans.  They have done nothing against the British people or the American people. 
 
WARE:  Do you think the planners have underestimated the extent to which Iraqis, who may 
well loathe  
Saddam Hussein, but still feel a powerful loyalty to either Arab nationalism or their country? 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, Desert Rats 
1991 Gulf War 
I think undoubtedly that's so.  You see, don’t you, the fact that Americans are not seen as 
liberators.  I don’t  
think they ever would have been seen as liberators.  A much – I use the word 'hated' because I 
think that's  
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probably the right word - a much hated nation in that region, despite the fact that they're 
trying to be helpful.   
That's not how the Arabs actually see them, and I think that is a powerful factor in this. 
 
Al-Manar TV  
 
WARE:  On this fire of Arab hatred for America, TV pictures like these, beamed across the 
Middle East,  
are the equivalent of high-octane fuel.  This is how Islamic fundamentalists are exploiting the 
Iraq War. 
 
RUMSFELD:  [message subtitled] The weapons that are being used today have a degree of 
precision that  
no one ever dreamt of. 
 
WARE:  The message is that America and Britain are deliberately targeting Iraqi civilians. 
 
RUMSFELD:  [voice echoing over scenes of civilian casualties]  Weapons that are being 
used today have a  
degree of precision that no one ever dreamt of. 
 
WARE:  It's what many Arabs believe anyway, without this satellite channel associated with 
Hezbollah.   
 




WARE:  This virulent anti-Americanism is being echoed ever more loudly in the Arab street, 
even in  
moderate countries like Morocco.  According to the commentator the crowd is chanting:  




CIA Agent, Middle East, 1976-97 
I've never seen anti-Americanism for instance in the Middle East this strong, ever.  What 
they're saying is  
you're American and a private citizen.  We don't have anything against you but your 
President.. President  
Bush is a fascist.  He's crazy or he's on a religious crusade or whatever and they said we don’t 
understand. 
 
WARE:  Now the Iraqi regime has welcomed what it calls a "non-conventional" weapon.  
Not that those  
wielding it need much encouragement. 
 




daughters, my son and a mother, protected by God and his prophet.  I pledge myself to the 
service of God,  
his prophet and President Saddam.  I don’t intend to go home, and by God's will I will die 
here as a martyr. 
 
WARE:  Perhaps this is another stunt from Iraqi TV - perhaps.  But there are credible reports 
of hundreds of  
Palestinians, Yemenis, Tunisians and Saudi's assembling at a camp outside Baghdad.  Britain 
and America  
say this war will stop Iraq's weapons of mass destruction from getting to Al-Qaeda.  None has 
yet been  
found though there is evidence they do exist.   
 
Cairo, Egypt 
WARE:  What's less clear is whether Iraq had an active link to Al-Qaeda in the first place.  If 
this didn't  
exist before the war, it will soon warn Arab leaders. 
 
HOSNI MUBARAK 
President of Egypt 
There will be more terrorism and the terrorist groups will deny it and instead of one Bin 
Laden, we will  
have a hundred Bin Laden. 
 
WARE:  The President of Egypt is the head of an Arab state and presumably if he thinks this 
is going to  
create the very thing that you're trying to remove or destroy then you have to take him 
seriously, don’t you? 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
Of course we take him seriously.  I've had the privilege of meeting him on a number of 
occasions.  He is a  
very impressive observer of the  Arab world and one who, from experience, needs to be taken 
seriously.  
 
WARE:  But you think he's wrong when he says this will precipitate an even greater global 
terrorist  
problem.  You think he's just flat wrong, even though he's head of an Arab state. 
 
HOON:  I recognise that there is a concern, as I've indicated already.  It's something that we 
will have to  
have regard to, but it doesn't mean that taking action to remove a dreadful, appalling regime 
in Iraq is any  
less legitimate. 
 
WARE:  In the last week what appears to be two suicide bombings have killed seven soldiers.  
In one case  




AMERICAN SOLDIER:  They stopped the vehicle at the road block that has clearly marked 
in Arabic that  
it's a road block.  The driver beckoned them a little bit closer and as the soldiers approached, 
the driver  
detonated a bomb killing himself and the four soldiers. 
 
WARE:  Soldiers are understandably now much more nervous.  Away from the cameras 
twice last week  
American soldiers shot first and asked questions later.  At least 14 Iraqis, including 7 
members of one  
family  have been shot at checkpoints.  
 
3rd April 2003 
 
GEORGE BUSH:  Having travelled hundreds of miles, we will now go the last 200 yards. 
 
WARE:  Now that the Americans have reached Baghdad they face their biggest gamble.   
The city has a  
population of five million.  Yet because the Americans have nothing like the number of 
troops that would  
normally be expected to take a city of this size, they seem not to have planned for a big 
ground battle. 
 
Are you suggesting that there wasn't an original plan.. a ground plan for that? 
 
Maj Gen PATRICK CORDINGLEY 
Commander, Desert Rats 
1991 Gulf War 
I think that must be obvious because there are simply not enough soldiers in place for a full-
scale assault on  
Baghdad, and the… 
 
WARE:  That's a pretty major admission, isn't it, if there is no ground plan?  Are you 
seriously suggesting  
there might not be ground plan. 
 
CORDINGLEY:  I'm saying that I genuinely believed that the Americans thought that 
Baghdad would  
capitulate once it had been attacked in a surgical way.  I genuinely believe that the Americans 
never thought  
that it was going to be necessary to put large numbers of ground troops into Baghdad.  
 
WARE:  On the way to Baghdad, as American troops closed into Saddam airport, 12 miles 
from the city  
centre, the posture of the Iraqi regime was, as always, bluster. 
 
IRAQI MINISTER OF INFORMATION:  They are nowhere.  They are nowhere really.  
Why not to take  




WARE:  Twelve hours later Saddam Airport had been renamed Baghdad International 
Airport, and tonight  
an American military plane landed there.  Lining stretches of the road to Baghdad, and 
tonight in Basra,  
were cheering crowds, emboldened perhaps by a growing belief that the tyrant who called 
himself variously   
the anointed one, the glorious leader, direct descendent of the prophet and the President of 
Iraq will soon be  
toppled. 
 
HOON:  What we've seen in previous conflicts, perhaps most obviously the Kosovo 
campaign, a certain  
point is reached at which even the most fanatical determined regime, with however many 
supporters, may  
implode, may collapse from the inside, because that regime recognises in some way that's 
hard to detect  
sometimes from the outside, that there is no purpose and no utility in carrying on resistance.  
We have not  
yet got to that stage in Baghdad or Iraq.  We may not notice it happening until there is a 
sudden collapse. 
 
WARE:  This war has never remotely been a fight between equals.  Even Saddam's famed 
Republican  
Guards didn't offer much resistance.  Those who did were pulverised from the ground and air.  
The gamble  
is that as the Americans probe further into the city, Saddam's soldiers will simply melt away.  
But will they?   
 
CORDINGLEY:  Of course if that gamble is wrong, then you've got a whole series of 
Republican Guard  
soldiers joining up with these irregular forces in Baghdad.  I think you've got to accept that 
there are half a  
million people perhaps who are members of the Ba'ath Party who's jobs are going to be lost 
and quite a  
number of those are going to think it's going to be worthwhile putting up some form of 
resistance just to see  
if the international community can say that's enough and stop and save Saddam Hussein at 
the last minute.   
I mean clearly they've got that judgment wrong and there's no way the Americans aren't 
going to finish this  
particular thing, but nevertheless there are definitely going to be some people there who are 
going to fight  
for their jobs. 
 
WARE:  This is just a foretaste of what fighting in a built up area like Baghdad will be like if 
that's what it  
comes to.  It took British troops a week to finally take control of the southern port of Umm-
Qasr, a town of  
40,000 people.  In comparison to what a lengthy ground war would mean in Baghdad, Umm-





REPORTER:  It takes a while to pinpoint exactly where the shots are coming from.  We're 
slowly being  
sucked into a street fight.  It seems the gunfire has been coming from the police station down 
here and there  
are reports of gunmen positioned on some of the roof tops.  This is the kind of urban warfare 
no Marine  
wants to fight. 
 
WARE:  How much experience has the US army of urban warfare? 
 
Colonel ROBERT KILLEBREW 
US Military Planner 
1991 Gulf War 
Not nearly as much as you Brits have from Northern Ireland.  Most of our urban warfare 
training has been  
theoretical.  We have had some experience, of course, in Panama in '89.  We did a little bit 
obviously and  
famously in Mogadishu, but generally speaking, our troops have been training for urban 
warfare extensively  
but it's only been training. 
 
WARE:  Yesterday there were signs in the centre of Baghdad that special Republican Guard 
troops were  
digging in for a fight.  They're amongst the most loyal of Saddam's troops.  The coming days 
will tell just  
how loyal they'll be. 
 
If urban guerrilla warfare does break out in Baghdad, how bloody is it going to be? 
 
CORDINGLEY:  I think it could be very bloody.  The problem there is that you find yourself 
trying to cope  
with an enemy who is hidden in houses, and if that is the case after you've taken some 
casualties yourself  
which is sometimes very difficult to avoid, you then have to demolish the house that they're 
in and then  
civilian casualties will be involved as well.   So it could become a bloody affair. 
 
WARE:  And the difficulty there of course is that you lose Iraqi hearts and minds which must 
be feeling  
pretty fragile anyway after two weeks of very heavy aerial bombardment. 
 
ROSE?:  You are definitely going to make a significant difference again in the hearts and 
minds and make  
it much more difficult afterwards to win back any support that you might have from the local 





WARE:  Any resistance within Baghdad, like this show of it yesterday, may not subside until 
the  
Americans capture him dead or alive.  To do that they'll need the help of live informants 
close to him, and  
that could be difficult. 
 
When you were in the CIA working on Iraq, did the CIA then have a reliable and extensive 
intelligent  
network in Baghdad and Iraq? 
 
ROBERT BAER 
CIA Agent, Middle East, 1976-97 
No, not at all.  There was… there's virtually nobody.  It was a closed country.  We called it a 
'denied' area.   
It was almost impossible to figure out what was going on.  Saddam was a hard nut to crack 
and no one did  
very well at it for the last 30 years. 
 
WARE:  Saddam has many doubles and whether he's dead or alive his days are surely 
numbered.  The  
manner of his passing though is already oxygen not just to anti-Americanism but also to 
hostility to Britain  
too.  
 
ALI MUHSEN HAMID 
Arab League Ambassador to UK 
Arabs will not forget this war.  I heard a British politician some days ago and he said that we 
have never  
forgotten our wars with France, which is hundreds of years old.  So we will not forget this 
war at all. 
 
 
BAER:  You know, if Bin Laden is alive, I can assure you he's watching his television right 
now.  He's  
watching BBC, keeping his fingers crossed this war goes on for a long time and is very 
bloody because he  
will have a lot of recruits. 
 
WARE:  These are just the opening shots in the new world order dominated by American 
supremacy with  
some help from their closest ally Tony Blair.  Whatever this war takes, both leaders are going 
to finish it  
because both remain confident that its outcome will bring peace and security to the world. 
 
BUSH:  These are sacrifices in a high calling - the defence of our nation and the peace of the 
world.  We are  
applying the power of our country to ensure our security and to serve the cause of justice, and 
we will  




WARE:  And yet, apparently, to secure that peace, we may now have to engage in war over 
several decades.   
After Iraq other states deemed by America to be a threat to its security could be in the firing 
line.  But first  
the face of the Middle East has to be changed according to a former CIA director close to the 
hawks in the  
Bush Administration.   
 
JAMES WOOLSEY 
Director, CIA, 1993-95 
This Fourth World War I think will last considerably longer than either World Wars One or 
Two did for us,  
hopefully not the full four plus decades of Cold War. 
 
WARE:  If this apocalyptic vision is right, the stakes for what George Bush and Tony Blair 
have embarked  
on could not be higher. 
 
In the latest incident of friendly fire an American jet hit a convoy of American forces and 
Kurdish fighters  
killing 16.  With the convoy was a BBC team including John Simpson and Panorama 
producer Tom Giles.  
We regret to say the BBC's translator, Cameron Abdu Raza Mohamed was killed.  The rest of 
the team  





































Battle For Basra 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 27:04:03 
........................................................................ 
 
JANE CORBIN:  The British army have seized Basra from the grasp of Saddam Hussein's 
militias, but at  
night there is no peace on these streets, only fear.  A few people brave the curfew to guard 
their homes and  
their families.   
 
BASRA MAN:  Now we are from this area, now we are afraid because somebody that came, 
they will  
become thief.  So I am afraid really because somebody they want to kill us because they are 
thief, they will  
take my car, they will take everything.  So you want to help us – help us. 
 
JANE CORBIN 
It's incredibly eerie here on the streets of Basra tonight.  In recent days several state owned 
banks have been  
looted and it seems that some of those responsible are members of Saddam's militia, people 
who escaped  
the battle.  It seems they'll do anything to prevent Basra getting back to normal again.  Earlier 
in the evening  
these Irish guards were involved in a gunfight.  Two nights ago one of their number was 
seriously wounded  
by an Iraqi sniper.  There is a power vacuum in Basra. 
 
Sergeant, what sort of problems have you been having at night on these patrols?  What's 
going on? 
 
Sergeant NICK PERRY 
Irish Guards 
Basically what we've got is groups, groups of guys coming in from the slums area into the 
town centre  
where we are now and they're armed with AK47s and basically harassing the locals, you 
know.. kicking  
front doors in, going into houses and firing their weapons off, scaring people.  I would say 
they probably  




CORBIN:  The real battle for Basra to ensure security and foster a government that Iraqis 
trust is still being  
waged on these streets. The British Army may well be in for a long stay.  Basra is Iraq's 
second city, home  
to nearly a million and a half people, mostly Shiah Moslems.  Saddam hated Basra and its 
people, he  
starved it of funding and brutally repressed its citizens after they dared to defy him by rising 
up after the  
Gulf War 12 years ago.  As we arrived in Basra, British troops had just entered the city and 
begun  
investigating the regime's many official buildings.  Major Lindsay MacDuff showed me what 
lay beneath an  
anonymous looking block targeted by coalition bombers during the battle to take the city. 
 
   
MAJ. MacDUFF:  We found these cells here which there are a fair number of them, some 
this side and then  
further over to the rear. 
 
CORBIN:  There seems to be metal cots, beds or something in there. 
 
MAJ. MacDUFF:  Yes, I assume that they were used for accommodation of people and that's 
slightly more  
salubrious.  In others you'll find that there's just nothing, not even windows. 
 
CORBIN:  Not even windows?   
 
MAJ. MacDUFF:  All cages.  Just… 
 
CORBIN:  Just complete cells. 
 
MAJ. MacDUFF:   Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  Tens of thousands of prisoners, people targeted for their political and religious 
beliefs were  
incarcerated by the regime in its prisons during its two and a half decades in power.  Many of 
them never  
emerged again.  Iron rings in the floor hinted at shackles, hooks in the ceiling of worse.  
Torture inflicted on  
those who opposed the regime.  Two local men emerged from the shadows in the prison with 
a British army  
interpreter.  They'd been held here recently and were convinced there were still secret cells 
hidden deep  
underground, cells where prisoners were still locked up. 
 
So what have they been telling you? 
 




They believe there's an underground prison, but that's a belief of many Iraqis because there 
have been  
underground prisons before, a lot like this but even deeper.  They believe they've got friends, 
relatives ?? in  
prison close to this location.  We searched yesterday, we're searching again today. 
 
CORBIN:  And this is the map that he's… 
 
DOCHERTY:  And this is the sketch map of… this here is where we are, and his belief is that 
there's  
another stairway which leads to another underground prison, but 1) we can't find the 
stairway, can't find a  
door, there's nothing obvious, and this is a concrete structure so it should stand out but there's 
nothing. 
 
CORBIN:  These men had been held blindfolded, easily disorientated.  Who knows exactly 
where they'd  
been held and where the other prisoners might be?  In a compound there was more evidence 
of the methods  
used by the regime.   
 
What do you think this area was? 
 
MAJ. MacDUFF:  Well all around the outside of us here are a number of cells and then we're 
standing in a  
cage, and we've had a number of reports of people who've come and said to us that they were 
strapped to  
the cages and then electrocuted.  Normally you'd put animals in cages, but clearly these 
weren't animals kept  
here.   
 
CORBIN:  Out side the Security Headquarters a crowd was growing.   It was the first time 
ordinary  
Basrians had ventured inside this forbidden compound.  The rumours spread that friends and 
relatives were  
still holed up underground.  Major MacDuff struggled to keep control.  The crowd wanted the 
British to  
bring diggers and excavate the site.  Five thousand men at least from the city had disappeared 
into Saddam's  
prisons in the last decade alone.   
 
BASRA MAN:  My brother was taken.  They brought him here and I… me and my mother 
and my wife, my  
father, my brothers, were taken to another prison. 
 
CORBIN:  Everyone here had a terrible story to tell of people missing since the Shiah 
uprising against the  
regime 12 years ago.  The bloody reprisals then had engrained a sense of fear in Basran 
society.  People  




Until people know that Saddam is dead, they wont feel really free? 
 
BASRA MAN:  Yes, this is what we say, we want to see him dead. 
 
CORBIN:  The war in Basra had pitted British troops against a regime prepared to hold its 
own people  
hostage in order to survive.  The coalition targeted the regime's nerve centre, the Ba'ath Party, 
Saddam's  
henchmen and his loyalist militias.  The vast majority of the people of the city took no part.  
Even Iraq's  
regular army had no stomach for a fight.  We found the home of the man who came to 
symbolise the  
regime's brutality in Basra, Saddam's cousin, the military governor of Southern Iraq.   This 
once palatial  
mansion had belonged to Ali Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed 'Chemical Ali'.  He'd ordered the 
killing of 5000  
Kurds with poison gas, most of them were women and children.  Homeless families now 
occupied al- 
Majid's house.  They too had suffered at the hands of Saddam and his cousin. 
 
KHALOOD BANDA 
President Saddam Hussein killed my husband.  I have five children, five young girls.  When 
he was killed I  
was pregnant with the fifth girl. 
 
CORBIN:  Why was your husband killed? 
 
BANDA:  I think he was killed for political reasons. 
 
CORBIN:  And what is the situation now, are you still afraid of the Saddam Hussein regime? 
 
BANDA:  Yes, I'm scared of course of the people and of everybody.   Thank you Mr Blair. 
 
CORBIN:  You want to thank Mr Blair for bringing the army here? 
 
BANDA:  Yes, yes.   Very good. 
 
CORBIN:  And many people feel that in Basrah? 
 
ALL:   Yes, yes, yes, yes.   [applause]    
 
MAN:  Thank God Mr Blair. 
 
CORBIN:  When the war began in March British troops advanced rapidly on Basra.  They 
took control of  
the bridges on the outskirts of the city within 48 hours.   Inside Basra, people listening on 
their radios knew  
what was coming.  Abed Hassan Hamooudi took us into the compound of the house into 
which he gathered  
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his family.  From across the city three generations of Hamooudis - sons and daughters, 
spouses and their  
children - came here.  They wanted to live through the war together. 
 
MR HAMOOUDI:  From the time the invasion started, 17 days ago or 18 days, ago we all 
moved here. 
 
CORBIN:  The Hamooudis are a well respected family in Basra.  A manager in the oil 
business Abed  
Hassan and his wife had brought up their children to have successful professional careers as 
doctors and  
scientists.  The family has strong links with Britain, spending many years in Manchester. 
 
CORBIN:  How did you live from day to day with the difficulties of when the battle was on? 
 
DINA:  No, we were so happy.  There was TV, we were all together, playing, loving, just 
nothing.  
 
CORBIN:  So despite…. 
 
GIRL:  We've got water, got electricity, everything, so we were very happy, a very happy 
family.  We were  
all together. 
 
CORBIN:  The Hamooudis had dug a well in their garden in the centre of the city.  They 
were prepared for  
a long siege but they prayed that the British Army would arrive soon to liberate them from 
the regime. 
 
ABED HASSAN HAMOOUDI 
So we had taken all the precautions, we'd done shopping etc, ration food, dry food, we got 
plenty here. 
 
CORBIN:  On the bridges leading in to Basra the British 7th Armoured Brigade had routed 
the Iraqi Army's  
tanks.  The Iraqi regular troops here were unwilling to fight, they tried to melt away.  But 
behind them were  
hard line militias, Fedayeen fiercely loyal to Saddam Hussein.  They put up a ferocious fight. 
 
Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS 
Commander, 7th Cavalry Armoured Brigade 
They were coercing the regular army to go back and get their equipment, and they were 
coercing them to  
fight on behalf of the regime. 
 
CORBIN:  What do you mean, coercing them? 
 
BINNS:  Well they were using money, they were using threats of force, they were holding 





CORBIN:  After six days of fighting, around a thousand Iraqi civilians tried to flee the city in 
search of  
water and safety.  They knew the British controlled the bridges and were emboldened to 
make a break for it.   
 
Major LINDSAY MacDUFF 
The Blackwatch 
The indirect fire came without warning quite clearly and the result of that where people 
would try and  
disperse in order to avoid being hit by the mortar rounds. 
 
CORBIN:  The Iraqi militias were firing on their own people from inside the city.  One 
woman was badly  
injured by shrapnel from the mortars. 
 
 
MacDUFF:  Our soldiers, fortunate for them, had warrior vehicles to jump in the back of, but 
for the  
civilians there was no cover.   
 
CORBIN:  The militias were prepared to terrorise the population, to kill women and children.  
They wanted  
to stop men, they were forcing to fight, from escaping.  
 
MacDUFF:  There were militia men machine-gunning people to prevent them from leaving 
Basra. 
 
CORBIN:  Machine-gunning them? 
 
MacDUFF:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  Their own people? 
 
MacDUFF:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  What was your reaction at that point? 
 
MacDUFF:  Well, unbelievable, heinous kind of activity to do. 
 
CORBIN:  British commanders camped in the desert outside Basra hoped that having troops 
surrounding  
the city would encourage Iraqis to rise up and topple the regime.  There was an attempt at 
revolt.  A crowd  
set fire to a government building but the rebellion was crushed when seven policemen who 
refused to fire  
on their own people were executed.  British hopes were dashed.  They would now have to 
destroy Saddam's  




BINNS:  We developed a concept for Basra and we imagined it to be a body.  What we 
wanted to do was to  
remove the brain but at the same time keep the vital organs and the central nervous system in 
tact. 
 
CORBIN:  British commanders then received a vital tip-off from inside the city.  Dozens of 
members of  
Saddam Hussein's main instrument of power and repression would be gathering in Basra that 
night.   
 
Captain CHARLIE TAYLOR 
Royal Artillery   
Basically we had a human intelligence report.. a human report that there was a meeting 
within the Ba'ath  
Party Headquarters. 
 
CORBIN:  A British drone, a pilotless plane with a camera was called in to observe the 
target.  American  
planes armed with jadams – bunker busting munitions – were scrambled overhead.   
 
And what was the end result? 
 
TAYLOR:  The end result, as clearly as you can see on the screen there, that the jadam 
munitions hit pretty  
much in the centre of the Ba'ath Party Headquarters. 
 
CORBIN:  The next day the British military received reports that 200 people had been killed 
in the  
bombing.  The Ba'ath Party pervaded Iraqi society at the highest levels.  Key figures in the 
security  
apparatus were now dead.  But it was soon clear that Saddam's cousin, al-Majid, the infamous 
'Chemical  
Ali' had escaped.  The militias continued to fight and hold people hostage.  Then late one 
afternoon, came  
word that al-Majid and key aids were expected at a private villa in the city.  It was right next 
door to the  
house where the Hamooudi family had been holed up for weeks.   
 
DINA:  There was my brother, Afonz, daughter Azana and Zena and Zaiandin, and 
Mustapha, Diad's son  
Hassan, all were there playing, laughing, they were playing computer. 
 
CORBIN:  At 6 o'clock the coalition planners received word from their source on the ground.  
al-Majid had  
arrived at the house and had taken a sleeping pill, he'd be there for the night.  It took hours to 
get permission  
for a bombing raid on a residential street in Basra and complete the targeting plan. 
 
The house in question was believed to be occupied at the time by Chemical Ali as he's called, 





BINNS:  Yes, it was.  It was occupied by him. 
 
CORBIN:  It was.  You're sure about that? 
 
BINNS:  Absolutely sure.  Yes.  Otherwise we wouldn't have attacked. 
 
CORBIN:  Did you hear the planes overhead before? 
 
DINA:  Yes, yes because it hit the road this side. 
 
CORBIN:  As those bombs hit the road? 
 
DINA:  Yes, second bomb also.  The third one was on our heads. 
 
ABED HASSAN HAMOOUDI 
All the bricks though reinforced concrete fell on the family and a heap of dust was about 1 
metre high.   
They were all there.  What I did, I managed luckily to save the life of my daughter with her 
two sons, four  
years and 6 months.  The third one was killed with his grandmum.  I managed to remove the 
bricks from  
them because I heard a noise "ba, ba, ba"   which means dad, dad.  So I tried my.. you know.. 
my case at  
that time, at the time I was removing the bricks, another rocket fell there.  Luckily I escaped a 
disaster  
otherwise I should have been killed. 
 
CORBIN:  Ten members of the family from three generations of Hamooudis died that night.  
Dina's infant  
son was killed, her mother and her sister and a beloved niece Zanab, on the threshold of a 
bright future.   
 
DINA:  Zanab 19 years old, she's in pharmacy. 
 
CORBIN:  She was a pharmacy student.  
 
DINA:  Yes, the first year. 
 
CORBIN:  And she was in the house that night? 
 
DINA:  Yes, she was in the same room with me. 
 
CORBIN:  Yes, and your own young son was there. 
 
DINA:  Yes, between her and my mum.   
 




DINA:  And my sister and her daughter.. little daughter. 
 
CORBIN:  Mr Hamooudi's oldest son, a doctor, identified his mother, his brother, sister and 
four of his five  
children amongst the dead, the youngest, Zena, just 8 years old.   The smell of death hung 
over the bomb  
site six days later.  Coalition forces had yet to investigate the scene of a bombing they 
claimed was carefully  
targeted to avoid civilian casualties.   
 
We did actually meet one family, the doctor's family, we met his father and ten members of 
that family were  
killed in a raid on the house next door.   
 
Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS 
Commander, 7th Cavalry Armoured Brigade 
Yes, well I understand their anger.  But we.. that particular attack, it took us… and this was 
very precise  
intelligence of a meeting of all the senior Ba'ath Party figures in a house, and it took us seven 
hours to come  
to the decision to attack it.  We re-checked and checked, checked and re-checked the 
intelligence.  Were  
very careful with the type of munitions that were delivered, and we hit the target.  One of.. as 
a result of that  
attack I acknowledged that one prominent doctor lost ten members of his family.  
 
CORBIN:  Despite the Brigadier's certainty that Chemical Ali was in the house, there is 
doubt about  
whether this attempt to kill him succeeded.  In the bottom of the crater there was a military 
epaulette  
bearing a general's stars and a black beret.  Were they torn from Ali's body by the blast or put 
there  
afterwards to convince people he was dead while he got away?  A man here just now was too 
afraid to  
speak openly but he told me that Chemical Ali was at this house that night with 12 of his 
bodyguard.  The  
rumour around here is that somehow Saddam Hussein's cousin and henchman escaped from 
this bombsite  
and fled Basra.   
 
Do you think you killed him? 
 
BINNS:  I don’t know.  Chemical Ali's rather like Elvis.  Nobody is quite sure whether he's 
dead or alive,  
and every day we get five… at least five reports of his current location.  Whether or not we 
killed him, we  
certainly removed him, in that we forced him to leave the city. 
 
CORBIN:  As the 7th Armoured Brigade seized their opportunity to enter at last the heart of 
Basra they  
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discovered a real hard core of fighters in the city.  These men, unlike many of Saddam's 
militia, did not flee  
Basra in disarray after the bomb attack on Ali Hassan al-Majid.  They were extremists 
prepared to fight to  
the death to defend a Moslem country from Western invaders.  These fighters killed two 
soldiers of the  
Royal Scotts Dragoon Guard in a fierce battle at an Islamic college. 
 
Lt col HUGH BLACKMAN 
Royal Scotts Dragoon Guards 
We attacked into the College of Literature where we believed there was something between 
about 60 and  
100 Fedayeen or militia men of various nationalities.  
 
CORBIN:  What sort of nationalities? 
 
BLACKMAN:  We believe there were Syrians.  We certainly saw evidence that there were 
probably  
Tunisians and Algerians. 
 
CORBIN:  They'd come what, to fight for the regime, a sort of Jihad or what? 
 
BLACKMAN:  I believe so.  There were clearly local Basra men who had joined the militia, 
whether that  
was coerced or voluntarily, but quite clearly some people had come in.  One ticket showed a 
man who had  
chanced it through Damascus in late March, he'd clearly come to fight the war. 
 
CORBIN:  The presence of foreign fighters in the city has raised the spectre of terrorism in 
the future, and  
of suicide attacks against western forces.  British troops had taken Basra and killed hundreds 
of militia men,  
but an unknown number of Saddam's loyalists and their supporters from abroad had simply 
disappeared.   
British casualties were only in single figures, but the death toll of Iraqi civilians was far 
higher.  The figures  
are impossible as yet to verify.  But local estimates were 400 injured and 90 dead.  The war is 
over and  
people of Basra are venturing out on the streets again, but they face an uncertain future.  The 
coalition was  
convinced it could win this war.  It had a battle plan, but there was no blueprint for a post-
Saddam Iraq.   
Basra was without water, electricity and fuel.  And after decades of dictatorship there was 
now a dangerous  
power vacuum.  Major Duncan McSporran and his company of 150 soldiers took over an old 
police  
barracks in the north of Basra.  They suddenly found themselves responsible for 150,000 




McSPORRAN:  That fire's still burning over on the northern front.  I'm surprised they've not 
put that out  
yet.  I'm surprised it's not gone out.  It's been burning for 21 days. 
 
CORBIN:  Looting and gunfights were breaking out across the city.  Leaderless and fearful, 
local people  
turned to British officers and their men for food and water and security.  Many showed their 
appreciation  
for the forces which had liberated them.  But there was anger too, it was directed at invaders 
who'd prepared  
no immediate backup administration for Basra. 
 
BASRA MAN:  The main problem here also to bring government suitable, the situation is 
difficult. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, okay, let me explain, the situation is difficult.  Firstly, with the water, is 
that you're  
correct, the water engineering works aren't working.  Okay?  This is… we're working as hard 
as we can to  
fix them and bring them to you. 
 
BASRA MAN:  Let me say something.   
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes? 
 
MAN:  You are better than Saddam Hussein. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Excellent.  I'm glad you think so. 
 
CORBIN:  It was now four days since the taking of Basra and people were desperate for 
clean drinking  
water.  Ever since the uprising 12 years before, the regime had allowed the city's 
infrastructure to crumble,  
using water as a weapon to control the people.  The water system was not bombed by the 
collation.  British  
soldiers watched the regime shutting down the supplies. 
 
Major DUNCAN McSPORRAN 
1st Fusiliers 
We were able to observe, over a period of about five or six nights, the water reserves in that 
tank just  
dropping. 
 
CORBIN:  That was a deliberate move by the regime, even though it was failing, was to 
deprive people  
here of water. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes.   I have absolutely no doubt of that whatsoever, and part of their 
propaganda war  




CORBIN:  The next morning a local religious leader, Jassim Michman arrives at the base to 
try and  
coordinate relief efforts with the British.  Most imams untainted by association with the 
Ba'ath Party are  
trusted. 
 
MICHMAN:  I have a report for you and you can read it. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, thank you very much. 
 
CORBIN:  Looting is widespread, but the police, many with links to the Ba'ath, have 
vanished, fearful of  
revenge attacks. 
 
McSPORRAN:  The police, have they said that they will come back to work? 
 
MICHMAN:  I told the responsible man on that and he said yes but what I am not quite sure, 
we are afraid. 
 
CORBIN:  The need for water is urgent.  The pumping system can't be restarted and water 
must be brought  
from far away. 
 
McSPORRAN:  How is the water situation at the moment? 
 
MICHMAN:  Ah, this is we want to talk about it.   You know.. still there is no water. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, I have asked for some water tankers free of charge to bring water, and I 
am hoping  
today that I will bring some water tankers here. 
 
MICHMAN:  Good. 
 
McSPORRAN:  And then what I will do is I will escort the water tankers to the mosque and 
we will park  
them up outside the mosque. 
 
MICHMAN:  One outside the mosque, one in front of the mosque. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, to help with the people. 
 
CORBIN:  For the coalition forces it's now a hearts and minds campaign to convince the 
Basrans the new  
British regime can restore the city's functions and its security.  Major McSporran helps the 
imam to use a  
satellite phone, a brief chance to reassure his son in London.  He's been unable to speak to 





McSPORRAN:  It's an answer phone, do you want to just speak to the phone.  It's just an 
answer machine. 
 
MICHMAN:  A message? 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes. 
 
MICHMAN:  Hello son.  Hello, I am your father here.  We are very good.  ?? in Basra.  Yes, 
there is no  
telephone to contact you.  Okay son?  Your mother and your brother okay.   
 
McSPORRAN:  Thank you. 
 
CORBIN:  The imam of a local mosque however can't run a city the size of Basra.  The 
Ba'ath Party  
dominated almost every aspect of life here as the Nazis once did in Germany.  It will prove 
almost  
impossible to root the Ba'ath out completely. 
 
The problem is, how do you know who the good guys are and the Bad guys?  That's a real 
problem for you  
surely? 
 
McSPORRAN:  It is but what we're doing is we're deferring to the people that we can 
identify and  
particularly as with this gentleman's own case, the sort of religious leaders who the locals 
obviously respect,  
we found very quickly in the small villages on the outskirts of town that the key Ba'athist 
members, the  
people who've been responsible for enforcing the regime were indicated to us straightaway.   
 
CORBIN:  So people here know who the bad guys are. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, they do very much so. 
 
CORBIN:  The bad guys were still very much in evidence on the streets of Basra as the Irish 
Guard were  
finding on their nightly patrols.  These young soldiers with experience of Northern Ireland 
reckoned that  
some criminal elements were seizing their opportunity as the regime released its grip on 
Basra.  But  
Sergeant Perry suspected that some of the gunmen were one time members of Saddam's 
militias seeking to  
prolong the anarchy.   
 
SOLDIER:  You see Ali Baba? 
 
BASRA MEN:  No, no, no.    
 




BASRA MEN:  No, no, no.  No Ali Baba. 
 
CORBIN:  Locals call the looters 'Ali Babas' – thieves, a familiar term to British ears. 
 
SOLDIER:  All is very quiet? 
 
BASRA MAN:  We hear a shooting another time. 
 
CORBIN:  Still no local police had been persuaded to patrol these streets, especially at night.   
Householders, in this well-off part of Basra, had banded together to protect their own 
properties. 
 
SOLDIER:  Very soon the police will be here to protect you. 
 
BASRA MAN:  I swear by my God.  Really? 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam's regime had fallen by now in Baghdad as well as Basra.  But people here 
fear the old  
police and their Ba'ath Party associations.  The soldiers were already wondering when they 
would be able to  
go home, but many people wanted the British to remain in Basra to protect them. 
 
Why is it that you don’t have any trust in the old police?  You seem to not want the old police 
back. Why is  
that? 
 




CORBIN:  And you don’t trust them? 
 
McSPORRAN:  Speaking to them there you can see the sort of doubts they have within, you 
know.. not the  
old police not the old regime, which is obviously something that people at the top need to be 
aware of. 
 
BASRA PEOPLE:  Thank you, good bye.  Thank you very much and welcome. 
 
CORBIN:  Further down the road the patrol stopped a large empty truck breaking the curfew. 
The three  
men inside were acting suspiciously.   Inside the truck the soldiers found an iron bar.   
 
McSPORRAN:  What is that for? 
 
BASRA MAN:  No, no, nothing. 
 




CORBIN:  The men's protestations of innocence cut no ice. The soldiers were convinced they 
were off on a  
looting spree. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Right, I understand.  You get in the van and you go.  Yes?  Listen to me.  
You get in the  
van and you go.  Yes? 
 
MAN:  Yes. 
 
McSPORRAN:  I don’t want to see you here again. 
 
MAN:  Yes, yes.    
 
McSPORRAN:  Go. 
 
CORBIN:  The breakdown of law and order in Basra is likely to last some time.  It risks 
getting British  
troops bogged down in peacekeeping duties in the city.  The commander of the 7th Armoured 
Brigade  
which had taken Basra established himself in Saddam's summer palace, a huge and ornate 
complex in a city  
of poverty and squalor.  The Brigadier's planning meetings were now increasingly concerned 
with  
preventing any extremist Shia or tribal faction from unilaterally taking over the city. 
 
BINNS:  It's inappropriate that any grouping at this stage occupies the Mayor's house. 
 
CORBIN:  Vast quantities of arms and ammunition were still being discovered throughout 
the city, fuel for  
future conflict. 
 
OFFICER:  Also I understand, just to the South East is the naval dockyard comprehensively 
trashed. 
 
CORBIN:  And the illusive Chemical Ali still featured on the map, showing the latest 
reported sightings of  
Saddam's cousin.  The army was now tasked with handing out Tony Blair's message to the 
people of Basrah  
via a newspaper masterminded by Downing Street's export spin doctor. 
 
OFFICER:  The newspaper at the moment is only 5,000 copies per day.  I spoke to Colonel 
Nick last night  
and were going to see if we could try go get it changed to 30,000 in a week and therefore 
have a hopefully  
better impact on the city in Basra. The newspaper is actually being controlled by Alistair 
Campbell's office  
so he takes interest in it and it is only here for an 8 week trial and then they will review it and 
see if it's been  




CORBIN:  An unstable currency, the Iraqi dinar posed one of the biggest problems in the 
aftermath of war.   
 
OFFICER:  You might be interested to note Brigadier that these are the three currencies that 
are circulating  
at the moment.  These are circulating. 
 
BRIGADIER:  What are they? 
 
OFFICER:  They are the new print 250, from the entire stock handed in they haven't been 
touched.  
 
BRIGADIER:  That's what I exchanged yesterday. 
 
OFFICER:  Well you've been done then.  
 
ALL:  (laughter)   
 
OFFICER:  The 10,000 he said to me last night was not acceptable at all on the streets.  And 
there's a  
million there. 
 
CORBIN:  One banker, afraid of looters, was bringing vast quantities of the increasingly 
devalued notes to  
the British base.   
 
OFFICER:  Also G5 last night asked for some…. 
 
BRIGADIER:  What are you going to do with it? 
 
OFFICER:  I have no idea Brigadier, I was looking for a bit of a steer on that actually… 
[laughter] 
Added to that, today he's coming back with another billion… [laughter] 
And he's also handed in 47 gold bars, there's sackfuls of them, absolutely sacksful.    
 
BRIGADIER:  I think we'd better discuss this.   
 
CORBIN:  There really is a sense out there that there's a power vacuum, that a war was 
fought, but who is  
running the place?  Are the Americans going to run it?  You know.. do you expect a local 
leadership to  




Brigadier GRAHAM BINNS 
Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade 
Iraq will be run by the people of Iraq and we have to transition from where they were, from a 
brutal regime  
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to a democracy, and that transition will be difficult, and we will see, and we are beginning to 
see different  
groupings vying for power. 
 
CORBIN:  There are many tribes and religious groupings in Basra.  The marsh Arabs form a 
large majority  
on the outskirts of the town. They were ruthlessly persecuted by Saddam Hussein after the 
uprising 12 years  
ago when American forces failed to support their rebellion.  They still remember this 
betrayal.  Brigadier  
Dens has come to meet the Sheikhs of the Goramsha Clan to find out who they would support 
in an interim  
council the British are trying to put together.  But their continuing fear of the old regime is 
paralysing their  
ability to make decisions about their future.  
 
MAN:  We still fear of Saddam Hussein.  We want you to show us on television, is he dead, 
is he alive,  
where has he gone, because we're afraid of the Security Police and the Ba'ath Party regime.  
We afraid of  
them.  We've got fear in our heart. 
 
DENS:  The regime has gone.   
 
MAN:  He said:  "I don’t want you, your friendly army to leave us like 1991.  Now we are 
with you, now  
we are happy, but please don’t leave us.  We're afraid.  That is the truth I'm telling you. 
 
DENS:  We're not leaving.  We demonstrated our commitment by coming here, fighting a 
war and  
liberating.  The emphasis is now on you to start working. 
 
CORBIN:  The Brigadier insists that this tribe of 2000 people must first choose their own 
representative  
and then work with the new council to get Basra functioning again. 
 
DENS:  So are you prepared to place your trust in the members of this council? 
 
MEN:  We are with you. 
 
CORBIN:  The British Army, as yet, has no answer to the question of how to rid Basra of the 
Ba'ath Party's  
grip.  Many competent people have some affiliation with Saddam Hussein's party in the past.    
 
BINNS:  All people with influence have linkages with the Ba'ath Party.  That was the only 
way that they  
could survive.  So I judge people not necessarily by what they did in the past, but how they 





CORBIN:  In Basra's port the wreck of Saddam's official presidential yacht lies rusting, 
battered by the  
coalition's bombs.  In this place, once the stronghold of the Ba'ath there are angry officials 
who now deny  
they were ever members of the party.  Their anger though, underlines how fragile peace is, 
and how many  
problems still remains to be resolved.   
 
How do people here in the port feel about what happened? 
 
IMAD HASSAN 
We are very angry.  We are very sorry for what is happening here because our ship is 
destroyed.  That ship,  
the crew of the ship, now they have no job, they have no salary.  How can they do their 
living? 
 
CORBIN:  People come here to draw water from the river.  There's still no clean drinking 
water and no  
local leadership, just the British Army who hope they'll only be temporary custodians of 
Basra. 
 
How do people feel now?  It's more than a week since the war ended but how do people feel 
about the  
British troops on their streets? 
 
HASSAN:  Well I will tell you something.  People have infighted against the English troops, 
and there is  
nothing happening now, but if these things will continue, I mean without water, without food, 
without  
medicine, without schools, no the people will not stay still, they will fight. 
 
CORBIN:  They will fight the British? 
 
HASSAN:  They will fight I assure you for that. 
 
CORBIN:  The old ruler and the old regime are gone.  They symbols of their power lie 
broken, but there is  
no sense yet of what will replace them.  The Hamooudi family still wait to bury their dead at 
a shrine north  
of Basra.  The roads are not yet safe to travel there.  Meanwhile they are trying to repair their 
shattered  
home.  They have written to Tony Blair and to the Ministry of Defence demanding 
compensation for the ten  
relatives who were killed.  Nothing will replace their loss but they feel it is their right. 
 
What will your family do now? What will the women do? 
 
DINA HAMOOUDI 




CORBIN:  Despite their personal tragedy the Hamooudis are determined that something good 
must come  
out of the suffering the people of Basra endured under Saddam Hussein. 
 
ABED HASSAN HAMOOUDI 
The main thing, the most important thing we got rid of the regime so we don’t want to go 
back to the same  
trouble by nominating poor people and not knowledgeable person, this is what happen.  We 
want  
democracy, we want quietness, fairness, peace of mind, at least we live as a human being. 
 
CORBIN:  British commanders in Saddam's palace know their troops who fought for this city 
now want to  
go home.  But no clear exit strategy has emerged from the chaos of the war.  There is little 
sign yet of  
democracy and peace in Basra.  Unless they have security soon, people here may well turn on 
those who  






























The Price of Victory 






MAJ. SCOTT PATTON:  Tell him (injured Iraqi resistance fighter)  that  
if he cooperates with us we might  
be able to save his life because we have very good doctors, okay, but  
tell him if he doesn't cooperate with  
us, it's bad for him, it's bad for his health.  Tell him that. 
 
REPORTER:  For three months we've been on the streets of Baghdad  
chronicling a long, hot and bloody  
summer.   
 
PATTON:  Tell him if he's lying he's going to piss me off really bad. 
 
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO:  You occupy with a military force but you  
can't restore law and order with  
the military.  This is why an occupation cannot last. 
 
REPORTER:  We've been following a battalion of American troops as  
they take on an increasingly  
dangerous and unpredictable enemy.   
 
PATTON:  We're going to help you if you help us.  If you don’t help  
us you can forget it, okay?  We came  
here to help you.   
 
PAUL BREMER:  The American people have undertaken with the British  
and our other coalition allies  
here a noble exercise and we will see it through. 
 
REPORTER:  But that noble exercise requires America to show the same  
commitment for nation building  
as it did to removing Saddam. This is the story of three months in  
Baghdad with the occupiers as they face  
up to that challenge. 
 
PATTON:  (addressing troops)  I'd like to welcome everybody to  
'Thunder Run 6'.  We've got some credible  
intelligence…. 
 
REPORTER:  Major Scott Patton has just received a tip off about some  
paramilitaries who targeted his  
battalion in a recent grenade attack.  He's about to send in nearly  
300 troops in one of the units biggest  
counter insurgency operations to date. 
 
PATTON:  Reggie, your task is to secure objective Tammy. 
 
REPORTER:  These men are from the 427 field artillery.  They call  
themselves Thunder Battalion.  They  
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arrived just after the war.  They're artillery specialists used to  
firing shells across a battlefield, now they're in  
the middle of Baghdad experiencing for the very first time an urban  
guerrilla war.  We joined Captain  
Reggie Harris in one of the lead vehicles.   
 
CAPT. REGGIE HARRIS:  Right now we've got about close to 100 US  
forces that's operating on the street  
right now.  We suspect ?? that have weapons cachets that might have  
been involved in recent attacks that's  
going on against US forces.  We don’t know if they're Fedayeen,  
Ba'athist, but we do know they have talks  
with Saddam.   (to driver)  Stop right here, stop right here. Block  
the road, block the road. 
 
REPORTER:  The gang they're looking for are believed to be operating  
out of a high rise apartment block  
in Sheik Marouf, Baghdad's oldest quarter.  As Reggie Harris' troops  
secure the building, a group of elite  
snipers head to a nearby roof to provide covering fire.  Poised  
outside the target flat, Thunder's lead assault  
team moves in.  But the resistance are one step ahead.  Inside  
there's nothing.  No paramilitaries, no guns,  
just an empty flat.  A block away, the US army snipers have just  
spotted an Iraqi in the street below armed  
with a Kalashnikov.   
 
(sounds of gunfire) 
 
SOLDIER:  He's gone down that hole again.  Did you shoot that one? 
 
SOLDIER 2:  I might have got him.  I don’t see anyone.  A man was  
across the wall in a green shirt, he was  
being handed an AK by a man in white shorts.  I shot the wall.  I  
don’t think I hit him.  I suppose I didn't hit  
him. 
 
REPORTER:  Thunder Run 6 is aborted but the soldiers are left exposed,  
bunched in a small area of town  
with few exit routes, and their vulnerability is not lost on the  
resistance. 
 
SOLDIER:  (on radio)  Right now they've got contacts out-fired and  
exposed right now.  They've got one  
MP that's critical.  Right now they're moving to the FOB to the  
Medivac point. Over. 
 
REPORTER:  Two American soldiers and one Iraqi civilian have been  
injured.  There are 550 soldiers in  





SOLDIER:  I felt the percussion wave, it kind of stunned me.  I  
closed my eyes and opened my eyes and I  
could see the dust and debris were all around us, the windshield was  
cracked, both of 'em, driver's and  
passenger's side had fallen out, and we… exited and set up security  
and started assisting wounded.  And  
what they say about everything going into slow motion, I found out  
today it's true.  From the time the  
percussion waves hit, everything for the next minute or so were slow  
motion. 
 
REPORTER:  It is now July and attacks on coalition troops are  
averaging over 80 a week.  A soldier is  
being killed almost every day, and this more than two months after  
President Bush declared an end to Major  
combat operations.  By mid July the US commander in the Middle East  
finally admits they're engaged in a  
classic guerrilla type campaign.  And the Americans say they know who  
the insurgence are, remnants of the  
former regime, still free, still loyal to Saddam and still heavily  
armed.  A resistance President Bush had  
once challenged with the phrase: "Bring 'em on".  Drafted in to help  
the military hunt them down in a  
country awash with weapons is the former New York Police Chief  
Bernard Kerik.  Effectively he's Iraq's  




Coalition Provisional Authority 
These (referring to range of displayed weapons)  were seized over the  
last day and a half by the same group  
of individuals.  This information was given to us civilians, came  
forward to talk about possible attacks on  
the coalition.  The objective here is to create a free Iraq.  You  
don’t do that by cowering, you don’t do that  
by backing down.  We're going to deal with the resistance in two ways,  
we're going to either arrest them, or  
we're going to kill them.  This job to me is very personal.  On  
September 11th 2001 I was the Police  
Commissioner of New York City.  I respond to the towers when they  
were hit.  I stood beneath tower one  
when tower two was struck by flight 175.  I watched over the next 24  
hours as 23 members of my  
department were in fact missing inside those buildings.  They never  
came out.  I lost 23 people.  They were  
responding to defend the freedom of the United States.  This country  
was the threat to that freedom.  This  
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country was a threat to the freedom of the UK.  We have now freed  
this country.  We have liberated Iraq  
and I think I owe it to the 23 people I lost. 
 
REPORTER:  Iraq is officially under military occupation with 140,000  
troops in the country.  Britain is the  
other main occupier, but it remains essentially an American show with  
the UN, in peace as in war, relegated  
to the sidelines.  The occupiers go by the name of the Coalition  
Provisional Authority or CPA, now based in  
the sumptuous palaces of the old regime.  The vision, to turn Iraq  
into a beacon of democracy for the  
Middle East. 
 
Would you say the Americans are a good nation at peacekeeping? 
 
PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority 
We are learning about peacekeeping.  It's not something we have done  
in a long time.  We have had  
experience now in Germany, Japan, to some extent Haiti, Bosnia,  
Kosovo, Afghanistan.  So we have got  
some experience in it.  The problem with nation building is that it  
takes time, and it takes a lot of patience,  
and Americans are not usually renowned for their patience, but I'm  
encouraged by my conversations with  
people in both our executive branch in Congress that our country  
understands that we have a solemn  
obligation now to see this through and to see it through well and to  
put the time and resources behind it so  
we succeed. 
 
REPORTER:  Baghdad, two months after the end of the war.  When we  
first arrived we found a city still  
scarred by battle but free of the apocalyptic scenario some had  
predicted.  There was no famine, no mass  
refuge crisis, no religious civil war.  But at the street level the  
city was barely functioning.  Once regarded  
as the most advanced in the Arab world, now buried in its own waste  
and just about anything else which  
had served its purpose (carcass of dead horse in the road).  Many  
people were struggling just to get enough  
electricity and water, and, for that matter, money.  With so many  
fraudulent back notes in circulation since  
the war, the genuine high denomination notes had lost their value.  
 
This is the 10,000 dinar note.  Most people's savings and salaries  
are in this denomination.  But they're  
finding it extremely difficult to use these notes.  A lot of the  
traders wont accept it and money exchanges  
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like this will only pay 70% of its value. 
 
But the coalition came up with a solution. Ad hoc money exchanges for  
people to swap their savings for  
smaller, usable bank notes.  The problem was, they opened at only a  
few locations leaving a small group of  
soldiers – in this case from the 1.6 Infantry Battalion – to deal  
with thousands of anxious civilians.   
Precisely the sort of scenario where Iraqis get to judge Americans as  
peacekeepers. 
 
SOLDIER:  Men and women are poor, they're not able to get to the bank,  
and then they come and we try  
and have a number system where they get in, they got a number to get  
through the line.  Some people are  
cutting.  Once one person comes in, five or six will try to push  
through the line.  That's when we have to  
defend ourselves and push them back to keep the flow of movement  
going the way we want it to. 
 
SOLDIER: (to woman in surging crowd)  Do you want these (cuffs)  on  
your fucking hands?  Then get the  
fuck out! 
 
IRAQI MAN:  You know it's very difficult for Iraqi people to hear the  
soldiers shouting on a woman.  We  
respect the woman here so much.  So you have to tell those soldiers  
how the Iraqi people respect each other.  
 
2nd IRAQI MAN:  He said: "fuck Iraq". 
 
REPORTER:  Who did? 
 
2nd IRAQI MAN:  He… this army.  I don’t know what his name. 
 
REPORTER:  What did you say? 
 
2nd IRAQI MAN:  I say?  If I have gun in my hand I tell him what I  
say by gun. 
 
REPORTER:  In the torrid heat of an Iraqi summer and struggling to  
pacify, let alone understand, a people  
who'd been asking them for help, for some soldiers discipline becomes  
a casualty.   
 
(footage of ferocious attack by several soldiers on one Iraqi pinned  
motionless and helpless on the ground) 
 
The soldiers would later claim that they had to use such force  
because the man, a suspected pickpocket, was  
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resisting arrest and fighting them on the ground.  The Americans  
release him a few minutes later to go to  
hospital to get treatment for the injuries he's just received.    
While we were filming the money exchange a  
more serious situation had developed outside Assassin's Gate, the  
entrance the CPA headquarters.  400,000  
Iraqi soldiers had been dismissed, unpaid, as part of the coalition's  
purge of the old regime.  And now some  
of them were on the street demanding emergency payment.  But the  
protest became violent, rocks were  
thrown at an army convoy, and in response and American soldier shot  
into the crowd.  Two of the  
demonstrators, apparently unarmed, were killed.  We were directed to  
the house of one of the men who'd  
been shot. Tarik Al-Mashhadani, a father of five.  His family had  
just received his body in a US army body  
bag.  For many in Iraq, and especially Ala, now sniffing the blood of  
his younger brother, the occupiers  
have little margin for error. 
 
ALA AL-MASHHADANI:  The martyr is alive forever and his blood is  
always fresh.  It smells good.  I  
can't get dirt from it.  I want to know who shot my brother and bring  
him to trial.  If this doesn't happen I  
wont keep silent and neither will the Iraq people.  
 
REPORTER:  The Americans say that there is an investigation  
continuing into this matter. 
 
AL-MASHHADANI:  They wont do anything.  The Iraqi people know why the  
Americans and British are  
here – oil, and to allow Israel to grow across the Middle East.   
These are his five children.  Who will feed  
them now?  We have our tribal system of justice.  Either the killer  
is killed, or the victim's family receive  
compensation.  If we don’t get justice, we will punish them.  We will  
kill four for the one they killed. 
 
REPORTER:  As the brother's coffin was being led through the streets,  
the US military had already issued a  
press release claiming someone on the crowd had begun shooting at  
their soldiers so one of them fired back.   
But when we found a senior army doctor who'd actually witnessed the  
incident, his version of events was  
somewhat different.  
 
Major MATTHEW JENNINGS 
82nd Airborne Division 
My instinct of the shooting was… well I hate to say this but I don’t  
think it was necessary.  I believe  
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someone felt threatened.  You know, the American military police  
company that was coming by in their  
vehicles, someone felt threat enough, great enough, to open fire on  
the crowd.  Yet where was no weapons  
to be seen within the crowd. 
 
REPORTER:  You didn't see any? 
 
JENNINGS:  I did not see any weapons.  Now granted we're in Baghdad.   
There probably were weapons  
there, but I did not see any, nor was any fire that I heard, returned  
back on the soldiers. 
 
REPORTER:  The conduct of some in the US military was also worrying  
the UN's then main trouble  
shooter and head of mission in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello.  He  
worked closely with the CPA Chief Paul  
Bremer.  A highly regarded diplomat, he would later be murdered in a  
suicide bomb attack on the UN  
headquarters in Baghdad.  This was his last television interview. 
 
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO 
UN Special Envoy to Ira 
I have discovered in my career, and I've been in six or seven  
peacekeeping operations that soldiers are bad  
policemen, they are not trained for that, and as a rule one should  
never use the military for law and order  
tasks which is why so many mistakes are being committed here.   
 
MAJ. JENNINGS:  With a little bit of the morale deficit that we have  
here, you put us in a situation where  
do we shoot or do we not shoot?  We're still the shooters, and  
there's a great possibility that we'll shoot first,  
and then let things sort out and fill out the reports and do the  
investigations afterwards. 
 
REPORTER:  We've since found out there was no investigation into the  
shooting of  Ala's brother, Tarik.   
Not since the Second World War has the US Military been in control of  
a city of 5 million people  
responsible with the CPA for making it function at every level, and  
that can even mean rebuilding soccer  
pitches, the latest task for Reggie Harris. 
 
Are you any good at soccer? 
 
REGGIE HARRIS:  I'm pretty good, I'm average.  It's a sport so I'm  
good at him.  (laughs)  We're going to  
head out now and get motivated.  Today we're here to work on the  
football field and give these young kids  
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like this a chance to play soccer.  Okay?  That's what we're here for,  
alright? 
 
REPORTER:  A lot of the reconstruction of Iraq has been painfully  
slow.  Coalition attempts to revive the  
antiquated oil and electricity networks have been hindered by  
sabotage, and community projects like this  
are limited.  The soldiers know only too well that the longer they  
stay in any one place, the greater the risk  
of attack.   
 
HARRIS:  This is a project that was brought to my attention.  I'm  
kind of the sheriff, mayor, so to speak of  
this neighbourhood, me and my forces here.  So we decided to give  
something back to the community, and  
one project that we're doing, we've called the Taskforce  
Neighbourhood Project, and what we're calling it is  
'Completing a Kid's Dream".   We're not only here to provide peace,  
security and civility, we're also here to  
help rebuild Iraq.  Will you present the first ball to the people.  
 
SOLDIER:  On behalf of the Iron Thunder Battalion and the Gators we  
hope the children can continue to be  
children and have fun. 
 
REPORTER:  The US military is also involved in constructing a grass  
roots political framework for Iraq.   
Reggie Harris' extensive portfolio now includes chairing one of the  
city's newly established neighbourhood  
council's, essentially a forum for local communities, to highlight  
their immediate concern. 
 
How many jobs are you actually doing here? 
 
CAPT. HARRIS:  (laughing)  I'm a negotiator, I'm a police officer,  
I'm a mayor, I'm the sheriff of my  
neighbourhood.  I'm a councilman, sometimes I'm an unemployment  
officer. 
 
REPORTER:  Without wanting to sound rude, what makes you qualified?   
What qualifications do you have  
for all these jobs? 
 
Captain REGGIE HARRRIS 
27th Field Artillery Regiment 
Well honestly, I have a degree in several of the…  (laughs)  no, I  
don’t know.  I guess when you wear the  
uniform the people here automatically assume that you can provide a  




REPORTER:  Many, many Iraqis are grateful to the soldiers for ridding  
their country of Saddam's tyranny.   
In video stalls across Baghdad there's now a macabre trade in DVDs  
where the full horror of the old regime  
is finally laid bare.  This footage is thought to have been taken in  
a Baghdad prison. 
 
(horrific scene of whipping of prisoner, on the ground, amongst  
others apparently whipped to death) 
 
The systematic brutality that became a hallmark of the Saddam regime  
dehumanised the nation.  We came  
across Ali one morning in the west of the city.  He told us how they  
cut off his ear when he tried to desert  
the army. 
 
Can I ask you how you feel about the Americans? 
 
IRAQI MAN:  Good bush, no Saddam. 
 
REPORTER:  Good bush? 
 
IRAQI MAN:  Yes.  No Saddam. 
 
REPORTER:  Then in a coffee house a local GP articulated why it meant  
so much to him that Bush and  
Blair had gone to war. 
 
Dr GAITH AL SAUD 
I can't forget what the previous regime have done to us.  There is no  
sense of forgiveness.  It was so bad.  So  
bad.  So many of my colleagues were executed. (emotional, close to  
tears)   Excuse me.  I remember them,  
they were true Iraqis, true people, keen to do help to others.  They  
have been executed for political reasons,  
nothing else. 
 
REPORTER:  These are friends of yours? 
 
AL SAUD:  Yes, close friends of mine, with the same graduation.  They  
were brilliant people.  I don’t  
know how to forgive them.  Forgiveness has lost its meaning. 
 
REPORTER:  By the middle of the summer the coalition concluded Saddam  
was still alive and still  
somewhere in Iraq and they wanted to believe that it was his die hard  
supporters, the so called dead enders  
who were leading the resistance.  So they assumed they'd struck at  
the heart of the movement when they  
killed his sons Uday and Qusay after a 6 hour fire fight in the  
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northern city of Mosul.  The coalition paraded  
their bodies on TV so that no one was in any doubt that they were  
dead.  And now everyone wanted to  
know when would they get Saddam. 
 
BERNARD KERIK 
Coalition Provisional Authority 
The bottom line is he will be caught.  He will be captured or killed,  
just like his sons.  As confident as I am  
sitting here right now, we will have him in custody dead or alive  
some time in the future. 
 
REPORTER:  Dead or alive. 
 
KERIK:  Dead or alive. 
 
REPORTER:  What's preferable? 
 
KERIK:  (pause)   Dead or alive. 
 
REPORTER:  Another day, another fractious gathering at a Baghdad  
money exchange.  Life in the city is  
still far from normal.  As before, the CPA has opted for only a few  
locations to set up their exchanges  
which means once again that thousands of people are descending on one  
street having to wait for hours to  
get their money in temperatures of up to 50 degrees Celsius.  This  
time the Americans who are still doing  
most of the policing in the city have brought riot batons.   
 
What techniques are you using to control this crowd? 
 
SOLDIER:  There's nothing, it seems, that this mob understands except  
an iron fist.  At first you come in  
and you try to be polite and try to say:  "Look, we need you to move  
back, you just stand over there" and  
you get no response.  You get no response. 
 
REPORTER:  How old are you? 
 
SOLDIER:  28 years old, college student.  I'm actually an art major  
at school, which is totally different than  
this.  I'd rather be studying fine literature and art. 
 
REPORTER:  Do you think as soldiers you're getting satisfactory  
support from the senior civil  
administrators in this country? 
 
SOLDIER:  I'll leave it at this.  I think the people that are in  
charge very high up don’t see what's actually  
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happening, and that's how I feel.  There's a definite disconnect  
between what needs to happen and what's  
actually happening, and I think the administration needs to take that  
in effect.  We need to get these people  
food, water, housing and government fast.   
 
REPORTER:  But that can't happen overnight. 
 
SOLDIER:  I know it can't happen overnight but something has to be  
implemented to get this plan moving  
because here on the lowest level of military hierarchy I don’t see it  
happening.  I see nothing of this  
happening and I'm sure there are plans being made, papers drafted,  
whatnot, but these people don’t see that  
and I don’t see it and that's what makes them angry and that's what  
makes them want to attack us, and day  
by day more and more soldiers are going down. 
 
REPORTER:  It's not just junior ranking soldiers who are prepared to  
openly criticise the way the coalition  
is running Iraq.  Matthew Jennings is a Westpoint graduate, a major  
with 12 years experience as a  
professional soldier.  Having fought a war he still believes in, it's  
now early summer and he thought he'd be  
home. 
 
Major MATTHEW JENNINGS 
82nd Airborne Division 
I know personally I'm upset because people seem to be dragging their  
feet.  I wonder how often many of  
these folks in these large palaces, how often do they come visit  
these hospitals here?  How often do they see  
the actual problems that are there? 
 
REPORTER:  Do you listen to your boss in CPA, Paul Bremer,  
electricity is back, a number of courts are  
up, the schools are running, everyone seems a lot happier than many  
people would suggest on the streets. 
 
JENNINGS:  You're on the streets, I'm on the streets.  I'd like to  
report the same things they're reporting.  I  
don’t know – maybe the emperor is not wearing any clothes. 
 
REPORTER:  Ambassador, there's a strong perception among many Iraqis  
and not a few American soldiers  
that the CPA is far too detached from the situation on the ground.   
How do you respond to that? 
 
PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provision Authority 
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Well I don’t think it's true.  We've got hundreds of people working  
for us all across the country.  We have  
officers now in all 18 provincial capitals, and we have people  
working every day in the ministries both here  
and in capitals.  We have a lot of people out all the time. 
 
REPORTER:  But a panel of experts sent out by the Pentagon recently  
concluded that there is a disconnect  
between on the ground realities and policy formation at CPA HQ.  One  
member of the group described the  
CPA as "living in a cocoon inside a bubble".  Do you really know what  
the Iraq people are experiencing day  
to day? 
 
BREMER:  Oh yes, I think so, they're pretty clear about it.  They  
make it clear in their demonstrations and  
their newspaper stories.  We have a pretty good understanding of the  
problems they have.  They have  
problems with security and with power and water and those are the  
problems that we spend a great deal of  
our time on, those are our top priority issues, just as they are  
their top priority problems. 
 
REPORTER:  Under international law an occupying power has a duty to  
restore civic order, but in Baghdad  
the coalition has been finding it difficult, especially when it comes  
to restoring power even to pre war  
levels.  As in any modern city, electricity is its life blood, the  
essential provider of light, heat and water.   
But supply here hardly ever exceeds 12 hours a day.  Some homes get  
just three, and the slow pace of  
progress is feeding a growing discontent within the city. 
 
Saturday night, the centre of Baghdad and the electricity has gone  
again.  What people around here can't  
understand is how a superpower which took their country in just 21  
days can't even get the lights to work. 
 
Perhaps the most important and most onerous of all the obligations  
facing the occupiers is the duty to  
restore law and order, and in Baghdad in particular this has been a  
problem.  It's not possible to verify levels  
of crime before the war, but there's a widespread perception in  
Baghdad that the number of shootings and  
stabbings in the city has risen sharply since the occupation.  This  
man has just received bullet wounds to his  
shoulder and head.  Baghdad Central Morgue - nearly four months after  
the toppling of Saddam we filmed  
coffin after coffin being brought to the building.  We were told that  
in the previous two days 91 bodies had  
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been registered here.  The Morgue's director told me that in a  
similar period before the war that figure  
would rarely have exceeded 5.  You don’t have to stay here very long  
to get a clear picture of just how far  
law and order has broken down in the city.  There's an almost  
constant stream of coffins, nearly all of them  
containing bodies of people who've been killed by gunshot. 
 
(footage of procession of chanting Iraqis carrying coffing) 
 
Apparently this is a 20 year old Iraqi whose family are claiming was  
shot by American troops.  Now they  
said it was time for retribution.  His family and friends had no  
qualms about telling me they were ready to  
fight the Americans. 
 
But hang on, they liberated you and Iraq from Saddam Hussein, he's no  
longer here and that is thanks to the  
Americans and in a small part the British. 
 
IRAQI MAN:  Saddam is a hero and will continue to be a hero.  Every  
Iraqi is a soldier for Saddam.  The  
Americans are killing us and looting our oil.  I'm in Saddam's  
Fedayeen.  I love Saddam and I want to drink  
the blood of all American soldiers.   
 
REPORTER:  Whatever the true circumstances surrounding the death of  
this young Iraqi, these mourners  
made no attempt to hide their deep hatred of the Americans, and they  
left with one final show of defiance. 
 
(several bursts of gunshot from departing procession) 
 
Getting Iraqi police, or IPs as they're known, back to work has been  
a priority for the coalition.  But the old  
police are still being retrained leaving just over half the numbers  
they need on the ground.  Towards the end  
of August we found a police station near Thunder Battalion being  
rebuilt.  It had minimal resources.  And  
outside, Baghdad's by now familiar sound (gunshot and machinegun fire)   
was becoming relentless.  Now  
this is the funeral…   Is that a machine gun? 
 
SOLDIER:  Yes they are, and AK47. 
 
REPORTER:  The shooting is in fact illegal but neither the soldiers,  
nor the Iraqi police are inclined to  
intervene. 
 
SOLDIER:  Now if you don’t mind I'm going to move you out of this  
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area for your own safety. 
 
REPORTER:  Okay.  I mean this has been going on for half an hour now,  
this shooting.  Do you think law  
and order has been more or less re-established in Baghdad? 
 
SOLDIER:  Slowly, yes. 
 
REPORTER:  What, when you hear this constant gunfire?   
 
SOLDIER:  Well they have been practicing doing this for 35 years, so  
it's not like overnight you're going to  
stop performing acts and deeds that you've been performing. 
 
REPORTER:  But I think Saad, my translator, you were saying that  
before the…. 
 
SAAD:  Yeah, before the coming of the American troops, anyone who  
shoots a bullet in a funeral or in a  
wedding party, he would be put in prison for six months. 
 
REPORTER:  If they were caught firing like this? 
 
SAAD:  Well, they will be sent to death.  This is a battle.  This is  
not a…. It is a battlefield.  They are  
showing their power. 
 
REPORTER:  I mean that was.. that was just extraordinary.  I mean the  
whole.. I mean for about half an  
hour this area was just reverberating to the sound of gunfire and the  
police, the soldiers, you can't do  
anything… no one can do anything about it. 
 
SOLDIER:  This station itself is used to a 118 IPs.  We have a total  
of 48 here at this station.  It is going to  
take more larger amounts of people on the ground in order to stop  
these type of activities.  
 
REPORTER:  When are you going to get these extra people? 
 
SOLDIER:  I have no idea. 
 
BERNARD KERIK 
Coalition Provisional Authority 
If you want a safer and more secure environment then do something  
about it.  You can't just say well it's all  
the Americans and all Britain's fault.  We're losing people  
protecting the lives of Iraqis, many of whom  




REPORTER:  But you… Britain and America are legally bound under the  
Geneva Convention to restore  
law and order. 
 
KERIK:  Well we're doing that.  We're doing that.  What do you think,  
it happens overnight?  People here,  
they want it done in 120 days, and they want it done without any  
infrastructure, any, zero, like no police  
stations, no cars, no telephones, no internet, no technology, none.   
No forensic people, no papers to write a  
report on, and if we had the paper we don’t have a desk and a chair  
to sit at.   
 
REPORTER:  Reggie Harris and his men will be in Iraq until next year.   
Thousands of others who fought  
the war are still waiting to go home.  Today's Pentagon favours a  
lean, high-tech military using the  
minimum number of troops.  But in Washington there are now those who  
are convinced that America came  
into Iraq with a force large enough to win the war but too small to  
secure the peace.  A lot of these soldiers  
will be away from their families for at least a year.  Reggie Harris  
is about to miss a milestone in the life of  
any first time parent. 
 
REGGIE HARRIS:  I miss em.. you know.. definitely, and I'm definitely  
going to miss his 6th birthday and  
I'm going to miss him going to school and getting first day.. his  
first day at school now, and I told my wife  
if by some chance.. you know.. I don’t make it out of here, and I  
don’t make it back to him, you just keep  
telling him that daddy always told him to accomplish the mission, you  
know.. and tell my soldiers that now.   
But I tell her to tell him that, and whatever he put his mind to, you  
know.. he'll accomplish it and he'll do it  
regardless of what anybody else tell him, he'll accomplish the  
mission (controlled voice – visible tears) you  
know.. and I just… I just pray that I make it out and I can tell him  
that myself.  But he's going to be alright.   
I know God is watching over him and he's going to be alright.  He's  
going to be fine. 
 
REPORTER:  On the battalion are professional and highly committed  
soldiers who believe fervently in the  
US cause in Iraq.  But the methods some American soldiers are using  
in this highly volatile and fragile  
environment raise questions about their suitability as peacekeepers.   
Last month Thunder got another tip- 
off.  A man suspected of being behind a recent attack on the  
battalion was in hospital.  He'd been shot and  
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his condition was thought to be critical.  Thunder dispatch a team. 
 
Major SCOTT PATTON 
Head of Operations "Thunder Battalion" 
If it turns out that we have and we can keep him alive to try to get  
some more intelligence from him, it'll be  
a pretty significant find for us. 
 
PATTON:  (arriving at hospital)  How you been? 
 
SOLDIER:  I'm doing fine sir. 
 
PATTON:  What kind of condition is he in? 
 
SOLDIER:  He don’t look too good sir. 
 
PATTON:  Not looking good?  Okay.  Alright.  I'm going to go check  
out your patient.  Okay? 
 
REPORTER:  In fact the man Thunder's head of operations is about to  
interrogate has been shot in the  
stomach in a gunfight near his home. 
 
PATTON:  Okay, we're going to ask him some questions.  Tell him that  
if he cooperates with us we might  




PATTON:  Because we have very good doctors.  Okay?  But tell him if  
he doesn't cooperate with us…. 
 
INTERPRETER:  He's dead. 
 





PATTON:  Tell him I need to know who else was with him the day he  





PATTON:  Tell him if he's lying then he's going to piss me off really  
bad.  Eight other people have  
mentioned your name and your brother's name.  I'm not…. Look at me,  
I'm not stupid, okay?  I'm not stupid.   
And it's going to… we're going to help you if you help us.  If you  
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don’t help us you can forget it.  Okay?   
We came here to help you.  Alright?  So it behoves you to give help.   
Alright.  Come on. 
 
(To reporter)   He's lying.  They all do.  Well I mean when you have  
12 other sources and they're all  
independent and they're not interlinked so it's not like a family  
feud…   Most of them are very scared to tell  
the truth and I don’t think he… he looks like he's in pretty decent  
shape so he doesn't look like…  
 
REPORTER:  Has he been… he's been shot, has he? 
 
PATTON:  Yes.  Looks like it's somewhere in the abdomen.  We're going  
to have our doc check him out in  
a minute and then what we'll do is we'll take him back to the… 
 
REPORTER:  After the interview, if he doesn't cooperate, what's going  
to happen to him? 
 
PATTON:  We're still going to… ah… I mean.. we'll still give him  
medical care, I mean that's… you know..  
that's our way.  But we're going to put him in jail.  He'll  
eventually give us information. 
 
REPORTER:  After Thunder's medics have examined him, the patient, now  
detainee, is given the all clear  
to be moved.  He'll be handed over to the military police for more  
questioning.  As Scott Patton and his  
team move out, the man's mother is left bewildered, not knowing what  
will happen to her son. 
 
PATTON:  We've always tried to use approach of.. you know.. the  
carrot and the stick.  We're going to be  
very polite and nice and you've seen our soldiers be that way.  And  
then if somebody gives us a reason to be  
ugly, we'll be ugly. 
 
REPORTER:  One tactic the American troops employ in Iraq is the  
cordon and search operation.  In this  
case a whole section of Thunder's neighbourhood has been sealed off.   
It's 2 o'clock in the morning and 600  
troops have been brought in to search every single home for any  
evidence of paramilitary activity.  But so  
far no weapons have been found. 
 
REPORTER:  Are you concerned that you could do more damage by these  
house to house raids ultimately  




PATTON:  No, but as you see, we engage the people, we tell them why  
we're here, and most of them have  
been pretty receptive. 
 
REPORTER:  In the past such raids such raids have yielded important  
weapon finds and paramilitaries have  
been detained.  But the whole process is driven often by low grade  
intelligence and as a result the raids are  
very hit and miss.  It's all eerily reminiscent of what happened in  
Belfast in the early days of the troubles.   
As for the detainees, questions have been raised about their  
treatment.  The use of hoods, we were told, is  
so that they don’t try to escape on their way back to the base.  And  
this is what awaits them when they get  
there – a temporary detention centre where, with their hands still  
cuffed and with no access to bedding or  
chairs – they'll have to spend the rest of the night. 
 
What do you think of the conditions in which people are being  
arrested?  They're being hooded, taken off to  
barbed wire compounds, made to sit in these compounds for hours on  
end. 
 
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO August 2003 
UN Special Envoy in Iraq 
Unnecessarily rough.  I have made that point.  Then again, not always  
respecting, often not respecting local  
sensitivities, the culture and religion, and that is unnecessary  
because I presume you can achieve the same  
purpose by displaying more respect for local traditions and local  
culture. 
 
REPORTER:  Are the soldiers using excessive force? 
 
PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority 
I don’t think so.  I think they do their very best.  Their rules of  
engagement are very clear.  They do their  
very best to avoid unnecessary force, and I think while there are  
mistakes as there always are in any kind of  
combat situations, on the whole they're doing a very good job. 
 
REPORTER:  For all the criticism and for all the set backs there has  
bee significant progress in Iraq.  The  
new power sharing, governing council offers a tantalising glimpse of  
what both occupiers and occupied  
ultimately desire, a democratic Iraq.  As their holidays near an end,  
in October Iraq's children will be back  
at school.  Universities will also open.  A new press has been born  
with 150 newspaper titles heralding new  
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freedoms of speech.  Baghdad is finally being cleaned up, and  
although the bulk of the reconstruction work  
has yet to be done, smaller projects are beginning to appear across  
the city. 
 
BREMER:  I think we have made enormous progress in the last three  
months.  We've carried out several  
thousand reconstruction programmes.  The larger projects which take a  
little time to get cranked up are now  
beginning to show progress, particularly in the area; reconstructing  
roads, bridges, airports and of course the  
power system.  These are big projects which require time to get  
worked up and you don’t spend hundreds of  
billions of dollars overnight. 
 
REPORTER:  But undermining all of these advances is the constant  
problem of security – or lack of it.   
One morning we went into the centre of Baghdad to film a shop selling  
an item previously banned under  
Saddam, the TV satellite dish, now one of many defining images of the  
new Iraq.  But then, an hour later,  
on our return to the shop, we found this – the area, one of the  
city's most affluent neighbourhoods had  
become a battle zone, and the TV satellite shop we'd filmed earlier  
was now being pulverised by heavy  
cannon and machinegun fire.  A group of American soldiers had just  
taken a hit on one of their vehicles and  
they decided to hit back with another overwhelming show of force.   
But this was a busy shopping district  
and in the confusion the soldiers opened fire on a group of onlookers.   
 
(devastating scenes of those shot and grief stricken relative) 
 
REPORTER:  Since the end of the war, how many Iraqis have been killed  
by American soldiers? 
 
PAUL BREMER:  I don’t really know.  I don’t know.  I don’t keep  
numbers.  It's been a very restricted  
number and it's been in fact what… it's.. it's a… it follows on,  
probably the war that killed the fewest  
civilians and did the least collateral damage of any war in history. 
 
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO:  You occupy with a military force but you  
can't restore law and order with  
the military.  This is why an occupation cannot last.  This is why  
occupation is, by definition, good for the  
short-term – if it is good at all as a matter of fact.  I don’t think  
it is.  It think it is anachronistic.  But since  
this country is occupied, the occupation should be kept as short as  
possible, particularly when it comes to  
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the security sector. 
 
REPORTER:  Is too much being asked of the military in this  
reconstruction period? 
 
Major SCOTT PATTON 
27th Field Artillery Regiment 
Who else will do it? 
 
REPORTER:  Civilians, could bring in civilians from the United  
Nations, give the United Nations a bigger  
role. 
 
PATTON:  Yeah, this could.  But if you look at.. if there's one  
organisation in the world that could make  
this happen, you're looking at 'em.  Not me but the US Army. 
 
REPORTER:  Iraq is fragmented but determined resistance movement has  
grown bolder in its public  
defiance of the occupiers.  By August the coalition's insistence that  
these remained principally diehard  
Ba'athists looked increasingly unconvincing.  In these propaganda  
videos the majority of fighters claim they  
were killing on behalf of Islam and not Saddam.  And at the street  
level the men of Thunder Battalion now  
realise they're facing a very different threat to the one they first  
encountered. 
 
PATTON:  Okay, what have we got? 
 
REGGIE HARRIS:  (holding up document for filming)  Osama Bin Laden,  
this is ?? word tracing. 
 
REPORTER:  A picture of Osama Bin Laden.  The irony of such an image  
will not be lost on Washington  
and London. 
 
PATTON:  Why do they have Osama Bin Laden pictures in their house? 
 
REPORTER:  Few things could undermine the coalition's sense of  
victory more than the realisation that  
their war may now be helping to swell Bin Laden's movement.   
 









REPORTER:  In Washington some officials are now describing Iraq as a  
magnet for Al-Qaeda.  Last month  
a US military commander in Iraq conceded that the foreign fighters  
who've entered the country since the  
end of the war may have links to Al-Qaeda.  The changing nature of  
Iraq's resistance was illustrated all too  
clearly last month when a car bomb ripped apart the Jordanian Embassy  
in Baghdad.  Eleven people were  
killed and fifty injured.  The sophistication and sheer scale of the  
attack represented a whole new terrorist  
threat. 
 
Is there a danger of the coalition getting trapped into a prolonged  
guerrilla war here? 
 
PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority 




REPORTER:  That's it? 
 
BREMER:  What's your next question? 
 
REPORTER:  Well at this rate America is going to be stuck in Iraq for  
a long time.  I mean you do not have  
the security situation under control.  American soldiers are being  
killed every week. 
 
PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provisional Authority 
I fundamentally disagree with you.  We do have the security situation  
under control.  We have a problem of  
security in a small area of the country from Baghdad north to Tikrit  
where we are taking casualties, and  
every one of those casualties is a tragedy but the level of  
casualties is not substantial.  We will of course be  
here a long time.  We've always said we'd be here a long time.  We  
will be here until the job is done. 
 
SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO August 2003 
UN Special Envoy to Iraq 
We're all betting on a successful transition from the Saddam Hussein  
era to a democracy, a stable, united,  
peaceful Iraq that no longer threatens its neighbours as Saddam did  
for so long.  And if this fails, obviously  





REPORTER:  And if it were to fail? 
 
DE MELLO:  I can't predict.  I don’t have a crystal ball but it would  
be bad for Iraq.  This country could  
turn into a true and long-term anarchy which by necessity would  
affect its neighbours and the region as a  
whole. 
 
REPORTER:  48 hours later Sergio Vieira de Mello was sitting in the  
same office when a truck, laden with  
explosives, drove into the UN compound; 22 people were killed in the  
attack including Sergio Vieira de  
Mello.   
 
(on site)  About an hour ago a massive car bomb ripped out a corner  
of the building here and the casualties  
are coming out, they're being airlifted off to field hospitals and  
this is the United Nations which is here, it  
has one agenda, that is to help rebuild this country.  Why anyone  
would target it in this fashion is baffling.   
What made the attack so surprising was that the UN always stated  
explicitly that it wanted to end the  
occupation as quickly as possible.  But perhaps this was more of a  
message to America and everyone else  
willing to help them, a reminder of just how vulnerable they are in  
this part of the Middle East. 
 




Coalition Provisional Authority 
(May-Sept 2003) 
Well it's obviously people that don’t want us to succeed.  It's  
people that don’t… you know.. it's the same  
people that's fighting the coalition, fighting the resistance,  
they've got to learn – we're not leaving.  The  
coalition is not leaving.  The coalition is not going to be  
intimidated nor is the United Nations and they can  
speak for themselves.  The bottom line is, this is the same type of  
people that's fighting the coalition that is  
doing this.  They're cowards. 
 
REPORTER:  Washington is now coming to terms with the fact that Iraq  
has become a common battlefield,  
not just for those wanting to end the occupation but also for the  
multitude of foreign fighters who've spotted  
a new arena for waging their Jihad against America.  Earlier this  
week the UN's Baghdad office was  
bombed again.  Nineteen people were injured, one killed.  As a result  
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the UN has decided to further reduce  
its international staff in Iraq, prompting many of the remaining aid  
agencies to reconsider their position.   
And in America there are some who are now calling for the troops to  
come home too. 
 
Some people in the States are advocating a withdrawal from Iraq.  Is  
it time to cut and run? 
 
BREMER:  Not at all, and I wouldn't pay very much attention to those  
voices.  The American people have  
undertaken with the British and our other coalition allies here a  
noble exercise and we will see it through. 
 
REPORTER:  On Friday the Pentagon announced the deployment of an  
extra 10,000 troops to Iraq.  That  
Iraq has the potential to lead the Arab world one day as a wealthy,  
secure democracy is not in doubt.  But as  
the debate at the UN this week has shown, the world is still divided  
on how the country should get there.   
America now wants help in Iraq but its reluctance to relinquish its  
dominant role in the country remains a  
hurdle for many nations who could offer support.  And all the time in  
Iraq the patience of a grateful but  
hugely expectant people is wearing thin.  Before we left the country  
at the end of August, we returned to  
one of Baghdad's busiest hospitals just over a mile away from Thunder  
Battalion. 
 
I mean this is extraordinary.  We're back in emergency of Koran  
Hospital and it's empty, there are no  
doctors.  It's empty!  Look at it!   That's the men's ward –  
absolutely empty.  The women's ward – that's  
empty.  It's extraordinary.  The doctors have just vanished. 
 
Local residents suffering from repeated blackouts had tapped into the  
hospital's already struggling generator  
and caused a complete collapse of the system.  No electricity – no  
power.  One of the city's largest hospitals  
empty and unusable.  While we were there we met one of the hospitals  
transplant surgeons, a man like so  
many inside and outside Iraq, is not counting the price of victory. 
 
What do you think of the coalition at the moment, progress being made? 
 
Dr HOTHAME KHALID 
Now the Iraqi people they are counting days.  They have been here for  
two months – okay.  They have been  
here for three months – okay.  They have been four months – that's  
okay too.  But when they have been here  
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for five or six months you can expect explosion here. 
 
(Sounds of gunfire) 
 
KHALID:  You can see now – gunfire. 
 
REPORTER:  Would you ever take up arms against the American troops? 
 
KHALID:  Yes.  Yes.  In the right moment – yes. 
 
REPORTER:  Why would you take a gun to the Americans if you felt the  
time was right? 
 
KHALID:  This is something built inside me.  I cannot tolerate  
occupationists.  I cannot tolerate something  
that break my freedom.  You see the Americans are playing with  
dangerous traits in the Iraqi personality  
now.  They are putting the nose of Iraqi people to the earth and this  
is a very dangerous point. 
 
REPORTER:  But they came here to give you your freedom.  They freed  
you from Saddam Hussein. 
 
















STILL CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 23:11:03 
........................................................................ 
 
JANE CORBIN:  Panorama is going on a hunt for Saddam's illusive weapons.   
 
The Scientific Bureau was a front company for the Ministry of Defence.  They engaged in a 
lot of legal  
activity but also some illegal activities. 
 




OFFICER:  And heading up towards the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and we'll head up to 
Street 15. 
 
CORBIN:  The stakes are high.  The reputations of a Prime Minister and a President are on 
the line. 
 
OFFICER:  Get out and secure the area.  EOD will enter the building first.   
 
CORBIN:  They said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that's why we went 
to war.  Every  
day for the past 4 months these hunters have hoped to strike lucky.   
 
This is a surprise trip right into the heart of down town Baghdad.  The team is hoping that 
they're going to  
find not only relevant documents but also Iraqis who can tell them something about the 
programmes of  
mass destruction.  Tonight we reveal just what the weapon hunters have found and why it 
doesn't  
substantiate many of the statements made by the politicians who took us to war.  
 
On the outskirts of Baghdad lie rusted remains, Iraq's feared armoury.  No weapons of mass 
destruction,  
just old tanks, battlefield rockets and artillery.  Yet George Bush and Tony Blair had been 
adamant before  
the war that Saddam Hussein was a current and serious threat.  The danger, they suggested, 
was imminent. 
 
24th September 2002 
BLAIR:  The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down, it is up and running 
now. 
 
26th September 2002 
BUSH:  The danger to our country is grave.  The danger to our country is growing.  The Iraqi 
regime  
possesses biological and chemical weapons. 
 
24th September 2002 
BLAIR:  He has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological 
weapons which  
could be activated within 45 minutes including….  
 
CORBIN:  But there was no Iraqi order to fire weapons of mass destruction as coalition 
troops advanced.   
The chemical and biological shells they confidently expected to find within days never 
materialised.  Now  
the Iraq Survey group continues the hunt for the weapons the politicians and intelligence 
agencies told us  
existed.  The ISG has received a tip off that this small Iraqi pharmaceutical company was 
secretly importing  
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materials to make long-range missiles for Saddam Hussein.  The company's own website 
makes clear its  
view of America's war against terror. 
 
SOLDIER:  [reference to material found]  Bulls eye on Bush, note to make this the home 
page.   
 
CORBIN:  The public were led to expect that coalition soldiers would unearth warheads 
filled with nerve  
gas and anthrax, but they're dismantling computers instead. 
 
MAJ SUTTER:  The good thing is we found a lot of email addresses, we found a lot of names 
of  
individuals that we're already aware of and other contacts that they've worked with, so that's a 
good start  
right there. 
 
CORBIN:  Then they find blueprints which reveal this drug firm was really a front company 
for military  
procurement.  
 
SUTTER:  We're finding a lot of standard pharmaceutical stuff on the top of each pile, and 
usually when  
you go down through, you find more about military applications, radar, body armour and a 
number of other  
items in here.  A lot of chemicals mentioned here, probably most are pharmaceuticals, we're 
interested in  
certain ones that could be used for propellant applications. 
 
JANE CORBIN 
There's an order for 500 tons of a chemical used in propellant missile fuel.  The ISG Group 
has been here  
for about 2 hours now and they say it is worth taking these boxes back.  There are files of 
interest to them.   
But the big question is, how significant would all this turn out to be.  The prospect of finding 
the smoking  
gun has faded.  Now there's just a giant puzzle the ISG has to piece together. 
 
Major JOHN SUTTER 
Iraq Survey Group 
We found lots of documents where they were trying to go around legal ways to purchase 
these things, and  
again it's a front company, so we've got lots of information.  We didn't find the things we 
were looking for  
but we're going to have to sit down and do the research to try to make to the missile firms.  
And so yes,  
there's no single large missile that we've found or a chemical that we've found.  But we've 
found a lot of  




CORBIN:  It took two months from the end of the war to set up the Iraq Survey Group and 
begin the  
systematic search for the weapons.  A thousand experts from America, Britain and Australia 
were brought  
together.  A US led group took over an old palace of Saddam's renamed 'Camp Slayer'.  It 
was trashed and  
looted like many of the places in Iraq they were interested in.  The coalition's failure to secure 
sites and  
preserve evidence created a problem for the ISG from the start.  In the new command centre 
the murals  
proclaimed Iraq's military might, but what was the truth?  Did they possess forbidden 
weapons?  It was the  
ISG's task to find out.   
 
DR KAY:  This document gives you a good view of the grandeur of this complex, and in fact 
you can't even  
see all of it here, and that was a Ba'ath convention centre in the middle of the lake. This is 
what was to be a  
main presidential palace still under construction at the time of the war. 
 
CORBIN:  Under fire for their intelligence estimates before the war, the CIA chose a man 
they called their  
'ramrod' to head up the ISG.  David Kay was close to the Pentagon too.  Dr Kay, an ex-UN 
inspector who'd  
helped uncover Iraq's past nuclear programme started knowing political futures could rest on 
his findings. 
 
DR DAVID KAY 
Iraq Survey Group 
The entire credibility of both the US and I must say I think British foreign policy and 
intelligence has been  
called into question by our inability to find the weapons immediately.  I think we all realise 
after Iraq we  
really do have to readjust our intelligence services for the new demands posed by countries 
like Iraq and  
others. We're not going to know how to make that adjustment until we know what the lessons 
learned here,  
what was the ground truth? 
 
CORBIN:  Dr Kay's own credibility was also at stake.  A supporter of regime change before 
the war, he'd  
been convinced Saddam had WMD.   
 
17th September 2002 
KAY:  If you want to disarm Iraq, remove it's weapons of mass destruction, there is no 
alternative to  
replacing the regime. 
 
18th December 2002 
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KAY:  Essentially, everyone who runs an active intelligence service knows this regime has 
been seeking  
weapons of mass destruction.   
 
14th April 2003 
KAY:  Oh I think it's there and it's got to be found and that is the new priority.  The 
administration has to  
invest the effort and the people into doing it.   
 
CORBIN:  Some Washington insiders were concerned about David Kay's appointment.  Greg 
Fieldman was  
a Director in the State Department's Intelligence Bureau until six months before the war. 
 
GREG THIELMANN 
State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002 
My only concern about David Kay is that he doesn't have the reputation for objectivity and 
care in precisely  
describing what the evidence is.  I'm not concerned that his group is still seeking evidence.  I 
would look  
forward to seeing whatever he comes up with but his position was so outspoken on the outset 
I worry a little  
bit about his objectivity.   
 
CORBIN:  Dr Kay's critics pointed to remarks he'd made just after the war but before he 
joined the ISG  
about two captured Iraqi trailers. 
 
KAY:  … nutrients.  Think of it as sort of a chicken soup for biological weapons. 
 
CORBIN:  David Kay judged these vehicles to be mobile production facilities for biological 
weapons. 
 
11th May 2003 
KAY:  Literally there is nothing else you would do this way on a mobile facility.  That is it.   
 
CORBIN:  The CIA was also quick to declare the trailer's part of a mobile biological 
weapons programme.   
Tony Blair and George Bush seized on the find.   
 
2nd June 2003 




30th May 2003 
BUSH:  We've found the weapons of mass destruction, we found biological laboratories.   
 
KAY:  I wish that news hadn't come out.  We're still under active investigation trying to 
figure it out.  My  
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standard of proof is that you need documentation, you need physical evidence or analytical 
proof, and you  
need Iraqis who were involved in the programme who can testify as to what you've found. 
 
CORBIN:  The infamous trailers are parked on a back lot at Camp Slayer, but you don’t hear 
much about  
them now.  The Iraqis claim they produced hydrogen to fill weather balloons on an artillery 
range.  Because  
some pipes are missing, experts can't tell if they carried a gas or a liquid biological agent.   
The vessel at the  
centre of each trailer is the biggest mystery of all. The experts are pretty much split 50/50 on 
this bit of kit.   
Is it a fomenter to brew deadly germs or a vessel to produce hydrogen.  Somebody even 
suggested it  
resembles a giant coffee peculator.  Exhaustive testing of the equipment failed to reveal any 
trace of  
biological weapons agent.  Reluctantly, by July, the ISG leader conceded everyone had been 
rather hasty.   
 
It was premature to announce them as being that definitely and embarrassing. 
 
KAY:  I think it was premature and embarrassing.  That's exactly what we're trying to do.  
That's why I'm so  
reticent in my discussion with you essentially in early July when we're talking now, because I 
don’t want  
this.. I don’t want the mobile biological production facilities fiasco of May to be the model of 
the future. 
 
CORBIN:  As they moved into Camp Slayer the ISG team adopted a forensic approach to the 
hunt.   
Frontline troops had failed to find anything at sites identified before the war.  The search 
would now  
concentrate on people and records.  Iraq had been a bureaucratic nation.  Members of 
Saddam's regime tried  
to destroy many documents as they fled.  But the mountains of paperwork of ministries, 
barracks and  
factories was soon collected at Camp Slayer. 
 
SOLDIER:  There's no exact figure been done but we estimate it's about 7½ miles if it was 
laid end to end. 
 
CORBIN:  Twelve years ago, after the first Gulf War, it was a paper trail which led UN 
inspectors to Iraq's  
hidden weapons programmes.  For decades denial and deception had been built in to the very 
fabric of the  
regime.  But clues had been inadvertently been revealed in documents.  That's where the ISG 
began, sifting  




intelligence analysts working with translators.  Their job – to identify any Iraqi who might be 
involved in  
producing, storing or moving weapons of mass destruction. 
 
OFFICER:  Could I get everybody's attention again.  What we're looking for are high ranking 
officials  
starting with major and above, working with Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard. 
 
This is a Special Security Force and it's about information. 
 
CORBIN:  The mood of the Iraq Survey Group in July was upbeat.  But a change of language 
was already  
detectable with less emphasis on finding actual weapons. 
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Iraq Survey Group 
I can say that we've already found enough evidence to convince me that we will be 
successful, if you judge  
success by finding a weapons programme that involved weapons of mass destruction. 
 
CORBIN:  What about the weapons themselves, because I think the public expected to see 
weapons lined  
up ready to use against our troops. 
 
KAY:  Well, if I'd found weapons ready to be used and lined up I'd be breaking news.  I just 
don’t know.   
We're looking for them.  The Iraqis engaged in quite a bit of destruction and dispersal effort 
prior to the  
war, certainly during the war and after the war, and that's why it's not an easy task. 
 
CORBIN:  In New York another man who'd found Iraq no easy task is retiring as Mr Kay 
began his hunt.   
Dr Hans Blix's UN teams had searched Iraq for weapons of mass destruction just before the 
war.  He  
suspected Iraq might have forbidden research programmes, but Dr Blix came under fire from 
the Americans  
for failing to find stockpiles of anthrax and weapons.  In June Dr Blix also noticed there was 
more emphasis  
now not on the weapons but on Iraq's so-called capabilities and programmes. 
 
Dr HANS BLIX 
UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003  
I've even seen American spokesmen sort of veering in that direction rather than talking about 
big stocks of  
the supplies, talking about the capability and programme.  That's conceivable.  Saddam might 
have said that  
one day we'll be out of sanctions and then we can do.. can do these programmes again, that is 
possible.  But  




CORBIN:  A year ago the message coming from Washington and London was that Saddam's 
Hussein's  
regime posed a current and serious threat.  In the US the President and his officials raised the 
ultimate  
spectre of modern warfare, the nuclear bomb.   
 
7th October 2002 
BUSH:  They've seen clear evidence of peril.  We cannot wait for the final proof, the 
smoking gun that  
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.  
 
8th September 2002 
CONDOLEEZZA RICE:  There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can 
acquire nuclear  
weapons, but we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. 
 
23rd September 2002   
RICHARD PERLE:  I don’t know what sort of evidence… a mushroom cloud would be a 
powerful  
statement, but do you want to wait for that? 
 
CORBIN:  These aluminium tubes became a weapon in the hawks armoury to make their 
case Iraq was  
reconstituting its nuclear programme.  UN inspectors believed Iraq's explanation.  The tubes 
were for  
conventional battlefield rockets.  But David Kay agreed with the President's officials who 
said the tubes  





Dr DAVID KAY 
I've seen one of them.  The centrifuge tubes look like they're of the design which is German 
derived, that  
the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed, therefore enriching uranium, that 
is taking  
natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon. 
 
CORBIN:  But Mr Kay's statement glossed over an intense debate in Washington.  Energy 
Department  
officials, the foremost experts, said the tubes were not suitable for centrifuges.  And many in 
the State  
Department believed Iraq's nuclear programme was dormant. 
 
GREG THIELMANN 
State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002 
This is something that became controversial within the US government.  We certainly 
thought it was  
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plausible that the Iraqis might be doing this.  But over time the State Department Intelligence 
Bureau was  
convinced by some of the best experts in the US government and elsewhere on centrifuges 
that this  
particular type of aluminum was not suitable for use in a nuclear weapons programme.   
 
12th September 2002 
 
CORBIN:  But in a keynote speech at the UN before the war President Bush used the tubes as 
proof Iraq  
was reactivating its nuclear weapons programme.   
 
BUSH:  Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used to enrich 
uranium for a  
nuclear weapon.  Should Iraq acquire fissile material it would be able to build a nuclear 
weapon within a  
year. 
 
THIELMANN:  The President in his speech to the United Nations in September of 2002 just 
made a flat  
assertion, this aluminum was for a nuclear weapons programme.  No acknowledgment 
whatsoever that  
there was any controversy.   
 
CORBIN:  Why was that?  What was he trying to do, do you think? 
 
THIELMANN:  Well, he was trying to build a case that Iraq posed an imminent danger, and 
there's no  
better way to scare the American people than to conjure up a mushroom cloud. 
 
CORBIN:  The Iraq Survey Group's first missions went out looking for evidence of nuclear 
weapons  
facilities, but after several months the ISG concluded and then stated publicly that there was 
no evidence  
that Iraq had an active nuclear programme just before the war.  It was no comfort to the US 
administration. 
 
THIELMANN:  I mean this was basically David Kay as the President's hand chosen leader of 
the Iraq's  
survey group acknowledging that the President was dead wrong in his information to the 
world on the most  
important category of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Iraq Survey Group 
To date we have found only small indications of interest in centrifusion, not even anything I 
would call a  
restart of the centrifusion programme. 
 




KAY:  I wouldn't say it was dormant.  There are signs of new interest in it but it was certainly 
not a  
vigorous ongoing programme.   
 
CORBIN:  Though Saddam was still interested in nuclear weapons, the UN had dismantled 
his nuclear  
infrastructure and placed his raw stocks of uranium under guard in 1991.  Sanctions appear to 
have made it  
impossible for Saddam to reactivate his nuclear programme.  So where did that leave Mr 
Kay's certainty  
about the tubes? 
 
KAY:  Well the problem we have with the tubes is the tubes a year ago.. two years ago when 
we weren't in  
the country we were just looking at the tubes themselves, and the tubes looked like they were 
suitable for  
centrifuge, and in fact I still think, if I were only looking at the tubes, they were suitable for 
the centrifuge.   
Now we've got a great advantage now, we're inside the country, so we don’t have to grasp at 
straws of  
evidence.   
 
CORBIN:  Straws of evidence, Dr Kay's description of some of the intelligence that took us 
to war in Iraq.   
There was other evidence too, it came from defectors who provided a window on the brutal 
regime in a  
country western intelligence found difficult to penetrate.  This man, Ahmad Chalabi, Leader 
of the  
opposition Iraqi National Congress, ran a US funded intelligence and propaganda campaign.  
He brought  
some of the defectors to the world's attention. 
 
Dr AHMAD CHALABI 
Leader, Iraqi National Congress 
We evaluated that these people knew what they were talking about and we handed them over, 
but it's not  
our job to make an intelligence assessment for the government of the United States or for the 
governments  
of Britain.  They have very large agencies to do so. 
 
CORBIN:  Since the war the claims of several defectors promoted by the INC have come 
under further  
scrutiny.  Last September a nuclear physicist who called himself Saddam's bomb-maker 
spoke to Panorama.   
In an interview we decided not to broadcast Kadir Hamza said he had inside information that 
Iraq had  






HAMZA:  Iraq is on a more accelerated pace of trying to achieve nuclear weapons before it is 
stopped by  
inspections or war or otherwise. 
 
CORBIN:  We didn't broadcast our interview with Dr Hamza because several sources 
suggested he wasn't  
credible.  The claims had already made front page news across the world.  The State 
Department had their  
doubts about him, but Dr Hamza appeared before Congress and was sited by the President 
and top US  
officials. 
 
15th January 2003 
DONALD RUMSFELD:  As I've said repeatedly, I honestly believe that the way information 
is gained is  
through defectors. 
 
7th Cavalry October 2002 
BUSH:  Information from a high ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed 
that despite his  
public promises Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear programme to continue. 
 
GREG THIELMANN 
State Department Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002 
It looks now like it did then to some of us that one has to be very careful with human 
intelligence.   
Particularly intelligence from the Iraqi National Congress and others who had an obvious 
motivation to  
alarm foreign governments about what Saddam Hussein was doing.  And saw a whole 
collection of people  
in the US government who were making very strong arguments in advance that Iraq was 
pursuing all of  
these weapons. 
 
CORBIN:  The man who helped bring some of the defectors to the west's attention is now 
back in Baghdad,  
with Saddam's removal Dr Chalabi is now enjoying a taste of power as a leading member of 
the Iraqi  
interim governing council. 
 
Does it matter at the end of the day if the defector's claims weren't found to be true and the 
war happened,  
you got what you wanted at the end of the day? 
 
Dr AHMAD CHALABI 
Leader, Iraqi National Congress 
Indeed we are proud that we got what we wanted.  We are back in Baghdad, we are back in 
Iraq and Iraq is  
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now… the Iraqi people are much better off than they were under Saddam, and they will be 
much better off  
in the future. 
 
CORBIN:  By August the heat was on the Iraq's Survey Group at Camp Slayer.  It was now 
three months  
since the end of the war and no weapons of mass destruction had been found.  Missions got 
underway to  
follow up information found in the documents.  People had been traced and some Iraqis had 
come forward  
to offer tips on where the weapons might be found.  Twelve ISG teams spread out to begin 
searching 120  
huge ammunition dumps.  They were looking for hidden stockpiles of chemical weapons 
which the  
politicians and intelligence agencies said existed before the war, along with plans for their 
deployment. 
 
5th February 2003 
COLIN POWELL:  A conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 
and 500 tons  
of chemical weapons agents.  That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. 
 
24th September 2002 
BLAIR:  The dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agent for chemical 
weapons, has rebuilt  





Dr HANS BLIX 
UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003 
I had several conversations with Tony Blair and my definite impression was that he was 
convinced..  
subjectively convinced that they had weapons of mass destruction.  He was not fooling me at 
all.  But the  
analysis of it, the examination of it, that had been made by his staff, or himself, he had had 
time, was not  
sufficiently critical. 
 
CORBIN:  Not sufficiently critical? 
 
BLIX:  No. 
 
CORBIN:  Again and again ISG teams returned to Camp Slayer without finding any weapons 
of mass  
destruction.  It was an exhausting, frustrating task.  Brigadier John Deverall, the British 
Deputy Commander  




Brigadier JOHN DEVERALL 
Iraq Survey Group 
We went through a total of some two and a half thousand tons of conventional ammunition in 
order to try to  
find the jokers in the pack. 
 
CORBIN:  Several Iraqis had claimed that chemical weapons were hidden at the base 
amongst a batch of  
conventional munitions.  
 
DEVERALL:  Based on a apparently good information, based on an awful lot of physical 
searching, based  
on over 100 people from across the board in terms of speciality, and teams working in 
tandem, we found  
nothing. 
 
CORBIN:  But doesn't it show, surely, that the intelligence was wrong, it was wrong before 
the war and the  
intelligence you've been given subsequently is wrong as well. 
 
DEVERALL:  For all we could assess the intelligence might well have been correct.  The 
point was, when  
we came to do the uncovering there was nothing left to uncover that we could find. 
 
CORBIN:  So, where is it? 
 
DEVERALL:  It is indeed conceivable the intelligence was wrong, but bearing in mind it was 
multi-sourced  
I think conceivable they were removed, conceivable they were hidden elsewhere and or 
destroyed.  But so  
far impossible to tell with that particular batch.   
 
CORBIN:  It was a familiar story to Hans Blix now home in Sweden writing a book.  By now 
the ISG had  
had the same time on the ground in post-Saddam Iraq as the UN had been given before the 
war and had  
found no weapons.  But Dr Blix himself had been suspicious.  He had not received 
satisfactory proof from  
the Iraqis that they had destroyed their WMD a decade earlier as they claimed.  
 
You helped to create this impression they were there. 
 
BLIX:  In a way we did, because we certainly didn't exclude that they had them.  But it's true 
that we did say  
that this is unaccounted for, and I also warned the Security Council that you cannot jump 
from that to  
saying that they have it. 
 




happened to them.  But it's not just about the shiny weapons themselves. 
 
CORBIN:  Well as far as the public is concerned, it is about the shiny weapons because that's 
what led us to  
war, that was the imminent threat. 
 
DEVERALL:  But you have to look at things in a more detailed way and certainly the ISG 
has worked for  
three months involving interviewing over 500 Iraqis who have been possibly complicit in 
these  
programmes, indicate that you're looking at a much deeper area here. 
 
CORBIN:  Unless the ISG find proof WMD existed before the war, Mr Blair's claim that 
some weapons  
could be deployed within 45 minutes can't be substantiated.  So could it be that Iraqi officials 
were telling  
the truth when they claimed they'd long since destroyed all the weapons.  In January I went to 
lunch in  
Baghdad with the man responsible for satisfying the UN that Iraq no longer had WMD.  A 
key figure in the  
weapons programmes in the past, Dr Amer Al Sa'adi insisted they'd destroyed all the 
stockpiles in 1991, but  
there were no records or independent witnesses. 
 
The West still doesn't seem to believe Iraq, there's still this feeling you're hiding something, 
that you're not  
really laying out your cards on the table. 
 
General AMER AL SA'ADI 
Adviser to Saddam Hussein 
Well how else can they justify their military build up?  They must portray things as not being 
satisfactory,  
that Iraq is holding back, Iraq is hiding things.  How else can they justify their actions to their 
public?  If we  
have something, we will produce it.  We will be happy to produce it, to get rid of it and get 
done.  But we  
don’t… we don’t.  What do we do? 
 
CORBIN:  When I returned to Baghdad in the summer, the restaurant had escaped the bombs 
and the  
looting, but my host was no longer available for lunch.  He'd discovered he was one of the 
infamous deck of  
cards the US wanted list, and so Dr Al Sa'adi chose to give himself up.  The city was still 
violent and  
lawless and the doctor's family had been holed up for weeks at home in a suburb of Baghdad.   
 





CORBIN:  Helma, Dr Sa'adi's German wife had heard nothing from him for months, since he 
disappeared  




He was so convinced about what he had always said, and up to the… half an hour before he 
left, and he  
went to the Americans, he said that I know there is nothing to be found and I've always said 
that and I'm  
repeating it again and time will bear me out.  These were his sort of last words, I remember 
very well. 
 
CORBIN:  Dr Al Sa'adi is being held at Camp Slayer in a special prison.  He is one of the 
high value  
detainees as the ISG calls them.  Top officials and scientists from Saddam Hussein's regime.   
 
What about Dr Amoral Sa'adi, you're now holding him.  Is he saying anything and what do 
you really think  
about his role? 
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Iraq Survey Group 
Well we are talking to him and he is talking.  Do I think it's the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth?  No  
indeed I do not.  I think Dr Sa'adi continues to vital pieces of information, but we're actively 
talking to him.   
In fact I think Dr Sa'adi was extremely important over the years.   
 
CORBIN:  But by September the interrogations of Dr Saadi and other high ranking Iraqis 
haven't led to the  
discovery of any weapons.  The ISG team, now 1400 strong, was about to deliver its first 
report.  Criticism  
of both the British Prime Minister and the President was growing, and so was the pressure on 
David Kay. 
 
KAY:  I just want to produce the facts and others have to draw the answers of what were the 
differences and  
what are the implications of any differences that exist. 
 
CORBIN:  You've found no weapons at all so far, actual weapons. 
 
KAY:  We have found no actual weapons of mass destruction that exist at this point.  But, 
having said that,  
and I know that sounds like a pretty struggling statement, you know how large this country is.  
The situation  
that we found ourselves in for example, we didn't start until June, there had been widespread 
looting in  






State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002 
I think he's in a very delicate position.  He's obviously struggling with a desire to maintain his 
own personal  
integrity and also probably a political understanding that he is failing in his mission as 
assigned by the  
White House to get this troublesome issue behind him. 
 
CORBIN:  In October I went with David Kay as he investigated suspicions Iraq had a 
biological weapons  
programme.  Before the war the politicians insisted on the basis of intelligence that Iraq was 
producing such  
weapons. 
 
24th September 2002 
BLAIR: … that they have now got such facilities.  The biological agents we believe Iraq can 
produce  
include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin; all eventually result in excruciatingly 
painful death. 
 
5th February 2003 
POWELL:  There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the 
capability to  
rapidly produce more, many more, and he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and 
diseases in  
ways that can cause massive death and destruction.   
 
KILLIP:  We've been through this headquarters building here, it's taken us quite a long time 
through all the  
documents. 
 
KAY:  Any documents? 
 
KILLIP:  Lots of documents. 
 
CORBIN:  The ISG was looking at evidence Iraq had misled the UN at this agricultural 
research centre  
south of Baghdad.   
 
KILLIP:  Okay, what you've got down this side is a whole series of laboratories and I think…  
 
CORBIN:  A former UN inspector with long experience of Iraq's WMD, Hamish Killip had 
been  
conducting an inventory to see what was here and determine if anything had been removed. 
 
HAMISH KILLIP:  There's a bit of looting here.  Clearly things that had been ripped out 
from the wall like  
that, that looks like looting.  On the other hand, there are buildings that we do find here where 
you come  
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into a place like this and it is suspiciously clean, there is absolutely nothing left, and you 
know that was  
done some time ago. 
 
CORBIN:  In the past Iraqi scientists lied, denying they'd developed a military bio weapons 
programme they  
hid it behind civilian facilities.  Under a crucial UN resolution 1441 Iraq was given one last 
chance to  
declare equipment which could be used in forbidden programmes.  Here the ISG say they've 
found evidence  
of Iraq's deception. 
 
KAY:  It is interesting that this fomenter was not declared.  I mean that in and of itself is a 
violation of  
1441.  That fomenter was subject to declaration.  
 
CORBIN:  And it ends up in a biological laboratory context. 
 
HAMISH KILLIP 
Iraq Survey Group 
It ends up in a highly secure, highly competent centre of excellence of Iraqi science which is, 
as you saw,  
you came in, extremely well protected, one of their secret enclaves in the country.  Yes, I 
mean the context  
of this is very strange. 
 
CORBIN:  The ISG now says the fomenter was suitable for culturing bio warfare germs, but 
testing hasn't  
shown that it was used for this purpose.  So far the strongest indication that Iraq may have 
continued a  
clandestine programme is the ISG's discovery of 97 samples reference strains.  A scientist 
had kept them  
hidden in his fridge at home for the past ten years.  One of the test tubes or vials contained an 
organism  
called botulinum.   
 
What about the vial of botulinum that was found?  I mean how dangerous is it?  I mean could 
it have been  
used for biological weapons? 
 
KILLIP:  No, that was for diagnostic purposes.  It was not one of the strains that Iraq 
weaponised.  
 
CORBIN:  But the suggestion is that it could have been used. 
 
KILLIP:  It's something that Iraq should have declared to us.  It's like other bits of equipment 
you've seen  
here today.  Iraq had an obligation to tell us about these things and it did not do so, and that in 





CORBIN:  But not a substance that could have been weaponised. 
 
KILLIP:  Not as a vial, no. 
 
CORBIN:  This Iraqi ministry was responsible for declaring to the UN any items remaining 
from Iraq's past  
weapons programme.  I'd been here before the war, when UN inspectors were searching the 
country.   
 
This place has been pretty much cleared out, hasn't it?  There's nothing left. 
 
In January in the Ministry I'd been allowed to meet a Ba'ath Party official and senior scientist 
whom, it now  
turned out, had given the botulinum to her colleague to hide.  Dr Rihab Taha, the woman UN 
inspectors  
called Dr Germ, had trained in Britain and had used her skills in Iraq's past bio weapons 
programme.  She  






Dr RIHAB TAHA 
I think it is our right to have a capability and be able to defend ourselves.  And to have 
something as a  
deterrent. 
 
CORBIN:  So even though you were producing toxins and bacteria that could kill hundreds 
of thousands of  
people.   
 
TAHA:  Well we never have this intention to use it. 
 
CORBIN:  But the ISG say they've been told by Dr Taha's colleague that as well as 
botulinum she wanted  
him to hide other samples including anthrax, an agent Iraq had weaponised.   
 
Dr DAVID KAY 
Iraq Survey Group 
This side has turned back after two days the larger box of samples, he says, to Dr Taha and 
said he was  
keeping it in his refrigerator.  "It's too dangerous, I have a small child in the house, take it 
back"  We've not  
been able to find that group of samples and we need to. 
 
CORBIN:  And what does she say? What does Rihab Taha say about this? 
 




CORBIN:  She denies it? 
 
KAY:  No, she just doesn't talk about it.  She just wont respond to questions on this issue. 
 
CORBIN:  Another Iraqi scientist has told us Dr Taha gave samples of a third bio warfare 
agent, aflatoxin,  
to a colleague to keep at home, but there's still no proof Iraq had restarted a bio-weapons 
programme, and  
the language is changing again.  The ISG isn't talking so much about programmes but Iraq's 
violation of the  
UN resolution. 
 
But those who would say that this war was fought on faulty intelligence, would point to the 
fact that you  
found a few old vials of material.  This doesn't constitute a biological programme or even 
really proof of an  
intention to start one. 
 
KAY:  We haven't said that it constitutes a biological programme or the intention.  What we 
have said, and  
I think it's undeniable, is that this was a clear violation of UN resolution 1441,  the Iraqis 
under the  
resolution were required to give up all of this material, to declare it to the UN, for over ten 
years they failed  
to declare it and failed to return it.  That's all we've said about this. 
 
CORBIN:  It was another defector Sayeed Adnan Al-Haideri, sponsored by the Iraqi National 
Congress who  
helped create the impression that Iraq was hiding a biological weapons programme.  He 
claimed he had  
fitted out specialised secret laboratories.  The INC arranged an interview with Mr Haideri 
before handing  
him over to American intelligence.  Last year we did broadcast some of this defector's 
testimony because  





ADNAN SAEED AL-HAIDERI 
This place is not normal place, not for normal chemicals.  The exhausting is not normal.  
There is HNO3  
here. 
 
CORBIN:  The ISG has searched but they have found none of the laboratory facilities 
described by Mr  





State Dept Intelligence Bureau 1998-2002 
There was obviously a faction in the US government and in the US intelligence community 
that never met a  
report that it considered unreliable.  It already knew what the answer was, it was faith-based 
intelligence. 
 
KAY:  I don’t think any of us would be surprised if it turns out in the end that there were a 
number of  
defectors who told less than the full truth.  Some put out disinformation at the direction of the 
Iraqi  
government, others just exaggerated their own roles or completely fabricated what they knew.  
This has  
always been the case with defectors. 
 
CORBIN:  The ISG produced their first interim report in October.  They had failed to find 
chemical or  
biological weapons or an active nuclear programme.  But they did have something to reveal.  
The ISG had  
been collecting up Iraq's battlefield rockets, weapons with a range of up to 150 kilometres 
which were  
allowed under UN resolutions.  But Iraq had been secretly developing several long-range 
missiles and  
seeking forbidden technically from North Korea.  There was no sign of Iraq's old scuds but 
the ISG  
discovered evidence that engineers had continued to produce fuel for the rockets. 
 
KAY:  Missiles are very significant to us because they're the long pole in the tent, they're the 
thing that  
takes the longest to produce.  We do not get a 1000 kilometre range missile in a matter of 
weeks or even  
months.  The Iraqis had started in late '99-2000 to produce a family of missiles that would 
have gotten to  
1000 kilometres. 
 
CORBIN:  Valuable information was coming from an Iraqi engineer prepared to risk his life 
to expose  
Iraq's illicit missile programmes.  I set off to meet him in a safe house in Baghdad.  He didn't 
want to be  
identified.  The engineer explained his team had been given orders in April 2001 to begin 
secretly to design  
a long-range missile. 
 
So how far was this missile designed to go? 
 
ENGINEER:  500 kilometres. 
 
CORBIN:  500 kilometres, that's beyond the permitted range. 
 




CORBIN:  The design involved adding an extra engine to a short-range rocket.  The Iraqis 
reckoned they'd  
be able to hide things more successfully inside an existing programme that was allowed.  
Then the team  
were told to double the missile's range. 
 
ENGINEER:  This rocket from 1000 kilometres. 
 
CORBIN:  So this was even further, 1000 kilometres. 
 
ENGINEER:  A 1000 kilometres yes. 
 
CORBIN:  And how many engines? 
 
ENGINEER:  Five engines. 
 
CORBIN:  Why did you work on this forbidden programme? 
 
ENGINEER:  Our regime here was harsh.  We could not refuse to work.  When the state 
ordered us to make  
a missile with a range of 500 kilometres, we couldn't say we would not work on it because we 
would have  
been killed or imprisoned. 
 
CORBIN:  The missile was never built.  The designs we've seen show only a conventional 
warhead.  But  
when the UN visited last year everything was hidden. 
 
ENGINEER:  We were told that we must hand documents and designs for long-range 
missiles to the project  
director, that is the Director General.  We would hand them over to him and he would hide 
them.  When the  
UN left, these documents would be returned to us and we would start work again. 
 
CORBIN:  I wanted to talk to another missile scientist to find further evidence for the 
engineer's story.  It  
meant travelling to another part of town.  Baghdad is a dangerous place for westerners and 
Iraqis alike. 
 
I've just come back from talking to a second Iraqi scientist.  He's a more senior individual and 
he confirms  
he was involved too in this illicit missile programme.  He wont let me film him, however, he 
wont even let  
me say who he is.  He's absolutely terrified.  He's scared of retribution, he says, from 
members of Saddam's  
old regime. 
 
Iraqi scientists have learnt the risks of talking.  One man who had cooperated with the ISG 
has already paid  




KAY:  One was killed right after being talked to by us.  Someone came up to him in front of 
his house, put  
a gun to the back of his head and blew his brains out.  Another source, very important source 
to us on the  
biological programme took six bullets into his body and it's only by the grace of god that he's 
still alive.   
Others report routinely that they're under threat and we're trying to deal with that. 
 
CORBIN:  So what's the answer, I mean this reign of fear, it's likely to continue, will you 
ever really get to  
the bottom of this? 
 
KAY:  Well we all have hopes that, when Saddam is captured, the pressure will go off 
somewhat, but we'll  
get to the bottom. 
 
CORBIN:  So what was Saddam really up to?  Did he have WMD, and if not, why did he 
give the  
impression he hadn't come clean with the UN inspectors.  It had all been so different before 
9/11.  Then the  
American assessment of the threat his regime posed was in stark contrast to the rhetoric in the 
run up to the  
war. 
 
24th February 2001 
POWELL:  He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass 
destruction, he  
is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours. 
 
CORBIN:  Historically Iran has always been Iraq's great enemy.  A monument 
commemorates the million  
lives lost in their most recent war.  That's the most likely reason why Saddam wanted 
missiles, not to hit the  
West. 
 
Iraqi Missile Engineer 
The minister said that Iran had fired a 750 kilometre range missile.  So, within 6 months, we 
had to design  
one that went 500 kilometres.  The government wasn't on the best of terms Iran, and a missile 
like that  
could reach Israel. 
 
CORBIN:  Coalition troops expected to be the target of chemical weapons as they crossed 
what they called  
the red line, the approach to Baghdad.  But they found just abandoned tanks.  We've spoken 
to an officer  
from the elite Special Republican Guard who was there.  He believes Saddam's way of 
countering all his  




Special Republican Guard Officer 
He used chemical weapons at Halabja, everybody was afraid of him using them, even during 
the war with  
Iran.  People in Kuwait were afraid of chemical weapons, Israel was afraid of them.  So 
everybody was  
afraid that Iraq would use chemical weapons against them, so they avoided him. 
 
CORBIN:  The officer says he ran his unit's weapons inventory.  Western intelligence 
believed the Special  
Republican Guard had responsibility for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. 
 
SRG OFFICER:  After the sanctions, that is to say from 1991 onwards, there were no stocks 
of chemical  
weapons, neither with the Special Republican Guard nor other units, there were none 
available at all, it was  
no more than talk, a lot of hot air. 
 
 
BLIX:  I have some theories, it's like putting up the sign on the door "beware of the dog" and 
you don’t  
have a dog. 
 
CORBIN:  If it was a bluff by Saddam, it was also a massive miscalculation.  He lost his 
army, his family  
and his country. 
 
HELMA:  [reading from letter]  "There seem to be plans underway to supply us with winter 
clothes and  
covers which I find ominous."  
 
CORBIN:  Mrs Al Sa'adi's letters from her husband, the Iraqi official in prison show he 
doesn't expect to be  
released soon.  He still maintains the weapons were long since destroyed.  His wife believes 
he was trapped  
between trying to satisfy the UN and serving a dictator who had his own agenda. 
 
Why didn't Saddam Hussein come clean?  What happened?  There is a big mystery here, 
what's the answer? 
 
HELMA AL-SA'ADI 
My husband was fighting on two fronts.  He was trying to convince the UN and also he was 
trying to  
convince the government, the regime, to cooperate with him.  But somehow they always kept 
decisions or  
admissions right to the last moment.  Maybe the President was bluffing, thinking they will be 
afraid. 
 
CORBIN:  The ISG have now undertaken 355 missions.  They say they need more time, time 
the UN  
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inspectors never had.  But some suggest it may be safer for politicians not to let the ISG reach 
a final  
verdict. 
 
Dr HANS BLIX 
UN Weapons Inspector 2000-2003 
They would rather end the whole thing by controversy than by an admission that it was 
wrong. 
 
CORBIN:  So in other words they want to leave it hanging. 
 
BLIX:  Yes, I think so. 
 
CORBIN:  So no one can say well there definitely weren't weapons. 
 
BLIX:  I think so.  Controversy will be preferable to a judgement.  Politicians will prefer to 
retreat under a  
cloud of dust or… or mist.  But we ordinary people I think would like to have some real 
clarity. 
 
CORBIN:  David Kay is still searching for the weapons he was sure existed before the war.  
His next report  
is due in January as an election year begins in Washington, and as Lord Hutton produces his 
verdict, one  
that is likely to throw the spotlight on Mr Blair and British intelligence assessments before 
the war.  It's too  
soon to conclude there were no weapons or programmes but should Mr Kay be downgrading 
expectations? 
 
Do you ever think that you may have got it completely wrong?  There may be nothing to this 
at the end of  
the day, nothing really substantial, nothing current and really threatening? 
 
KAY:  I think we have a process that if we get to the end of the day and we find nothing, we 
will all be able  
to say this is the evidence that led… leads us to the conclusion that there was nothing there or 
there was  
something there. 
 
CORBIN:  And you're prepared to be proved wrong, that there was nothing at the end of the 
day? 
 
KAY:  Absolutely.  If that turns out to be the truth, you know.. so be it. 
 
CORBIN:  Iraq's people are reclaiming the places out of bounds for so long.  Even Saddam's 
weapons  
factories and research establishments now destroyed by war.  The Iraq Survey Group is still 
searching but it  


















SADDAM ON THE RUN 
PANORAMA  
 
SADDAM ON THE RUN 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1  DATE: 28:03:04 
........................................................................ 
 
JANE CORBIN:  A winter's evening in a quiet village near Tikrit.  US forces advance under 
cover of  
darkness.  Their goal – the man they call the "Ace of Spades".  They've been hunting him for 
eight long  
months now.  Finally they've run him to earth in a miserable hole beneath the ground.  
Tonight on  
Panorama we tell the story of how Saddam Hussein and his family evaded the Coalition's 
greatest manhunt.   
It's a tale of brutality and revenge.  We tell of the treachery that led his sons to die in a hail of 
rockets, and  
we reveal who ultimately betrayed the dictator himself.  Last month in A'Zamiya in 
Baghdad's old quarter  
they celebrated the Muslim festival of sacrifice.  The children here still sing Saddam's 
praises.  To this day  
much of A'Zamiya supports Iraq's former president, though he's in jail.  The scars of the war 
are still fresh  
in people's hearts and on the walls of the mosque which bore the brunt of an American attack 
here during  




Imam, Al-A'Zamiya mosque 
Four or five metres away from where I stood Saddam was in a car surrounded by lots of 
people, and there  
were his bodyguards armed with RPGs and automatic rifles.   
 
Baghdad 
April 9th 2003 
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[footage of Saddam Hussein waving to cheering crowd] 
 
He was standing up, Qusay was at the car with him.  The A'Zamiya were cheering them and 
applauding, he  
was greeting them as well. 
 
CORBIN:  These pictures of Saddam's last stand on the streets of Baghdad were taken on 
April 9th last year  
as Saddam worked the crowd, surrounded by his faithful bodyguards and loyal supporters.  
But at this very  
moment US forces were seizing control of the city centre only a couple of miles away.  Very 
different  
images were recorded here which came to symbolise the toppling of Saddam's regime.  This 
crowd saw him  
only as a hated figure who'd held Iraq in the grip of fear for almost 30 years.  Saddam would 
cling on in the  
capital for one more day, but the Americans had already picked up a rumour he was in 
A'Zamiya.  This  
assault team of 300 US marines were sent to capture or kill the former Iraq President. 
 
April 10th 2003 
 
At dawn the next morning they launched an assault against Saddam loyalists now holed up in 
the mosque at  
A'Zamiya.  The battle was intense.  The marines were convinced they had Saddam cornered.  
Many Iraqis  
and one US soldier were to die.   
 
ABU MOUSSA 
Imam, Al-A'zamiya mosque 
I opened the door of the mosque to look out and saw lots of martyrs on  the ground.  On that 
day we buried  
33 martyrs, I counted them one by one.  I would prey over them while the others would dig 
and bury. 
 
CORBIN:  As the Americans closed in on him Saddam realised Baghdad was lost.  He 
ordered his family  
be evacuated from the city.   
 
RAGHAD HUSSEIN 
Daughter of Saddam Hussein 
After about midday my dad sent his cars from the private protection who told us to get in.  
We had almost  
lost contact with my father and brothers because things had got out of hand.  I saw with my 
own eyes the  
army withdrawing and the terrified faces of the Iraqi soldiers who unfortunately were running 
away and  
looking around them.  Missiles were falling on my left and right.  They fell not further than 
50 to 100  




CORBIN:  With US forces moving in from all sides Saddam dismissed most of his aids.  One 
of his  
bodyguards who was there described the scene to us. 
 
'ABU DHARI' 
Saddam Hussein's personal bodyguard 
Words spoken by actor 
The last time I saw him he said:  "My son, each of you go to your homes."  We said:  "Sir, we 
want to stay  
with you.  Why should we go?"   But he insisted.  Even his son, Qusay, was crying a little.  
He was trying  
not to show his feelings.  He was stressed but he didn't want to destroy the moral of the 
people who were  
watching him, but inside, he was definitely broken. 
 
CORBIN:  Then, with only two bodyguards to accompany him, Saddam drove off in his 
white Oldsmobile  
and vanished.  The rule of Saddam Hussein was over, his family scattered.  Today their 
palace complex on  
the outskirts of Baghdad lies ruined, the target of the coalition's bombs and missiles in the 
first strike of the  
war.  Some of the graffiti reads:  "From a palace to a hole".  Iraqis once feared and were 
fascinated by the  
nation's first family.  They were celebrities, some bloodstained, others tragic.  This is Saddam 
with his first  
and only official wife, Sajida, the matriarch of the family.  Uday and Qusay were their sons, 
the heirs whom  
Saddam promoted to high positions.  But their cruelty and greed earned them hatred amongst 
ordinary  
Iraqis.  Hala was Saddam's youngest daughter, his two eldest girls, Rana and Raghad.  
Saddam wasn't there  
when his family's compound was struck by coalition missiles.  One valuable target that was 
hit by the  
Americans that night – a shed in the palace grounds.  They didn't know its contents or that 
they were  
intended to support Saddam on the run.  Eight year old Ali took me to see a secret he'd 
discovered.  Ali had  
been finding burnt out cases in the rubble. 
 
[to Ali]  So this is where you found the dollars? 
 
Two days before the war Saddam had ordered a heist of a billion dollars from the central 
bank.  We believe  
this was some of that money. 
 
ALI ADNAN SAAD 
Son of site guard 
This is Saddam, and I came here and I found it.  They're burnt.  I found them in the truck and 





CORBIN:  The loot was hidden inside a rubbish truck, part of a hoard earmarked to buy 
loyalty and  
weapons if Saddam lost the fight to stay in power.  During the war Saddam had evaded the 
coalition's  
assassination attempts by moving between a succession of safe houses.  This was just one of 
the villas he  
used.  The extra generator and multiple phone lines which suddenly appeared were a 
giveaway to the  
neighbours.  Saddam met his war cabinet here when it still seemed possible to him that he 
could hang on to  
power.  But within days he had to flee.  When he left Baghdad on April 10th Saddam and his 
handpicked  
bodyguards made for a bunker in Dialah on the northern outskirts of the city. 
 
Dr AYAD ALLAWI 
Security Committee 
Iraqi Governing Council 
He stayed there in that bunker until some of the couriers were exposed going in and outside 
the area. 
 
CORBIN:  And who were his couriers? 
 
ALLAWI:  His step-nephew was a courier between his wife and him… himself, Saddam, at 
that stage. 
 
CORBIN:  He would carry letters or messages? 
 
ALLAWI:  Messages, yes, and they had, by then, distributed also satellite telephones.  They 
were using  
them heavily the first part of Saddam's disappearance.  
 
CORBIN:  Wasn't it risky to use satellite phones and perhaps lead Americans…  
 
ALLAWI:  It was risky.  It was very risky.  It became very risky in fact. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam was forced to leave the bunker after 3 weeks and give up using phones.  
He began  
moving every few hours.  But he needed to show Iraqis he was still alive and rally them to the 
Ba'athist  
resistance which was beginning to grow.  Sa'ad Al-Silawi broadcasts for Al-Arabiya were 
being closely  
watched by Saddam in hiding.  In the early summer the reporter got a message to be in a 




TELEVISION Reporter, Al-Arabiya 
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It said:  "Saad go under the tree, okay and under the tree you will find an envelope.  There is 
something  
important in this envelope." 
 
CORBIN:  Very mysterious. 
 
AL-ARABIYA:  Very.  And I went to the assigned place, you know..  
 
CORBIN:  Can you play me one. 
 
AL-ARABIYA:  And I put it in very cautious, you know.. and suddenly I discovered….  
 
[plays tape]   
 
CORBIN:  It's the voice of Saddam Hussein. 
 
AL-ARABIYA:  It is Saddam Hussein, you know. 
 
CORBIN:  Did you know immediately?  Did you recognise him? 
 
AL-ARABIYA:  I know, because we used to listen to him, we know his voice and even his 
way of  
speaking. 
 
CORBIN:  When you heard that first tape, what was Saddam Hussein saying on the tape, 
what was his  
message? 
 
AL-ARABIYA:  His message, you know.. is convince the people to defend Iraq, saying a 
political things  
about the lines of Bush administration, Bush himself and Blair.   
 
CORBIN:  The lie being exposed by now was Saddam, his denial of his regimes crimes 
against humanity.   
Mass graves are being uncovered all over Iraq, evidence of the slaughter of hundreds of 
thousands of  
ordinary Iraqis on the orders of Saddam and his henchman.  In May investigators began 
identifying the  
victims and preparing evidence.  But there was still no former president to put on trial.   
Hunted by the  
coalition  last Spring Saddam headed for his hometown of Tikrit in the so-called Sunni 
triangle in central  
Iraq.  We travelled the same route to find those who'd helped Saddam in this Ba'athist 
heartland and those  
who'd tracked him.    
 
The US 4th Infantry Division first raised the American flag over Saddam's favourite palace in 
Tikrit last  




beginning to organise and challenge the coalition.  The division's commanding general soon 
became aware  
the most wanted man in Iraq was still alive and on his patch. 
 
Maj. General RAY ODIERNO 
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division 
We were very aware of the fact that this was a place with a lot of close ties to Saddam 
Hussein, both tribal  
and family, so we were very much aware of that.  So when we first came in here, we did 
understand that  
this was probably the heart of his support.  We continued to get intelligence that told us, from 
the ground,  
human intelligence, that said no he's alive and he's operating. 
 
CORBIN:  The division's intelligence unit under Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell set out to 
pin down  
Saddam's whereabouts to find his sons and key officials.  Within a month they'd scored their 
first success.   
In June an informer led US soldiers to a local farm and told them to start digging. 
 
Lt. Colonel STEVE RUSSELL 
1-22 Battalion, 4th Infantry Division 
On this particular farm they found eight and a half million US dollars, over eight hundred 
thousand in  
foreign currency.  We found an additional estimated two million dollars of jewellery that 
belonged to Sajida  
Hussein, Saddam's wife, right there on the farm. 
 
CORBIN:  Just in one place. 
 
RUSSELL:  Just in one place.  It was buried in vault type containers that you would see in a 
treasury or in a  
bank. 
 
CORBIN:  Did it seem to you that a lot of thought had gone into this, that there were caches 
of money and  
gold and jewels ready to fund a resistance. 
 
RUSSELL:  Other units had captured these type of containers and they matched the same 
general  
description and type.  It became apparent to us that there was a lot of money that was out 
there.   
 
CORBIN:  To counter the huge sums Saddam had squirreled away to buy loyalty and guns, 
the Americans  
came up with their own big incentive.   
 
July 3rd 2003 
Ambassador PAUL BREMER 
Head of Coalition Provisions Authority 
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I am today announcing a twenty-five million dollar reward for information leading to the 
capture of Saddam  
Hussein, and a fifteen million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of either of 
his sons. 
 
CORBIN:  At first the Americans thought the key to catching Saddam lay in seizing the top 
men on the US  
wanted list, the deck of cards.  In June they captured the former president's personal 
secretary, number 4  
after Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay.  Then the Americans just missed catching the 
sons in Tikrit. 
 
RUSSELL:  We knew that they were on the move.  They had been in our suburb north of 
Tikrit.  We didn't  
know where they went.  We got intelligence that they had left after a series of raids.  It turns 
out they were  
in Mosul.  
 
CORBIN:  Mosul lies just over 200 miles north of Baghdad, near the border with Syria.  The 
city is an  
ethnic mix of Kurds and Arabs.  Under Saddam, most of them had become the Ba'athist 
stronghold in the  
north.  A number of key regime figures had already been captured here.  The city was 
controlled by another  
US division, the 101st Airborne.  The daily military intelligence briefing of the 101st.  Last 
summer the  
Commander heard reports from time to time that both Saddam and his two sons might be in 
his area.   
 
Maj. General DAVID PETRAEUS 
Commander, 101st Airborne 
We chased various rumours in Mosul and throughout Nineveh province on a variety of 
occasions reports of  
sightings of Saddam or Uday and Qusay and we were working very, very hard to try to 
develop the  




CORBIN:  On family home movies Uday and Qusay lived up to their image in Iraq - gangster 
sons of a  
mafia don, hated and feared.  Qusay was known as the thug.  He headed Saddam's security 
apparatus.   
Uday, dubbed 'the psychopath' was a serial rapist who had tortured and killed.  They were 
vicious and  
corrupt and Iraqis still live in fear of their return to power. 
 
How important was it for what you were trying to do out there with hearts and minds that you 
find the  




PETRAEUS:  It was very important, both substantively if you will and very, very important  
psychologically.  On the substantive side, people like Uday and Qusay had enormous 
amounts of money. 
 
CORBIN:  And what were they doing with the money? 
 
PETRAEUS:  They were hiring others to take shots at our soldiers, to take shots at those who 
were trying to  
play a role in the new Iraq. 
 
CORBIN:  Resistance attacks in the Mosul area increased last summer, but there was no firm 
evidence that  
Uday and Qusay were in the city.  Then one day in late July came the lucky break.  Someone 
walked  
through the door offering the Americans valuable information on Saddam's son. 
 
PETRAEUS:  Each day people would come to the wire, if you will, of various compounds 
and offer to tell  
us where Saddam was if we'd just give them that 30 million dollars right there, right then.  So 
this was  
another source offering to tell us where high value targets were, and at this point frankly we'd 
developed a  
bit of scepticism about quite a bit of this.  But the credit for the initial bit of this goes to a 
great army  
sergeant who saw something believable about this source. 
 
CORBIN:  The source made a startling admission.  Saddam's sons were staying with him in 
an affluent area  
of the city.   
 
JANE CORBIN 
That red sign on the wall reads:  "Land for Sale".   It was once the place where a palatial 
house stood, but  
now it's completely levelled because that is where Uday and Qusay, the sons of Saddam, 
made their last  
stand. Saddam's sons had been living right under the noses of the Americans.  Their host had 
installed an  
extra generator in his home and had been buying more food than usual.  Qusay's 14 year old 
son, Mustafa,  




This is how unaware we were.  If we knew that Uday and Qusay were here, we'd have 
recognised his son.   
We had never heard that Uday and Qusay had even been to Mosul. 
 
CORBIN:  The owner of the house in which the sons were staying was a distant relative of 
Saddam's.   
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In a ropey family video, Nawaf Zaidan in a tribal headdress played host to a group of 
Saddam's bodyguards  
and some prostitutes in a Mosul hotel.  As always in this clan, relations were complicated.  
Zaidan's brother  
had once been imprisoned by Saddam and a blood feud simmered in the background.  The 
US wont confirm  
it but we know it was Nawaf Zaidan who betrayed Uday and Qusay to the Americans.  What 
was the gist of  
what the source was telling your people? 
 
PETRAEUS:  Well, the source told us where they were, what they were doing, who they had 
with them in  
terms of security and so forth, so it was very, very detailed. 
 
CORBIN:  Why did he tell you?  What was in it for him?  What was motivating him? 
 
PETRAEUS:  Well certainly 30 million dollars helps motivate someone. 
 
CORBIN:  Dawn on July 22nd last year, as Mosul awoke US special forces, units from the 
101st Airborne,  
cordoned off Zaidan's neighbourhood.  
 
July 22nd 2003 
 
SHAFIQ:  It was about 6.30.. 6.45 and we saw lots of American cars.  We thought they must 
have come to  
search for weapons.  They found that the doors were closed and nobody was answering.  
Then there were  
two gunshots from inside.   
 
PETRAEUS:  That was the first time in any of the operations that we'd conducted where once 
we had  
someone surrounded that they actually shot back. 
 
CORBIN:  So you knew it was serious this time, that those people in that house intended to 
fight. 
 
PETRAEUS:  Yes, they had quite an arsenal inside there and it was a pretty robust house. 
 
SHAFIQ:  Then the Americans were shooting at the house and shouting from loudhailers:  
"Give yourselves  
up".  No one responded but carried on firing, so then the battle started in earnest.  
 
PETRAEUS:  We did in fact prep the target if you will, with machine gun fire and with fire 
that we thought  
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probably would not kill them but would intimidate them to the point that they might this time 
surrender,  
and that didn't happen.  We decided that we weren't going to risk anymore American lives 
and we were just  
going to blow 'em up.  It turned out that those killed, Uday, Qusay and their bodyguards in a 
bathroom in  
which they were hiding inside the bedroom on the top floor that was totally barricaded, and 
then the son  
who was a fairly large 15 or 16 year old was killed when the forces entered the house clearing 
it. 
 
CORBIN:  This is the son of Qusay. 
 
PERAEUS:  Yes. 
 
CORBIN:  And was it necessary to kill a 14 year old as well? 
 
PERAEUS:  Again, in that context, it is something I would never question, that these soldiers 
were clearing  
a room where they had been shot at previously, three of their members had been wounded, 
and the  
individual made a threatening move with a weapon, so that's not something I'd ever second-
guess. 
 
CORBIN:  Mustafa, here in black, having a weapons lesson from his father, was clearly no 
stranger to guns.   
He may or may not have actually threatened the Americans, either way, he died.  Qusay's 
death caused little  
grief but the killing of Mustafa sparked anger amongst many Iraqis.  During the two hour 
attack local  
people had gathered to demonstrate against the heavy-handed operation.   Stones were 
thrown.  The  
Americans say shots were fired from the crowd.  The people here deny this. One protestor 
was killed by US  
forces.  People were angry and the Americans needed to get the news out first, this 
controversial operation  
had succeeded in killing Saddam's sons.  So after identifying the bodies the Pentagon decided 
to display the  
disfigured corpses to the media.  There were accusations of barbarism.  But Iraqis now 
accepted Uday and  
Qusay were gone forever.  As for the betrayer, he was last seen in Mosul sitting in a car 
watching the  
American operation.  He and his family then disappeared. 
 
What's happened to the source that led you to Uday and Qusay? 
 
PERAEUS:  I don’t know. He and his family are 30 million dollars richer and enjoying it in 
some  




CORBIN:  So America has looked after them, has it? 
 
PERAEUS:  Someone has.  We put them on a plane and wished them well and that was the 
last we saw or  
heard of them. 
 
CORBIN:  Was it worth it, 30 million dollars to catch these two? 
 
PERAEUS:  Oh absolutely, yeah, yeah.  These two were absolutely barbaric in what they did.  
 
CORBIN:  Saddam's sons were buried in a family graveyard near Tikrit, closely watched by 
the coalition.   
Yes, according to one of Saddam's bodyguards, the former president actually went to the 
grave himself on  
the evening of the funeral.   
 
'ABU DHARI' 
Saddam Hussein's personal bodyguard 
Words spoken by an actor 
After the funeral people saw Saddam Hussein visiting the graves with a group of his 
protectors.  No one  
recognised them and even the car they came in wasn't spotted.  At the grave Saddam read a 
verse from the  
Koran and cried.  There were flags on the grave.  After he finished reading, he took the flags 
and left.  He  
cried for his sons.  
 
CORBIN:  Eight months later and Uday and Qusay's graves lie untended, just mounds of 
earth.  No one  
mourns them, only their father who called them martyrs in a tape released just after their 
funerals. 
 
Had Saddam one hundred children other than Uday and Qusay I would have sacrificed them 
on the  
same path… 
 
CORBIN:  With Saddam's sons disposed of, the hunt for the ace of spades himself took on 
added urgency.   
Tikrit has long been the haunt of diehard Ba'athists as we found out one day in the division's 
intelligence  
headquarters.  A roaring overhead heralded a rocket attack.  Daring attacks like this began in 
earnest last  
summer.  The resistance was growing in strength and US casualties began to mount.  The 
Americans knew  
that establishing security in their area and finding Saddam were interlinked.  The weapons 
were being fired  
by the same men protecting the former president.   
 
Lt. Colonel STEVE RUSSELL 
1-22 Battalion, 4th Infantry Division 
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There were approximately half a dozen families that were closely tied to him, and when I say 
closely, these  
were people that literally had their entire lives, their occupation taking care of Saddam, doing 
his bidding.   
Maybe they didn't hold important cabinet posts, and that was not readily known initially.  We 
imagine that  
the deck of cards people were.. okay, we collect the whole set and we've got him.  But what 
we found fairly  
early on was these families were really the ones that were doing a lot of the resistance. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam's secretary snatched by the US a month earlier wasn't talking.  But 
documents  
discovered with him enabled intelligence officers to work out who was who in Saddam's 
circle.  The cooks,  
the bodyguards the drivers, and photographs proved a goldmine. 
 
 
CORBIN:  [looking at photographs]  The same people for years…  
 
RUSSELL:  Sure, right. 
 
CORBIN:  And some of these were picked up in raids were they? 
 
RUSSELL:  Most.  These would be the bodyguards, some of the inner circle that we were 
talking about and  
some of the different things.  These became very important to us.  We would ask okay, who's 
this guy and  
why is he standing so close to Saddam and….  
 
CORBIN:  One photo, taken just two years before, featured a row of bodyguards around 
Saddam, looking  
every inch the mafia don.  One by one the Americans put names to faces, found their homes, 
then they  
planned to catch them.  Manhunts were launched nightly throughout the Sunni triangle.  Safe 
houses and  
family homes were raided as soon as any tip came in that someone in Saddam's circle might 
be in the area.  
 
RUSSELL:  We would go after one of these once we got intelligence and moved very 
swiftly, very quickly.   
There was a time where we were conducting multiple raids, even sometimes on the same day, 
we would go  
across the river to farms.  We would go into the cities, into the villages, all on these tips.   We 
were  
successful in a great number of them, and it did create a momentum and an excitement that 
were getting  
somewhere, we were getting closer to him. 
 
CORBIN:  Raids last summer didn't turn up the ace of spades but the Americans did find 
large quantities of  
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arms, explosives and money.  It confirmed that Saddam loyalists were running the resistance 
in the area.   
Then, on July 29th at 4am, the Americans had a breakthrough.  They caught someone they 
were sure could  
lead them to Saddam.   
 
July 29th 2003 
 
Adnan Abdullah Abid al-Musslit was one of Saddam's longest serving bodyguards.  He'd 
been brought out  
of retirement by the President just before the war.  Adnan is standing on Saddam's immediate 
left in the  
photograph of the bodyguards.  Another picture confirmed as-Musslit's trusted position 
within the family.   
A younger, thinner Adnan attending Uday's birthday party.   
 
We wanted to know more about Adnan and his family.  In a bullet-scarred compound, 
witness to US raids  
in this part of town, I found a group of Tikritis well acquainted with the family.  They told me 
the al- 
Musslits were related to Saddam, and that as well as Adnan, at least three of his cousins were 
also Saddam's  
bodyguards, it was the family business.  
 
TIKRITI MAN:  They're a well known family in the area with a good reputation.  They've 
never attacked  
anyone, I'm talking about the brothers.  They're also known to be in the Special Guard.  
They're bodyguards. 
 
CORBIN:  So this family was part of Saddam Hussein's Special Guard? 
 
MAN:  Yes, they were part of the Special Guards, but they'd stopped doing their job with 
Saddam Hussein,  
and they were spending time with their families in this area. 
 
CORBIN:  Adnan refused, under interrogation, to reveal Saddam's whereabouts.  But the al-
Musslit family  
remained a focus for the Americans.  The raids and arrests of people known to be close to the 
former  
President drove him deeper underground.  Once more the trail was growing colder.  In 
August the US  
military released photo-fits of how Saddam might be disguising himself in traditional garb, 
hair died grey,  
even without his signature and moustache.  The Americans knew that Saddam had abandoned 
his usual  
mode of transport for battered taxis. 
 
Maj. General RAY ODIERNO 
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division 
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In the beginning we'd look for these large columns, four/five vehicles, big SUVs a lot of 
protection.  We  
were told that absolutely was not the case.  He was moving with taxi cabs, he was moving 
dressed like a  
shepherd.  He had grown a beard, it was greying, that he was moving quite often.  Well what 
would happen  
is when he'd go into a place, he'd have a network that worked very clearly when US forces 
were coming,  
and then you need to be able to hide and move right away.  
 
CORBIN:  Saddam was on familiar territory.  He'd put this town on the map and brought 
riches and  
preferment to Tikriti clans.  The 4th Infantry Division held the area in an iron grip with 
25,000 soldiers, but  
no Iraqi whether out of sympathy or fear was prepared to rat on Saddam.  
 
It seems extraordinary that Saddam hid out for so many months here in Tikrit, the place with 
the Heaviest  
US military presence in Iraq.  He did it by calling in favours, relying on family loyalties and 
the sacrosanct  
Arab tradition of offering hospital and refuge.   
 
Resistance propaganda film 
 
Last autumn violence across Iraq increased.  Loyalists from the former regime were bolstered 
by Islamic  
militants from outside, attacking a common US enemy.   In Tikrit the Americans were 
suffering significant  
losses.  There was no evidence that Saddam was directing resistance operations day to day, 
but the coalition  
believed he was a vital inspiration for the Ba'athists. 
 
ODIERNO:  Mortar attacks increased.  Attack on helicopters started.  The IEDs – the 
improvised explosive  
devices – tripled.  So they really started to raise the level.  I still did not believe that Saddam 
was running it  
and coordinating it, but I still believed he was the icon.  He was the individual they still 
looked to as their  
icon, this is why we're doing this. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam at large taunted the Bush administration.  It was now 4 months since 
President Bush  
prematurely proclaimed the war was over, a war, he said, was justified.  
 
PRESIDENT BUSH:  Major combat operations in Iraq have ended in the Battle of Iraq the 
United States  
and our allies have prevailed.  




CORBIN:  But by September the number of US soldiers killed during the occupation 
surpassed those who  
died during the invasion.  
 
REPORTER:  What about the weapons Prime Minister, what about weapons of mass 
destruction ? 
 
CORBIN:  And Tony Blair was under pressure too.  Six months and still no WMDs to show a 
sceptical  
British public.  
 
What sort of messages were you getting from on high about the importance of catching this 
man, the  
importance politically? 
 
ODIERNO: Yes, first stop no pressure, there was really no pressure to capture him.  
Obviously I'd get  
questions about "what are you hearing, what do you know?"   But there was no specific 
pressure:  "you have  
to get Saddam Hussein, that's extremely important to our goal." 
 
CORBIN:  No pressure? 
 
ODIERNO:  Not one time did somebody come down and say what are you doing about this, 
you know.. are  
you going to capture him, we need to capture him right now.  Never said to me. 
 
CORBIN:  By the early autumn the Pentagon had also formed a secret unit – Taskforce 121.  
Using  
electronic surveillance and undercover agents, the CIA and Special Forces scoured Iraq for 
clues.  Their  
orders were clear, to capture or kill high value target number one, Saddam Hussein.   
 
Dr AYAD ALLAWI 
Security Committee 
Iraqi Governing Council 
Definitely there were a lot of pressures, emanating from both London and Washington on the 
Coalition here  
to try and get him, and I think maybe 2 ½ or 3 months prior to his arrest there were taskforces 
were formed  
here who had nothing to do really but to keep tracking Saddam. 
 
CORBIN:  As the autumn progressed the US military in Tikrit found local people, tiring of 
the violence,  
more willing now to give them information.  The First Brigade's commander, an officer with 
a reputation as  
a tough operator, stepped up the raids.  Colonel Hickey believed he was getting closer to 
Saddam. 
 




HICKEY:  Yes there were three incidents where I thought we were quite close. 
 
CORBIN:  Within hours even? 
 
Colonel JAMES HICKEY 
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division 
I would say in one instance, it was in the early autumn, maybe 3-4 hours.  It was just one of 
those things  
that soldiers get a sense of after a while, and it made perfect sense at the time that told by 
god, we were  
close that night.  And then we kind of went back and figured out how to do it better. 
 
CORBIN:  As well as the relentless raids, the US military stepped up the fire power.  They 
used missiles  
and tanks to destroy alleged resistance safe houses round Tikrit.  By the beginning of 
November Saddam  
was under siege.  His home town and powerbase surrounded his faithful bodyguard targeted 
and then  
arrested one by one by the Americans.  The noose was tightening day by day.  Protests 
erupted in several  
towns in the Sunni triangle.  People showed their support for Saddam.  The US learnt Saddam 
was secretly  
appearing at some of the demonstrations.  The resistance was trying to bolster their failing 
figurehead.   
 
Maj. General RAY ODIERNO 
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division   
We were getting a series of protests that started in Bacuba, Tikrit, Beji, Kirkuk, and the 
reports we were  
getting is that they were doing this as a show of support for him.  Those are the reports we 
were getting so  
we were kind of tracking him around these areas to see if this was true.  We did do a couple 
of raids based  
on information and we went in right behind him so we just missed him, he was here a few 
nights ago.  
 
CORBIN:  In early December the Al-Arabiya TV station received a final message from the 
former President  
which showed how cut off from reality he'd become.  
 
SA'AD AL-SILAWI 
TV Reporter, Al-Arabiya 
This is the last, two pages letter and ten days before they catch him. 
 
 
CORBIN:  And this came what, delivered to you or…? 
 




CORBIN:  And it's handwritten. 
 
AL-SILAWI:  It's handwritten. 
 
CORBIN:  And are  you sure… ? 
 
AL-SILAWI:  And this is the signature. 
 
CORBIN:  This is the signature on your…  
 
AL-SILAWI:  Yes, and he's confused, he is, and if you look at that… 
 
CORBIN:  So you felt it was… 
 
AL-SILAWI:  Yeah. 
 
CORBIN:  Rambling. 
 
AL-SILAWI:  Rambling, rambling. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam must have known the noose was tightening.  His family were dead or in 
exile.  His  
closest advisers and bodyguards arrested one by one.  He was hardly the leader of a 
resistance, more a  
hunted fugitive.  By now the Americans knew that one man only held the key to the capture 
of Saddam. 
 
HICKEY:  I felt so strongly that if we got our hands on this man, we would get information 
about the  
whereabouts of Saddam Hussein, and that was simply as a result of process of elimination, 
there wasn't  
anybody else that would know. 
 
CORBIN:  Anything at all that you can say about this man?  What did he look like? 
 
HICKEY:  He was a middle aged man that sort of went pear shaped. 
 
CORBIN:  Pear shaped. 
 
HICKEY:  Yeah. 
 
CORBIN:  His waistline? 
 
HICKEY:  Right.  
 
CORBIN:  Young, old? 
 




CORBIN:  Middle-aged.  And was he someone who you'd identified from photographs 
around Saddam as  
being the inner core? 
 
HICKEY:  We knew who he was and we knew exactly what he looked like. 
 
CORBIN:  The Americans wont say but we've learnt that man was another member of the al-
Musslit  
family.  Mohamed Ibrahim Omar al-Musslit.  He's on Saddam's right in a brown striped shirt, 
and these  
pictures filmed just before Baghdad fell.  For years Mohamed had been a key figure in the 
President's  
special security organisation.  His cousin Adnan had been arrested last July.  Mohamed had 
take control of  
Saddam on the run, the only person who knew where he was from hour to hour and who was 
with him.  On  
the night of December 12th a series of raids in the Sunni triangle led US Special Forces to a 
house in  
Baghdad where they unexpectedly caught Mohamed al-Musslit.  It took just a few hours 
interrogation for  
him to crack and betray Saddam. 
 
So you found the source that gave you the final clue.  How did you get the information out of 
him? 
 
ODIERNO:  Well I was not there so I can't answer that question.  We have special people do 
that but it  
was…  
 
CORBIN:  Was force used? 
 
ODIERNO:  No, no, it was in fact.. I did ask that question and force was not used. 
 
CORBIN:  Because many Iraqis talk about torture, they believe torture would have been used 
on him. 
 
ODIERNO:  No, I believe there was not torture used.  I truly believe there was not torture 
used on him. 
 
CORBIN:  And what did he tell you? 
 
ODIERNO:  Well what he said was, this is Saddam, this is where Saddam is.  This is where 
he's been for  
the last few days and if you go here you'll find him. 
 
CORBIN:  Within hours Colonel Hickey's unit was on the road.  He took Panorama back 
over the route he'd  
traced that night to hunt down Saddam.  Together with US Special Forces under cover of 
darkness Hickey  
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and his men made for the village of Al Doha on the outskirts of Tikrit.  This place was home 
to one of  
many clans related to Saddam.  The informer had told US forces the former president would 
be in one of  
two groups of buildings on a farm codenamed Wolverine 1 and 2. 
 
HICKEY:  We knew we had to quickly clear each one of those objectives to see if we could 
find our man.   
We suspected however that there would be a.. what we'd call an underground tunnel 
somewhere in those  
palm groves just beyond where you see.. get to Wolverine 2.  Now it was just a matter of 
finding our man.   
Nothing was found there.  Nothing was found there.  As we moved down into the palm grove 
and began  
moving through the palm grove we started to find a couple more men. 
 
CORBIN:  Those men were members of Saddam's clan and owned the farm.  One had been 
his cook, the  
other, one of his drivers.  Colonel Hickey's men took up position in the palm grove while 
Special Forces  
advanced on a shack near the river.  At 8.30 that night they found Saddam hiding in his 
bolthole. 
 
So this is it. 
 
HICKEY:  This is it.  This is where the ah… this is the presidential suite. 
 
CORBIN:  The presidential suite. 
 
HICKEY:  Yes, this is the kitchenette here and there'd be the boudoir. 
 
CORBIN:  And what was under this tarpaulin covered in area? 
 
HICKEY:  There was a kitchen there, and in there they found the money. 
 
CORBIN:  So what do you think, that he was living here… 
 
HICKEY:  He was living here. 
 
CORBIN:  And the hole was a bolthole for when he felt there was danger. 
 
HICKEY:  Yes, that's where found him, yeah, yeah, he was right down there.  We've since 
covered it.. I've  
cleaned it up and covered it up, but it was right there. 
 
CORBIN:  It was here. 
 




CORBIN:  US soldiers from the top secret Task Force which had tracked Saddam for many 
months  
uncovered the underground chamber and pulled him out.    
 
US Special Forces – personal pictures 
 
They posted their own record of that moment on the internet, despite army rules banning any 
publicity of  
special operations.   
 
What did he say? 
 
Colonel JAMES HICKEY 
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division 
Well he introduced himself as:  "I am Saddam Hussein, I am President of Iraq and I'm willing 
to negotiate".   
And of course we accepted his surrender. 
 
CORBIN:  Some people say that he actually spat at one of the soldiers and the soldier hit 
back with a rifle  
butt. 
 
HICKEY:  I don’t know. 
 
CORBIN:  You didn't see that yourself. 
 
HICKEY:  No. 
 
CORBIN:  In the shack beside the hole the kitchen area was littered with food.  Next door a 
bedroom with a  
stack of books, a ceremonial flag propped against the wall, the only reminder of Saddam's 
lost status.  His  
swimming trunks were hanging on a tree for bathing in the river.  A metal box was found 
with $750,000  
and there was a gun which Saddam failed to use on the Americans or on himself, despite his 
pledge to die a  
martyr.   Some of the papers in his briefcase revealed those around him had been feeding 
Saddam with lies  
about what was happening in Iraq while he was on the run. 
 
Maj. General RAY ODIERNO 
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division 
They had made one comment that one of our units had lost like a hundred tanks or something 
like this,  
some outrageous statement in there and told him that  it had been real successful and 
everything was going  
great in our area when it was very much far from the truth, so… 
 




ODIERNO:  Yes, very much so.  Very much so. 
 
CORBIN:  A path from the shack where Saddam surrendered leads down to the River Tigris.  
Forty-four  
years before at this same spot he had swum the river and made his getaway after attempting 
to kill Iraq's  




It was an event commemorated each year by Saddam in a ritual swim.  He used it to bolster 
the myth of his  
invincibility.  Now he'd been captured here, within a few miles of the place where he'd been 
born and where  
his sons were buried.   
 
Coalition Press Conference 
December 14th 2003 
Ladies and gentlemen, we've got him. 
[Cheers and Applause] 
 
CORBIN:  A former Iraqi foreign minister, an exile, was on the platform when Saddam's 
capture was  
announced. 
 
Dr ADNAN PACHACHI 
Iraqi Governing Council 
As soon as Ambassador Bremer said:   "We've got him" there were cheers all over the place 
and people  
were crying.  It was a very emotional period.  I mean a lot of people have lost so many 
relatives of their  
own, so many friends, so many… really Iraq passed through a terrible, terrible time.   
 
CORBIN:  Saddam was shown submitting to medical tests in a humiliating television 
broadcast, an echo of  
the earlier controversial parading of the bodies of his sons.  The Americans and some Iraqis 
claimed these  
pictures were necessary to prove the dictator had finally been defeated without even putting 
up a fight.  
 
PACHACHI:  A lot of Iraqis said that he should have committed suicide or he should have at 
least resisted  
like his sons and gone down as a fighter. 
 
CORBIN:  Saddam was taken to the American high security prison at Baghdad airport.  A 
delegation from  
the Iraqi governing council went to see him, amongst them Adnan Pachachi.  They found the 
former  




PACHACHI:  They told him:  "What happened to the mass graves?"  He said well I think 
they're probably  
either deserters or criminals.  So he didn't seem to be remorseful or repentant. 
 
CORBIN:  A phone call came through from President Bush for Dr Pachachi as he was 
leaving Saddam's  
cell.   
 
PACHACHI:  As we went out from Saddam the President called us and I said well we are 
very happy in  
this, yeah. 
 
CORBIN:  And how did he sound? 
 
PACHACHI:  Elated.   
 
CORBIN:  Following Saddam's capture this spider hole became a magnet for US soldiers, 
amongst them  
Lieutenant Colonel Russell's unit which had tracked down the bodyguards over many 
months.  And Colonel  
Hickey and his men who were there that night brandishing Saddam's cashbox for the camera.  
Since  
Panorama's visit a few weeks ago, the hole has now been capped with concrete.  The trusted 
bodyguard and  
clansman who betrayed Saddam to the Americans wont be reaping any benefit, unlike the 
other relative  
who'd informed on Uday and Qusay.   
 
There was a 25 million dollar bounty on Saddam Hussein's head.  Who gets the money? 
 
Maj. General RAY ODIERNO 
Commander, US 4th Infantry Division 
I'm not sure. I don’t think anybody gets the money.  I think the US Treasury is going to save 
25 million  
dollars. 
 
CORBIN:  Because the source is under arrest you mean? 
 
ODIERNO:  The source has a very shady background so he will not get the reward. 
 
CORBIN:  As for the former First Family of Iraq, Saddam's wife Sajida and their youngest 
daughter are  
now living in Syria.  Sajida has refused to break her silence.  His other daughters, Raghad and 
Ranah are in  
exile in Jordan.  Raghad gave this fierce defence of her father just after his capture.  
 
Speaking on December 16th 2003 
RAGHAD HUSSEIN 
Daughter of Saddam Hussein 
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I am once again proud that this person is my father.  We all know what the purpose is of the 
way in which  
he was displayed.  Where is democracy, where is the immunity that every president of a 
country enjoys?   
But there he is.  I swear that the lion remains a lion even if he is chained.  Do you think that 
they could have  
caught him without drugging him? 
 
CORBIN:  With Saddam in jail evidence of his regime's atrocities committed across three 
decades is still  
being uncovered and trials prepared.  It will be months, perhaps years before Saddam himself 
faces his  
accusers.  The coalition worked so hard to capture a man they believe committed crimes 
against humanity,  
but when he goes on trial, many nations, including the US and Britain may face hard 
questions too.   
 
Dr AYAD ALLAWI 
Security Committee 
Iraqi governing Council 
I think this should be really on trial, why Saddam was allowed to do this, why he was allowed 
to become a  
tyrant and why he was allowed to stay in power for that long.  So I think this is all going to be 
on trial now. 
 
CORBIN:  That sounds as if the West will have some questions to answer as well. 
 
ALLAWI:  I guess everybody is going to have a lot of questions to answer for. 
 
CORBIN:  As Saddam Hussein awaits his fate, likely to be the death penalty, he is reportedly 
vague and  
uncooperative, but he still talks as if he was President of Iraq. 
 
What was your picture as you left him in that cell alone, what did you think? 
 
Dr ADNAN PACHACHI 
Iraqi Governing Council 
You can imagine what kind of thoughts must have gone through his head.  I mean to see 
himself in this  
situation, it's really something almost of Shakespearian or ancient Greek proportions.  And 
when we  
finished he said:  "Is that all?"  As though he was expecting something else.  He was 
expecting, you know..  
some kangaroo trial, you know.. as he, during his regime, you know.. they used to bring 
people and try them  
and within half an hour the trial was finished and they face a firing squad. 
 
CORBIN:  Next week on Panorama on the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, 
Fergal Keane talks  
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to the killers to discover why ordinary men obeyed their government and murdered their 
neighbours.  If you  
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